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authorRichard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>2017-10-11 20:57:05 -0400
committerJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>2017-10-20 15:22:43 +1100
commitdb1a8922cf3f0b936595ba41774fe4b66adf091a (patch)
tree4037669ca131379ee303fa457b461e6ba8c542f7 /security
parent33957a104c86985f087b08a363590a948c9ff08c (diff)
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capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root
Factor out the case of privileged root from the function cap_bprm_set_creds() to make the latter easier to read and analyse. Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Okay-ished-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c76
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index c25e0d27537f..be9bca50c312 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -695,6 +695,52 @@ out:
return rc;
}
+/*
+ * handle_privileged_root - Handle case of privileged root
+ * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
+ * @has_fcap: Are any file capabilities set?
+ * @effective: Do we have effective root privilege?
+ * @root_uid: This namespace' root UID WRT initial USER namespace
+ *
+ * Handle the case where root is privileged and hasn't been neutered by
+ * SECURE_NOROOT. If file capabilities are set, they won't be combined with
+ * set UID root and nothing is changed. If we are root, cap_permitted is
+ * updated. If we have become set UID root, the effective bit is set.
+ */
+static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
+ bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid)
+{
+ const struct cred *old = current_cred();
+ struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
+
+ if (issecure(SECURE_NOROOT))
+ return;
+ /*
+ * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
+ * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
+ * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
+ */
+ if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
+ warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
+ * executables under compatibility mode, we override the
+ * capability sets for the file.
+ */
+ if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
+ /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
+ new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
+ old->cap_inheritable);
+ }
+ /*
+ * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
+ */
+ if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
+ *effective = true;
+}
+
/**
* cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -707,46 +753,20 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *old = current_cred();
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
- bool effective, has_cap = false, is_setid;
+ bool effective = false, has_cap = false, is_setid;
int ret;
kuid_t root_uid;
if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old)))
return -EPERM;
- effective = false;
ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
- if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
- /*
- * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
- * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
- * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
- */
- if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
- warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
- goto skip;
- }
- /*
- * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root
- * executables under compatibility mode, we override the
- * capability sets for the file.
- *
- * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
- */
- if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
- /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
- new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
- old->cap_inheritable);
- }
- if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
- effective = true;
- }
-skip:
+ handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))