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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-07-29 17:38:46 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-07-29 17:38:46 -0700
commit7a1e8b80fb1e8ead4cec15d1fc494ed290e4d2e9 (patch)
tree55a36d4256f1ae793b5c8e88c0f158737447193f /security
parenta867d7349e94b6409b08629886a819f802377e91 (diff)
parent7616ac70d1bb4f2e9d25c1a82d283f3368a7b632 (diff)
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Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - TPM core and driver updates/fixes - IPv6 security labeling (CALIPSO) - Lots of Apparmor fixes - Seccomp: remove 2-phase API, close hole where ptrace can change syscall #" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (156 commits) apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling tpm: Add TPM 2.0 support to the Nuvoton i2c driver (NPCT6xx family) tpm: Factor out common startup code tpm: use devm_add_action_or_reset tpm2_i2c_nuvoton: add irq validity check tpm: read burstcount from TPM_STS in one 32-bit transaction tpm: fix byte-order for the value read by tpm2_get_tpm_pt tpm_tis_core: convert max timeouts from msec to jiffies apparmor: fix arg_size computation for when setprocattr is null terminated apparmor: fix oops, validate buffer size in apparmor_setprocattr() apparmor: do not expose kernel stack apparmor: fix module parameters can be changed after policy is locked apparmor: fix oops in profile_unpack() when policy_db is not present apparmor: don't check for vmalloc_addr if kvzalloc() failed apparmor: add missing id bounds check on dfa verification apparmor: allow SYS_CAP_RESOURCE to be sufficient to prlimit another task apparmor: use list_next_entry instead of list_entry_next apparmor: fix refcount race when finding a child profile apparmor: fix ref count leak when profile sha1 hash is read apparmor: check that xindex is in trans_table bounds ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/Kconfig21
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c11
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/audit.c3
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/crypto.c3
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/domain.c22
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/file.c3
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h1
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/match.h1
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/include/policy.h2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c30
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/match.c16
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/path.c61
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy.c61
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c7
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/resource.c6
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/iint.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima.h11
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c21
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c9
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c3
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c12
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c35
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c13
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity.h1
-rw-r--r--security/keys/persistent.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c2
-rw-r--r--security/security.c29
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c21
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/netlabel.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c36
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c70
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c5
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/gc.c9
36 files changed, 345 insertions, 195 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
index 232469baa94f..be5e9414a295 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
@@ -31,13 +31,26 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
- bool "SHA1 hash of loaded profiles"
+ bool "Enable introspection of sha1 hashes for loaded profiles"
depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_SHA1
default y
help
- This option selects whether sha1 hashing is done against loaded
- profiles and exported for inspection to user space via the apparmor
- filesystem.
+ This option selects whether introspection of loaded policy
+ is available to userspace via the apparmor filesystem.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT
+ bool "Enable policy hash introspection by default"
+ depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
+ default y
+
+ help
+ This option selects whether sha1 hashing of loaded policy
+ is enabled by default. The generation of sha1 hashes for
+ loaded policy provide system administrators a quick way
+ to verify that policy in the kernel matches what is expected,
+ however it can slow down policy load on some devices. In
+ these cases policy hashing can be disabled by default and
+ enabled only if needed.
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index ad4fa49ad1db..729e595119ed 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -331,6 +331,7 @@ static int aa_fs_seq_hash_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
seq_printf(seq, "%.2x", profile->hash[i]);
seq_puts(seq, "\n");
}
+ aa_put_profile(profile);
return 0;
}
@@ -379,6 +380,8 @@ void __aa_fs_profile_migrate_dents(struct aa_profile *old,
for (i = 0; i < AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF; i++) {
new->dents[i] = old->dents[i];
+ if (new->dents[i])
+ new->dents[i]->d_inode->i_mtime = CURRENT_TIME;
old->dents[i] = NULL;
}
}
@@ -550,8 +553,6 @@ fail2:
}
-#define list_entry_next(pos, member) \
- list_entry(pos->member.next, typeof(*pos), member)
#define list_entry_is_head(pos, head, member) (&pos->member == (head))
/**
@@ -582,7 +583,7 @@ static struct aa_namespace *__next_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root,
parent = ns->parent;
while (ns != root) {
mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
- next = list_entry_next(ns, base.list);
+ next = list_next_entry(ns, base.list);
if (!list_entry_is_head(next, &parent->sub_ns, base.list)) {
mutex_lock(&next->lock);
return next;
@@ -636,7 +637,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
parent = rcu_dereference_protected(p->parent,
mutex_is_locked(&p->ns->lock));
while (parent) {
- p = list_entry_next(p, base.list);
+ p = list_next_entry(p, base.list);
if (!list_entry_is_head(p, &parent->base.profiles, base.list))
return p;
p = parent;
@@ -645,7 +646,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
}
/* is next another profile in the namespace */
- p = list_entry_next(p, base.list);
+ p = list_next_entry(p, base.list);
if (!list_entry_is_head(p, &ns->base.profiles, base.list))
return p;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index 89c78658031f..3a7f1da1425e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -200,7 +200,8 @@ int aa_audit(int type, struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp,
if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL)
(void)send_sig_info(SIGKILL, NULL,
- sa->u.tsk ? sa->u.tsk : current);
+ sa->type == LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK && sa->u.tsk ?
+ sa->u.tsk : current);
if (sa->aad->type == AUDIT_APPARMOR_ALLOWED)
return complain_error(sa->aad->error);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/crypto.c b/security/apparmor/crypto.c
index 532471d0b3a0..b75dab0df1cb 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/crypto.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/crypto.c
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ int aa_calc_profile_hash(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 version, void *start,
int error = -ENOMEM;
u32 le32_version = cpu_to_le32(version);
+ if (!aa_g_hash_policy)
+ return 0;
+
if (!apparmor_tfm)
return 0;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index dc0027b28b04..fc3036b34e51 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
file_inode(bprm->file)->i_uid,
file_inode(bprm->file)->i_mode
};
- const char *name = NULL, *target = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL;
int error = 0;
if (bprm->cred_prepared)
@@ -399,6 +399,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (cxt->onexec) {
struct file_perms cp;
info = "change_profile onexec";
+ new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
if (!(perms.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC))
goto audit;
@@ -413,7 +414,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (!(cp.allow & AA_MAY_ONEXEC))
goto audit;
- new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(cxt->onexec);
goto apply;
}
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
new_profile = aa_get_newest_profile(ns->unconfined);
info = "ux fallback";
} else {
- error = -ENOENT;
+ error = -EACCES;
info = "profile not found";
/* remove MAY_EXEC to audit as failure */
perms.allow &= ~MAY_EXEC;
@@ -445,10 +445,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (!new_profile) {
error = -ENOMEM;
info = "could not create null profile";
- } else {
+ } else
error = -EACCES;
- target = new_profile->base.hname;
- }
perms.xindex |= AA_X_UNSAFE;
} else
/* fail exec */
@@ -459,7 +457,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* fail the exec.
*/
if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS) {
- aa_put_profile(new_profile);
error = -EPERM;
goto cleanup;
}
@@ -474,10 +471,8 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
error = may_change_ptraced_domain(new_profile);
- if (error) {
- aa_put_profile(new_profile);
+ if (error)
goto audit;
- }
}
/* Determine if secure exec is needed.
@@ -498,7 +493,6 @@ int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
bprm->unsafe |= AA_SECURE_X_NEEDED;
}
apply:
- target = new_profile->base.hname;
/* when transitioning profiles clear unsafe personality bits */
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
@@ -506,15 +500,19 @@ x_clear:
aa_put_profile(cxt->profile);
/* transfer new profile reference will be released when cxt is freed */
cxt->profile = new_profile;
+ new_profile = NULL;
/* clear out all temporary/transitional state from the context */
aa_clear_task_cxt_trans(cxt);
audit:
error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, GFP_KERNEL, OP_EXEC, MAY_EXEC,
- name, target, cond.uid, info, error);
+ name,
+ new_profile ? new_profile->base.hname : NULL,
+ cond.uid, info, error);
cleanup:
+ aa_put_profile(new_profile);
aa_put_profile(profile);
kfree(buffer);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c
index d186674f973a..4d2af4b01033 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/file.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/file.c
@@ -110,7 +110,8 @@ int aa_audit_file(struct aa_profile *profile, struct file_perms *perms,
int type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
struct common_audit_data sa;
struct apparmor_audit_data aad = {0,};
- sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE;
+ sa.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK;
+ sa.u.tsk = NULL;
sa.aad = &aad;
aad.op = op,
aad.fs.request = request;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index e4ea62663866..5d721e990876 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
extern bool aa_g_audit_header;
extern bool aa_g_debug;
+extern bool aa_g_hash_policy;
extern bool aa_g_lock_policy;
extern bool aa_g_logsyscall;
extern bool aa_g_paranoid_load;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/match.h b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
index 001c43aa0406..a1c04fe86790 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/match.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/match.h
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct table_set_header {
#define YYTD_ID_ACCEPT2 6
#define YYTD_ID_NXT 7
#define YYTD_ID_TSIZE 8
+#define YYTD_ID_MAX 8
#define YYTD_DATA8 1
#define YYTD_DATA16 2
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index c28b0f20ab53..52275f040a5f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -403,6 +403,8 @@ static inline int AUDIT_MODE(struct aa_profile *profile)
return profile->audit;
}
+bool policy_view_capable(void);
+bool policy_admin_capable(void);
bool aa_may_manage_policy(int op);
#endif /* __AA_POLICY_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 7798e1608f4f..41b8cb115801 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
if (!*args)
goto out;
- arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
+ arg_size = size - (args - (largs ? largs : (char *) value));
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
@@ -671,6 +671,12 @@ enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
&aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
+/* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */
+bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT);
+module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+#endif
+
/* Debug mode */
bool aa_g_debug;
module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
@@ -728,51 +734,49 @@ __setup("apparmor=", apparmor_enabled_setup);
/* set global flag turning off the ability to load policy */
static int param_set_aalockpolicy(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!policy_admin_capable())
return -EPERM;
- if (aa_g_lock_policy)
- return -EACCES;
return param_set_bool(val, kp);
}
static int param_get_aalockpolicy(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!policy_view_capable())
return -EPERM;
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
}
static int param_set_aabool(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!policy_admin_capable())
return -EPERM;
return param_set_bool(val, kp);
}
static int param_get_aabool(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!policy_view_capable())
return -EPERM;
return param_get_bool(buffer, kp);
}
static int param_set_aauint(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!policy_admin_capable())
return -EPERM;
return param_set_uint(val, kp);
}
static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!policy_view_capable())
return -EPERM;
return param_get_uint(buffer, kp);
}
static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!policy_view_capable())
return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
@@ -784,7 +788,7 @@ static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
int i;
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!policy_admin_capable())
return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
@@ -805,7 +809,7 @@ static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!policy_admin_capable())
return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
@@ -817,7 +821,7 @@ static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp)
static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp)
{
int i;
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ if (!policy_admin_capable())
return -EPERM;
if (!apparmor_enabled)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 727eb4200d5c..3f900fcca8fb 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
* it every time we use td_id as an index
*/
th.td_id = be16_to_cpu(*(u16 *) (blob)) - 1;
+ if (th.td_id > YYTD_ID_MAX)
+ goto out;
th.td_flags = be16_to_cpu(*(u16 *) (blob + 2));
th.td_lolen = be32_to_cpu(*(u32 *) (blob + 8));
blob += sizeof(struct table_header);
@@ -61,7 +63,9 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
table = kvzalloc(tsize);
if (table) {
- *table = th;
+ table->td_id = th.td_id;
+ table->td_flags = th.td_flags;
+ table->td_lolen = th.td_lolen;
if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8)
UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
u8, byte_to_byte);
@@ -73,14 +77,14 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
u32, be32_to_cpu);
else
goto fail;
+ /* if table was vmalloced make sure the page tables are synced
+ * before it is used, as it goes live to all cpus.
+ */
+ if (is_vmalloc_addr(table))
+ vm_unmap_aliases();
}
out:
- /* if table was vmalloced make sure the page tables are synced
- * before it is used, as it goes live to all cpus.
- */
- if (is_vmalloc_addr(table))
- vm_unmap_aliases();
return table;
fail:
kvfree(table);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/path.c b/security/apparmor/path.c
index edddc026406b..a8fc7d08c144 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/path.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/path.c
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
-
/* modified from dcache.c */
static int prepend(char **buffer, int buflen, const char *str, int namelen)
{
@@ -39,6 +38,38 @@ static int prepend(char **buffer, int buflen, const char *str, int namelen)
#define CHROOT_NSCONNECT (PATH_CHROOT_REL | PATH_CHROOT_NSCONNECT)
+/* If the path is not connected to the expected root,
+ * check if it is a sysctl and handle specially else remove any
+ * leading / that __d_path may have returned.
+ * Unless
+ * specifically directed to connect the path,
+ * OR
+ * if in a chroot and doing chroot relative paths and the path
+ * resolves to the namespace root (would be connected outside
+ * of chroot) and specifically directed to connect paths to
+ * namespace root.
+ */
+static int disconnect(const struct path *path, char *buf, char **name,
+ int flags)
+{
+ int error = 0;
+
+ if (!(flags & PATH_CONNECT_PATH) &&
+ !(((flags & CHROOT_NSCONNECT) == CHROOT_NSCONNECT) &&
+ our_mnt(path->mnt))) {
+ /* disconnected path, don't return pathname starting
+ * with '/'
+ */
+ error = -EACCES;
+ if (**name == '/')
+ *name = *name + 1;
+ } else if (**name != '/')
+ /* CONNECT_PATH with missing root */
+ error = prepend(name, *name - buf, "/", 1);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
/**
* d_namespace_path - lookup a name associated with a given path
* @path: path to lookup (NOT NULL)
@@ -74,7 +105,8 @@ static int d_namespace_path(const struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
* control instead of hard coded /proc
*/
return prepend(name, *name - buf, "/proc", 5);
- }
+ } else
+ return disconnect(path, buf, name, flags);
return 0;
}
@@ -120,29 +152,8 @@ static int d_namespace_path(const struct path *path, char *buf, int buflen,
goto out;
}
- /* If the path is not connected to the expected root,
- * check if it is a sysctl and handle specially else remove any
- * leading / that __d_path may have returned.
- * Unless
- * specifically directed to connect the path,
- * OR
- * if in a chroot and doing chroot relative paths and the path
- * resolves to the namespace root (would be connected outside
- * of chroot) and specifically directed to connect paths to
- * namespace root.
- */
- if (!connected) {
- if (!(flags & PATH_CONNECT_PATH) &&
- !(((flags & CHROOT_NSCONNECT) == CHROOT_NSCONNECT) &&
- our_mnt(path->mnt))) {
- /* disconnected path, don't return pathname starting
- * with '/'
- */
- error = -EACCES;
- if (*res == '/')
- *name = res + 1;
- }
- }
+ if (!connected)
+ error = disconnect(path, buf, name, flags);
out:
return error;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 705c2879d3a9..179e68d7dc5f 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -766,7 +766,9 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_find_child(struct aa_profile *parent, const char *name)
struct aa_profile *profile;
rcu_read_lock();
- profile = aa_get_profile(__find_child(&parent->base.profiles, name));
+ do {
+ profile = __find_child(&parent->base.profiles, name);
+ } while (profile && !aa_get_profile_not0(profile));
rcu_read_unlock();
/* refcount released by caller */
@@ -916,6 +918,22 @@ static int audit_policy(int op, gfp_t gfp, const char *name, const char *info,
&sa, NULL);
}
+bool policy_view_capable(void)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
+ bool response = false;
+
+ if (ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ response = true;
+
+ return response;
+}
+
+bool policy_admin_capable(void)
+{
+ return policy_view_capable() && !aa_g_lock_policy;
+}
+
/**
* aa_may_manage_policy - can the current task manage policy
* @op: the policy manipulation operation being done
@@ -930,7 +948,7 @@ bool aa_may_manage_policy(int op)
return 0;
}
- if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+ if (!policy_admin_capable()) {
audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, NULL, "not policy admin", -EACCES);
return 0;
}
@@ -1067,7 +1085,7 @@ static int __lookup_replace(struct aa_namespace *ns, const char *hname,
*/
ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
{
- const char *ns_name, *name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ const char *ns_name, *info = NULL;
struct aa_namespace *ns = NULL;
struct aa_load_ent *ent, *tmp;
int op = OP_PROF_REPL;
@@ -1082,18 +1100,15 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
/* released below */
ns = aa_prepare_namespace(ns_name);
if (!ns) {
- info = "failed to prepare namespace";
- error = -ENOMEM;
- name = ns_name;
- goto fail;
+ error = audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, ns_name,
+ "failed to prepare namespace", -ENOMEM);
+ goto free;
}
mutex_lock(&ns->lock);
/* setup parent and ns info */
list_for_each_entry(ent, &lh, list) {
struct aa_policy *policy;
-
- name = ent->new->base.hname;
error = __lookup_replace(ns, ent->new->base.hname, noreplace,
&ent->old, &info);
if (error)
@@ -1121,7 +1136,6 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
if (!p) {
error = -ENOENT;
info = "parent does not exist";
- name = ent->new->base.hname;
goto fail_lock;
}
rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->parent, aa_get_profile(p));
@@ -1163,7 +1177,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
list_del_init(&ent->list);
op = (!ent->old && !ent->rename) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
- audit_policy(op, GFP_ATOMIC, ent->new->base.name, NULL, error);
+ audit_policy(op, GFP_ATOMIC, ent->new->base.hname, NULL, error);
if (ent->old) {
__replace_profile(ent->old, ent->new, 1);
@@ -1187,14 +1201,14 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(void *udata, size_t size, bool noreplace)
/* parent replaced in this atomic set? */
if (newest != parent) {
aa_get_profile(newest);
- aa_put_profile(parent);
rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->parent, newest);
- } else
- aa_put_profile(newest);
+ aa_put_profile(parent);
+ }
/* aafs interface uses replacedby */
rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->replacedby->profile,
aa_get_profile(ent->new));
- __list_add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, ent->new);
+ __list_add_profile(&newest->base.profiles, ent->new);
+ aa_put_profile(newest);
} else {
/* aafs interface uses replacedby */
rcu_assign_pointer(ent->new->replacedby->profile,
@@ -1214,9 +1228,22 @@ out:
fail_lock:
mutex_unlock(&ns->lock);
-fail:
- error = audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, name, info, error);
+ /* audit cause of failure */
+ op = (!ent->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
+ audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, ent->new->base.hname, info, error);
+ /* audit status that rest of profiles in the atomic set failed too */
+ info = "valid profile in failed atomic policy load";
+ list_for_each_entry(tmp, &lh, list) {
+ if (tmp == ent) {
+ info = "unchecked profile in failed atomic policy load";
+ /* skip entry that caused failure */
+ continue;
+ }
+ op = (!ent->old) ? OP_PROF_LOAD : OP_PROF_REPL;
+ audit_policy(op, GFP_KERNEL, tmp->new->base.hname, info, error);
+ }
+free:
list_for_each_entry_safe(ent, tmp, &lh, list) {
list_del_init(&ent->list);
aa_load_ent_free(ent);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index a689f10930b5..138120698f83 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -583,6 +583,9 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
error = PTR_ERR(profile->policy.dfa);
profile->policy.dfa = NULL;
goto fail;
+ } else if (!profile->policy.dfa) {
+ error = -EPROTO;
+ goto fail;
}
if (!unpack_u32(e, &profile->policy.start[0], "start"))
/* default start state */
@@ -676,7 +679,7 @@ static bool verify_xindex(int xindex, int table_size)
int index, xtype;
xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK;
index = xindex & AA_X_INDEX_MASK;
- if (xtype == AA_X_TABLE && index > table_size)
+ if (xtype == AA_X_TABLE && index >= table_size)
return 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -776,7 +779,7 @@ int aa_unpack(void *udata, size_t size, struct list_head *lh, const char **ns)
goto fail_profile;
error = aa_calc_profile_hash(profile, e.version, start,
- e.pos - start);
+ e.pos - start);
if (error)
goto fail_profile;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c
index 748bf0ca6c9f..67a6072ead4b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/resource.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c
@@ -101,9 +101,11 @@ int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_profile *profile, struct task_struct *task,
/* TODO: extend resource control to handle other (non current)
* profiles. AppArmor rules currently have the implicit assumption
* that the task is setting the resource of a task confined with
- * the same profile.
+ * the same profile or that the task setting the resource of another
+ * task has CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.
*/
- if (profile != task_profile ||
+ if ((profile != task_profile &&
+ aa_capable(profile, CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, 1)) ||
(profile->rlimits.mask & (1 << resource) &&
new_rlim->rlim_max > profile->rlimits.limits[resource].rlim_max))
error = -EACCES;
diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c
index 345b75997e4c..c710d22042f9 100644
--- a/security/integrity/iint.c
+++ b/security/integrity/iint.c
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ static void iint_free(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint)
iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
}
@@ -159,6 +160,7 @@ static void init_once(void *foo)
iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN;
+ iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
}
static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index d3a939bf2781..db25f54a04fe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ struct ima_template_desc {
};
struct ima_template_entry {
+ int pcr;
u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* sha1 or md5 measurement hash */
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc; /* template descriptor */
u32 template_data_len;
@@ -154,7 +155,8 @@ enum ima_hooks {
};
/* LIM API function definitions */
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask,
+ enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr);
int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func);
int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -162,19 +164,20 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len);
+ int xattr_len, int pcr);
void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
const unsigned char *filename);
int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
struct ima_template_entry **entry);
int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
- struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename);
+ struct inode *inode,
+ const unsigned char *filename, int pcr);
void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);
const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf);
/* IMA policy related functions */
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
- int flags);
+ int flags, int *pcr);
void ima_init_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy(void);
void ima_update_policy_flag(void);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
index 5a2218fe877a..9df26a2b75ba 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ out:
*/
int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
int violation, struct inode *inode,
- const unsigned char *filename)
+ const unsigned char *filename, int pcr)
{
static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
static const char audit_cause[] = "hashing_error";
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
}
memcpy(entry->digest, hash.hdr.digest, hash.hdr.length);
}
+ entry->pcr = pcr;
result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode, filename);
return result;
}
@@ -144,7 +145,8 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
result = -ENOMEM;
goto err_out;
}
- result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename);
+ result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode,
+ filename, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
if (result < 0)
ima_free_template_entry(entry);
err_out:
@@ -157,6 +159,7 @@ err_out:
* @inode: pointer to inode to measure
* @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
* @func: caller identifier
+ * @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr=
*
* The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
@@ -168,13 +171,13 @@ err_out:
* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask.
*
*/
-int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
+int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr)
{
int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE;
flags &= ima_policy_flag;
- return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags);
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, flags, pcr);
}
/*
@@ -252,7 +255,7 @@ out:
void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value,
- int xattr_len)
+ int xattr_len, int pcr)
{
static const char op[] = "add_template_measure";
static const char audit_cause[] = "ENOMEM";
@@ -263,7 +266,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
xattr_len, NULL};
int violation = 0;
- if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
+ if (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))
return;
result = ima_alloc_init_template(&event_data, &entry);
@@ -273,9 +276,11 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
return;
}
- result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename);
- if (!result || result == -EEXIST)
+ result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr);
+ if (!result || result == -EEXIST) {
iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
+ iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr);
+ }
if (result < 0)
ima_free_template_entry(entry);
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 1bcbc12e03d9..4b9b4a4e1b89 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
if (!ima_appraise)
return 0;
- return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE);
+ return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE, NULL);
}
static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -370,6 +370,7 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig)
return;
iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK;
+ iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
if (digsig)
iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG;
return;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 60d011aaec38..c07a3844ea0a 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -123,7 +123,6 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
struct ima_template_entry *e;
char *template_name;
int namelen;
- u32 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
bool is_ima_template = false;
int i;
@@ -137,10 +136,10 @@ static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
/*
* 1st: PCRIndex
- * PCR used is always the same (config option) in
- * little-endian format
+ * PCR used defaults to the same (config option) in
+ * little-endian format, unless set in policy
*/
- ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof(pcr));
+ ima_putc(m, &e->pcr, sizeof(e->pcr));
/* 2nd: template digest */
ima_putc(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
@@ -219,7 +218,7 @@ static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
e->template_desc->name : e->template_desc->fmt;
/* 1st: PCR used (config option) */
- seq_printf(m, "%2d ", CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
+ seq_printf(m, "%2d ", e->pcr);
/* 2nd: SHA1 template hash */
ima_print_digest(m, e->digest, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
index 5d679a685616..32912bd54ead 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c
@@ -79,7 +79,8 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
}
result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL,
- boot_aggregate_name);
+ boot_aggregate_name,
+ CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
if (result < 0) {
ima_free_template_entry(entry);
audit_cause = "store_entry";
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 68b26c340acd..596ef616ac21 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
if ((iint->version != inode->i_version) ||
(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) {
iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE);
+ iint->measured_pcrs = 0;
if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE)
ima_update_xattr(iint, file);
}
@@ -162,6 +163,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
char *pathbuf = NULL;
const char *pathname = NULL;
int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise;
+ int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL;
int xattr_len = 0;
bool violation_check;
@@ -174,7 +176,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
* Included is the appraise submask.
*/
- action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func);
+ action = ima_get_action(inode, mask, func, &pcr);
violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK) &&
(ima_policy_flag & IMA_MEASURE));
if (!action && !violation_check)
@@ -209,7 +211,11 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
*/
iint->flags |= action;
action &= IMA_DO_MASK;
- action &= ~((iint->flags & IMA_DONE_MASK) >> 1);
+ action &= ~((iint->flags & (IMA_DONE_MASK ^ IMA_MEASURED)) >> 1);
+
+ /* If target pcr is already measured, unset IMA_MEASURE action */
+ if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr)))
+ action ^= IMA_MEASURE;
/* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */
if (!action) {
@@ -238,7 +244,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
if (action & IMA_MEASURE)
ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname,
- xattr_value, xattr_len);
+ xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr);
if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname,
xattr_value, xattr_len, opened);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 0f887a564a29..aed47b777a57 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020
#define IMA_INMASK 0x0040
#define IMA_EUID 0x0080
+#define IMA_PCR 0x0100
#define UNKNOWN 0
#define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -40,6 +41,9 @@
#define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008
#define AUDIT 0x0040
+#define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \
+ (a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
+
int ima_policy_flag;
static int temp_ima_appraise;
@@ -60,6 +64,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
u8 fsuuid[16];
kuid_t uid;
kuid_t fowner;
+ int pcr;
struct {
void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
void *args_p; /* audit value */
@@ -319,6 +324,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
* @func: IMA hook identifier
* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
+ * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
*
* Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
* conditions.
@@ -328,7 +334,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
* than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
*/
int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
- int flags)
+ int flags, int *pcr)
{
struct ima_rule_entry *entry;
int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1);
@@ -353,6 +359,9 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
else
actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action >> 1);
+ if ((pcr) && (entry->flags & IMA_PCR))
+ *pcr = entry->pcr;
+
if (!actmask)
break;
}
@@ -478,7 +487,8 @@ enum {
Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic,
Opt_fsuuid, Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner,
- Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio
+ Opt_appraise_type, Opt_permit_directio,
+ Opt_pcr
};
static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -502,6 +512,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
{Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"},
{Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"},
{Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"},
+ {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"},
{Opt_err, NULL}
};
@@ -774,6 +785,20 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
case Opt_permit_directio:
entry->flags |= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO;
break;
+ case Opt_pcr:
+ if (entry->action != MEASURE) {
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ ima_log_string(ab, "pcr", args[0].from);
+
+ result = kstrtoint(args[0].from, 10, &entry->pcr);
+ if (result || INVALID_PCR(entry->pcr))
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ else
+ entry->flags |= IMA_PCR;
+
+ break;
case Opt_err:
ima_log_string(ab, "UNKNOWN", p);
result = -EINVAL;
@@ -1011,6 +1036,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
seq_puts(m, " ");
}
+ if (entry->flags & IMA_PCR) {
+ snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), "%d", entry->pcr);
+ seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_pcr), tbuf);
+ seq_puts(m, " ");
+ }
+
if (entry->flags & IMA_FSUUID) {
seq_printf(m, "fsuuid=%pU", entry->fsuuid);
seq_puts(m, " ");
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
index 552705d5a78d..32f6ac0f96df 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c
@@ -44,7 +44,8 @@ struct ima_h_table ima_htable = {
static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_extend_list_mutex);
/* lookup up the digest value in the hash table, and return the entry */
-static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value)
+static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value,
+ int pcr)
{
struct ima_queue_entry *qe, *ret = NULL;
unsigned int key;
@@ -54,7 +55,7 @@ static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value)
rcu_read_lock();
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_htable.queue[key], hnext) {
rc = memcmp(qe->entry->digest, digest_value, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- if (rc == 0) {
+ if ((rc == 0) && (qe->entry->pcr == pcr)) {
ret = qe;
break;
}
@@ -89,14 +90,14 @@ static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
return 0;
}
-static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash)
+static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr)
{
int result = 0;
if (!ima_used_chip)
return result;
- result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, hash);
+ result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcr, hash);
if (result != 0)
pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result);
return result;
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
if (!violation) {
memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof(digest));
- if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) {
+ if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest, entry->pcr)) {
audit_cause = "hash_exists";
result = -EEXIST;
goto out;
@@ -135,7 +136,7 @@ int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
if (violation) /* invalidate pcr */
memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof(digest));
- tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest);
+ tpmresult = ima_pcr_extend(digest, entry->pcr);
if (tpmresult != 0) {
snprintf(tpm_audit_cause, AUDIT_CAUSE_LEN_MAX, "TPM_error(%d)",
tpmresult);
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 90bc57d796ec..24520b4ef3b0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache {
struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */
u64 version; /* track inode changes */
unsigned long flags;
+ unsigned long measured_pcrs;
enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4;
enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4;
enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4;
diff --git a/security/keys/persistent.c b/security/keys/persistent.c
index 2ef45b319dd9..1edc1f0a0ce2 100644
--- a/security/keys/persistent.c
+++ b/security/keys/persistent.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ found:
ret = key_link(key_ref_to_ptr(dest_ref), persistent);
if (ret == 0) {
key_set_timeout(persistent, persistent_keyring_expiry);
- ret = persistent->serial;
+ ret = persistent->serial;
}
}
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index a29e3554751e..43affcf10b22 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx,
if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring)
return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
-
+
user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
if (!user)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 709569305d32..c4bb47db30ee 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -700,18 +700,39 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
int security_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
{
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- return call_int_hook(inode_getsecurity, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, name,
- buffer, alloc);
+ /*
+ * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecurity, list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.inode_getsecurity(inode, name, buffer, alloc);
+ if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
int security_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- return call_int_hook(inode_setsecurity, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, name,
- value, size, flags);
+ /*
+ * Only one module will provide an attribute with a given name.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_setsecurity, list) {
+ rc = hp->hook.inode_setsecurity(inode, name, value, size,
+ flags);
+ if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 19be9d39c742..ec30880c4b98 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4627,13 +4627,13 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
if (err) {
- selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
+ selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
return err;
}
err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
PEER__RECV, &ad);
if (err) {
- selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
+ selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 0);
return err;
}
}
@@ -5001,7 +5001,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
if (err) {
- selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
+ selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
return NF_DROP;
}
}
@@ -5087,6 +5087,15 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
}
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+ return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
+}
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+
static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
int ifindex,
u16 family)
@@ -6321,6 +6330,12 @@ static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
.hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
.priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
},
+ {
+ .hook = selinux_ipv6_output,
+ .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
+ .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+ .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+ },
#endif /* IPV6 */
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
index 8c59b8f150e8..75686d53df07 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/netlabel.h
@@ -40,7 +40,8 @@
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void);
-void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway);
+void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, int error,
+ int gateway);
void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec);
void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec);
@@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ static inline void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
}
static inline void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family,
int error,
int gateway)
{
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 1f989a539fd4..aaba6677ee2e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
*
*/
static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
+ u16 family,
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
u32 *sid)
{
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,
if (rc == 0 &&
(secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHEABLE) &&
(secattr->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE))
- netlbl_cache_add(skb, secattr);
+ netlbl_cache_add(skb, family, secattr);
return rc;
}
@@ -151,9 +152,9 @@ void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
* present on the packet, NetLabel is smart enough to only act when it should.
*
*/
-void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, int error, int gateway)
+void selinux_netlbl_err(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, int error, int gateway)
{
- netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, error, gateway);
+ netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, error, gateway);
}
/**
@@ -214,7 +215,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(struct sk_buff *skb,
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
- rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, &secattr, sid);
+ rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, family,
+ &secattr, sid);
else
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
*type = secattr.type;
@@ -284,7 +286,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)
int rc;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- if (family != PF_INET)
+ if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
return 0;
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
@@ -333,7 +335,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family)
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;
- if (family != PF_INET)
+ if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
return 0;
secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk);
@@ -382,7 +384,8 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
if (rc == 0 && secattr.flags != NETLBL_SECATTR_NONE)
- rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, &secattr, &nlbl_sid);
+ rc = selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(skb, family,
+ &secattr, &nlbl_sid);
else
nlbl_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
@@ -405,11 +408,26 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(struct sk_security_struct *sksec,
return 0;
if (nlbl_sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED)
- netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
+ netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, family, rc, 0);
return rc;
}
/**
+ * selinux_netlbl_option - Is this a NetLabel option
+ * @level: the socket level or protocol
+ * @optname: the socket option name
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Returns true if @level and @optname refer to a NetLabel option.
+ * Helper for selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt().
+ */
+static inline int selinux_netlbl_option(int level, int optname)
+{
+ return (level == IPPROTO_IP && optname == IP_OPTIONS) ||
+ (level == IPPROTO_IPV6 && optname == IPV6_HOPOPTS);
+}
+
+/**
* selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt - Do not allow users to remove a NetLabel
* @sock: the socket
* @level: the socket level or protocol
@@ -431,7 +449,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock,
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
- if (level == IPPROTO_IP && optname == IP_OPTIONS &&
+ if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
(sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_LABELED ||
sksec->nlbl_state == NLBL_CONNLABELED)) {
netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 1b1fd27de632..0765c5b053b5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1347,7 +1347,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_avc_cache_threshold(struct file *file,
{
char *page;
ssize_t ret;
- int new_value;
+ unsigned int new_value;
ret = task_has_security(current, SECURITY__SETSECPARAM);
if (ret)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
index 57644b1dc42e..894b6cdc11c5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ int ebitmap_netlbl_import(struct ebitmap *ebmap,
e_iter = kzalloc(sizeof(*e_iter), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (e_iter == NULL)
goto netlbl_import_failure;
- e_iter->startbit = offset & ~(EBITMAP_SIZE - 1);
+ e_iter->startbit = offset - (offset % EBITMAP_SIZE);
if (e_prev == NULL)
ebmap->node = e_iter;
else
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 89df64672b89..082b20c78363 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
struct av_decision *avd)
{
struct context lo_scontext;
- struct context lo_tcontext;
+ struct context lo_tcontext, *tcontextp = tcontext;
struct av_decision lo_avd;
struct type_datum *source;
struct type_datum *target;
@@ -553,67 +553,41 @@ static void type_attribute_bounds_av(struct context *scontext,
scontext->type - 1);
BUG_ON(!source);
+ if (!source->bounds)
+ return;
+
target = flex_array_get_ptr(policydb.type_val_to_struct_array,
tcontext->type - 1);
BUG_ON(!target);
- if (source->bounds) {
- memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
-
- memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
- lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
+ memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
- context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
- tcontext,
- tclass,
- &lo_avd,
- NULL);
- if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
- return; /* no masked permission */
- masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
- }
+ memcpy(&lo_scontext, scontext, sizeof(lo_scontext));
+ lo_scontext.type = source->bounds;
if (target->bounds) {
- memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
-
memcpy(&lo_tcontext, tcontext, sizeof(lo_tcontext));
lo_tcontext.type = target->bounds;
-
- context_struct_compute_av(scontext,
- &lo_tcontext,
- tclass,
- &lo_avd,
- NULL);
- if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
- return; /* no masked permission */
- masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
+ tcontextp = &lo_tcontext;
}
- if (source->bounds && target->bounds) {
- memset(&lo_avd, 0, sizeof(lo_avd));
- /*
- * lo_scontext and lo_tcontext are already
- * set up.
- */
+ context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
+ tcontextp,
+ tclass,
+ &lo_avd,
+ NULL);
- context_struct_compute_av(&lo_scontext,
- &lo_tcontext,
- tclass,
- &lo_avd,
- NULL);
- if ((lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed) == avd->allowed)
- return; /* no masked permission */
- masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
- }
+ masked = ~lo_avd.allowed & avd->allowed;
- if (masked) {
- /* mask violated permissions */
- avd->allowed &= ~masked;
+ if (likely(!masked))
+ return; /* no masked permission */
- /* audit masked permissions */
- security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
- tclass, masked, "bounds");
- }
+ /* mask violated permissions */
+ avd->allowed &= ~masked;
+
+ /* audit masked permissions */
+ security_dump_masked_av(scontext, tcontext,
+ tclass, masked, "bounds");
}
/*
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index b75634dbf53b..87a9741b0d02 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2255,6 +2255,9 @@ static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
int rc;
+ if (!sig)
+ return 0; /* null signal; existence test */
+
smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
/*
@@ -4020,7 +4023,7 @@ access_check:
rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
MAY_WRITE, rc);
if (rc != 0)
- netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
+ netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, sk->sk_family, rc, 0);
break;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case PF_INET6:
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/gc.c b/security/tomoyo/gc.c
index 986a6a756868..540bc29e1b5a 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/gc.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/gc.c
@@ -645,11 +645,6 @@ void tomoyo_notify_gc(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const bool is_register)
}
}
spin_unlock(&tomoyo_io_buffer_list_lock);
- if (is_write) {
- struct task_struct *task = kthread_create(tomoyo_gc_thread,
- NULL,
- "GC for TOMOYO");
- if (!IS_ERR(task))
- wake_up_process(task);
- }
+ if (is_write)
+ kthread_run(tomoyo_gc_thread, NULL, "GC for TOMOYO");
}