diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 36 |
3 files changed, 45 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h index 7f57382afee4..93ed60080cfe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h @@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u32 asid, bool immut int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level); void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages); void kdump_sev_callback(void); +void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void); #else static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; } static inline int snp_lookup_rmpentry(u64 pfn, bool *assigned, int *level) { return -ENODEV; } @@ -282,6 +283,7 @@ static inline int rmp_make_private(u64 pfn, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u32 as static inline int rmp_make_shared(u64 pfn, enum pg_level level) { return -ENODEV; } static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {} static inline void kdump_sev_callback(void) { } +static inline void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void) {} #endif #endif diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c index 6f3b3e028718..0a120d85d7bb 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c @@ -102,6 +102,13 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_setup_arch(void) phys_addr_t total_mem = memblock_phys_mem_size(); unsigned long size; + /* + * Do RMP table fixups after the e820 tables have been setup by + * e820__memory_setup(). + */ + if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)) + snp_fixup_e820_tables(); + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return; diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c index ab0e8448bb6e..0ae10535c699 100644 --- a/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c @@ -163,6 +163,42 @@ bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) return true; } +static void __init __snp_fixup_e820_tables(u64 pa) +{ + if (IS_ALIGNED(pa, PMD_SIZE)) + return; + + /* + * Handle cases where the RMP table placement by the BIOS is not + * 2M aligned and the kexec kernel could try to allocate + * from within that chunk which then causes a fatal RMP fault. + * + * The e820_table needs to be updated as it is converted to + * kernel memory resources and used by KEXEC_FILE_LOAD syscall + * to load kexec segments. + * + * The e820_table_firmware needs to be updated as it is exposed + * to sysfs and used by the KEXEC_LOAD syscall to load kexec + * segments. + * + * The e820_table_kexec needs to be updated as it passed to + * the kexec-ed kernel. + */ + pa = ALIGN_DOWN(pa, PMD_SIZE); + if (e820__mapped_any(pa, pa + PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM)) { + pr_info("Reserving start/end of RMP table on a 2MB boundary [0x%016llx]\n", pa); + e820__range_update(pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED); + e820__range_update_table(e820_table_kexec, pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED); + e820__range_update_table(e820_table_firmware, pa, PMD_SIZE, E820_TYPE_RAM, E820_TYPE_RESERVED); + } +} + +void __init snp_fixup_e820_tables(void) +{ + __snp_fixup_e820_tables(probed_rmp_base); + __snp_fixup_e820_tables(probed_rmp_base + probed_rmp_size); +} + /* * Do the necessary preparations which are verified by the firmware as * described in the SNP_INIT_EX firmware command description in the SNP |