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authorWaiman Long <longman@redhat.com>2020-06-04 16:48:21 -0700
committerGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>2020-06-20 10:24:59 +0200
commite27d0385dfad1182bae9b582aff9e19e5d024a26 (patch)
tree14b6a62723c23358501109138ba146ab0ce85924 /security
parent527e2ec8e7804e3d2ef1c6d52866efd849750faf (diff)
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mm: add kvfree_sensitive() for freeing sensitive data objects
[ Upstream commit d4eaa2837851db2bfed572898bfc17f9a9f9151e ] For kvmalloc'ed data object that contains sensitive information like cryptographic keys, we need to make sure that the buffer is always cleared before freeing it. Using memset() alone for buffer clearing may not provide certainty as the compiler may compile it away. To be sure, the special memzero_explicit() has to be used. This patch introduces a new kvfree_sensitive() for freeing those sensitive data objects allocated by kvmalloc(). The relevant places where kvfree_sensitive() can be used are modified to use it. Fixes: 4f0882491a14 ("KEYS: Avoid false positive ENOMEM error on key read") Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200407200318.11711-1-longman@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h11
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c16
2 files changed, 5 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index 124273e500cf..d479ca71137e 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -306,15 +306,4 @@ static inline void key_check(const struct key *key)
#define key_check(key) do {} while(0)
#endif
-
-/*
- * Helper function to clear and free a kvmalloc'ed memory object.
- */
-static inline void __kvzfree(const void *addr, size_t len)
-{
- if (addr) {
- memset((void *)addr, 0, len);
- kvfree(addr);
- }
-}
#endif /* _INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index c07c2e2b2478..9394d72a77e8 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -133,10 +133,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
error3:
- if (payload) {
- memzero_explicit(payload, plen);
- kvfree(payload);
- }
+ kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
error2:
kfree(description);
error:
@@ -351,7 +348,7 @@ long keyctl_update_key(key_serial_t id,
key_ref_put(key_ref);
error2:
- __kvzfree(payload, plen);
+ kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
error:
return ret;
}
@@ -859,7 +856,7 @@ can_read_key:
*/
if (ret > key_data_len) {
if (unlikely(key_data))
- __kvzfree(key_data, key_data_len);
+ kvfree_sensitive(key_data, key_data_len);
key_data_len = ret;
continue; /* Allocate buffer */
}
@@ -868,7 +865,7 @@ can_read_key:
ret = -EFAULT;
break;
}
- __kvzfree(key_data, key_data_len);
+ kvfree_sensitive(key_data, key_data_len);
key_put_out:
key_put(key);
@@ -1170,10 +1167,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(NULL);
error2:
- if (payload) {
- memzero_explicit(payload, plen);
- kvfree(payload);
- }
+ kvfree_sensitive(payload, plen);
error:
return ret;
}