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| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst | 223 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst | 1 |
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diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7b410aef9c5c --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.rst @@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +=============== +Core Scheduling +=============== +Core scheduling support allows userspace to define groups of tasks that can +share a core. These groups can be specified either for security usecases (one +group of tasks don't trust another), or for performance usecases (some +workloads may benefit from running on the same core as they don't need the same +hardware resources of the shared core, or may prefer different cores if they +do share hardware resource needs). This document only describes the security +usecase. + +Security usecase +---------------- +A cross-HT attack involves the attacker and victim running on different Hyper +Threads of the same core. MDS and L1TF are examples of such attacks. The only +full mitigation of cross-HT attacks is to disable Hyper Threading (HT). Core +scheduling is a scheduler feature that can mitigate some (not all) cross-HT +attacks. It allows HT to be turned on safely by ensuring that only tasks in a +user-designated trusted group can share a core. This increase in core sharing +can also improve performance, however it is not guaranteed that performance +will always improve, though that is seen to be the case with a number of real +world workloads. In theory, core scheduling aims to perform at least as good as +when Hyper Threading is disabled. In practice, this is mostly the case though +not always: as synchronizing scheduling decisions across 2 or more CPUs in a +core involves additional overhead - especially when the system is lightly +loaded. When ``total_threads <= N_CPUS/2``, the extra overhead may cause core +scheduling to perform more poorly compared to SMT-disabled, where N_CPUS is the +total number of CPUs. Please measure the performance of your workloads always. + +Usage +----- +Core scheduling support is enabled via the ``CONFIG_SCHED_CORE`` config option. +Using this feature, userspace defines groups of tasks that can be co-scheduled +on the same core. The core scheduler uses this information to make sure that +tasks that are not in the same group never run simultaneously on a core, while +doing its best to satisfy the system's scheduling requirements. + +Core scheduling can be enabled via the ``PR_SCHED_CORE`` prctl interface. +This interface provides support for the creation of core scheduling groups, as +well as admission and removal of tasks from created groups:: + + #include <sys/prctl.h> + + int prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, + unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5); + +option: + ``PR_SCHED_CORE`` + +arg2: + Command for operation, must be one off: + + - ``PR_SCHED_CORE_GET`` -- get core_sched cookie of ``pid``. + - ``PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE`` -- create a new unique cookie for ``pid``. + - ``PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO`` -- push core_sched cookie to ``pid``. + - ``PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM`` -- pull core_sched cookie from ``pid``. + +arg3: + ``pid`` of the task for which the operation applies. + +arg4: + ``pid_type`` for which the operation applies. It is of type ``enum pid_type``. + For example, if arg4 is ``PIDTYPE_TGID``, then the operation of this command + will be performed for all tasks in the task group of ``pid``. + +arg5: + userspace pointer to an unsigned long for storing the cookie returned by + ``PR_SCHED_CORE_GET`` command. Should be 0 for all other commands. + +In order for a process to push a cookie to, or pull a cookie from a process, it +is required to have the ptrace access mode: `PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS` to the +process. + +Building hierarchies of tasks +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +The simplest way to build hierarchies of threads/processes which share a +cookie and thus a core is to rely on the fact that the core-sched cookie is +inherited across forks/clones and execs, thus setting a cookie for the +'initial' script/executable/daemon will place every spawned child in the +same core-sched group. + +Cookie Transferral +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Transferring a cookie between the current and other tasks is possible using +PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM and PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO to inherit a cookie from a +specified task or a share a cookie with a task. In combination this allows a +simple helper program to pull a cookie from a task in an existing core +scheduling group and share it with already running tasks. + +Design/Implementation +--------------------- +Each task that is tagged is assigned a cookie internally in the kernel. As +mentioned in `Usage`_, tasks with the same cookie value are assumed to trust +each other and share a core. + +The basic idea is that, every schedule event tries to select tasks for all the +siblings of a core such that all the selected tasks running on a core are +trusted (same cookie) at any point in time. Kernel threads are assumed trusted. +The idle task is considered special, as it trusts everything and everything +trusts it. + +During a schedule() event on any sibling of a core, the highest priority task on +the sibling's core is picked and assigned to the sibling calling schedule(), if +the sibling has the task enqueued. For rest of the siblings in the core, +highest priority task with the same cookie is selected if there is one runnable +in their individual run queues. If a task with same cookie is not available, +the idle task is selected. Idle task is globally trusted. + +Once a task has been selected for all the siblings in the core, an IPI is sent to +siblings for whom a new task was selected. Siblings on receiving the IPI will +switch to the new task immediately. If an idle task is selected for a sibling, +then the sibling is considered to be in a `forced idle` state. I.e., it may +have tasks on its on runqueue to run, however it will still have to run idle. +More on this in the next section. + +Forced-idling of hyperthreads +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +The scheduler tries its best to find tasks that trust each other such that all +tasks selected to be scheduled are of the highest priority in a core. However, +it is possible that some runqueues had tasks that were incompatible with the +highest priority ones in the core. Favoring security over fairness, one or more +siblings could be forced to select a lower priority task if the highest +priority task is not trusted with respect to the core wide highest priority +task. If a sibling does not have a trusted task to run, it will be forced idle +by the scheduler (idle thread is scheduled to run). + +When the highest priority task is selected to run, a reschedule-IPI is sent to +the sibling to force it into idle. This results in 4 cases which need to be +considered depending on whether a VM or a regular usermode process was running +on either HT:: + + HT1 (attack) HT2 (victim) + A idle -> user space user space -> idle + B idle -> user space guest -> idle + C idle -> guest user space -> idle + D idle -> guest guest -> idle + +Note that for better performance, we do not wait for the destination CPU +(victim) to enter idle mode. This is because the sending of the IPI would bring +the destination CPU immediately into kernel mode from user space, or VMEXIT +in the case of guests. At best, this would only leak some scheduler metadata +which may not be worth protecting. It is also possible that the IPI is received +too late on some architectures, but this has not been observed in the case of +x86. + +Trust model +~~~~~~~~~~~ +Core scheduling maintains trust relationships amongst groups of tasks by +assigning them a tag that is the same cookie value. +When a system with core scheduling boots, all tasks are considered to trust +each other. This is because the core scheduler does not have information about +trust relationships until userspace uses the above mentioned interfaces, to +communicate them. In other words, all tasks have a default cookie value of 0. +and are considered system-wide trusted. The forced-idling of siblings running +cookie-0 tasks is also avoided. + +Once userspace uses the above mentioned interfaces to group sets of tasks, tasks +within such groups are considered to trust each other, but do not trust those +outside. Tasks outside the group also don't trust tasks within. + +Limitations of core-scheduling +------------------------------ +Core scheduling tries to guarantee that only trusted tasks run concurrently on a +core. But there could be small window of time during which untrusted tasks run +concurrently or kernel could be running concurrently with a task not trusted by +kernel. + +IPI processing delays +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Core scheduling selects only trusted tasks to run together. IPI is used to notify +the siblings to switch to the new task. But there could be hardware delays in +receiving of the IPI on some arch (on x86, this has not been observed). This may +cause an attacker task to start running on a CPU before its siblings receive the +IPI. Even though cache is flushed on entry to user mode, victim tasks on siblings +may populate data in the cache and micro architectural buffers after the attacker +starts to run and this is a possibility for data leak. + +Open cross-HT issues that core scheduling does not solve +-------------------------------------------------------- +1. For MDS +~~~~~~~~~~ +Core scheduling cannot protect against MDS attacks between an HT running in +user mode and another running in kernel mode. Even though both HTs run tasks +which trust each other, kernel memory is still considered untrusted. Such +attacks are possible for any combination of sibling CPU modes (host or guest mode). + +2. For L1TF +~~~~~~~~~~~ +Core scheduling cannot protect against an L1TF guest attacker exploiting a +guest or host victim. This is because the guest attacker can craft invalid +PTEs which are not inverted due to a vulnerable guest kernel. The only +solution is to disable EPT (Extended Page Tables). + +For both MDS and L1TF, if the guest vCPU is configured to not trust each +other (by tagging separately), then the guest to guest attacks would go away. +Or it could be a system admin policy which considers guest to guest attacks as +a guest problem. + +Another approach to resolve these would be to make every untrusted task on the +system to not trust every other untrusted task. While this could reduce +parallelism of the untrusted tasks, it would still solve the above issues while +allowing system processes (trusted tasks) to share a core. + +3. Protecting the kernel (IRQ, syscall, VMEXIT) +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Unfortunately, core scheduling does not protect kernel contexts running on +sibling hyperthreads from one another. Prototypes of mitigations have been posted +to LKML to solve this, but it is debatable whether such windows are practically +exploitable, and whether the performance overhead of the prototypes are worth +it (not to mention, the added code complexity). + +Other Use cases +--------------- +The main use case for Core scheduling is mitigating the cross-HT vulnerabilities +with SMT enabled. There are other use cases where this feature could be used: + +- Isolating tasks that needs a whole core: Examples include realtime tasks, tasks + that uses SIMD instructions etc. +- Gang scheduling: Requirements for a group of tasks that needs to be scheduled + together could also be realized using core scheduling. One example is vCPUs of + a VM. diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst index ca4dbdd9016d..f12cda55538b 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst @@ -15,3 +15,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time. tsx_async_abort multihit.rst special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst + core-scheduling.rst |