diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/configs/tiny.config | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 69 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c | 4 |
5 files changed, 25 insertions, 63 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index c580d8c33562..2a1f0ce7c59a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ config X86 select ARCH_DISCARD_MEMBLOCK select ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE if ACPI select ARCH_HAS_ATOMIC64_DEC_IF_POSITIVE - select ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS select ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED select ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE select ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/tiny.config b/arch/x86/configs/tiny.config index 4e2ecfa23c15..4b429df40d7a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/configs/tiny.config +++ b/arch/x86/configs/tiny.config @@ -1 +1,3 @@ CONFIG_NOHIGHMEM=y +# CONFIG_HIGHMEM4G is not set +# CONFIG_HIGHMEM64G is not set diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h index a0ae610b9280..c3f291195294 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -697,43 +697,14 @@ unsigned long __must_check _copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long __must_check _copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned n); -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS -# define copy_user_diag __compiletime_error -#else -# define copy_user_diag __compiletime_warning -#endif - -extern void copy_user_diag("copy_from_user() buffer size is too small") -copy_from_user_overflow(void); -extern void copy_user_diag("copy_to_user() buffer size is too small") -copy_to_user_overflow(void) __asm__("copy_from_user_overflow"); - -#undef copy_user_diag - -#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS - -extern void -__compiletime_warning("copy_from_user() buffer size is not provably correct") -__copy_from_user_overflow(void) __asm__("copy_from_user_overflow"); -#define __copy_from_user_overflow(size, count) __copy_from_user_overflow() - -extern void -__compiletime_warning("copy_to_user() buffer size is not provably correct") -__copy_to_user_overflow(void) __asm__("copy_from_user_overflow"); -#define __copy_to_user_overflow(size, count) __copy_to_user_overflow() - -#else +extern void __compiletime_error("usercopy buffer size is too small") +__bad_copy_user(void); -static inline void -__copy_from_user_overflow(int size, unsigned long count) +static inline void copy_user_overflow(int size, unsigned long count) { WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected (%d < %lu)!\n", size, count); } -#define __copy_to_user_overflow __copy_from_user_overflow - -#endif - static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) { @@ -743,31 +714,13 @@ copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) kasan_check_write(to, n); - /* - * While we would like to have the compiler do the checking for us - * even in the non-constant size case, any false positives there are - * a problem (especially when DEBUG_STRICT_USER_COPY_CHECKS, but even - * without - the [hopefully] dangerous looking nature of the warning - * would make people go look at the respecitive call sites over and - * over again just to find that there's no problem). - * - * And there are cases where it's just not realistic for the compiler - * to prove the count to be in range. For example when multiple call - * sites of a helper function - perhaps in different source files - - * all doing proper range checking, yet the helper function not doing - * so again. - * - * Therefore limit the compile time checking to the constant size - * case, and do only runtime checking for non-constant sizes. - */ - if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) { check_object_size(to, n, false); n = _copy_from_user(to, from, n); - } else if (__builtin_constant_p(n)) - copy_from_user_overflow(); + } else if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) + copy_user_overflow(sz, n); else - __copy_from_user_overflow(sz, n); + __bad_copy_user(); return n; } @@ -781,21 +734,17 @@ copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) might_fault(); - /* See the comment in copy_from_user() above. */ if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) { check_object_size(from, n, true); n = _copy_to_user(to, from, n); - } else if (__builtin_constant_p(n)) - copy_to_user_overflow(); + } else if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) + copy_user_overflow(sz, n); else - __copy_to_user_overflow(sz, n); + __bad_copy_user(); return n; } -#undef __copy_from_user_overflow -#undef __copy_to_user_overflow - /* * We rely on the nested NMI work to allow atomic faults from the NMI path; the * nested NMI paths are careful to preserve CR2. diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c index f5c69d8974e1..b81fe2d63e15 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c @@ -669,6 +669,17 @@ static void init_amd_gh(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_AMD_TLB_MMATCH); } +#define MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG 0xC0011029 + +static void init_amd_ln(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) +{ + /* + * Apply erratum 665 fix unconditionally so machines without a BIOS + * fix work. + */ + msr_set_bit(MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, 31); +} + static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) { u64 value; @@ -726,6 +737,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) case 6: init_amd_k7(c); break; case 0xf: init_amd_k8(c); break; case 0x10: init_amd_gh(c); break; + case 0x12: init_amd_ln(c); break; case 0x15: init_amd_bd(c); break; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c index ad5bc9578a73..1acfd76e3e26 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c @@ -56,12 +56,12 @@ asm (".pushsection .entry.text, \"ax\"\n" ".popsection"); /* identity function, which can be inlined */ -u32 _paravirt_ident_32(u32 x) +u32 notrace _paravirt_ident_32(u32 x) { return x; } -u64 _paravirt_ident_64(u64 x) +u64 notrace _paravirt_ident_64(u64 x) { return x; } |