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-rw-r--r--arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c7
-rw-r--r--arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c5
-rw-r--r--arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c6
-rw-r--r--include/linux/audit.h22
-rw-r--r--include/linux/netlink.h1
-rw-r--r--include/linux/security.h16
-rw-r--r--include/linux/selinux.h177
-rw-r--r--ipc/msg.c11
-rw-r--r--ipc/sem.c11
-rw-r--r--ipc/shm.c19
-rw-r--r--ipc/util.c7
-rw-r--r--kernel/audit.c160
-rw-r--r--kernel/audit.h10
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditfilter.c289
-rw-r--r--kernel/auditsc.c269
-rw-r--r--kernel/exit.c3
-rw-r--r--kernel/fork.c2
-rw-r--r--net/netlink/af_netlink.c2
-rw-r--r--net/socket.c2
-rw-r--r--security/dummy.c6
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c13
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/exports.c74
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c8
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.c30
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c235
33 files changed, 1142 insertions, 275 deletions
diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c
index 506462ef36a0..fd7eaf7866e0 100644
--- a/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ int do_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit)
if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) {
if (entryexit)
- audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->eax),
+ audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->eax),
regs->eax);
/* Debug traps, when using PTRACE_SINGLESTEP, must be sent only
* on the syscall exit path. Normally, when TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT is
@@ -720,14 +720,13 @@ int do_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit)
ret = is_sysemu;
out:
if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && !entryexit)
- audit_syscall_entry(current, AUDIT_ARCH_I386, regs->orig_eax,
+ audit_syscall_entry(AUDIT_ARCH_I386, regs->orig_eax,
regs->ebx, regs->ecx, regs->edx, regs->esi);
if (ret == 0)
return 0;
regs->orig_eax = -1; /* force skip of syscall restarting */
if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
- audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->eax),
- regs->eax);
+ audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->eax), regs->eax);
return 1;
}
diff --git a/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c b/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
index aee14fafd13d..00e0118e717c 100644
--- a/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
+++ b/arch/i386/kernel/vm86.c
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static void do_sys_vm86(struct kernel_vm86_struct *info, struct task_struct *tsk
/*call audit_syscall_exit since we do not exit via the normal paths */
if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
- audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(eax), eax);
+ audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(eax), eax);
__asm__ __volatile__(
"movl %0,%%esp\n\t"
diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
index 9887c8787e7a..e61e15e28d8b 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ syscall_trace_enter (long arg0, long arg1, long arg2, long arg3,
arch = AUDIT_ARCH_IA64;
}
- audit_syscall_entry(current, arch, syscall, arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3);
+ audit_syscall_entry(arch, syscall, arg0, arg1, arg2, arg3);
}
}
@@ -1662,7 +1662,7 @@ syscall_trace_leave (long arg0, long arg1, long arg2, long arg3,
if (success != AUDITSC_SUCCESS)
result = -result;
- audit_syscall_exit(current, success, result);
+ audit_syscall_exit(success, result);
}
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
index f3106d0771b0..9b4733c12395 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -483,7 +483,7 @@ static inline int audit_arch(void)
asmlinkage void do_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit)
{
if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && entryexit)
- audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->regs[2]),
+ audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->regs[2]),
regs->regs[2]);
if (!(current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED))
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ asmlinkage void do_syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit)
}
out:
if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && !entryexit)
- audit_syscall_entry(current, audit_arch(), regs->regs[2],
+ audit_syscall_entry(audit_arch(), regs->regs[2],
regs->regs[4], regs->regs[5],
regs->regs[6], regs->regs[7]);
}
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c
index bcb83574335b..4a677d1bd4ef 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ void do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
do_syscall_trace();
if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
- audit_syscall_entry(current,
+ audit_syscall_entry(
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC32
AUDIT_ARCH_PPC,
#else
@@ -556,8 +556,7 @@ void do_syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs)
#endif
if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
- audit_syscall_exit(current,
- (regs->ccr&0x1000)?AUDITSC_FAILURE:AUDITSC_SUCCESS,
+ audit_syscall_exit((regs->ccr&0x1000)?AUDITSC_FAILURE:AUDITSC_SUCCESS,
regs->result);
if ((test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
index 37dfe33dab73..8f36504075ed 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -734,7 +734,7 @@ asmlinkage void
syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit)
{
if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && entryexit)
- audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->gprs[2]), regs->gprs[2]);
+ audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->gprs[2]), regs->gprs[2]);
if (!test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE))
goto out;
@@ -761,8 +761,7 @@ syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int entryexit)
}
out:
if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && !entryexit)
- audit_syscall_entry(current,
- test_thread_flag(TIF_31BIT)?AUDIT_ARCH_S390:AUDIT_ARCH_S390X,
+ audit_syscall_entry(test_thread_flag(TIF_31BIT)?AUDIT_ARCH_S390:AUDIT_ARCH_S390X,
regs->gprs[2], regs->orig_gpr2, regs->gprs[3],
regs->gprs[4], regs->gprs[5]);
}
diff --git a/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c
index 49e6dedd027d..d31975e6d6f6 100644
--- a/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/sparc64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ asmlinkage void syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int syscall_exit_p)
if (unlikely(tstate & (TSTATE_XCARRY | TSTATE_ICARRY)))
result = AUDITSC_FAILURE;
- audit_syscall_exit(current, result, regs->u_regs[UREG_I0]);
+ audit_syscall_exit(result, regs->u_regs[UREG_I0]);
}
if (!(current->ptrace & PT_PTRACED))
@@ -677,8 +677,7 @@ asmlinkage void syscall_trace(struct pt_regs *regs, int syscall_exit_p)
out:
if (unlikely(current->audit_context) && !syscall_exit_p)
- audit_syscall_entry(current,
- (test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ?
+ audit_syscall_entry((test_thread_flag(TIF_32BIT) ?
AUDIT_ARCH_SPARC :
AUDIT_ARCH_SPARC64),
regs->u_regs[UREG_G1],
diff --git a/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c
index 60d2eda995c1..9a77fb3c269d 100644
--- a/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/um/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -275,15 +275,13 @@ void syscall_trace(union uml_pt_regs *regs, int entryexit)
if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) {
if (!entryexit)
- audit_syscall_entry(current,
- HOST_AUDIT_ARCH,
+ audit_syscall_entry(HOST_AUDIT_ARCH,
UPT_SYSCALL_NR(regs),
UPT_SYSCALL_ARG1(regs),
UPT_SYSCALL_ARG2(regs),
UPT_SYSCALL_ARG3(regs),
UPT_SYSCALL_ARG4(regs));
- else audit_syscall_exit(current,
- AUDITSC_RESULT(UPT_SYSCALL_RET(regs)),
+ else audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(UPT_SYSCALL_RET(regs)),
UPT_SYSCALL_RET(regs));
}
diff --git a/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c
index da8e7903d817..2d50024c9f30 100644
--- a/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86_64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -600,12 +600,12 @@ asmlinkage void syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
if (unlikely(current->audit_context)) {
if (test_thread_flag(TIF_IA32)) {
- audit_syscall_entry(current, AUDIT_ARCH_I386,
+ audit_syscall_entry(AUDIT_ARCH_I386,
regs->orig_rax,
regs->rbx, regs->rcx,
regs->rdx, regs->rsi);
} else {
- audit_syscall_entry(current, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64,
+ audit_syscall_entry(AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64,
regs->orig_rax,
regs->rdi, regs->rsi,
regs->rdx, regs->r10);
@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ asmlinkage void syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
asmlinkage void syscall_trace_leave(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (unlikely(current->audit_context))
- audit_syscall_exit(current, AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->rax), regs->rax);
+ audit_syscall_exit(AUDITSC_RESULT(regs->rax), regs->rax);
if ((test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE)
|| test_thread_flag(TIF_SINGLESTEP))
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 1c47c59058c1..b74c148f14e3 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
#define AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE 1305 /* Audit system configuration change */
#define AUDIT_SOCKADDR 1306 /* sockaddr copied as syscall arg */
#define AUDIT_CWD 1307 /* Current working directory */
+#define AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM 1311 /* IPC new permissions record type */
#define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
#define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */
@@ -145,6 +146,11 @@
#define AUDIT_PERS 10
#define AUDIT_ARCH 11
#define AUDIT_MSGTYPE 12
+#define AUDIT_SE_USER 13 /* security label user */
+#define AUDIT_SE_ROLE 14 /* security label role */
+#define AUDIT_SE_TYPE 15 /* security label type */
+#define AUDIT_SE_SEN 16 /* security label sensitivity label */
+#define AUDIT_SE_CLR 17 /* security label clearance label */
/* These are ONLY useful when checking
* at syscall exit time (AUDIT_AT_EXIT). */
@@ -287,10 +293,10 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms;
/* Public API */
extern int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *task);
extern void audit_free(struct task_struct *task);
-extern void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *task, int arch,
+extern void audit_syscall_entry(int arch,
int major, unsigned long a0, unsigned long a1,
unsigned long a2, unsigned long a3);
-extern void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *task, int failed, long return_code);
+extern void audit_syscall_exit(int failed, long return_code);
extern void audit_getname(const char *name);
extern void audit_putname(const char *name);
extern void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags);
@@ -314,7 +320,8 @@ extern void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx,
struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial);
extern int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid);
extern uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx);
-extern int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
+extern int audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
+extern int audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp);
extern int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args);
extern int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *addr);
extern int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt);
@@ -323,8 +330,8 @@ extern int audit_set_macxattr(const char *name);
#else
#define audit_alloc(t) ({ 0; })
#define audit_free(t) do { ; } while (0)
-#define audit_syscall_entry(t,ta,a,b,c,d,e) do { ; } while (0)
-#define audit_syscall_exit(t,f,r) do { ; } while (0)
+#define audit_syscall_entry(ta,a,b,c,d,e) do { ; } while (0)
+#define audit_syscall_exit(f,r) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_getname(n) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_putname(n) do { ; } while (0)
#define __audit_inode(n,i,f) do { ; } while (0)
@@ -333,7 +340,8 @@ extern int audit_set_macxattr(const char *name);
#define audit_inode_child(d,i,p) do { ; } while (0)
#define auditsc_get_stamp(c,t,s) do { BUG(); } while (0)
#define audit_get_loginuid(c) ({ -1; })
-#define audit_ipc_perms(q,u,g,m,i) ({ 0; })
+#define audit_ipc_obj(i) ({ 0; })
+#define audit_ipc_set_perm(q,u,g,m,i) ({ 0; })
#define audit_socketcall(n,a) ({ 0; })
#define audit_sockaddr(len, addr) ({ 0; })
#define audit_avc_path(dentry, mnt) ({ 0; })
@@ -366,7 +374,7 @@ extern void audit_log_d_path(struct audit_buffer *ab,
extern int audit_filter_user(struct netlink_skb_parms *cb, int type);
extern int audit_filter_type(int type);
extern int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq,
- void *data, size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid);
+ void *data, size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid);
#else
#define audit_log(c,g,t,f,...) do { ; } while (0)
#define audit_log_start(c,g,t) ({ NULL; })
diff --git a/include/linux/netlink.h b/include/linux/netlink.h
index f8f3d1c927f8..87b8a5703ebc 100644
--- a/include/linux/netlink.h
+++ b/include/linux/netlink.h
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct netlink_skb_parms
__u32 dst_group;
kernel_cap_t eff_cap;
__u32 loginuid; /* Login (audit) uid */
+ __u32 sid; /* SELinux security id */
};
#define NETLINK_CB(skb) (*(struct netlink_skb_parms*)&((skb)->cb))
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index aaa0a5cdbf75..1bab48f6aeac 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -869,11 +869,6 @@ struct swap_info_struct;
* @ipcp contains the kernel IPC permission structure
* @flag contains the desired (requested) permission set
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
- * @ipc_getsecurity:
- * Copy the security label associated with the ipc object into
- * @buffer. @buffer may be NULL to request the size of the buffer
- * required. @size indicates the size of @buffer in bytes. Return
- * number of bytes used/required on success.
*
* Security hooks for individual messages held in System V IPC message queues
* @msg_msg_alloc_security:
@@ -1223,7 +1218,6 @@ struct security_operations {
void (*task_to_inode)(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode);
int (*ipc_permission) (struct kern_ipc_perm * ipcp, short flag);
- int (*ipc_getsecurity)(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size);
int (*msg_msg_alloc_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
void (*msg_msg_free_security) (struct msg_msg * msg);
@@ -1887,11 +1881,6 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return security_ops->ipc_permission (ipcp, flag);
}
-static inline int security_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
-{
- return security_ops->ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, buffer, size);
-}
-
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg)
{
return security_ops->msg_msg_alloc_security (msg);
@@ -2532,11 +2521,6 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
-{
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg * msg)
{
return 0;
diff --git a/include/linux/selinux.h b/include/linux/selinux.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..4047bcde4484
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/selinux.h
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+/*
+ * SELinux services exported to the rest of the kernel.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <tinytim@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#ifndef _LINUX_SELINUX_H
+#define _LINUX_SELINUX_H
+
+struct selinux_audit_rule;
+struct audit_context;
+struct inode;
+struct kern_ipc_perm;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure.
+ * @field: the field this rule refers to
+ * @op: the operater the rule uses
+ * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
+ * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure
+ * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with
+ * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ struct selinux_audit_rule **rule);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
+ * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
+ *
+ * This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
+ * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
+ */
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
+ * @ctxid: the context ID to check
+ * @field: the field this rule refers to
+ * @op: the operater the rule uses
+ * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
+ * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
+ * -errno on failure.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
+ struct audit_context *actx);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_set_callback - set the callback for policy reloads.
+ * @callback: the function to call when the policy is reloaded
+ *
+ * This sets the function callback function that will update the rules
+ * upon policy reloads. This callback should rebuild all existing rules
+ * using selinux_audit_rule_init().
+ */
+void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void));
+
+/**
+ * selinux_task_ctxid - determine a context ID for a process.
+ * @tsk: the task object
+ * @ctxid: ID value returned via this
+ *
+ * On return, ctxid will contain an ID for the context. This value
+ * should only be used opaquely.
+ */
+void selinux_task_ctxid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *ctxid);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_ctxid_to_string - map a security context ID to a string
+ * @ctxid: security context ID to be converted.
+ * @ctx: address of context string to be returned
+ * @ctxlen: length of returned context string.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the context
+ * string will be allocated internally, and the caller must call
+ * kfree() on it after use.
+ */
+int selinux_ctxid_to_string(u32 ctxid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_get_inode_sid - get the inode's security context ID
+ * @inode: inode structure to get the sid from.
+ * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing
+ */
+void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_get_ipc_sid - get the ipc security context ID
+ * @ipcp: ipc structure to get the sid from.
+ * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing
+ */
+void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_get_task_sid - return the SID of task
+ * @tsk: the task whose SID will be returned
+ * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing
+ */
+void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid);
+
+
+#else
+
+static inline int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op,
+ char *rulestr,
+ struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
+{
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_task_ctxid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *ctxid)
+{
+ *ctxid = 0;
+}
+
+static inline int selinux_ctxid_to_string(u32 ctxid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+ *ctx = NULL;
+ *ctxlen = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid)
+{
+ *sid = 0;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid)
+{
+ *sid = 0;
+}
+
+static inline void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
+{
+ *sid = 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX */
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_SELINUX_H */
diff --git a/ipc/msg.c b/ipc/msg.c
index 48a7f17a7236..7d1340ccb16b 100644
--- a/ipc/msg.c
+++ b/ipc/msg.c
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@
* mostly rewritten, threaded and wake-one semantics added
* MSGMAX limit removed, sysctl's added
* (c) 1999 Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
+ *
+ * support for audit of ipc object properties and permission changes
+ * Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
*/
#include <linux/capability.h>
@@ -447,6 +450,11 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgctl (int msqid, int cmd, struct msqid_ds __user *buf)
if (msg_checkid(msq,msqid))
goto out_unlock_up;
ipcp = &msq->q_perm;
+
+ err = audit_ipc_obj(ipcp);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_unlock_up;
+
err = -EPERM;
if (current->euid != ipcp->cuid &&
current->euid != ipcp->uid && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
@@ -460,7 +468,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_msgctl (int msqid, int cmd, struct msqid_ds __user *buf)
switch (cmd) {
case IPC_SET:
{
- if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(setbuf.qbytes, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp)))
+ err = audit_ipc_set_perm(setbuf.qbytes, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp);
+ if (err)
goto out_unlock_up;
err = -EPERM;
diff --git a/ipc/sem.c b/ipc/sem.c
index 642659cd596b..7919f8ece6ba 100644
--- a/ipc/sem.c
+++ b/ipc/sem.c
@@ -61,6 +61,9 @@
* (c) 2001 Red Hat Inc <alan@redhat.com>
* Lockless wakeup
* (c) 2003 Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
+ *
+ * support for audit of ipc object properties and permission changes
+ * Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
*/
#include <linux/config.h>
@@ -820,6 +823,11 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int version, union semun
goto out_unlock;
}
ipcp = &sma->sem_perm;
+
+ err = audit_ipc_obj(ipcp);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
if (current->euid != ipcp->cuid &&
current->euid != ipcp->uid && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
err=-EPERM;
@@ -836,7 +844,8 @@ static int semctl_down(int semid, int semnum, int cmd, int version, union semun
err = 0;
break;
case IPC_SET:
- if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp)))
+ err = audit_ipc_set_perm(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, ipcp);
+ if (err)
goto out_unlock;
ipcp->uid = setbuf.uid;
ipcp->gid = setbuf.gid;
diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c
index 1c2faf62bc73..809896851902 100644
--- a/ipc/shm.c
+++ b/ipc/shm.c
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
* Shared /dev/zero support, Kanoj Sarcar <kanoj@sgi.com>
* Move the mm functionality over to mm/shmem.c, Christoph Rohland <cr@sap.com>
*
+ * support for audit of ipc object properties and permission changes
+ * Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
*/
#include <linux/config.h>
@@ -542,6 +544,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmctl (int shmid, int cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *buf)
if(err)
goto out_unlock;
+ err = audit_ipc_obj(&(shp->shm_perm));
+ if (err)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
if (!capable(CAP_IPC_LOCK)) {
err = -EPERM;
if (current->euid != shp->shm_perm.uid &&
@@ -594,6 +600,10 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmctl (int shmid, int cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *buf)
if(err)
goto out_unlock_up;
+ err = audit_ipc_obj(&(shp->shm_perm));
+ if (err)
+ goto out_unlock_up;
+
if (current->euid != shp->shm_perm.uid &&
current->euid != shp->shm_perm.cuid &&
!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
@@ -627,12 +637,15 @@ asmlinkage long sys_shmctl (int shmid, int cmd, struct shmid_ds __user *buf)
err=-EINVAL;
if(shp==NULL)
goto out_up;
- if ((err = audit_ipc_perms(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid,
- setbuf.mode, &(shp->shm_perm))))
- goto out_unlock_up;
err = shm_checkid(shp,shmid);
if(err)
goto out_unlock_up;
+ err = audit_ipc_obj(&(shp->shm_perm));
+ if (err)
+ goto out_unlock_up;
+ err = audit_ipc_set_perm(0, setbuf.uid, setbuf.gid, setbuf.mode, &(shp->shm_perm));
+ if (err)
+ goto out_unlock_up;
err=-EPERM;
if (current->euid != shp->shm_perm.uid &&
current->euid != shp->shm_perm.cuid &&
diff --git a/ipc/util.c b/ipc/util.c
index b3dcfad3b4f7..8193299f45f6 100644
--- a/ipc/util.c
+++ b/ipc/util.c
@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
* Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
* Oct 2002 - One lock per IPC id. RCU ipc_free for lock-free grow_ary().
* Mingming Cao <cmm@us.ibm.com>
+ * Mar 2006 - support for audit of ipc object properties
+ * Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>
*/
#include <linux/config.h>
@@ -27,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
@@ -464,8 +467,10 @@ void ipc_rcu_putref(void *ptr)
int ipcperms (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
{ /* flag will most probably be 0 or S_...UGO from <linux/stat.h> */
- int requested_mode, granted_mode;
+ int requested_mode, granted_mode, err;
+ if (unlikely((err = audit_ipc_obj(ipcp))))
+ return err;
requested_mode = (flag >> 6) | (flag >> 3) | flag;
granted_mode = ipcp->mode;
if (current->euid == ipcp->cuid || current->euid == ipcp->uid)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index c8ccbd09048f..df57b493e1cb 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
+
+#include "audit.h"
/* No auditing will take place until audit_initialized != 0.
* (Initialization happens after skb_init is called.) */
@@ -227,49 +230,103 @@ void audit_log_lost(const char *message)
}
}
-static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid)
+static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
{
- int old = audit_rate_limit;
- audit_rate_limit = limit;
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ int old = audit_rate_limit;
+
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+ if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+ return rc;
+ else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+ limit, old, loginuid, ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
- audit_rate_limit, old, loginuid);
+ limit, old, loginuid);
+ audit_rate_limit = limit;
return old;
}
-static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid)
+static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int limit, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
{
- int old = audit_backlog_limit;
- audit_backlog_limit = limit;
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ int old = audit_backlog_limit;
+
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+ if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+ return rc;
+ else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+ limit, old, loginuid, ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
- audit_backlog_limit, old, loginuid);
+ limit, old, loginuid);
+ audit_backlog_limit = limit;
return old;
}
-static int audit_set_enabled(int state, uid_t loginuid)
+static int audit_set_enabled(int state, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
{
- int old = audit_enabled;
+ int old = audit_enabled;
+
if (state != 0 && state != 1)
return -EINVAL;
- audit_enabled = state;
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+ if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+ return rc;
+ else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+ state, old, loginuid, ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
- audit_enabled, old, loginuid);
+ state, old, loginuid);
+ audit_enabled = state;
return old;
}
-static int audit_set_failure(int state, uid_t loginuid)
+static int audit_set_failure(int state, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
{
- int old = audit_failure;
+ int old = audit_failure;
+
if (state != AUDIT_FAIL_SILENT
&& state != AUDIT_FAIL_PRINTK
&& state != AUDIT_FAIL_PANIC)
return -EINVAL;
- audit_failure = state;
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+ if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)))
+ return rc;
+ else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+ state, old, loginuid, ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
- audit_failure, old, loginuid);
+ state, old, loginuid);
+ audit_failure = state;
return old;
}
@@ -387,7 +444,7 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(kernel_cap_t eff_cap, u16 msg_type)
static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
- u32 uid, pid, seq;
+ u32 uid, pid, seq, sid;
void *data;
struct audit_status *status_get, status_set;
int err;
@@ -413,6 +470,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
pid = NETLINK_CREDS(skb)->pid;
uid = NETLINK_CREDS(skb)->uid;
loginuid = NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid;
+ sid = NETLINK_CB(skb).sid;
seq = nlh->nlmsg_seq;
data = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
@@ -433,25 +491,43 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
return -EINVAL;
status_get = (struct audit_status *)data;
if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_ENABLED) {
- err = audit_set_enabled(status_get->enabled, loginuid);
+ err = audit_set_enabled(status_get->enabled,
+ loginuid, sid);
if (err < 0) return err;
}
if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_FAILURE) {
- err = audit_set_failure(status_get->failure, loginuid);
+ err = audit_set_failure(status_get->failure,
+ loginuid, sid);
if (err < 0) return err;
}
if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_PID) {
int old = audit_pid;
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ int rc;
+ if ((rc = selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+ sid, &ctx, &len)))
+ return rc;
+ else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
+ status_get->pid, old,
+ loginuid, ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
+ status_get->pid, old, loginuid);
audit_pid = status_get->pid;
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
- audit_pid, old, loginuid);
}
if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_RATE_LIMIT)
- audit_set_rate_limit(status_get->rate_limit, loginuid);
+ audit_set_rate_limit(status_get->rate_limit,
+ loginuid, sid);
if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_BACKLOG_LIMIT)
audit_set_backlog_limit(status_get->backlog_limit,
- loginuid);
+ loginuid, sid);
break;
case AUDIT_USER:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG...AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
@@ -465,8 +541,23 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, msg_type);
if (ab) {
audit_log_format(ab,
- "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u msg='%.1024s'",
- pid, uid, loginuid, (char *)data);
+ "user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u",
+ pid, uid, loginuid);
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+ sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ " ssid=%u", sid);
+ /* Maybe call audit_panic? */
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ " subj=%s", ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " msg='%.1024s'",
+ (char *)data);
audit_set_pid(ab, pid);
audit_log_end(ab);
}
@@ -480,7 +571,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
case AUDIT_LIST:
err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid,
uid, seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh),
- loginuid);
+ loginuid, sid);
break;
case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
@@ -490,7 +581,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
err = audit_receive_filter(nlh->nlmsg_type, NETLINK_CB(skb).pid,
uid, seq, data, nlmsg_len(nlh),
- loginuid);
+ loginuid, sid);
break;
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
sig_data.uid = audit_sig_uid;
@@ -564,6 +655,11 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
skb_queue_head_init(&audit_skb_queue);
audit_initialized = 1;
audit_enabled = audit_default;
+
+ /* Register the callback with selinux. This callback will be invoked
+ * when a new policy is loaded. */
+ selinux_audit_set_callback(&selinux_audit_rule_update);
+
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "initialized");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index bc5392076e2b..6f733920fd32 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -54,9 +54,11 @@ enum audit_state {
/* Rule lists */
struct audit_field {
- u32 type;
- u32 val;
- u32 op;
+ u32 type;
+ u32 val;
+ u32 op;
+ char *se_str;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *se_rule;
};
struct audit_krule {
@@ -86,3 +88,5 @@ extern void audit_send_reply(int pid, int seq, int type,
extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);
extern void audit_panic(const char *message);
extern struct mutex audit_netlink_mutex;
+
+extern int selinux_audit_rule_update(void);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index d3a8539f3a83..7c134906d689 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include "audit.h"
/* There are three lists of rules -- one to search at task creation
@@ -42,6 +43,13 @@ struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e)
{
+ int i;
+ if (e->rule.fields)
+ for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
+ kfree(f->se_str);
+ selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
+ }
kfree(e->rule.fields);
kfree(e);
}
@@ -52,9 +60,29 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
audit_free_rule(e);
}
+/* Initialize an audit filterlist entry. */
+static inline struct audit_entry *audit_init_entry(u32 field_count)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *entry;
+ struct audit_field *fields;
+
+ entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!entry))
+ return NULL;
+
+ fields = kzalloc(sizeof(*fields) * field_count, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(!fields)) {
+ kfree(entry);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ entry->rule.fields = fields;
+
+ return entry;
+}
+
/* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space
* buffer. */
-static __attribute__((unused)) char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
+static char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len)
{
char *str;
@@ -84,7 +112,6 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
{
unsigned listnr;
struct audit_entry *entry;
- struct audit_field *fields;
int i, err;
err = -EINVAL;
@@ -108,23 +135,14 @@ static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule *rule)
goto exit_err;
err = -ENOMEM;
- entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (unlikely(!entry))
- goto exit_err;
- fields = kmalloc(sizeof(*fields) * rule->field_count, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (unlikely(!fields)) {
- kfree(entry);
+ entry = audit_init_entry(rule->field_count);
+ if (!entry)
goto exit_err;
- }
-
- memset(&entry->rule, 0, sizeof(struct audit_krule));
- memset(fields, 0, sizeof(struct audit_field));
entry->rule.flags = rule->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
entry->rule.listnr = listnr;
entry->rule.action = rule->action;
entry->rule.field_count = rule->field_count;
- entry->rule.fields = fields;
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i];
@@ -150,15 +168,20 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_rule_to_entry(struct audit_rule *rule)
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i];
- if (rule->fields[i] & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto exit_free;
- }
-
f->op = rule->fields[i] & (AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
f->type = rule->fields[i] & ~(AUDIT_NEGATE|AUDIT_OPERATORS);
f->val = rule->values[i];
+ if (f->type & AUDIT_UNUSED_BITS ||
+ f->type == AUDIT_SE_USER ||
+ f->type == AUDIT_SE_ROLE ||
+ f->type == AUDIT_SE_TYPE ||
+ f->type == AUDIT_SE_SEN ||
+ f->type == AUDIT_SE_CLR) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto exit_free;
+ }
+
entry->rule.vers_ops = (f->op & AUDIT_OPERATORS) ? 2 : 1;
/* Support for legacy operators where
@@ -188,8 +211,9 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
int err = 0;
struct audit_entry *entry;
void *bufp;
- /* size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data); */
+ size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data);
int i;
+ char *str;
entry = audit_to_entry_common((struct audit_rule *)data);
if (IS_ERR(entry))
@@ -207,10 +231,35 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
f->op = data->fieldflags[i] & AUDIT_OPERATORS;
f->type = data->fields[i];
+ f->val = data->values[i];
+ f->se_str = NULL;
+ f->se_rule = NULL;
switch(f->type) {
- /* call type-specific conversion routines here */
- default:
- f->val = data->values[i];
+ case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
+ if (IS_ERR(str))
+ goto exit_free;
+ entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
+
+ err = selinux_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
+ &f->se_rule);
+ /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
+ * become valid after a policy reload. */
+ if (err == -EINVAL) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux "
+ "\'%s\' is invalid\n", str);
+ err = 0;
+ }
+ if (err) {
+ kfree(str);
+ goto exit_free;
+ } else
+ f->se_str = str;
+ break;
}
}
@@ -286,7 +335,14 @@ static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule)
data->fields[i] = f->type;
data->fieldflags[i] = f->op;
switch(f->type) {
- /* call type-specific conversion routines here */
+ case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ data->buflen += data->values[i] =
+ audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->se_str);
+ break;
default:
data->values[i] = f->val;
}
@@ -314,7 +370,14 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
return 1;
switch(a->fields[i].type) {
- /* call type-specific comparison routines here */
+ case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ if (strcmp(a->fields[i].se_str, b->fields[i].se_str))
+ return 1;
+ break;
default:
if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val)
return 1;
@@ -328,6 +391,81 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
return 0;
}
+/* Duplicate selinux field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be
+ * re-initialized. */
+static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
+ struct audit_field *sf)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ char *se_str;
+
+ /* our own copy of se_str */
+ se_str = kstrdup(sf->se_str, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (unlikely(IS_ERR(se_str)))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ df->se_str = se_str;
+
+ /* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */
+ ret = selinux_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
+ &df->se_rule);
+ /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
+ * become valid after a policy reload. */
+ if (ret == -EINVAL) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux \'%s\' is "
+ "invalid\n", df->se_str);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Duplicate an audit rule. This will be a deep copy with the exception
+ * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The selinux specific fields
+ * will be updated in the copy. The point is to be able to replace the old
+ * rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule. */
+static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
+{
+ u32 fcount = old->field_count;
+ struct audit_entry *entry;
+ struct audit_krule *new;
+ int i, err = 0;
+
+ entry = audit_init_entry(fcount);
+ if (unlikely(!entry))
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ new = &entry->rule;
+ new->vers_ops = old->vers_ops;
+ new->flags = old->flags;
+ new->listnr = old->listnr;
+ new->action = old->action;
+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++)
+ new->mask[i] = old->mask[i];
+ new->buflen = old->buflen;
+ new->field_count = old->field_count;
+ memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
+
+ /* deep copy this information, updating the se_rule fields, because
+ * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
+ for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
+ switch (new->fields[i].type) {
+ case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
+ &old->fields[i]);
+ }
+ if (err) {
+ audit_free_rule(entry);
+ return ERR_PTR(err);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return entry;
+}
+
/* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate. Protected by
* audit_netlink_mutex. */
static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
@@ -448,9 +586,10 @@ static int audit_list_rules(void *_dest)
* @data: payload data
* @datasz: size of payload data
* @loginuid: loginuid of sender
+ * @sid: SE Linux Security ID of sender
*/
int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
- size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid)
+ size_t datasz, uid_t loginuid, u32 sid)
{
struct task_struct *tsk;
int *dest;
@@ -493,9 +632,23 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
err = audit_add_rule(entry,
&audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d\n",
- loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ /* Maybe call audit_panic? */
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "auid=%u ssid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d",
+ loginuid, sid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "auid=%u subj=%s add rule to list=%d res=%d",
+ loginuid, ctx, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "auid=%u add rule to list=%d res=%d",
+ loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
if (err)
audit_free_rule(entry);
@@ -511,9 +664,24 @@ int audit_receive_filter(int type, int pid, int uid, int seq, void *data,
err = audit_del_rule(entry,
&audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
- audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
- "auid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d\n",
- loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+
+ if (sid) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ /* Maybe call audit_panic? */
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "auid=%u ssid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
+ loginuid, sid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "auid=%u subj=%s remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
+ loginuid, ctx, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ } else
+ audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
+ "auid=%u remove rule from list=%d res=%d",
+ loginuid, entry->rule.listnr, !err);
audit_free_rule(entry);
break;
@@ -628,3 +796,62 @@ unlock_and_return:
rcu_read_unlock();
return result;
}
+
+/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields. Returns 1 if there
+ are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. */
+static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules.
+ * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain selinux
+ * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
+ * selinux field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
+ * updated rule. */
+int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *entry, *n, *nentry;
+ int i, err = 0;
+
+ /* audit_netlink_mutex synchronizes the writers */
+ mutex_lock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
+ if (!audit_rule_has_selinux(&entry->rule))
+ continue;
+
+ nentry = audit_dupe_rule(&entry->rule);
+ if (unlikely(IS_ERR(nentry))) {
+ /* save the first error encountered for the
+ * return value */
+ if (!err)
+ err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
+ audit_panic("error updating selinux filters");
+ list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
+ } else {
+ list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list);
+ }
+ call_rcu(&entry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
+ }
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_netlink_mutex);
+
+ return err;
+}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 7f160df21a23..1c03a4ed1b27 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include "audit.h"
@@ -89,7 +90,7 @@ struct audit_names {
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
dev_t rdev;
- char *ctx;
+ u32 osid;
};
struct audit_aux_data {
@@ -106,7 +107,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl {
uid_t uid;
gid_t gid;
mode_t mode;
- char *ctx;
+ u32 osid;
};
struct audit_aux_data_socketcall {
@@ -167,7 +168,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_context *ctx,
enum audit_state *state)
{
- int i, j;
+ int i, j, need_sid = 1;
+ u32 sid;
for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
@@ -257,6 +259,27 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (ctx)
result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val);
break;
+ case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
+ a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
+ match for now to avoid losing information that
+ may be wanted. An error message will also be
+ logged upon error */
+ if (f->se_rule) {
+ if (need_sid) {
+ selinux_task_ctxid(tsk, &sid);
+ need_sid = 0;
+ }
+ result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ f->op,
+ f->se_rule,
+ ctx);
+ }
+ break;
case AUDIT_ARG0:
case AUDIT_ARG1:
case AUDIT_ARG2:
@@ -329,7 +352,6 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT;
}
-/* This should be called with task_lock() held. */
static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
int return_valid,
int return_code)
@@ -391,9 +413,6 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
#endif
for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) {
- char *p = context->names[i].ctx;
- context->names[i].ctx = NULL;
- kfree(p);
if (context->names[i].name)
__putname(context->names[i].name);
}
@@ -416,11 +435,6 @@ static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context)
dput(axi->dentry);
mntput(axi->mnt);
}
- if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) {
- struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
- if (axi->ctx)
- kfree(axi->ctx);
- }
context->aux = aux->next;
kfree(aux);
@@ -506,7 +520,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context)
printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count);
}
-static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
char *ctx = NULL;
ssize_t len = 0;
@@ -518,7 +532,7 @@ static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
return;
}
- ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask);
+ ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ctx)
goto error_path;
@@ -536,47 +550,46 @@ error_path:
return;
}
-static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
- struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ char name[sizeof(tsk->comm)];
+ struct mm_struct *mm = tsk->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
- get_task_comm(name, current);
+ /* tsk == current */
+
+ get_task_comm(name, tsk);
audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name);
- if (!mm)
- return;
-
- /*
- * this is brittle; all callers that pass GFP_ATOMIC will have
- * NULL current->mm and we won't get here.
- */
- down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- vma = mm->mmap;
- while (vma) {
- if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
- vma->vm_file) {
- audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
- vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
- vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
- break;
+ if (mm) {
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ vma = mm->mmap;
+ while (vma) {
+ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) &&
+ vma->vm_file) {
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=",
+ vma->vm_file->f_dentry,
+ vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt);
+ break;
+ }
+ vma = vma->vm_next;
}
- vma = vma->vm_next;
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
}
- up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
- audit_log_task_context(ab, gfp_mask);
+ audit_log_task_context(ab);
}
-static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- int i;
+ int i, call_panic = 0;
struct audit_buffer *ab;
struct audit_aux_data *aux;
const char *tty;
- ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
+ /* tsk == current */
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SYSCALL);
if (!ab)
return; /* audit_panic has been called */
audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
@@ -587,8 +600,8 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld",
(context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no",
context->return_code);
- if (current->signal->tty && current->signal->tty->name)
- tty = current->signal->tty->name;
+ if (tsk->signal && tsk->signal->tty && tsk->signal->tty->name)
+ tty = tsk->signal->tty->name;
else
tty = "(none)";
audit_log_format(ab,
@@ -607,12 +620,12 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
context->gid,
context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid,
context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty);
- audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask);
+ audit_log_task_info(ab, tsk);
audit_log_end(ab);
for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) {
- ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, aux->type);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, aux->type);
if (!ab)
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
@@ -620,8 +633,39 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
case AUDIT_IPC: {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
audit_log_format(ab,
- " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s",
- axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx);
+ " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x",
+ axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+ if (axi->osid != 0) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+ axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
+ axi->osid);
+ call_panic = 1;
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ }
+ break; }
+
+ case AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM: {
+ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
+ audit_log_format(ab,
+ " new qbytes=%lx new iuid=%u new igid=%u new mode=%x",
+ axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode);
+ if (axi->osid != 0) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+ axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
+ axi->osid);
+ call_panic = 1;
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
+ }
break; }
case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: {
@@ -649,7 +693,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
}
if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) {
- ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_CWD);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CWD);
if (ab) {
audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt);
audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -659,7 +703,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
unsigned long ino = context->names[i].ino;
unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino;
- ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH);
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PATH);
if (!ab)
continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
@@ -685,32 +729,35 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
context->names[i].gid,
MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev),
MINOR(context->names[i].rdev));
- if (context->names[i].ctx) {
- audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s",
- context->names[i].ctx);
+ if (context->names[i].osid != 0) {
+ char *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 len;
+ if (selinux_ctxid_to_string(
+ context->names[i].osid, &ctx, &len)) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
+ context->names[i].osid);
+ call_panic = 2;
+ } else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
+ kfree(ctx);
}
audit_log_end(ab);
}
+ if (call_panic)
+ audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
}
/**
* audit_free - free a per-task audit context
* @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
*
- * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct.
+ * Called from copy_process and do_exit
*/
void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct audit_context *context;
- /*
- * No need to lock the task - when we execute audit_free()
- * then the task has no external references anymore, and
- * we are tearing it down. (The locking also confuses
- * DEBUG_LOCKDEP - this freeing may occur in softirq
- * contexts as well, via RCU.)
- */
context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0);
if (likely(!context))
return;
@@ -719,8 +766,9 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
* function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
* We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
* in the context of the idle thread */
+ /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
- audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
audit_free_context(context);
}
@@ -743,10 +791,11 @@ void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
* will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
* be written).
*/
-void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
+void audit_syscall_entry(int arch, int major,
unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2,
unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4)
{
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context;
enum audit_state state;
@@ -824,22 +873,18 @@ void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major,
* message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
* free the names stored from getname().
*/
-void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
+void audit_syscall_exit(int valid, long return_code)
{
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
struct audit_context *context;
- get_task_struct(tsk);
- task_lock(tsk);
context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code);
- task_unlock(tsk);
- /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have
- * called __put_task_struct. */
if (likely(!context))
- goto out;
+ return;
if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable)
- audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL);
+ audit_log_exit(context, tsk);
context->in_syscall = 0;
context->auditable = 0;
@@ -854,8 +899,6 @@ void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code)
audit_free_aux(context);
tsk->audit_context = context;
}
- out:
- put_task_struct(tsk);
}
/**
@@ -936,40 +979,11 @@ void audit_putname(const char *name)
#endif
}
-void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
+static void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix();
- char *ctx = NULL;
- int len = 0;
-
- if (!suffix)
- goto ret;
-
- len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0);
- if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
- goto ret;
- if (len < 0)
- goto error_path;
-
- ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ctx)
- goto error_path;
- len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0);
- if (len < 0)
- goto error_path;
-
- kfree(context->names[idx].ctx);
- context->names[idx].ctx = ctx;
- goto ret;
-
-error_path:
- if (ctx)
- kfree(ctx);
- audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context");
-ret:
- return;
+ selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &context->names[idx].osid);
}
@@ -1155,40 +1169,37 @@ uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx)
return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1;
}
-static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+/**
+ * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
+ * @ipcp: ipc permissions
+ *
+ * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
+ */
+int audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
+ struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
- char *ctx = NULL;
- int len = 0;
if (likely(!context))
- return NULL;
-
- len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0);
- if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP)
- goto ret;
- if (len < 0)
- goto error_path;
-
- ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!ctx)
- goto error_path;
+ return 0;
- len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len);
- if (len < 0)
- goto error_path;
+ ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!ax)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- return ctx;
+ ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
+ ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
+ ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
+ selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
-error_path:
- kfree(ctx);
- audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context");
-ret:
- return NULL;
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
+ ax->d.next = context->aux;
+ context->aux = (void *)ax;
+ return 0;
}
/**
- * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc
+ * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
* @qbytes: msgq bytes
* @uid: msgq user id
* @gid: msgq group id
@@ -1196,7 +1207,7 @@ ret:
*
* Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
*/
-int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
+int audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax;
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1212,9 +1223,9 @@ int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, str
ax->uid = uid;
ax->gid = gid;
ax->mode = mode;
- ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp);
+ selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
- ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
+ ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
context->aux = (void *)ax;
return 0;
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index f86434d7b3d1..e95b93282210 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <linux/futex.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
#include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h> /* for audit_free() */
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
@@ -910,6 +911,8 @@ fastcall NORET_TYPE void do_exit(long code)
if (unlikely(tsk->compat_robust_list))
compat_exit_robust_list(tsk);
#endif
+ if (unlikely(tsk->audit_context))
+ audit_free(tsk);
exit_mm(tsk);
exit_sem(tsk);
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index d2fa57d480d4..ac8100e3088a 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -114,8 +114,6 @@ void __put_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
WARN_ON(atomic_read(&tsk->usage));
WARN_ON(tsk == current);
- if (unlikely(tsk->audit_context))
- audit_free(tsk);
security_task_free(tsk);
free_uid(tsk->user);
put_group_info(tsk->group_info);
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index b8ea61f357e6..3862e73d14d7 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/scm.h>
@@ -1156,6 +1157,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_pid = dst_pid;
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = dst_group;
NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context);
+ selinux_get_task_sid(current, &(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid));
memcpy(NETLINK_CREDS(skb), &siocb->scm->creds, sizeof(struct ucred));
/* What can I do? Netlink is asynchronous, so that
diff --git a/net/socket.c b/net/socket.c
index 0ce12dfc7a71..02948b622bd2 100644
--- a/net/socket.c
+++ b/net/socket.c
@@ -267,6 +267,8 @@ int move_addr_to_user(void *kaddr, int klen, void __user *uaddr, int __user *ule
return -EINVAL;
if(len)
{
+ if (audit_sockaddr(klen, kaddr))
+ return -ENOMEM;
if(copy_to_user(uaddr,kaddr,len))
return -EFAULT;
}
diff --git a/security/dummy.c b/security/dummy.c
index fd99429278e9..8ccccccc12ac 100644
--- a/security/dummy.c
+++ b/security/dummy.c
@@ -563,11 +563,6 @@ static int dummy_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return 0;
}
-static int dummy_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
-{
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-}
-
static int dummy_msg_msg_alloc_security (struct msg_msg *msg)
{
return 0;
@@ -976,7 +971,6 @@ void security_fixup_ops (struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_reparent_to_init);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, task_to_inode);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_permission);
- set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, ipc_getsecurity);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_alloc_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_msg_free_security);
set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, msg_queue_alloc_security);
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index 688c0a267b62..faf2e02e4410 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o ss/
-selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o
+selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o exports.o
selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index ac5d69bb3377..a300702da527 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -800,7 +800,7 @@ out:
int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
{
struct avc_callback_node *c;
- int i, rc = 0;
+ int i, rc = 0, tmprc;
unsigned long flag;
struct avc_node *node;
@@ -813,15 +813,16 @@ int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)
for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
if (c->events & AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
- rc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
- 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ tmprc = c->callback(AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
+ 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
+ /* save the first error encountered for the return
+ value and continue processing the callbacks */
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = tmprc;
}
}
avc_latest_notif_update(seqno, 0);
-out:
return rc;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/exports.c b/security/selinux/exports.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ae4c73eb3085
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/selinux/exports.c
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * SELinux services exported to the rest of the kernel.
+ *
+ * Author: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 IBM Corporation, Timothy R. Chavez <tinytim@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/selinux.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/ipc.h>
+
+#include "security.h"
+#include "objsec.h"
+
+void selinux_task_ctxid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *ctxid)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
+ if (selinux_enabled)
+ *ctxid = tsec->sid;
+ else
+ *ctxid = 0;
+}
+
+int selinux_ctxid_to_string(u32 ctxid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+ if (selinux_enabled)
+ return security_sid_to_context(ctxid, ctx, ctxlen);
+ else {
+ *ctx = NULL;
+ *ctxlen = 0;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid)
+{
+ if (selinux_enabled) {
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ *sid = isec->sid;
+ return;
+ }
+ *sid = 0;
+}
+
+void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid)
+{
+ if (selinux_enabled) {
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+ *sid = isec->sid;
+ return;
+ }
+ *sid = 0;
+}
+
+void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
+{
+ if (selinux_enabled) {
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
+ *sid = tsec->sid;
+ return;
+ }
+ *sid = 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index b61b9554bc27..3cf368a16448 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4052,13 +4052,6 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
}
-static int selinux_ipc_getsecurity(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, void *buffer, size_t size)
-{
- struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
-
- return selinux_getsecurity(isec->sid, buffer, size);
-}
-
/* module stacking operations */
static int selinux_register_security (const char *name, struct security_operations *ops)
{
@@ -4321,7 +4314,6 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
.ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
- .ipc_getsecurity = selinux_ipc_getsecurity,
.msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
.msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 84047f69f9c1..7bc5b6440f70 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
*
* Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
*
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
@@ -385,6 +385,34 @@ out:
}
/*
+ * Set the MLS fields in the security context structure
+ * `context' based on the string representation in
+ * the string `str'. This function will allocate temporary memory with the
+ * given constraints of gfp_mask.
+ */
+int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask)
+{
+ char *tmpstr, *freestr;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!selinux_mls_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* we need freestr because mls_context_to_sid will change
+ the value of tmpstr */
+ tmpstr = freestr = kstrdup(str, gfp_mask);
+ if (!tmpstr) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ } else {
+ rc = mls_context_to_sid(':', &tmpstr, context,
+ NULL, SECSID_NULL);
+ kfree(freestr);
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
* Copies the effective MLS range from `src' into `dst'.
*/
static inline int mls_scopy_context(struct context *dst,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
index 03de697c8058..fbb42f07dd7c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
*
* Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
*
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
*/
#ifndef _SS_MLS_H_
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@ int mls_context_to_sid(char oldc,
struct sidtab *s,
u32 def_sid);
+int mls_from_string(char *str, struct context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask);
+
int mls_convert_context(struct policydb *oldp,
struct policydb *newp,
struct context *context);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 61492485de84..7177e98df7f3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -7,12 +7,13 @@
* Updated: Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
*
* Support for enhanced MLS infrastructure.
+ * Support for context based audit filters.
*
* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
*
* Added conditional policy language extensions
*
- * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2004-2006 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
* Copyright (C) 2003 - 2004 Tresys Technology, LLC
* Copyright (C) 2003 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
@@ -1811,3 +1812,235 @@ out:
POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
return rc;
}
+
+struct selinux_audit_rule {
+ u32 au_seqno;
+ struct context au_ctxt;
+};
+
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
+{
+ if (rule) {
+ context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
+ kfree(rule);
+ }
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
+{
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
+ struct role_datum *roledatum;
+ struct type_datum *typedatum;
+ struct user_datum *userdatum;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ *rule = NULL;
+
+ if (!ss_initialized)
+ return -ENOTSUPP;
+
+ switch (field) {
+ case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+ /* only 'equals' and 'not equals' fit user, role, and type */
+ if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL && op != AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
+ if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* only the above fields are valid */
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!tmprule)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt);
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ tmprule->au_seqno = latest_granting;
+
+ switch (field) {
+ case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+ userdatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_users.table, rulestr);
+ if (!userdatum)
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ else
+ tmprule->au_ctxt.user = userdatum->value;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+ roledatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_roles.table, rulestr);
+ if (!roledatum)
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ else
+ tmprule->au_ctxt.role = roledatum->value;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+ typedatum = hashtab_search(policydb.p_types.table, rulestr);
+ if (!typedatum)
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ else
+ tmprule->au_ctxt.type = typedatum->value;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ rc = mls_from_string(rulestr, &tmprule->au_ctxt, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+
+ if (rc) {
+ selinux_audit_rule_free(tmprule);
+ tmprule = NULL;
+ }
+
+ *rule = tmprule;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 ctxid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ struct context *ctxt;
+ struct mls_level *level;
+ int match = 0;
+
+ if (!rule) {
+ audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+ "selinux_audit_rule_match: missing rule\n");
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ POLICY_RDLOCK;
+
+ if (rule->au_seqno < latest_granting) {
+ audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+ "selinux_audit_rule_match: stale rule\n");
+ match = -ESTALE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ctxt = sidtab_search(&sidtab, ctxid);
+ if (!ctxt) {
+ audit_log(actx, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
+ "selinux_audit_rule_match: unrecognized SID %d\n",
+ ctxid);
+ match = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* a field/op pair that is not caught here will simply fall through
+ without a match */
+ switch (field) {
+ case AUDIT_SE_USER:
+ switch (op) {
+ case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+ match = (ctxt->user == rule->au_ctxt.user);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+ match = (ctxt->user != rule->au_ctxt.user);
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SE_ROLE:
+ switch (op) {
+ case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+ match = (ctxt->role == rule->au_ctxt.role);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+ match = (ctxt->role != rule->au_ctxt.role);
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SE_TYPE:
+ switch (op) {
+ case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+ match = (ctxt->type == rule->au_ctxt.type);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+ match = (ctxt->type != rule->au_ctxt.type);
+ break;
+ }
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SE_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SE_CLR:
+ level = (op == AUDIT_SE_SEN ?
+ &ctxt->range.level[0] : &ctxt->range.level[1]);
+ switch (op) {
+ case AUDIT_EQUAL:
+ match = mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL:
+ match = !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_LESS_THAN:
+ match = (mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level) &&
+ !mls_level_eq(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level));
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
+ match = mls_level_dom(&rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0],
+ level);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN:
+ match = (mls_level_dom(level,
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]) &&
+ !mls_level_eq(level,
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]));
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL:
+ match = mls_level_dom(level,
+ &rule->au_ctxt.range.level[0]);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ POLICY_RDUNLOCK;
+ return match;
+}
+
+static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = NULL;
+
+static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
+ u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET && aurule_callback)
+ err = aurule_callback();
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int __init aurule_init(void)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = avc_add_callback(aurule_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET,
+ SECSID_NULL, SECSID_NULL, SECCLASS_NULL, 0);
+ if (err)
+ panic("avc_add_callback() failed, error %d\n", err);
+
+ return err;
+}
+__initcall(aurule_init);
+
+void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
+{
+ aurule_callback = callback;
+}