diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/process')
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/process/5.Posting.rst | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/process/changes.rst | 41 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst | 26 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/process/coding-style.rst | 62 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/process/deprecated.rst | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/process/index.rst | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/process/maintainer-pgp-guide.rst | 286 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst | 4 |
9 files changed, 279 insertions, 164 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/process/5.Posting.rst b/Documentation/process/5.Posting.rst index 906235c11c24..d87f1fee4cbc 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/5.Posting.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/5.Posting.rst @@ -256,8 +256,10 @@ The tags in common use are: - Cc: the named person received a copy of the patch and had the opportunity to comment on it. -Be careful in the addition of tags to your patches: only Cc: is appropriate -for addition without the explicit permission of the person named. +Be careful in the addition of tags to your patches, as only Cc: is appropriate +for addition without the explicit permission of the person named; using +Reported-by: is fine most of the time as well, but ask for permission if +the bug was reported in private. Sending the patch diff --git a/Documentation/process/changes.rst b/Documentation/process/changes.rst index 19c286c23786..9a90197989dd 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/changes.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/changes.rst @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ you probably needn't concern yourself with pcmciautils. ====================== =============== ======================================== GNU C 5.1 gcc --version Clang/LLVM (optional) 11.0.0 clang --version +Rust (optional) 1.62.0 rustc --version +bindgen (optional) 0.56.0 bindgen --version GNU make 3.81 make --version bash 4.2 bash --version binutils 2.23 ld -v @@ -80,6 +82,29 @@ kernels. Older releases aren't guaranteed to work, and we may drop workarounds from the kernel that were used to support older versions. Please see additional docs on :ref:`Building Linux with Clang/LLVM <kbuild_llvm>`. +Rust (optional) +--------------- + +A particular version of the Rust toolchain is required. Newer versions may or +may not work because the kernel depends on some unstable Rust features, for +the moment. + +Each Rust toolchain comes with several "components", some of which are required +(like ``rustc``) and some that are optional. The ``rust-src`` component (which +is optional) needs to be installed to build the kernel. Other components are +useful for developing. + +Please see Documentation/rust/quick-start.rst for instructions on how to +satisfy the build requirements of Rust support. In particular, the ``Makefile`` +target ``rustavailable`` is useful to check why the Rust toolchain may not +be detected. + +bindgen (optional) +------------------ + +``bindgen`` is used to generate the Rust bindings to the C side of the kernel. +It depends on ``libclang``. + Make ---- @@ -348,6 +373,12 @@ Sphinx Please see :ref:`sphinx_install` in :ref:`Documentation/doc-guide/sphinx.rst <sphinxdoc>` for details about Sphinx requirements. +rustdoc +------- + +``rustdoc`` is used to generate the documentation for Rust code. Please see +Documentation/rust/general-information.rst for more information. + Getting updated software ======================== @@ -364,6 +395,16 @@ Clang/LLVM - :ref:`Getting LLVM <getting_llvm>`. +Rust +---- + +- Documentation/rust/quick-start.rst. + +bindgen +------- + +- Documentation/rust/quick-start.rst. + Make ---- diff --git a/Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst b/Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst index e899f14a4ba2..922e0b547bc3 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/code-of-conduct-interpretation.rst @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ the Technical Advisory Board (TAB) or other maintainers if you're uncertain how to handle situations that come up. It will not be considered a violation report unless you want it to be. If you are uncertain about approaching the TAB or any other maintainers, please -reach out to our conflict mediator, Mishi Choudhary <mishi@linux.com>. +reach out to our conflict mediator, Joanna Lee <joanna.lee@gesmer.com>. In the end, "be kind to each other" is really what the end goal is for everybody. We know everyone is human and we all fail at times, but the @@ -127,10 +127,12 @@ are listed at https://kernel.org/code-of-conduct.html. Members can not access reports made before they joined or after they have left the committee. -The initial Code of Conduct Committee consists of volunteer members of -the TAB, as well as a professional mediator acting as a neutral third -party. The first task of the committee is to establish documented -processes, which will be made public. +The Code of Conduct Committee consists of volunteer community members +appointed by the TAB, as well as a professional mediator acting as a +neutral third party. The processes the Code of Conduct committee will +use to address reports is varied and will depend on the individual +circumstance, however, this file serves as documentation for the +general process used. Any member of the committee, including the mediator, can be contacted directly if a reporter does not wish to include the full committee in a @@ -141,16 +143,16 @@ processes (see above) and consults with the TAB as needed and appropriate, for instance to request and receive information about the kernel community. -Any decisions by the committee will be brought to the TAB, for -implementation of enforcement with the relevant maintainers if needed. -A decision by the Code of Conduct Committee can be overturned by the TAB -by a two-thirds vote. +Any decisions regarding enforcement recommendations will be brought to +the TAB for implementation of enforcement with the relevant maintainers +if needed. A decision by the Code of Conduct Committee can be overturned +by the TAB by a two-thirds vote. At quarterly intervals, the Code of Conduct Committee and TAB will provide a report summarizing the anonymised reports that the Code of Conduct committee has received and their status, as well details of any overridden decisions including complete and identifiable voting details. -We expect to establish a different process for Code of Conduct Committee -staffing beyond the bootstrap period. This document will be updated -with that information when this occurs. +Because how we interpret and enforce the Code of Conduct will evolve over +time, this document will be updated when necessary to reflect any +changes. diff --git a/Documentation/process/coding-style.rst b/Documentation/process/coding-style.rst index 03eb53fd029a..007e49ef6cec 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/coding-style.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/coding-style.rst @@ -1186,6 +1186,68 @@ expression used. For instance: #endif /* CONFIG_SOMETHING */ +22) Do not crash the kernel +--------------------------- + +In general, the decision to crash the kernel belongs to the user, rather +than to the kernel developer. + +Avoid panic() +************* + +panic() should be used with care and primarily only during system boot. +panic() is, for example, acceptable when running out of memory during boot and +not being able to continue. + +Use WARN() rather than BUG() +**************************** + +Do not add new code that uses any of the BUG() variants, such as BUG(), +BUG_ON(), or VM_BUG_ON(). Instead, use a WARN*() variant, preferably +WARN_ON_ONCE(), and possibly with recovery code. Recovery code is not +required if there is no reasonable way to at least partially recover. + +"I'm too lazy to do error handling" is not an excuse for using BUG(). Major +internal corruptions with no way of continuing may still use BUG(), but need +good justification. + +Use WARN_ON_ONCE() rather than WARN() or WARN_ON() +************************************************** + +WARN_ON_ONCE() is generally preferred over WARN() or WARN_ON(), because it +is common for a given warning condition, if it occurs at all, to occur +multiple times. This can fill up and wrap the kernel log, and can even slow +the system enough that the excessive logging turns into its own, additional +problem. + +Do not WARN lightly +******************* + +WARN*() is intended for unexpected, this-should-never-happen situations. +WARN*() macros are not to be used for anything that is expected to happen +during normal operation. These are not pre- or post-condition asserts, for +example. Again: WARN*() must not be used for a condition that is expected +to trigger easily, for example, by user space actions. pr_warn_once() is a +possible alternative, if you need to notify the user of a problem. + +Do not worry about panic_on_warn users +************************************** + +A few more words about panic_on_warn: Remember that ``panic_on_warn`` is an +available kernel option, and that many users set this option. This is why +there is a "Do not WARN lightly" writeup, above. However, the existence of +panic_on_warn users is not a valid reason to avoid the judicious use +WARN*(). That is because, whoever enables panic_on_warn has explicitly +asked the kernel to crash if a WARN*() fires, and such users must be +prepared to deal with the consequences of a system that is somewhat more +likely to crash. + +Use BUILD_BUG_ON() for compile-time assertions +********************************************** + +The use of BUILD_BUG_ON() is acceptable and encouraged, because it is a +compile-time assertion that has no effect at runtime. + Appendix I) References ---------------------- diff --git a/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst b/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst index a6e36d9c3d14..c8fd53a11a20 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/deprecated.rst @@ -138,17 +138,20 @@ be NUL terminated. This can lead to various linear read overflows and other misbehavior due to the missing termination. It also NUL-pads the destination buffer if the source contents are shorter than the destination buffer size, which may be a needless performance penalty -for callers using only NUL-terminated strings. The safe replacement is +for callers using only NUL-terminated strings. + +When the destination is required to be NUL-terminated, the replacement is strscpy(), though care must be given to any cases where the return value of strncpy() was used, since strscpy() does not return a pointer to the destination, but rather a count of non-NUL bytes copied (or negative errno when it truncates). Any cases still needing NUL-padding should instead use strscpy_pad(). -If a caller is using non-NUL-terminated strings, strncpy() can -still be used, but destinations should be marked with the `__nonstring +If a caller is using non-NUL-terminated strings, strtomem() should be +used, and the destinations should be marked with the `__nonstring <https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Common-Variable-Attributes.html>`_ -attribute to avoid future compiler warnings. +attribute to avoid future compiler warnings. For cases still needing +NUL-padding, strtomem_pad() can be used. strlcpy() --------- diff --git a/Documentation/process/index.rst b/Documentation/process/index.rst index 2ba2a1582bbe..d4b6217472b0 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/index.rst @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ .. _process_index: +============================================= Working with the kernel development community ============================================= diff --git a/Documentation/process/maintainer-pgp-guide.rst b/Documentation/process/maintainer-pgp-guide.rst index 29e7d7b1cd44..40bfbd3b7648 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/maintainer-pgp-guide.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/maintainer-pgp-guide.rst @@ -121,57 +121,56 @@ edit your ``~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf`` file to set your own values:: to remove anything you had in place for older versions of GnuPG, as it may not be doing the right thing any more. -Set up a refresh cronjob -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - -You will need to regularly refresh your keyring in order to get the -latest changes on other people's public keys, which is best done with a -daily cronjob:: - - @daily /usr/bin/gpg2 --refresh >/dev/null 2>&1 - -Check the full path to your ``gpg`` or ``gpg2`` command and use the -``gpg2`` command if regular ``gpg`` for you is the legacy GnuPG v.1. - -.. _master_key: +.. _protect_your_key: -Protect your master PGP key -=========================== +Protect your PGP key +==================== This guide assumes that you already have a PGP key that you use for Linux kernel development purposes. If you do not yet have one, please see the "`Protecting Code Integrity`_" document mentioned earlier for guidance on how to create a new one. -You should also make a new key if your current one is weaker than 2048 bits -(RSA). - -Master key vs. Subkeys ----------------------- - -Subkeys are fully independent PGP keypairs that are tied to the "master" -key using certifying key signatures (certificates). It is important to -understand the following: - -1. There are no technical differences between the "master key" and "subkeys." -2. At creation time, we assign functional limitations to each key by - giving it specific capabilities. -3. A PGP key can have 4 capabilities: - - - **[S]** key can be used for signing - - **[E]** key can be used for encryption - - **[A]** key can be used for authentication - - **[C]** key can be used for certifying other keys - -4. A single key may have multiple capabilities. -5. A subkey is fully independent from the master key. A message - encrypted to a subkey cannot be decrypted with the master key. If you - lose your private subkey, it cannot be recreated from the master key - in any way. - -The key carrying the **[C]** (certify) capability is considered the -"master" key because it is the only key that can be used to indicate -relationship with other keys. Only the **[C]** key can be used to: +You should also make a new key if your current one is weaker than 2048 +bits (RSA). + +Understanding PGP Subkeys +------------------------- + +A PGP key rarely consists of a single keypair -- usually it is a +collection of independent subkeys that can be used for different +purposes based on their capabilities, assigned at their creation time. +PGP defines four capabilities that a key can have: + +- **[S]** keys can be used for signing +- **[E]** keys can be used for encryption +- **[A]** keys can be used for authentication +- **[C]** keys can be used for certifying other keys + +The key with the **[C]** capability is often called the "master" key, +but this terminology is misleading because it implies that the Certify +key can be used in place of any of other subkey on the same chain (like +a physical "master key" can be used to open the locks made for other +keys). Since this is not the case, this guide will refer to it as "the +Certify key" to avoid any ambiguity. + +It is critical to fully understand the following: + +1. All subkeys are fully independent from each other. If you lose a + private subkey, it cannot be restored or recreated from any other + private key on your chain. +2. With the exception of the Certify key, there can be multiple subkeys + with identical capabilities (e.g. you can have 2 valid encryption + subkeys, 3 valid signing subkeys, but only one valid certification + subkey). All subkeys are fully independent -- a message encrypted to + one **[E]** subkey cannot be decrypted with any other **[E]** subkey + you may also have. +3. A single subkey may have multiple capabilities (e.g. your **[C]** key + can also be your **[S]** key). + +The key carrying the **[C]** (certify) capability is the only key that +can be used to indicate relationship with other keys. Only the **[C]** +key can be used to: - add or revoke other keys (subkeys) with S/E/A capabilities - add, change or revoke identities (uids) associated with the key @@ -180,7 +179,7 @@ relationship with other keys. Only the **[C]** key can be used to: By default, GnuPG creates the following when generating new keys: -- A master key carrying both Certify and Sign capabilities (**[SC]**) +- One subkey carrying both Certify and Sign capabilities (**[SC]**) - A separate subkey with the Encryption capability (**[E]**) If you used the default parameters when generating your key, then that @@ -192,9 +191,6 @@ for example:: uid [ultimate] Alice Dev <adev@kernel.org> ssb rsa2048 2018-01-23 [E] [expires: 2020-01-23] -Any key carrying the **[C]** capability is your master key, regardless -of any other capabilities it may have assigned to it. - The long line under the ``sec`` entry is your key fingerprint -- whenever you see ``[fpr]`` in the examples below, that 40-character string is what it refers to. @@ -215,37 +211,30 @@ strong passphrase. To set it or change it, use:: Create a separate Signing subkey -------------------------------- -Our goal is to protect your master key by moving it to offline media, so -if you only have a combined **[SC]** key, then you should create a separate -signing subkey:: +Our goal is to protect your Certify key by moving it to offline media, +so if you only have a combined **[SC]** key, then you should create a +separate signing subkey:: $ gpg --quick-addkey [fpr] ed25519 sign -Remember to tell the keyservers about this change, so others can pull down -your new subkey:: - - $ gpg --send-key [fpr] - .. note:: ECC support in GnuPG GnuPG 2.1 and later has full support for Elliptic Curve Cryptography, with ability to combine ECC subkeys with traditional - RSA master keys. The main upside of ECC cryptography is that it is - much faster computationally and creates much smaller signatures when + RSA keys. The main upside of ECC cryptography is that it is much + faster computationally and creates much smaller signatures when compared byte for byte with 2048+ bit RSA keys. Unless you plan on using a smartcard device that does not support ECC operations, we recommend that you create an ECC signing subkey for your kernel work. - If for some reason you prefer to stay with RSA subkeys, just replace - "ed25519" with "rsa2048" in the above command. Additionally, if you - plan to use a hardware device that does not support ED25519 ECC - keys, like Nitrokey Pro or a Yubikey, then you should use - "nistp256" instead or "ed25519." + Note, that if you plan to use a hardware device that does not + support ED25519 ECC keys, you should choose "nistp256" instead or + "ed25519." -Back up your master key for disaster recovery ---------------------------------------------- +Back up your Certify key for disaster recovery +---------------------------------------------- The more signatures you have on your PGP key from other developers, the more reasons you have to create a backup version that lives on something @@ -277,9 +266,7 @@ home, such as your bank vault. Your printer is probably no longer a simple dumb device connected to your parallel port, but since the output is still encrypted with your passphrase, printing out even to "cloud-integrated" modern - printers should remain a relatively safe operation. One option is to - change the passphrase on your master key immediately after you are - done with paperkey. + printers should remain a relatively safe operation. Back up your whole GnuPG directory ---------------------------------- @@ -300,7 +287,7 @@ will use for backup purposes. You will need to encrypt them using LUKS -- refer to your distro's documentation on how to accomplish this. For the encryption passphrase, you can use the same one as on your -master key. +PGP key. Once the encryption process is over, re-insert the USB drive and make sure it gets properly mounted. Copy your entire ``.gnupg`` directory @@ -319,7 +306,7 @@ far away, because you'll need to use it every now and again for things like editing identities, adding or revoking subkeys, or signing other people's keys. -Remove the master key from your homedir +Remove the Certify key from your homedir ---------------------------------------- The files in our home directory are not as well protected as we like to @@ -334,7 +321,7 @@ think. They can be leaked or stolen via many different means: Protecting your key with a good passphrase greatly helps reduce the risk of any of the above, but passphrases can be discovered via keyloggers, shoulder-surfing, or any number of other means. For this reason, the -recommended setup is to remove your master key from your home directory +recommended setup is to remove your Certify key from your home directory and store it on offline storage. .. warning:: @@ -343,7 +330,7 @@ and store it on offline storage. your GnuPG directory in its entirety. What we are about to do will render your key useless if you do not have a usable backup! -First, identify the keygrip of your master key:: +First, identify the keygrip of your Certify key:: $ gpg --with-keygrip --list-key [fpr] @@ -359,7 +346,7 @@ The output will be something like this:: Keygrip = 3333000000000000000000000000000000000000 Find the keygrip entry that is beneath the ``pub`` line (right under the -master key fingerprint). This will correspond directly to a file in your +Certify key fingerprint). This will correspond directly to a file in your ``~/.gnupg`` directory:: $ cd ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d @@ -369,13 +356,13 @@ master key fingerprint). This will correspond directly to a file in your 3333000000000000000000000000000000000000.key All you have to do is simply remove the .key file that corresponds to -the master keygrip:: +the Certify key keygrip:: $ cd ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d $ rm 1111000000000000000000000000000000000000.key Now, if you issue the ``--list-secret-keys`` command, it will show that -the master key is missing (the ``#`` indicates it is not available):: +the Certify key is missing (the ``#`` indicates it is not available):: $ gpg --list-secret-keys sec# rsa2048 2018-01-24 [SC] [expires: 2020-01-24] @@ -404,7 +391,7 @@ file, which still contains your private keys. Move the subkeys to a dedicated crypto device ============================================= -Even though the master key is now safe from being leaked or stolen, the +Even though the Certify key is now safe from being leaked or stolen, the subkeys are still in your home directory. Anyone who manages to get their hands on those will be able to decrypt your communication or fake your signatures (if they know the passphrase). Furthermore, each time a @@ -447,7 +434,8 @@ functionality. There are several options available: - `Yubikey 5`_: proprietary hardware and software, but cheaper than Nitrokey Pro and comes available in the USB-C form that is more useful with newer laptops. Offers additional security features such as FIDO - U2F, among others, and now finally supports ECC keys (NISTP). + U2F, among others, and now finally supports NISTP and ED25519 ECC + keys. `LWN has a good review`_ of some of the above models, as well as several others. Your choice will depend on cost, shipping availability in your @@ -460,7 +448,7 @@ geographical region, and open/proprietary hardware considerations. Foundation. .. _`Nitrokey Start`: https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/product/nitrokey-start-6 -.. _`Nitrokey Pro 2`: https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/product/nitrokey-pro-2-3 +.. _`Nitrokey Pro 2`: https://shop.nitrokey.com/shop/product/nkpr2-nitrokey-pro-2-3 .. _`Yubikey 5`: https://www.yubico.com/products/yubikey-5-overview/ .. _Gnuk: https://www.fsij.org/doc-gnuk/ .. _`LWN has a good review`: https://lwn.net/Articles/736231/ @@ -627,10 +615,10 @@ Other common GnuPG operations Here is a quick reference for some common operations you'll need to do with your PGP key. -Mounting your master key offline storage -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ +Mounting your safe offline storage +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -You will need your master key for any of the operations below, so you +You will need your Certify key for any of the operations below, so you will first need to mount your backup offline storage and tell GnuPG to use it:: @@ -644,7 +632,7 @@ your regular home directory location). Extending key expiration date ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ -The master key has the default expiration date of 2 years from the date +The Certify key has the default expiration date of 2 years from the date of creation. This is done both for security reasons and to make obsolete keys eventually disappear from keyservers. @@ -685,6 +673,7 @@ remote end. .. _`Agent Forwarding over SSH`: https://wiki.gnupg.org/AgentForwarding +.. _pgp_with_git: Using PGP with Git ================== @@ -828,6 +817,63 @@ You can tell git to always sign commits:: .. _verify_identities: + +How to work with signed patches +------------------------------- + +It is possible to use your PGP key to sign patches sent to kernel +developer mailing lists. Since existing email signature mechanisms +(PGP-Mime or PGP-inline) tend to cause problems with regular code +review tasks, you should use the tool kernel.org created for this +purpose that puts cryptographic attestation signatures into message +headers (a-la DKIM): + +- `Patatt Patch Attestation`_ + +.. _`Patatt Patch Attestation`: https://pypi.org/project/patatt/ + +Installing and configuring patatt +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Patatt is packaged for many distributions already, so please check there +first. You can also install it from pypi using "``pip install patatt``". + +If you already have your PGP key configured with git (via the +``user.signingKey`` configuration parameter), then patatt requires no +further configuration. You can start signing your patches by installing +the git-send-email hook in the repository you want:: + + patatt install-hook + +Now any patches you send with ``git send-email`` will be automatically +signed with your cryptographic signature. + +Checking patatt signatures +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +If you are using ``b4`` to retrieve and apply patches, then it will +automatically attempt to verify all DKIM and patatt signatures it +encounters, for example:: + + $ b4 am 20220720205013.890942-1-broonie@kernel.org + [...] + Checking attestation on all messages, may take a moment... + --- + ✓ [PATCH v1 1/3] kselftest/arm64: Correct buffer allocation for SVE Z registers + ✓ [PATCH v1 2/3] arm64/sve: Document our actual ABI for clearing registers on syscall + ✓ [PATCH v1 3/3] kselftest/arm64: Enforce actual ABI for SVE syscalls + --- + ✓ Signed: openpgp/broonie@kernel.org + ✓ Signed: DKIM/kernel.org + +.. note:: + + Patatt and b4 are still in active development and you should check + the latest documentation for these projects for any new or updated + features. + +.. _kernel_identities: + How to verify kernel developer identities ========================================= @@ -899,65 +945,17 @@ the new default in GnuPG v2). To set it, add (or modify) the trust-model tofu+pgp -How to use keyservers (more) safely ------------------------------------ - -If you get a "No public key" error when trying to validate someone's -tag, then you should attempt to lookup that key using a keyserver. It is -important to keep in mind that there is absolutely no guarantee that the -key you retrieve from PGP keyservers belongs to the actual person -- -that much is by design. You are supposed to use the Web of Trust to -establish key validity. - -How to properly maintain the Web of Trust is beyond the scope of this -document, simply because doing it properly requires both effort and -dedication that tends to be beyond the caring threshold of most human -beings. Here are some shortcuts that will help you reduce the risk of -importing a malicious key. - -First, let's say you've tried to run ``git verify-tag`` but it returned -an error saying the key is not found:: - - $ git verify-tag sunxi-fixes-for-4.15-2 - gpg: Signature made Sun 07 Jan 2018 10:51:55 PM EST - gpg: using RSA key DA73759BF8619E484E5A3B47389A54219C0F2430 - gpg: issuer "wens@...org" - gpg: Can't check signature: No public key - -Let's query the keyserver for more info about that key fingerprint (the -fingerprint probably belongs to a subkey, so we can't use it directly -without finding out the ID of the master key it is associated with):: - - $ gpg --search DA73759BF8619E484E5A3B47389A54219C0F2430 - gpg: data source: hkp://keys.gnupg.net - (1) Chen-Yu Tsai <wens@...org> - 4096 bit RSA key C94035C21B4F2AEB, created: 2017-03-14, expires: 2019-03-15 - Keys 1-1 of 1 for "DA73759BF8619E484E5A3B47389A54219C0F2430". Enter number(s), N)ext, or Q)uit > q - -Locate the ID of the master key in the output, in our example -``C94035C21B4F2AEB``. Now display the key of Linus Torvalds that you -have on your keyring:: - - $ gpg --list-key torvalds@kernel.org - pub rsa2048 2011-09-20 [SC] - ABAF11C65A2970B130ABE3C479BE3E4300411886 - uid [ unknown] Linus Torvalds <torvalds@kernel.org> - sub rsa2048 2011-09-20 [E] - -Next, find a trust path from Linus Torvalds to the key-id you found via ``gpg ---search`` of the unknown key. For this, you can use several tools including -https://github.com/mricon/wotmate, -https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/docs/kernel/pgpkeys.git/tree/graphs, and -https://the.earth.li/~noodles/pathfind.html. - -If you get a few decent trust paths, then it's a pretty good indication -that it is a valid key. You can add it to your keyring from the -keyserver now:: - - $ gpg --recv-key C94035C21B4F2AEB - -This process is not perfect, and you are obviously trusting the -administrators of the PGP Pathfinder service to not be malicious (in -fact, this goes against :ref:`devs_not_infra`). However, if you -do not carefully maintain your own web of trust, then it is a marked -improvement over blindly trusting keyservers. +Using the kernel.org web of trust repository +-------------------------------------------- + +Kernel.org maintains a git repository with developers' public keys as a +replacement for replicating keyserver networks that have gone mostly +dark in the past few years. The full documentation for how to set up +that repository as your source of public keys can be found here: + +- `Kernel developer PGP Keyring`_ + +If you are a kernel developer, please consider submitting your key for +inclusion into that keyring. + +.. _`Kernel developer PGP Keyring`: https://korg.docs.kernel.org/pgpkeys.html diff --git a/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst b/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst index c61865e91f52..2fd8aa593a28 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst @@ -97,6 +97,12 @@ text, like this: commit <sha1> upstream. +or alternatively: + +.. code-block:: none + + [ Upstream commit <sha1> ] + Additionally, some patches submitted via :ref:`option_1` may have additional patch prerequisites which can be cherry-picked. This can be specified in the following format in the sign-off area: diff --git a/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst b/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst index be49d8f2601b..7dc94555417d 100644 --- a/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst +++ b/Documentation/process/submitting-patches.rst @@ -715,8 +715,8 @@ references. .. _backtraces: -Backtraces in commit mesages -^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ +Backtraces in commit messages +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ Backtraces help document the call chain leading to a problem. However, not all backtraces are helpful. For example, early boot call chains are |