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-rw-r--r--Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt27
-rw-r--r--Documentation/security/keys.txt41
-rw-r--r--certs/.gitignore4
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h5
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c44
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c4
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c2
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h1
-rw-r--r--crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c9
-rw-r--r--fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c6
-rw-r--r--fs/cifs/cifsacl.c25
-rw-r--r--fs/cifs/connect.c9
-rw-r--r--fs/cifs/sess.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c2
-rw-r--r--fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h5
-rw-r--r--fs/ext4/crypto_key.c4
-rw-r--r--fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c4
-rw-r--r--fs/fscache/object-list.c4
-rw-r--r--fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c4
-rw-r--r--include/crypto/public_key.h1
-rw-r--r--include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h2
-rw-r--r--include/keys/asymmetric-type.h15
-rw-r--r--include/keys/user-type.h8
-rw-r--r--include/linux/key-type.h3
-rw-r--r--include/linux/key.h33
-rw-r--r--kernel/.gitignore1
-rw-r--r--kernel/module_signing.c1
-rw-r--r--lib/digsig.c7
-rw-r--r--net/ceph/ceph_common.c2
-rw-r--r--net/ceph/crypto.c6
-rw-r--r--net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c20
-rw-r--r--net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c7
-rw-r--r--net/dns_resolver/internal.h8
-rw-r--r--net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c2
-rw-r--r--net/rxrpc/ar-key.c32
-rw-r--r--net/rxrpc/ar-output.c2
-rw-r--r--net/rxrpc/ar-security.c4
-rw-r--r--net/rxrpc/rxkad.c16
-rwxr-xr-xscripts/extract-module-sig.pl136
-rwxr-xr-xscripts/extract-sys-certs.pl144
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/big_key.c47
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c18
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c20
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c12
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c12
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c4
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key_auth.c12
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted.c6
-rw-r--r--security/keys/user_defined.c14
53 files changed, 572 insertions, 239 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt b/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt
index b7675904a747..8c07e0ea6bc0 100644
--- a/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/crypto/asymmetric-keys.txt
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ and looks like the following:
const struct public_key_signature *sig);
};
-Asymmetric keys point to this with their type_data[0] member.
+Asymmetric keys point to this with their payload[asym_subtype] member.
The owner and name fields should be set to the owning module and the name of
the subtype. Currently, the name is only used for print statements.
@@ -269,8 +269,7 @@ mandatory:
struct key_preparsed_payload {
char *description;
- void *type_data[2];
- void *payload;
+ void *payload[4];
const void *data;
size_t datalen;
size_t quotalen;
@@ -283,16 +282,18 @@ mandatory:
not theirs.
If the parser is happy with the blob, it should propose a description for
- the key and attach it to ->description, ->type_data[0] should be set to
- point to the subtype to be used, ->payload should be set to point to the
- initialised data for that subtype, ->type_data[1] should point to a hex
- fingerprint and quotalen should be updated to indicate how much quota this
- key should account for.
-
- When clearing up, the data attached to ->type_data[1] and ->description
- will be kfree()'d and the data attached to ->payload will be passed to the
- subtype's ->destroy() method to be disposed of. A module reference for
- the subtype pointed to by ->type_data[0] will be put.
+ the key and attach it to ->description, ->payload[asym_subtype] should be
+ set to point to the subtype to be used, ->payload[asym_crypto] should be
+ set to point to the initialised data for that subtype,
+ ->payload[asym_key_ids] should point to one or more hex fingerprints and
+ quotalen should be updated to indicate how much quota this key should
+ account for.
+
+ When clearing up, the data attached to ->payload[asym_key_ids] and
+ ->description will be kfree()'d and the data attached to
+ ->payload[asm_crypto] will be passed to the subtype's ->destroy() method
+ to be disposed of. A module reference for the subtype pointed to by
+ ->payload[asym_subtype] will be put.
If the data format is not recognised, -EBADMSG should be returned. If it
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys.txt b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
index c9e7f4f223a5..8c183873b2b7 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys.txt
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys.txt
@@ -1049,12 +1049,12 @@ search a specific keyring, so using keyrings in this way is of limited utility.
NOTES ON ACCESSING PAYLOAD CONTENTS
===================================
-The simplest payload is just a number in key->payload.value. In this case,
-there's no need to indulge in RCU or locking when accessing the payload.
+The simplest payload is just data stored in key->payload directly. In this
+case, there's no need to indulge in RCU or locking when accessing the payload.
-More complex payload contents must be allocated and a pointer to them set in
-key->payload.data. One of the following ways must be selected to access the
-data:
+More complex payload contents must be allocated and pointers to them set in the
+key->payload.data[] array. One of the following ways must be selected to
+access the data:
(1) Unmodifiable key type.
@@ -1092,6 +1092,13 @@ data:
the payload. key->datalen cannot be relied upon to be consistent with the
payload just dereferenced if the key's semaphore is not held.
+ Note that key->payload.data[0] has a shadow that is marked for __rcu
+ usage. This is called key->payload.rcu_data0. The following accessors
+ wrap the RCU calls to this element:
+
+ rcu_assign_keypointer(struct key *key, void *data);
+ void *rcu_dereference_key(struct key *key);
+
===================
DEFINING A KEY TYPE
@@ -1143,8 +1150,7 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory:
struct key_preparsed_payload {
char *description;
- void *type_data[2];
- void *payload;
+ union key_payload payload;
const void *data;
size_t datalen;
size_t quotalen;
@@ -1160,10 +1166,9 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory:
attached as a string to the description field. This will be used for the
key description if the caller of add_key() passes NULL or "".
- The method can attach anything it likes to type_data[] and payload. These
- are merely passed along to the instantiate() or update() operations. If
- set, the expiry time will be applied to the key if it is instantiated from
- this data.
+ The method can attach anything it likes to payload. This is merely passed
+ along to the instantiate() or update() operations. If set, the expiry
+ time will be applied to the key if it is instantiated from this data.
The method should return 0 if successful or a negative error code
otherwise.
@@ -1172,11 +1177,10 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory:
(*) void (*free_preparse)(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
This method is only required if the preparse() method is provided,
- otherwise it is unused. It cleans up anything attached to the
- description, type_data and payload fields of the key_preparsed_payload
- struct as filled in by the preparse() method. It will always be called
- after preparse() returns successfully, even if instantiate() or update()
- succeed.
+ otherwise it is unused. It cleans up anything attached to the description
+ and payload fields of the key_preparsed_payload struct as filled in by the
+ preparse() method. It will always be called after preparse() returns
+ successfully, even if instantiate() or update() succeed.
(*) int (*instantiate)(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
@@ -1197,6 +1201,11 @@ The structure has a number of fields, some of which are mandatory:
It is safe to sleep in this method.
+ generic_key_instantiate() is provided to simply copy the data from
+ prep->payload.data[] to key->payload.data[], with RCU-safe assignment on
+ the first element. It will then clear prep->payload.data[] so that the
+ free_preparse method doesn't release the data.
+
(*) int (*update)(struct key *key, const void *data, size_t datalen);
diff --git a/certs/.gitignore b/certs/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..f51aea4a71ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/certs/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+#
+# Generated files
+#
+x509_certificate_list
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
index 3f5b537ab33e..1d450b580245 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
@@ -14,8 +14,3 @@ extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id);
extern int __asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id,
struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id,
size_t hexlen);
-static inline
-const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key)
-{
- return key->type_data.p[1];
-}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
index 1916680ad81b..9f2165b27d52 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
@@ -307,25 +307,34 @@ static int asymmetric_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
}
/*
+ * Clean up the key ID list
+ */
+static void asymmetric_key_free_kids(struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (kids) {
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kids->id); i++)
+ kfree(kids->id[i]);
+ kfree(kids);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* Clean up the preparse data
*/
static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = prep->type_data[0];
- struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = prep->type_data[1];
- int i;
+ struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = prep->payload.data[asym_subtype];
+ struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids];
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
if (subtype) {
- subtype->destroy(prep->payload[0]);
+ subtype->destroy(prep->payload.data[asym_crypto]);
module_put(subtype->owner);
}
- if (kids) {
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(kids->id); i++)
- kfree(kids->id[i]);
- kfree(kids);
- }
+ asymmetric_key_free_kids(kids);
kfree(prep->description);
}
@@ -335,20 +344,19 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key)
{
struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
- struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->type_data.p[1];
+ struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->payload.data[asym_key_ids];
+ void *data = key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
+
+ key->payload.data[asym_crypto] = NULL;
+ key->payload.data[asym_subtype] = NULL;
+ key->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = NULL;
if (subtype) {
- subtype->destroy(key->payload.data);
+ subtype->destroy(data);
module_put(subtype->owner);
- key->type_data.p[0] = NULL;
}
- if (kids) {
- kfree(kids->id[0]);
- kfree(kids->id[1]);
- kfree(kids);
- key->type_data.p[1] = NULL;
- }
+ asymmetric_key_free_kids(kids);
}
struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
index 81efccbe22d5..6db4c01c6503 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/public_key.c
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkey_id_type_name);
static void public_key_describe(const struct key *asymmetric_key,
struct seq_file *m)
{
- struct public_key *key = asymmetric_key->payload.data;
+ struct public_key *key = asymmetric_key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
if (key)
seq_printf(m, "%s.%s",
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(public_key_verify_signature);
static int public_key_verify_signature_2(const struct key *key,
const struct public_key_signature *sig)
{
- const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data;
+ const struct public_key *pk = key->payload.data[asym_crypto];
return public_key_verify_signature(pk, sig);
}
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
index 7525fd183574..9441240f7d2a 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/signature.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ int verify_signature(const struct key *key,
return -EINVAL;
subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
if (!subtype ||
- !key->payload.data)
+ !key->payload.data[0])
return -EINVAL;
if (!subtype->verify_signature)
return -ENOTSUPP;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
index 1de01eaec884..dbeed6018e63 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
+#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
struct x509_certificate {
struct x509_certificate *next;
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
index 197096632412..64d42981a8d7 100644
--- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
+++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
@@ -266,7 +266,8 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
if (!use_builtin_keys
|| test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
- ret = x509_check_signature(key->payload.data, cert);
+ ret = x509_check_signature(key->payload.data[asym_crypto],
+ cert);
key_put(key);
}
return ret;
@@ -352,9 +353,9 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
/* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */
__module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
- prep->type_data[0] = &public_key_subtype;
- prep->type_data[1] = kids;
- prep->payload[0] = cert->pub;
+ prep->payload.data[asym_subtype] = &public_key_subtype;
+ prep->payload.data[asym_key_ids] = kids;
+ prep->payload.data[asym_crypto] = cert->pub;
prep->description = desc;
prep->quotalen = 100;
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c
index f4cf200b3c76..6908080e9b6d 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifs_spnego.c
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ cifs_spnego_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
goto error;
/* attach the data */
- key->payload.data = payload;
+ key->payload.data[0] = payload;
ret = 0;
error:
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ error:
static void
cifs_spnego_key_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- kfree(key->payload.data);
+ kfree(key->payload.data[0]);
}
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ cifs_get_spnego_key(struct cifs_ses *sesInfo)
#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG2
if (cifsFYI && !IS_ERR(spnego_key)) {
- struct cifs_spnego_msg *msg = spnego_key->payload.data;
+ struct cifs_spnego_msg *msg = spnego_key->payload.data[0];
cifs_dump_mem("SPNEGO reply blob:", msg->data, min(1024U,
msg->secblob_len + msg->sesskey_len));
}
diff --git a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
index 1ea780bc6376..3f93125916bf 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/cifsacl.c
@@ -58,16 +58,15 @@ cifs_idmap_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
* dereference payload.data!
*/
if (prep->datalen <= sizeof(key->payload)) {
- key->payload.value = 0;
- memcpy(&key->payload.value, prep->data, prep->datalen);
- key->datalen = prep->datalen;
- return 0;
+ key->payload.data[0] = NULL;
+ memcpy(&key->payload, prep->data, prep->datalen);
+ } else {
+ payload = kmemdup(prep->data, prep->datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!payload)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ key->payload.data[0] = payload;
}
- payload = kmemdup(prep->data, prep->datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!payload)
- return -ENOMEM;
- key->payload.data = payload;
key->datalen = prep->datalen;
return 0;
}
@@ -76,7 +75,7 @@ static inline void
cifs_idmap_key_destroy(struct key *key)
{
if (key->datalen > sizeof(key->payload))
- kfree(key->payload.data);
+ kfree(key->payload.data[0]);
}
static struct key_type cifs_idmap_key_type = {
@@ -233,8 +232,8 @@ id_to_sid(unsigned int cid, uint sidtype, struct cifs_sid *ssid)
* it could be.
*/
ksid = sidkey->datalen <= sizeof(sidkey->payload) ?
- (struct cifs_sid *)&sidkey->payload.value :
- (struct cifs_sid *)sidkey->payload.data;
+ (struct cifs_sid *)&sidkey->payload :
+ (struct cifs_sid *)sidkey->payload.data[0];
ksid_size = CIFS_SID_BASE_SIZE + (ksid->num_subauth * sizeof(__le32));
if (ksid_size > sidkey->datalen) {
@@ -307,14 +306,14 @@ sid_to_id(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, struct cifs_sid *psid,
if (sidtype == SIDOWNER) {
kuid_t uid;
uid_t id;
- memcpy(&id, &sidkey->payload.value, sizeof(uid_t));
+ memcpy(&id, &sidkey->payload.data[0], sizeof(uid_t));
uid = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, id);
if (uid_valid(uid))
fuid = uid;
} else {
kgid_t gid;
gid_t id;
- memcpy(&id, &sidkey->payload.value, sizeof(gid_t));
+ memcpy(&id, &sidkey->payload.data[0], sizeof(gid_t));
gid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, id);
if (gid_valid(gid))
fgid = gid;
diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c
index 773f4dc77630..3f2228570d44 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/connect.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c
@@ -2325,13 +2325,14 @@ static int
cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses)
{
int rc = 0;
- char *desc, *delim, *payload;
+ const char *delim, *payload;
+ char *desc;
ssize_t len;
struct key *key;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = ses->server;
struct sockaddr_in *sa;
struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
- struct user_key_payload *upayload;
+ const struct user_key_payload *upayload;
desc = kmalloc(CIFSCREDS_DESC_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!desc)
@@ -2374,14 +2375,14 @@ cifs_set_cifscreds(struct smb_vol *vol, struct cifs_ses *ses)
}
down_read(&key->sem);
- upayload = key->payload.data;
+ upayload = user_key_payload(key);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(upayload)) {
rc = upayload ? PTR_ERR(upayload) : -EINVAL;
goto out_key_put;
}
/* find first : in payload */
- payload = (char *)upayload->data;
+ payload = upayload->data;
delim = strnchr(payload, upayload->datalen, ':');
cifs_dbg(FYI, "payload=%s\n", payload);
if (!delim) {
diff --git a/fs/cifs/sess.c b/fs/cifs/sess.c
index bce6fdcd5d48..59727e32ed0f 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/sess.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/sess.c
@@ -988,7 +988,7 @@ sess_auth_kerberos(struct sess_data *sess_data)
goto out;
}
- msg = spnego_key->payload.data;
+ msg = spnego_key->payload.data[0];
/*
* check version field to make sure that cifs.upcall is
* sending us a response in an expected form
diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
index ce83e2edbe0a..52d14c9cf052 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2pdu.c
@@ -660,7 +660,7 @@ ssetup_ntlmssp_authenticate:
goto ssetup_exit;
}
- msg = spnego_key->payload.data;
+ msg = spnego_key->payload.data[0];
/*
* check version field to make sure that cifs.upcall is
* sending us a response in an expected form
diff --git a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h
index 5ba029e627cc..7b39260c7bba 100644
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key_payload_data(struct key *key)
{
if (key->type == &key_type_encrypted)
return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *)
- (&((struct encrypted_key_payload *)key->payload.data)->payload_data);
+ (&((struct encrypted_key_payload *)key->payload.data[0])->payload_data);
else
return NULL;
}
@@ -117,8 +117,7 @@ ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data(struct key *key)
auth_tok = ecryptfs_get_encrypted_key_payload_data(key);
if (!auth_tok)
- return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *)
- (((struct user_key_payload *)key->payload.data)->data);
+ return (struct ecryptfs_auth_tok *)user_key_payload(key)->data;
else
return auth_tok;
}
diff --git a/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c b/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c
index 1d510c11b100..5c52c79dea46 100644
--- a/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/crypto_key.c
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ int _ext4_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
struct key *keyring_key = NULL;
struct ext4_encryption_key *master_key;
struct ext4_encryption_context ctx;
- struct user_key_payload *ukp;
+ const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
struct crypto_ablkcipher *ctfm;
const char *cipher_str;
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ retry:
}
crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = keyring_key;
BUG_ON(keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon);
- ukp = ((struct user_key_payload *)keyring_key->payload.data);
+ ukp = user_key_payload(keyring_key);
if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct ext4_encryption_key)) {
res = -EINVAL;
goto out;
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c b/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c
index 9f77de2ef317..5de2d866a25c 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/crypto_key.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ int _f2fs_get_encryption_info(struct inode *inode)
struct key *keyring_key = NULL;
struct f2fs_encryption_key *master_key;
struct f2fs_encryption_context ctx;
- struct user_key_payload *ukp;
+ const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
struct crypto_ablkcipher *ctfm;
const char *cipher_str;
char raw_key[F2FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ retry:
}
crypt_info->ci_keyring_key = keyring_key;
BUG_ON(keyring_key->type != &key_type_logon);
- ukp = ((struct user_key_payload *)keyring_key->payload.data);
+ ukp = user_key_payload(keyring_key);
if (ukp->datalen != sizeof(struct f2fs_encryption_key)) {
res = -EINVAL;
goto out;
diff --git a/fs/fscache/object-list.c b/fs/fscache/object-list.c
index 51dde817e1f2..6b028b7c4250 100644
--- a/fs/fscache/object-list.c
+++ b/fs/fscache/object-list.c
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static const struct seq_operations fscache_objlist_ops = {
static void fscache_objlist_config(struct fscache_objlist_data *data)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
- struct user_key_payload *confkey;
+ const struct user_key_payload *confkey;
unsigned long config;
struct key *key;
const char *buf;
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@ static void fscache_objlist_config(struct fscache_objlist_data *data)
config = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
- confkey = key->payload.data;
+ confkey = user_key_payload(key);
buf = confkey->data;
for (len = confkey->datalen - 1; len >= 0; len--) {
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c
index 2e4902203c35..5ba22c6b0ffa 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4idmap.c
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static ssize_t nfs_idmap_get_key(const char *name, size_t namelen,
{
const struct cred *saved_cred;
struct key *rkey;
- struct user_key_payload *payload;
+ const struct user_key_payload *payload;
ssize_t ret;
saved_cred = override_creds(id_resolver_cache);
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static ssize_t nfs_idmap_get_key(const char *name, size_t namelen,
if (ret < 0)
goto out_up;
- payload = rcu_dereference(rkey->payload.rcudata);
+ payload = user_key_payload(rkey);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(payload)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(payload);
goto out_up;
diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
index 067c242b1e15..cc2516df0efa 100644
--- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
+++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
#define _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H
#include <linux/mpi.h>
-#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
enum pkey_algo {
diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h
index 4b840e822209..4915d40d3c3c 100644
--- a/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h
+++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-subtype.h
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ struct asymmetric_key_subtype {
static inline
struct asymmetric_key_subtype *asymmetric_key_subtype(const struct key *key)
{
- return key->type_data.p[0];
+ return key->payload.data[asym_subtype];
}
#endif /* _KEYS_ASYMMETRIC_SUBTYPE_H */
diff --git a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h
index c0754abb2f56..59c1df9cf922 100644
--- a/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/asymmetric-type.h
@@ -19,6 +19,16 @@
extern struct key_type key_type_asymmetric;
/*
+ * The key payload is four words. The asymmetric-type key uses them as
+ * follows:
+ */
+enum asymmetric_payload_bits {
+ asym_crypto,
+ asym_subtype,
+ asym_key_ids,
+};
+
+/*
* Identifiers for an asymmetric key ID. We have three ways of looking up a
* key derived from an X.509 certificate:
*
@@ -58,6 +68,11 @@ extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_generate_id(const void *val_1,
size_t len_1,
const void *val_2,
size_t len_2);
+static inline
+const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key)
+{
+ return key->payload.data[asym_key_ids];
+}
/*
* The payload is at the discretion of the subtype.
diff --git a/include/keys/user-type.h b/include/keys/user-type.h
index cebefb069c44..c56fef40f53e 100644
--- a/include/keys/user-type.h
+++ b/include/keys/user-type.h
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* the payload for a key of type "user" or "logon"
@@ -46,5 +48,11 @@ extern void user_describe(const struct key *user, struct seq_file *m);
extern long user_read(const struct key *key,
char __user *buffer, size_t buflen);
+static inline const struct user_key_payload *user_key_payload(const struct key *key)
+{
+ return (struct user_key_payload *)rcu_dereference_key(key);
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
#endif /* _KEYS_USER_TYPE_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/key-type.h b/include/linux/key-type.h
index ff9f1d394235..7463355a198b 100644
--- a/include/linux/key-type.h
+++ b/include/linux/key-type.h
@@ -40,8 +40,7 @@ struct key_construction {
*/
struct key_preparsed_payload {
char *description; /* Proposed key description (or NULL) */
- void *type_data[2]; /* Private key-type data */
- void *payload[2]; /* Proposed payload */
+ union key_payload payload; /* Proposed payload */
const void *data; /* Raw data */
size_t datalen; /* Raw datalen */
size_t quotalen; /* Quota length for proposed payload */
diff --git a/include/linux/key.h b/include/linux/key.h
index e1d4715f3222..66f705243985 100644
--- a/include/linux/key.h
+++ b/include/linux/key.h
@@ -89,6 +89,11 @@ struct keyring_index_key {
size_t desc_len;
};
+union key_payload {
+ void __rcu *rcu_data0;
+ void *data[4];
+};
+
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* key reference with possession attribute handling
@@ -186,28 +191,18 @@ struct key {
};
};
- /* type specific data
- * - this is used by the keyring type to index the name
- */
- union {
- struct list_head link;
- unsigned long x[2];
- void *p[2];
- int reject_error;
- } type_data;
-
/* key data
* - this is used to hold the data actually used in cryptography or
* whatever
*/
union {
- union {
- unsigned long value;
- void __rcu *rcudata;
- void *data;
- void *data2[2];
- } payload;
- struct assoc_array keys;
+ union key_payload payload;
+ struct {
+ /* Keyring bits */
+ struct list_head name_link;
+ struct assoc_array keys;
+ };
+ int reject_error;
};
};
@@ -336,12 +331,12 @@ static inline bool key_is_instantiated(const struct key *key)
}
#define rcu_dereference_key(KEY) \
- (rcu_dereference_protected((KEY)->payload.rcudata, \
+ (rcu_dereference_protected((KEY)->payload.rcu_data0, \
rwsem_is_locked(&((struct key *)(KEY))->sem)))
#define rcu_assign_keypointer(KEY, PAYLOAD) \
do { \
- rcu_assign_pointer((KEY)->payload.rcudata, (PAYLOAD)); \
+ rcu_assign_pointer((KEY)->payload.rcu_data0, (PAYLOAD)); \
} while (0)
#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
diff --git a/kernel/.gitignore b/kernel/.gitignore
index 790d83c7d160..b3097bde4e9c 100644
--- a/kernel/.gitignore
+++ b/kernel/.gitignore
@@ -5,4 +5,3 @@ config_data.h
config_data.gz
timeconst.h
hz.bc
-x509_certificate_list
diff --git a/kernel/module_signing.c b/kernel/module_signing.c
index bd62f5cda746..6528a79d998d 100644
--- a/kernel/module_signing.c
+++ b/kernel/module_signing.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include <crypto/public_key.h>
#include "module-internal.h"
diff --git a/lib/digsig.c b/lib/digsig.c
index ae05ea393fc8..07be6c1ef4e2 100644
--- a/lib/digsig.c
+++ b/lib/digsig.c
@@ -79,12 +79,13 @@ static int digsig_verify_rsa(struct key *key,
unsigned char *out1 = NULL;
const char *m;
MPI in = NULL, res = NULL, pkey[2];
- uint8_t *p, *datap, *endp;
- struct user_key_payload *ukp;
+ uint8_t *p, *datap;
+ const uint8_t *endp;
+ const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
struct pubkey_hdr *pkh;
down_read(&key->sem);
- ukp = key->payload.data;
+ ukp = user_key_payload(key);
if (ukp->datalen < sizeof(*pkh))
goto err1;
diff --git a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c
index 54a00d66509e..78f098a20796 100644
--- a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c
+++ b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ static int get_secret(struct ceph_crypto_key *dst, const char *name) {
goto out;
}
- ckey = ukey->payload.data;
+ ckey = ukey->payload.data[0];
err = ceph_crypto_key_clone(dst, ckey);
if (err)
goto out_key;
diff --git a/net/ceph/crypto.c b/net/ceph/crypto.c
index 4440edcce0d6..42e8649c6e79 100644
--- a/net/ceph/crypto.c
+++ b/net/ceph/crypto.c
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ static int ceph_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
if (ret < 0)
goto err_ckey;
- prep->payload[0] = ckey;
+ prep->payload.data[0] = ckey;
prep->quotalen = datalen;
return 0;
@@ -549,14 +549,14 @@ err:
static void ceph_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey = prep->payload[0];
+ struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey = prep->payload.data[0];
ceph_crypto_key_destroy(ckey);
kfree(ckey);
}
static void ceph_key_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey = key->payload.data;
+ struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey = key->payload.data[0];
ceph_crypto_key_destroy(ckey);
kfree(ckey);
diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
index 31cd4fd75486..c79b85eb4d4c 100644
--- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
+++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ dns_resolver_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
goto bad_option_value;
kdebug("dns error no. = %lu", derrno);
- prep->type_data[0] = ERR_PTR(-derrno);
+ prep->payload.data[dns_key_error] = ERR_PTR(-derrno);
continue;
}
@@ -137,8 +137,8 @@ dns_resolver_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
/* don't cache the result if we're caching an error saying there's no
* result */
- if (prep->type_data[0]) {
- kleave(" = 0 [h_error %ld]", PTR_ERR(prep->type_data[0]));
+ if (prep->payload.data[dns_key_error]) {
+ kleave(" = 0 [h_error %ld]", PTR_ERR(prep->payload.data[dns_key_error]));
return 0;
}
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ dns_resolver_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
memcpy(upayload->data, data, result_len);
upayload->data[result_len] = '\0';
- prep->payload[0] = upayload;
+ prep->payload.data[dns_key_data] = upayload;
kleave(" = 0");
return 0;
}
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ static void dns_resolver_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
- kfree(prep->payload[0]);
+ kfree(prep->payload.data[dns_key_data]);
}
/*
@@ -223,10 +223,10 @@ static int dns_resolver_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
*/
static void dns_resolver_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
- int err = key->type_data.x[0];
-
seq_puts(m, key->description);
if (key_is_instantiated(key)) {
+ int err = PTR_ERR(key->payload.data[dns_key_error]);
+
if (err)
seq_printf(m, ": %d", err);
else
@@ -241,8 +241,10 @@ static void dns_resolver_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
static long dns_resolver_read(const struct key *key,
char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
{
- if (key->type_data.x[0])
- return key->type_data.x[0];
+ int err = PTR_ERR(key->payload.data[dns_key_error]);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
return user_read(key, buffer, buflen);
}
diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c b/net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c
index 39d2c39bdf87..4677b6fa6dda 100644
--- a/net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c
+++ b/net/dns_resolver/dns_query.c
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ int dns_query(const char *type, const char *name, size_t namelen,
const char *options, char **_result, time_t *_expiry)
{
struct key *rkey;
- struct user_key_payload *upayload;
+ const struct user_key_payload *upayload;
const struct cred *saved_cred;
size_t typelen, desclen;
char *desc, *cp;
@@ -137,12 +137,11 @@ int dns_query(const char *type, const char *name, size_t namelen,
goto put;
/* If the DNS server gave an error, return that to the caller */
- ret = rkey->type_data.x[0];
+ ret = PTR_ERR(rkey->payload.data[dns_key_error]);
if (ret)
goto put;
- upayload = rcu_dereference_protected(rkey->payload.data,
- lockdep_is_held(&rkey->sem));
+ upayload = user_key_payload(rkey);
len = upayload->datalen;
ret = -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/net/dns_resolver/internal.h b/net/dns_resolver/internal.h
index 7af1ed39c009..0c570d40e4d6 100644
--- a/net/dns_resolver/internal.h
+++ b/net/dns_resolver/internal.h
@@ -23,6 +23,14 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
/*
+ * Layout of key payload words.
+ */
+enum {
+ dns_key_data,
+ dns_key_error,
+};
+
+/*
* dns_key.c
*/
extern const struct cred *dns_resolver_cache;
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c b/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c
index 25d60ed15284..1f8a144a5dc2 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/af_rxrpc.c
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ struct rxrpc_call *rxrpc_kernel_begin_call(struct socket *sock,
if (!key)
key = rx->key;
- if (key && !key->payload.data)
+ if (key && !key->payload.data[0])
key = NULL; /* a no-security key */
bundle = rxrpc_get_bundle(rx, trans, key, service_id, gfp);
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c
index db0f39f5ef96..da3cc09f683e 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-key.c
@@ -148,10 +148,10 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
token->kad->ticket[6], token->kad->ticket[7]);
/* count the number of tokens attached */
- prep->type_data[0] = (void *)((unsigned long)prep->type_data[0] + 1);
+ prep->payload.data[1] = (void *)((unsigned long)prep->payload.data[1] + 1);
/* attach the data */
- for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload[0];
+ for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload.data[0];
*pptoken;
pptoken = &(*pptoken)->next)
continue;
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxk5(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep,
goto inval;
/* attach the payload */
- for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload[0];
+ for (pptoken = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload.data[0];
*pptoken;
pptoken = &(*pptoken)->next)
continue;
@@ -764,10 +764,10 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
memcpy(&token->kad->ticket, v1->ticket, v1->ticket_length);
/* count the number of tokens attached */
- prep->type_data[0] = (void *)((unsigned long)prep->type_data[0] + 1);
+ prep->payload.data[1] = (void *)((unsigned long)prep->payload.data[1] + 1);
/* attach the data */
- pp = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload[0];
+ pp = (struct rxrpc_key_token **)&prep->payload.data[0];
while (*pp)
pp = &(*pp)->next;
*pp = token;
@@ -814,7 +814,7 @@ static void rxrpc_free_token_list(struct rxrpc_key_token *token)
*/
static void rxrpc_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- rxrpc_free_token_list(prep->payload[0]);
+ rxrpc_free_token_list(prep->payload.data[0]);
}
/*
@@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
if (prep->datalen != 8)
return -EINVAL;
- memcpy(&prep->type_data, prep->data, 8);
+ memcpy(&prep->payload.data[2], prep->data, 8);
ci = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("pcbc(des)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(ci)) {
@@ -842,7 +842,7 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
if (crypto_blkcipher_setkey(ci, prep->data, 8) < 0)
BUG();
- prep->payload[0] = ci;
+ prep->payload.data[0] = ci;
_leave(" = 0");
return 0;
}
@@ -852,8 +852,8 @@ static int rxrpc_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
*/
static void rxrpc_free_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- if (prep->payload[0])
- crypto_free_blkcipher(prep->payload[0]);
+ if (prep->payload.data[0])
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(prep->payload.data[0]);
}
/*
@@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ static void rxrpc_free_preparse_s(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
*/
static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- rxrpc_free_token_list(key->payload.data);
+ rxrpc_free_token_list(key->payload.data[0]);
}
/*
@@ -869,9 +869,9 @@ static void rxrpc_destroy(struct key *key)
*/
static void rxrpc_destroy_s(struct key *key)
{
- if (key->payload.data) {
- crypto_free_blkcipher(key->payload.data);
- key->payload.data = NULL;
+ if (key->payload.data[0]) {
+ crypto_free_blkcipher(key->payload.data[0]);
+ key->payload.data[0] = NULL;
}
}
@@ -1070,7 +1070,7 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *key,
size += 1 * 4; /* token count */
ntoks = 0;
- for (token = key->payload.data; token; token = token->next) {
+ for (token = key->payload.data[0]; token; token = token->next) {
toksize = 4; /* sec index */
switch (token->security_index) {
@@ -1163,7 +1163,7 @@ static long rxrpc_read(const struct key *key,
ENCODE(ntoks);
tok = 0;
- for (token = key->payload.data; token; token = token->next) {
+ for (token = key->payload.data[0]; token; token = token->next) {
toksize = toksizes[tok++];
ENCODE(toksize);
oldxdr = xdr;
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-output.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-output.c
index c0042807bfc6..a40d3afe93b7 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/ar-output.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-output.c
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int rxrpc_client_sendmsg(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct rxrpc_transport *trans,
service_id = htons(srx->srx_service);
}
key = rx->key;
- if (key && !rx->key->payload.data)
+ if (key && !rx->key->payload.data[0])
key = NULL;
bundle = rxrpc_get_bundle(rx, trans, key, service_id,
GFP_KERNEL);
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/ar-security.c b/net/rxrpc/ar-security.c
index 49b3cc31ee1f..8334474eb26c 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/ar-security.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/ar-security.c
@@ -137,9 +137,9 @@ int rxrpc_init_client_conn_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- if (!key->payload.data)
+ token = key->payload.data[0];
+ if (!token)
return -EKEYREJECTED;
- token = key->payload.data;
sec = rxrpc_security_lookup(token->security_index);
if (!sec)
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
index f226709ebd8f..d7a9ab5a9d9c 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static int rxkad_init_connection_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
_enter("{%d},{%x}", conn->debug_id, key_serial(conn->key));
- token = conn->key->payload.data;
+ token = conn->key->payload.data[0];
conn->security_ix = token->security_index;
ci = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("pcbc(fcrypt)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static void rxkad_prime_packet_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn)
if (!conn->key)
return;
- token = conn->key->payload.data;
+ token = conn->key->payload.data[0];
memcpy(&iv, token->kad->session_key, sizeof(iv));
desc.tfm = conn->cipher;
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static int rxkad_secure_packet_encrypt(const struct rxrpc_call *call,
rxkhdr.checksum = 0;
/* encrypt from the session key */
- token = call->conn->key->payload.data;
+ token = call->conn->key->payload.data[0];
memcpy(&iv, token->kad->session_key, sizeof(iv));
desc.tfm = call->conn->cipher;
desc.info = iv.x;
@@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ static int rxkad_verify_packet_encrypt(const struct rxrpc_call *call,
skb_to_sgvec(skb, sg, 0, skb->len);
/* decrypt from the session key */
- token = call->conn->key->payload.data;
+ token = call->conn->key->payload.data[0];
memcpy(&iv, token->kad->session_key, sizeof(iv));
desc.tfm = call->conn->cipher;
desc.info = iv.x;
@@ -780,7 +780,7 @@ static int rxkad_respond_to_challenge(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
if (conn->security_level < min_level)
goto protocol_error;
- token = conn->key->payload.data;
+ token = conn->key->payload.data[0];
/* build the response packet */
memset(&resp, 0, sizeof(resp));
@@ -848,12 +848,12 @@ static int rxkad_decrypt_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
}
}
- ASSERT(conn->server_key->payload.data != NULL);
+ ASSERT(conn->server_key->payload.data[0] != NULL);
ASSERTCMP((unsigned long) ticket & 7UL, ==, 0);
- memcpy(&iv, &conn->server_key->type_data, sizeof(iv));
+ memcpy(&iv, &conn->server_key->payload.data[2], sizeof(iv));
- desc.tfm = conn->server_key->payload.data;
+ desc.tfm = conn->server_key->payload.data[0];
desc.info = iv.x;
desc.flags = 0;
diff --git a/scripts/extract-module-sig.pl b/scripts/extract-module-sig.pl
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..faac6f2e377f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/extract-module-sig.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl -w
+#
+# extract-mod-sig <part> <module-file>
+#
+# Reads the module file and writes out some or all of the signature
+# section to stdout. Part is the bit to be written and is one of:
+#
+# -0: The unsigned module, no signature data at all
+# -a: All of the signature data, including magic number
+# -d: Just the descriptor values as a sequence of numbers
+# -n: Just the signer's name
+# -k: Just the key ID
+# -s: Just the crypto signature or PKCS#7 message
+#
+use strict;
+
+die "Format: $0 -[0adnks] module-file >out\n"
+ if ($#ARGV != 1);
+
+my $part = $ARGV[0];
+my $modfile = $ARGV[1];
+
+my $magic_number = "~Module signature appended~\n";
+
+#
+# Read the module contents
+#
+open FD, "<$modfile" || die $modfile;
+binmode(FD);
+my @st = stat(FD);
+die "$modfile" unless (@st);
+my $buf = "";
+my $len = sysread(FD, $buf, $st[7]);
+die "$modfile" unless (defined($len));
+die "Short read on $modfile\n" unless ($len == $st[7]);
+close(FD) || die $modfile;
+
+print STDERR "Read ", $len, " bytes from module file\n";
+
+die "The file is too short to have a sig magic number and descriptor\n"
+ if ($len < 12 + length($magic_number));
+
+#
+# Check for the magic number and extract the information block
+#
+my $p = $len - length($magic_number);
+my $raw_magic = substr($buf, $p);
+
+die "Magic number not found at $len\n"
+ if ($raw_magic ne $magic_number);
+print STDERR "Found magic number at $len\n";
+
+$p -= 12;
+my $raw_info = substr($buf, $p, 12);
+
+my @info = unpack("CCCCCxxxN", $raw_info);
+my ($algo, $hash, $id_type, $name_len, $kid_len, $sig_len) = @info;
+
+if ($id_type == 0) {
+ print STDERR "Found PGP key identifier\n";
+} elsif ($id_type == 1) {
+ print STDERR "Found X.509 cert identifier\n";
+} elsif ($id_type == 2) {
+ print STDERR "Found PKCS#7/CMS encapsulation\n";
+} else {
+ print STDERR "Found unsupported identifier type $id_type\n";
+}
+
+#
+# Extract the three pieces of info data
+#
+die "Insufficient name+kid+sig data in file\n"
+ unless ($p >= $name_len + $kid_len + $sig_len);
+
+$p -= $sig_len;
+my $raw_sig = substr($buf, $p, $sig_len);
+$p -= $kid_len;
+my $raw_kid = substr($buf, $p, $kid_len);
+$p -= $name_len;
+my $raw_name = substr($buf, $p, $name_len);
+
+my $module_len = $p;
+
+if ($sig_len > 0) {
+ print STDERR "Found $sig_len bytes of signature [";
+ my $n = $sig_len > 16 ? 16 : $sig_len;
+ foreach my $i (unpack("C" x $n, substr($raw_sig, 0, $n))) {
+ printf STDERR "%02x", $i;
+ }
+ print STDERR "]\n";
+}
+
+if ($kid_len > 0) {
+ print STDERR "Found $kid_len bytes of key identifier [";
+ my $n = $kid_len > 16 ? 16 : $kid_len;
+ foreach my $i (unpack("C" x $n, substr($raw_kid, 0, $n))) {
+ printf STDERR "%02x", $i;
+ }
+ print STDERR "]\n";
+}
+
+if ($name_len > 0) {
+ print STDERR "Found $name_len bytes of signer's name [$raw_name]\n";
+}
+
+#
+# Produce the requested output
+#
+if ($part eq "-0") {
+ # The unsigned module, no signature data at all
+ binmode(STDOUT);
+ print substr($buf, 0, $module_len);
+} elsif ($part eq "-a") {
+ # All of the signature data, including magic number
+ binmode(STDOUT);
+ print substr($buf, $module_len);
+} elsif ($part eq "-d") {
+ # Just the descriptor values as a sequence of numbers
+ print join(" ", @info), "\n";
+} elsif ($part eq "-n") {
+ # Just the signer's name
+ print STDERR "No signer's name for PKCS#7 message type sig\n"
+ if ($id_type == 2);
+ binmode(STDOUT);
+ print $raw_name;
+} elsif ($part eq "-k") {
+ # Just the key identifier
+ print STDERR "No key ID for PKCS#7 message type sig\n"
+ if ($id_type == 2);
+ binmode(STDOUT);
+ print $raw_kid;
+} elsif ($part eq "-s") {
+ # Just the crypto signature or PKCS#7 message
+ binmode(STDOUT);
+ print $raw_sig;
+}
diff --git a/scripts/extract-sys-certs.pl b/scripts/extract-sys-certs.pl
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..d476e7d1fd88
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scripts/extract-sys-certs.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,144 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl -w
+#
+use strict;
+use Math::BigInt;
+use Fcntl "SEEK_SET";
+
+die "Format: $0 [-s <systemmap-file>] <vmlinux-file> <keyring-file>\n"
+ if ($#ARGV != 1 && $#ARGV != 3 ||
+ $#ARGV == 3 && $ARGV[0] ne "-s");
+
+my $sysmap = "";
+if ($#ARGV == 3) {
+ shift;
+ $sysmap = $ARGV[0];
+ shift;
+}
+
+my $vmlinux = $ARGV[0];
+my $keyring = $ARGV[1];
+
+#
+# Parse the vmlinux section table
+#
+open FD, "objdump -h $vmlinux |" || die $vmlinux;
+my @lines = <FD>;
+close(FD) || die $vmlinux;
+
+my @sections = ();
+
+foreach my $line (@lines) {
+ chomp($line);
+ if ($line =~ /\s*([0-9]+)\s+(\S+)\s+([0-9a-f]+)\s+([0-9a-f]+)\s+([0-9a-f]+)\s+([0-9a-f]+)\s+2[*][*]([0-9]+)/
+ ) {
+ my $seg = $1;
+ my $name = $2;
+ my $len = Math::BigInt->new("0x" . $3);
+ my $vma = Math::BigInt->new("0x" . $4);
+ my $lma = Math::BigInt->new("0x" . $5);
+ my $foff = Math::BigInt->new("0x" . $6);
+ my $align = 2 ** $7;
+
+ push @sections, { name => $name,
+ vma => $vma,
+ len => $len,
+ foff => $foff };
+ }
+}
+
+print "Have $#sections sections\n";
+
+#
+# Try and parse the vmlinux symbol table. If the vmlinux file has been created
+# from a vmlinuz file with extract-vmlinux then the symbol table will be empty.
+#
+open FD, "nm $vmlinux 2>/dev/null |" || die $vmlinux;
+@lines = <FD>;
+close(FD) || die $vmlinux;
+
+my %symbols = ();
+my $nr_symbols = 0;
+
+sub parse_symbols(@) {
+ foreach my $line (@_) {
+ chomp($line);
+ if ($line =~ /([0-9a-f]+)\s([a-zA-Z])\s(\S+)/
+ ) {
+ my $addr = "0x" . $1;
+ my $type = $2;
+ my $name = $3;
+
+ $symbols{$name} = $addr;
+ $nr_symbols++;
+ }
+ }
+}
+parse_symbols(@lines);
+
+if ($nr_symbols == 0 && $sysmap ne "") {
+ print "No symbols in vmlinux, trying $sysmap\n";
+
+ open FD, "<$sysmap" || die $sysmap;
+ @lines = <FD>;
+ close(FD) || die $sysmap;
+ parse_symbols(@lines);
+}
+
+die "No symbols available\n"
+ if ($nr_symbols == 0);
+
+print "Have $nr_symbols symbols\n";
+
+die "Can't find system certificate list"
+ unless (exists($symbols{"__cert_list_start"}) &&
+ exists($symbols{"__cert_list_end"}));
+
+my $start = Math::BigInt->new($symbols{"__cert_list_start"});
+my $end = Math::BigInt->new($symbols{"__cert_list_end"});
+my $size = $end - $start;
+
+printf "Have %u bytes of certs at VMA 0x%x\n", $size, $start;
+
+my $s = undef;
+foreach my $sec (@sections) {
+ my $s_name = $sec->{name};
+ my $s_vma = $sec->{vma};
+ my $s_len = $sec->{len};
+ my $s_foff = $sec->{foff};
+ my $s_vend = $s_vma + $s_len;
+
+ next unless ($start >= $s_vma);
+ next if ($start >= $s_vend);
+
+ die "Cert object partially overflows section $s_name\n"
+ if ($end > $s_vend);
+
+ die "Cert object in multiple sections: ", $s_name, " and ", $s->{name}, "\n"
+ if ($s);
+ $s = $sec;
+}
+
+die "Cert object not inside a section\n"
+ unless ($s);
+
+print "Certificate list in section ", $s->{name}, "\n";
+
+my $foff = $start - $s->{vma} + $s->{foff};
+
+printf "Certificate list at file offset 0x%x\n", $foff;
+
+open FD, "<$vmlinux" || die $vmlinux;
+binmode(FD);
+die $vmlinux if (!defined(sysseek(FD, $foff, SEEK_SET)));
+my $buf = "";
+my $len = sysread(FD, $buf, $size);
+die "$vmlinux" if (!defined($len));
+die "Short read on $vmlinux\n" if ($len != $size);
+close(FD) || die $vmlinux;
+
+open FD, ">$keyring" || die $keyring;
+binmode(FD);
+$len = syswrite(FD, $buf, $size);
+die "$keyring" if (!defined($len));
+die "Short write on $keyring\n" if ($len != $size);
+close(FD) || die $keyring;
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
index 159ef3ea4130..461f8d891579 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ int evm_init_key(void)
return -ENOENT;
down_read(&evm_key->sem);
- ekp = evm_key->payload.data;
+ ekp = evm_key->payload.data[0];
if (ekp->decrypted_datalen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto out;
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index b6adb94f6d52..907c1522ee46 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -21,6 +21,16 @@
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
/*
+ * Layout of key payload words.
+ */
+enum {
+ big_key_data,
+ big_key_path,
+ big_key_path_2nd_part,
+ big_key_len,
+};
+
+/*
* If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to
* hold it as the permanently resident metadata for the shmem fs will be at
* least as large as the data.
@@ -47,7 +57,7 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
*/
int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload;
+ struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
struct file *file;
ssize_t written;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
@@ -60,7 +70,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
/* Set an arbitrary quota */
prep->quotalen = 16;
- prep->type_data[1] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen;
+ prep->payload.data[big_key_len] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen;
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
/* Create a shmem file to store the data in. This will permit the data
@@ -94,7 +104,8 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
- prep->payload[0] = memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
+ prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = data;
+ memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
}
return 0;
@@ -110,10 +121,10 @@ error:
void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
- struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload;
+ struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
path_put(path);
} else {
- kfree(prep->payload[0]);
+ kfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
}
}
@@ -123,11 +134,12 @@ void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
*/
void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
{
- struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2;
+ struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
/* clear the quota */
key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
- if (key_is_instantiated(key) && key->type_data.x[1] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
+ if (key_is_instantiated(key) &&
+ (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
vfs_truncate(path, 0);
}
@@ -136,14 +148,16 @@ void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
*/
void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- if (key->type_data.x[1] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
- struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2;
+ size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
+
+ if (datalen) {
+ struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
path_put(path);
path->mnt = NULL;
path->dentry = NULL;
} else {
- kfree(key->payload.data);
- key->payload.data = NULL;
+ kfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
+ key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL;
}
}
@@ -152,12 +166,12 @@ void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
*/
void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
- unsigned long datalen = key->type_data.x[1];
+ size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
seq_puts(m, key->description);
if (key_is_instantiated(key))
- seq_printf(m, ": %lu [%s]",
+ seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]",
datalen,
datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff");
}
@@ -168,14 +182,14 @@ void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
*/
long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
{
- unsigned long datalen = key->type_data.x[1];
+ size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
long ret;
if (!buffer || buflen < datalen)
return datalen;
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
- struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2;
+ struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
struct file *file;
loff_t pos;
@@ -190,7 +204,8 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
ret = -EIO;
} else {
ret = datalen;
- if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data, datalen) != 0)
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data],
+ datalen) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 7bed4ad7cd76..927db9f35ad6 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -303,10 +303,10 @@ out:
*
* Use a user provided key to encrypt/decrypt an encrypted-key.
*/
-static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, u8 **master_key,
+static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, const u8 **master_key,
size_t *master_keylen)
{
- struct user_key_payload *upayload;
+ const struct user_key_payload *upayload;
struct key *ukey;
ukey = request_key(&key_type_user, master_desc, NULL);
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, u8 **master_key,
goto error;
down_read(&ukey->sem);
- upayload = ukey->payload.data;
+ upayload = user_key_payload(ukey);
*master_key = upayload->data;
*master_keylen = upayload->datalen;
error:
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ static int init_blkcipher_desc(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, const u8 *key,
}
static struct key *request_master_key(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
- u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
+ const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
{
struct key *mkey = NULL;
@@ -653,7 +653,7 @@ static int encrypted_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
{
struct key *mkey;
u8 derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
- u8 *master_key;
+ const u8 *master_key;
u8 *hmac;
const char *hex_encoded_data;
unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
@@ -837,7 +837,7 @@ static void encrypted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
*/
static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data;
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data[0];
struct encrypted_key_payload *new_epayload;
char *buf;
char *new_master_desc = NULL;
@@ -896,7 +896,7 @@ static long encrypted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
{
struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload;
struct key *mkey;
- u8 *master_key;
+ const u8 *master_key;
size_t master_keylen;
char derived_key[HASH_SIZE];
char *ascii_buf;
@@ -957,13 +957,13 @@ out:
*/
static void encrypted_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data;
+ struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = key->payload.data[0];
if (!epayload)
return;
memset(epayload->decrypted_data, 0, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
- kfree(key->payload.data);
+ kfree(key->payload.data[0]);
}
struct key_type key_type_encrypted = {
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h
index 8136a2d44c63..47802c0de735 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h
@@ -5,10 +5,10 @@
#if defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) || \
(defined(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS_MODULE) && defined(CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS_MODULE))
extern struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
- u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen);
+ const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen);
#else
static inline struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
- u8 **master_key,
+ const u8 **master_key,
size_t *master_keylen)
{
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c
index 013f7e5d3a2f..b5b4812dbc87 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/masterkey_trusted.c
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
* data, trusted key type data is not visible decrypted from userspace.
*/
struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
- u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
+ const u8 **master_key, size_t *master_keylen)
{
struct trusted_key_payload *tpayload;
struct key *tkey;
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ struct key *request_trusted_key(const char *trusted_desc,
goto error;
down_read(&tkey->sem);
- tpayload = tkey->payload.data;
+ tpayload = tkey->payload.data[0];
*master_key = tpayload->key;
*master_keylen = tpayload->key_len;
error:
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index aee2ec5a18fc..ab7997ded725 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
key->index_key.desc_len = desclen;
key->index_key.description = kmemdup(desc, desclen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!key->description)
+ if (!key->index_key.description)
goto no_memory_3;
atomic_set(&key->usage, 1);
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key,
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) {
/* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */
atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys);
- key->type_data.reject_error = -error;
+ key->reject_error = -error;
smp_wmb();
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags);
set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags);
@@ -1046,14 +1046,14 @@ int generic_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->quotalen);
if (ret == 0) {
- key->type_data.p[0] = prep->type_data[0];
- key->type_data.p[1] = prep->type_data[1];
- rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload[0]);
- key->payload.data2[1] = prep->payload[1];
- prep->type_data[0] = NULL;
- prep->type_data[1] = NULL;
- prep->payload[0] = NULL;
- prep->payload[1] = NULL;
+ rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload.data[0]);
+ key->payload.data[1] = prep->payload.data[1];
+ key->payload.data[2] = prep->payload.data[2];
+ key->payload.data[3] = prep->payload.data[3];
+ prep->payload.data[0] = NULL;
+ prep->payload.data[1] = NULL;
+ prep->payload.data[2] = NULL;
+ prep->payload.data[3] = NULL;
}
pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index 0b9ec78a7a7a..fb111eafcb89 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
char type[32], *description;
void *payload;
long ret;
- bool vm;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (plen > 1024 * 1024 - 1)
@@ -98,14 +97,12 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
/* pull the payload in if one was supplied */
payload = NULL;
- vm = false;
if (_payload) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!payload) {
if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
goto error2;
- vm = true;
payload = vmalloc(plen);
if (!payload)
goto error2;
@@ -138,10 +135,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
key_ref_put(keyring_ref);
error3:
- if (!vm)
- kfree(payload);
- else
- vfree(payload);
+ kvfree(payload);
error2:
kfree(description);
error:
@@ -1033,7 +1027,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_common(key_serial_t id,
if (!instkey)
goto error;
- rka = instkey->payload.data;
+ rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
goto error;
@@ -1200,7 +1194,7 @@ long keyctl_reject_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned timeout, unsigned error,
if (!instkey)
goto error;
- rka = instkey->payload.data;
+ rka = instkey->payload.data[0];
if (rka->target_key->serial != id)
goto error;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index d33437007ad2..f931ccfeefb0 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring)
if (!keyring_name_hash[bucket].next)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&keyring_name_hash[bucket]);
- list_add_tail(&keyring->type_data.link,
+ list_add_tail(&keyring->name_link,
&keyring_name_hash[bucket]);
write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
@@ -387,9 +387,9 @@ static void keyring_destroy(struct key *keyring)
if (keyring->description) {
write_lock(&keyring_name_lock);
- if (keyring->type_data.link.next != NULL &&
- !list_empty(&keyring->type_data.link))
- list_del(&keyring->type_data.link);
+ if (keyring->name_link.next != NULL &&
+ !list_empty(&keyring->name_link))
+ list_del(&keyring->name_link);
write_unlock(&keyring_name_lock);
}
@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data)
/* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */
if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) {
smp_rmb();
- ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->type_data.reject_error);
+ ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->reject_error);
kleave(" = %d [neg]", ctx->skipped_ret);
goto skipped;
}
@@ -990,7 +990,7 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check)
* that's readable and that hasn't been revoked */
list_for_each_entry(keyring,
&keyring_name_hash[bucket],
- type_data.link
+ name_link
) {
if (!kuid_has_mapping(current_user_ns(), keyring->user->uid))
continue;
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index 43b4cddbf2b3..a3f85d2a00bb 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -457,7 +457,7 @@ key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx)
down_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem);
if (key_validate(ctx->cred->request_key_auth) == 0) {
- rka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
+ rka = ctx->cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];
ctx->cred = rka->cred;
key_ref = search_process_keyrings(ctx);
@@ -647,7 +647,7 @@ try_again:
key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED);
key = NULL;
} else {
- rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
+ rka = ctx.cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];
key = rka->dest_keyring;
__key_get(key);
}
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index 486ef6fa393b..95d5cfc172c6 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring)
if (cred->request_key_auth) {
authkey = cred->request_key_auth;
down_read(&authkey->sem);
- rka = authkey->payload.data;
+ rka = authkey->payload.data[0];
if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED,
&authkey->flags))
dest_keyring =
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr)
return -ERESTARTSYS;
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) {
smp_rmb();
- return key->type_data.reject_error;
+ return key->reject_error;
}
return key_validate(key);
}
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 5d672f7580dd..4f0f112fe276 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key,
struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- key->payload.data = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data;
+ key->payload.data[0] = (struct request_key_auth *)prep->data;
return 0;
}
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *key,
static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,
struct seq_file *m)
{
- struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
+ struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];
seq_puts(m, "key:");
seq_puts(m, key->description);
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key,
static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,
char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
{
- struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
+ struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];
size_t datalen;
long ret;
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *key,
*/
static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key)
{
- struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
+ struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];
kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key)
*/
static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data;
+ struct request_key_auth *rka = key->payload.data[0];
kenter("{%d}", key->serial);
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info,
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &cred->request_key_auth->flags))
goto auth_key_revoked;
- irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data;
+ irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0];
rka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred);
rka->pid = irka->pid;
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index d3633cf17c7d..903dace648a1 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -1007,7 +1007,7 @@ static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
*/
static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data[0];
struct trusted_key_payload *new_p;
struct trusted_key_options *new_o;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
@@ -1114,12 +1114,12 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer,
*/
static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data;
+ struct trusted_key_payload *p = key->payload.data[0];
if (!p)
return;
memset(p->key, 0, p->key_len);
- kfree(key->payload.data);
+ kfree(key->payload.data[0]);
}
struct key_type key_type_trusted = {
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index 36b47bbd3d8c..28cb30f80256 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ int user_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
/* attach the data */
prep->quotalen = datalen;
- prep->payload[0] = upayload;
+ prep->payload.data[0] = upayload;
upayload->datalen = datalen;
memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen);
return 0;
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_preparse);
*/
void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- kfree(prep->payload[0]);
+ kfree(prep->payload.data[0]);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse);
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
if (ret == 0) {
/* attach the new data, displacing the old */
- zap = key->payload.data;
+ zap = key->payload.data[0];
rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload);
key->expiry = 0;
}
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_update);
*/
void user_revoke(struct key *key)
{
- struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data;
+ struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data[0];
/* clear the quota */
key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(user_revoke);
*/
void user_destroy(struct key *key)
{
- struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data;
+ struct user_key_payload *upayload = key->payload.data[0];
kfree(upayload);
}
@@ -183,10 +183,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_describe);
*/
long user_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
{
- struct user_key_payload *upayload;
+ const struct user_key_payload *upayload;
long ret;
- upayload = rcu_dereference_key(key);
+ upayload = user_key_payload(key);
ret = upayload->datalen;
/* we can return the data as is */