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-rw-r--r--fs/namei.c511
1 files changed, 380 insertions, 131 deletions
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index de74ad2bc6e2..216f16e74351 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -259,7 +259,24 @@ void putname(struct filename *name)
__putname(name);
}
-static int check_acl(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+/**
+ * check_acl - perform ACL permission checking
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @inode: inode to check permissions on
+ * @mask: right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC ...)
+ *
+ * This function performs the ACL permission checking. Since this function
+ * retrieve POSIX acls it needs to know whether it is called from a blocking or
+ * non-blocking context and thus cares about the MAY_NOT_BLOCK bit.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
+ */
+static int check_acl(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL
struct posix_acl *acl;
@@ -271,14 +288,14 @@ static int check_acl(struct inode *inode, int mask)
/* no ->get_acl() calls in RCU mode... */
if (is_uncached_acl(acl))
return -ECHILD;
- return posix_acl_permission(inode, acl, mask);
+ return posix_acl_permission(mnt_userns, inode, acl, mask);
}
acl = get_acl(inode, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS);
if (IS_ERR(acl))
return PTR_ERR(acl);
if (acl) {
- int error = posix_acl_permission(inode, acl, mask);
+ int error = posix_acl_permission(mnt_userns, inode, acl, mask);
posix_acl_release(acl);
return error;
}
@@ -287,18 +304,31 @@ static int check_acl(struct inode *inode, int mask)
return -EAGAIN;
}
-/*
- * This does the basic UNIX permission checking.
+/**
+ * acl_permission_check - perform basic UNIX permission checking
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @inode: inode to check permissions on
+ * @mask: right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC ...)
+ *
+ * This function performs the basic UNIX permission checking. Since this
+ * function may retrieve POSIX acls it needs to know whether it is called from a
+ * blocking or non-blocking context and thus cares about the MAY_NOT_BLOCK bit.
*
- * Note that the POSIX ACL check cares about the MAY_NOT_BLOCK bit,
- * for RCU walking.
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
*/
-static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+static int acl_permission_check(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
unsigned int mode = inode->i_mode;
+ kuid_t i_uid;
/* Are we the owner? If so, ACL's don't matter */
- if (likely(uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid))) {
+ i_uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
+ if (likely(uid_eq(current_fsuid(), i_uid))) {
mask &= 7;
mode >>= 6;
return (mask & ~mode) ? -EACCES : 0;
@@ -306,7 +336,7 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask)
/* Do we have ACL's? */
if (IS_POSIXACL(inode) && (mode & S_IRWXG)) {
- int error = check_acl(inode, mask);
+ int error = check_acl(mnt_userns, inode, mask);
if (error != -EAGAIN)
return error;
}
@@ -320,7 +350,8 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask)
* about? Need to check group ownership if so.
*/
if (mask & (mode ^ (mode >> 3))) {
- if (in_group_p(inode->i_gid))
+ kgid_t kgid = i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
+ if (in_group_p(kgid))
mode >>= 3;
}
@@ -330,6 +361,7 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask)
/**
* generic_permission - check for access rights on a Posix-like filesystem
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: inode to check access rights for
* @mask: right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC,
* %MAY_NOT_BLOCK ...)
@@ -342,25 +374,33 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct inode *inode, int mask)
* generic_permission is rcu-walk aware. It returns -ECHILD in case an rcu-walk
* request cannot be satisfied (eg. requires blocking or too much complexity).
* It would then be called again in ref-walk mode.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
*/
-int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+int generic_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode,
+ int mask)
{
int ret;
/*
* Do the basic permission checks.
*/
- ret = acl_permission_check(inode, mask);
+ ret = acl_permission_check(mnt_userns, inode, mask);
if (ret != -EACCES)
return ret;
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
/* DACs are overridable for directories */
if (!(mask & MAY_WRITE))
- if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode,
+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode,
CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
- if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode,
+ CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -370,7 +410,8 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
*/
mask &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC;
if (mask == MAY_READ)
- if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode,
+ CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
/*
* Read/write DACs are always overridable.
@@ -378,31 +419,38 @@ int generic_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
* at least one exec bit set.
*/
if (!(mask & MAY_EXEC) || (inode->i_mode & S_IXUGO))
- if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
+ if (capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode,
+ CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_permission);
-/*
+/**
+ * do_inode_permission - UNIX permission checking
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @inode: inode to check permissions on
+ * @mask: right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC ...)
+ *
* We _really_ want to just do "generic_permission()" without
* even looking at the inode->i_op values. So we keep a cache
* flag in inode->i_opflags, that says "this has not special
* permission function, use the fast case".
*/
-static inline int do_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+static inline int do_inode_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
if (unlikely(!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_FASTPERM))) {
if (likely(inode->i_op->permission))
- return inode->i_op->permission(inode, mask);
+ return inode->i_op->permission(mnt_userns, inode, mask);
/* This gets set once for the inode lifetime */
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
inode->i_opflags |= IOP_FASTPERM;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
}
- return generic_permission(inode, mask);
+ return generic_permission(mnt_userns, inode, mask);
}
/**
@@ -427,8 +475,9 @@ static int sb_permission(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode, int mask)
/**
* inode_permission - Check for access rights to a given inode
- * @inode: Inode to check permission on
- * @mask: Right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC)
+ * @mnt_userns: User namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @inode: Inode to check permission on
+ * @mask: Right to check for (%MAY_READ, %MAY_WRITE, %MAY_EXEC)
*
* Check for read/write/execute permissions on an inode. We use fs[ug]id for
* this, letting us set arbitrary permissions for filesystem access without
@@ -436,7 +485,8 @@ static int sb_permission(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode, int mask)
*
* When checking for MAY_APPEND, MAY_WRITE must also be set in @mask.
*/
-int inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+int inode_permission(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
int retval;
@@ -456,11 +506,11 @@ int inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
* written back improperly if their true value is unknown
* to the vfs.
*/
- if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(inode))
+ if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(mnt_userns, inode))
return -EACCES;
}
- retval = do_inode_permission(inode, mask);
+ retval = do_inode_permission(mnt_userns, inode, mask);
if (retval)
return retval;
@@ -960,11 +1010,16 @@ int sysctl_protected_regular __read_mostly;
*/
static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inode)
{
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns;
+ kuid_t i_uid;
+
if (!sysctl_protected_symlinks)
return 0;
+ mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(nd->path.mnt);
+ i_uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode);
/* Allowed if owner and follower match. */
- if (uid_eq(current_cred()->fsuid, inode->i_uid))
+ if (uid_eq(current_cred()->fsuid, i_uid))
return 0;
/* Allowed if parent directory not sticky and world-writable. */
@@ -972,7 +1027,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inod
return 0;
/* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */
- if (uid_valid(nd->dir_uid) && uid_eq(nd->dir_uid, inode->i_uid))
+ if (uid_valid(nd->dir_uid) && uid_eq(nd->dir_uid, i_uid))
return 0;
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
@@ -985,6 +1040,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inod
/**
* safe_hardlink_source - Check for safe hardlink conditions
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @inode: the source inode to hardlink from
*
* Return false if at least one of the following conditions:
@@ -995,7 +1051,8 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inod
*
* Otherwise returns true.
*/
-static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
+static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *inode)
{
umode_t mode = inode->i_mode;
@@ -1012,7 +1069,7 @@ static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
return false;
/* Hardlinking to unreadable or unwritable sources is dangerous. */
- if (inode_permission(inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))
+ if (inode_permission(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE))
return false;
return true;
@@ -1020,6 +1077,7 @@ static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
/**
* may_linkat - Check permissions for creating a hardlink
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @link: the source to hardlink from
*
* Block hardlink when all of:
@@ -1028,14 +1086,21 @@ static bool safe_hardlink_source(struct inode *inode)
* - hardlink source is unsafe (see safe_hardlink_source() above)
* - not CAP_FOWNER in a namespace with the inode owner uid mapped
*
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
+ *
* Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error.
*/
-int may_linkat(struct path *link)
+int may_linkat(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct path *link)
{
struct inode *inode = link->dentry->d_inode;
/* Inode writeback is not safe when the uid or gid are invalid. */
- if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
+ if (!uid_valid(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)) ||
+ !gid_valid(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)))
return -EOVERFLOW;
if (!sysctl_protected_hardlinks)
@@ -1044,7 +1109,8 @@ int may_linkat(struct path *link)
/* Source inode owner (or CAP_FOWNER) can hardlink all they like,
* otherwise, it must be a safe source.
*/
- if (safe_hardlink_source(inode) || inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
+ if (safe_hardlink_source(mnt_userns, inode) ||
+ inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
return 0;
audit_log_path_denied(AUDIT_ANOM_LINK, "linkat");
@@ -1055,6 +1121,7 @@ int may_linkat(struct path *link)
* may_create_in_sticky - Check whether an O_CREAT open in a sticky directory
* should be allowed, or not, on files that already
* exist.
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @dir_mode: mode bits of directory
* @dir_uid: owner of directory
* @inode: the inode of the file to open
@@ -1070,16 +1137,25 @@ int may_linkat(struct path *link)
* the directory doesn't have to be world writable: being group writable will
* be enough.
*
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
+ *
* Returns 0 if the open is allowed, -ve on error.
*/
-static int may_create_in_sticky(umode_t dir_mode, kuid_t dir_uid,
- struct inode * const inode)
+static int may_create_in_sticky(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct nameidata *nd, struct inode *const inode)
{
+ umode_t dir_mode = nd->dir_mode;
+ kuid_t dir_uid = nd->dir_uid;
+
if ((!sysctl_protected_fifos && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode)) ||
(!sysctl_protected_regular && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) ||
likely(!(dir_mode & S_ISVTX)) ||
- uid_eq(inode->i_uid, dir_uid) ||
- uid_eq(current_fsuid(), inode->i_uid))
+ uid_eq(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode), dir_uid) ||
+ uid_eq(current_fsuid(), i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)))
return 0;
if (likely(dir_mode & 0002) ||
@@ -1569,14 +1645,15 @@ static struct dentry *lookup_slow(const struct qstr *name,
return res;
}
-static inline int may_lookup(struct nameidata *nd)
+static inline int may_lookup(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct nameidata *nd)
{
if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) {
- int err = inode_permission(nd->inode, MAY_EXEC|MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
+ int err = inode_permission(mnt_userns, nd->inode, MAY_EXEC|MAY_NOT_BLOCK);
if (err != -ECHILD || !try_to_unlazy(nd))
return err;
}
- return inode_permission(nd->inode, MAY_EXEC);
+ return inode_permission(mnt_userns, nd->inode, MAY_EXEC);
}
static int reserve_stack(struct nameidata *nd, struct path *link, unsigned seq)
@@ -2122,11 +2199,13 @@ static int link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd)
/* At this point we know we have a real path component. */
for(;;) {
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns;
const char *link;
u64 hash_len;
int type;
- err = may_lookup(nd);
+ mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(nd->path.mnt);
+ err = may_lookup(mnt_userns, nd);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -2174,7 +2253,7 @@ static int link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd)
OK:
/* pathname or trailing symlink, done */
if (!depth) {
- nd->dir_uid = nd->inode->i_uid;
+ nd->dir_uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, nd->inode);
nd->dir_mode = nd->inode->i_mode;
nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT;
return 0;
@@ -2511,7 +2590,7 @@ static int lookup_one_len_common(const char *name, struct dentry *base,
return err;
}
- return inode_permission(base->d_inode, MAY_EXEC);
+ return inode_permission(&init_user_ns, base->d_inode, MAY_EXEC);
}
/**
@@ -2656,15 +2735,16 @@ int user_path_at_empty(int dfd, const char __user *name, unsigned flags,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(user_path_at_empty);
-int __check_sticky(struct inode *dir, struct inode *inode)
+int __check_sticky(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
+ struct inode *inode)
{
kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid();
- if (uid_eq(inode->i_uid, fsuid))
+ if (uid_eq(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode), fsuid))
return 0;
- if (uid_eq(dir->i_uid, fsuid))
+ if (uid_eq(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, dir), fsuid))
return 0;
- return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_FOWNER);
+ return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FOWNER);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_sticky);
@@ -2688,7 +2768,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(__check_sticky);
* 11. We don't allow removal of NFS sillyrenamed files; it's handled by
* nfs_async_unlink().
*/
-static int may_delete(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *victim, bool isdir)
+static int may_delete(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *victim, bool isdir)
{
struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(victim);
int error;
@@ -2700,19 +2781,21 @@ static int may_delete(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *victim, bool isdir)
BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir);
/* Inode writeback is not safe when the uid or gid are invalid. */
- if (!uid_valid(inode->i_uid) || !gid_valid(inode->i_gid))
+ if (!uid_valid(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)) ||
+ !gid_valid(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)))
return -EOVERFLOW;
audit_inode_child(dir, victim, AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE);
- error = inode_permission(dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
+ error = inode_permission(mnt_userns, dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
if (error)
return error;
if (IS_APPEND(dir))
return -EPERM;
- if (check_sticky(dir, inode) || IS_APPEND(inode) ||
- IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_SWAPFILE(inode) || HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(inode))
+ if (check_sticky(mnt_userns, dir, inode) || IS_APPEND(inode) ||
+ IS_IMMUTABLE(inode) || IS_SWAPFILE(inode) ||
+ HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(mnt_userns, inode))
return -EPERM;
if (isdir) {
if (!d_is_dir(victim))
@@ -2737,7 +2820,8 @@ static int may_delete(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *victim, bool isdir)
* 4. We should have write and exec permissions on dir
* 5. We can't do it if dir is immutable (done in permission())
*/
-static inline int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *child)
+static inline int may_create(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *dir, struct dentry *child)
{
struct user_namespace *s_user_ns;
audit_inode_child(dir, child, AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_CREATE);
@@ -2746,10 +2830,10 @@ static inline int may_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *child)
if (IS_DEADDIR(dir))
return -ENOENT;
s_user_ns = dir->i_sb->s_user_ns;
- if (!kuid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, current_fsuid()) ||
- !kgid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, current_fsgid()))
+ if (!kuid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, fsuid_into_mnt(mnt_userns)) ||
+ !kgid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, fsgid_into_mnt(mnt_userns)))
return -EOVERFLOW;
- return inode_permission(dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
+ return inode_permission(mnt_userns, dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
}
/*
@@ -2796,10 +2880,26 @@ void unlock_rename(struct dentry *p1, struct dentry *p2)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(unlock_rename);
-int vfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
- bool want_excl)
+/**
+ * vfs_create - create new file
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @dir: inode of @dentry
+ * @dentry: pointer to dentry of the base directory
+ * @mode: mode of the new file
+ * @want_excl: whether the file must not yet exist
+ *
+ * Create a new file.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
+ */
+int vfs_create(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, bool want_excl)
{
- int error = may_create(dir, dentry);
+ int error = may_create(mnt_userns, dir, dentry);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -2810,7 +2910,7 @@ int vfs_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
error = security_inode_create(dir, dentry, mode);
if (error)
return error;
- error = dir->i_op->create(dir, dentry, mode, want_excl);
+ error = dir->i_op->create(mnt_userns, dir, dentry, mode, want_excl);
if (!error)
fsnotify_create(dir, dentry);
return error;
@@ -2822,7 +2922,7 @@ int vfs_mkobj(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,
void *arg)
{
struct inode *dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
- int error = may_create(dir, dentry);
+ int error = may_create(&init_user_ns, dir, dentry);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -2844,7 +2944,8 @@ bool may_open_dev(const struct path *path)
!(path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_iflags & SB_I_NODEV);
}
-static int may_open(const struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
+static int may_open(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, const struct path *path,
+ int acc_mode, int flag)
{
struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -2879,7 +2980,7 @@ static int may_open(const struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
break;
}
- error = inode_permission(inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);
+ error = inode_permission(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -2894,13 +2995,13 @@ static int may_open(const struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
}
/* O_NOATIME can only be set by the owner or superuser */
- if (flag & O_NOATIME && !inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
+ if (flag & O_NOATIME && !inode_owner_or_capable(mnt_userns, inode))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
-static int handle_truncate(struct file *filp)
+static int handle_truncate(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct file *filp)
{
const struct path *path = &filp->f_path;
struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
@@ -2914,7 +3015,7 @@ static int handle_truncate(struct file *filp)
if (!error)
error = security_path_truncate(path);
if (!error) {
- error = do_truncate(path->dentry, 0,
+ error = do_truncate(mnt_userns, path->dentry, 0,
ATTR_MTIME|ATTR_CTIME|ATTR_OPEN,
filp);
}
@@ -2929,7 +3030,9 @@ static inline int open_to_namei_flags(int flag)
return flag;
}
-static int may_o_create(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
+static int may_o_create(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
+ umode_t mode)
{
struct user_namespace *s_user_ns;
int error = security_path_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, 0);
@@ -2937,11 +3040,12 @@ static int may_o_create(const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t m
return error;
s_user_ns = dir->dentry->d_sb->s_user_ns;
- if (!kuid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, current_fsuid()) ||
- !kgid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, current_fsgid()))
+ if (!kuid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, fsuid_into_mnt(mnt_userns)) ||
+ !kgid_has_mapping(s_user_ns, fsgid_into_mnt(mnt_userns)))
return -EOVERFLOW;
- error = inode_permission(dir->dentry->d_inode, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
+ error = inode_permission(mnt_userns, dir->dentry->d_inode,
+ MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -3020,6 +3124,7 @@ static struct dentry *lookup_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct file *file,
const struct open_flags *op,
bool got_write)
{
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns;
struct dentry *dir = nd->path.dentry;
struct inode *dir_inode = dir->d_inode;
int open_flag = op->open_flag;
@@ -3067,13 +3172,15 @@ static struct dentry *lookup_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct file *file,
*/
if (unlikely(!got_write))
open_flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
+ mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(nd->path.mnt);
if (open_flag & O_CREAT) {
if (open_flag & O_EXCL)
open_flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
if (!IS_POSIXACL(dir->d_inode))
mode &= ~current_umask();
if (likely(got_write))
- create_error = may_o_create(&nd->path, dentry, mode);
+ create_error = may_o_create(mnt_userns, &nd->path,
+ dentry, mode);
else
create_error = -EROFS;
}
@@ -3108,8 +3215,9 @@ static struct dentry *lookup_open(struct nameidata *nd, struct file *file,
error = -EACCES;
goto out_dput;
}
- error = dir_inode->i_op->create(dir_inode, dentry, mode,
- open_flag & O_EXCL);
+
+ error = dir_inode->i_op->create(mnt_userns, dir_inode, dentry,
+ mode, open_flag & O_EXCL);
if (error)
goto out_dput;
}
@@ -3213,6 +3321,7 @@ finish_lookup:
static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
struct file *file, const struct open_flags *op)
{
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns;
int open_flag = op->open_flag;
bool do_truncate;
int acc_mode;
@@ -3225,12 +3334,13 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
}
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED))
audit_inode(nd->name, nd->path.dentry, 0);
+ mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(nd->path.mnt);
if (open_flag & O_CREAT) {
if ((open_flag & O_EXCL) && !(file->f_mode & FMODE_CREATED))
return -EEXIST;
if (d_is_dir(nd->path.dentry))
return -EISDIR;
- error = may_create_in_sticky(nd->dir_mode, nd->dir_uid,
+ error = may_create_in_sticky(mnt_userns, nd,
d_backing_inode(nd->path.dentry));
if (unlikely(error))
return error;
@@ -3250,13 +3360,13 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
return error;
do_truncate = true;
}
- error = may_open(&nd->path, acc_mode, open_flag);
+ error = may_open(mnt_userns, &nd->path, acc_mode, open_flag);
if (!error && !(file->f_mode & FMODE_OPENED))
error = vfs_open(&nd->path, file);
if (!error)
error = ima_file_check(file, op->acc_mode);
if (!error && do_truncate)
- error = handle_truncate(file);
+ error = handle_truncate(mnt_userns, file);
if (unlikely(error > 0)) {
WARN_ON(1);
error = -EINVAL;
@@ -3266,7 +3376,23 @@ static int do_open(struct nameidata *nd,
return error;
}
-struct dentry *vfs_tmpfile(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, int open_flag)
+/**
+ * vfs_tmpfile - create tmpfile
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @dentry: pointer to dentry of the base directory
+ * @mode: mode of the new tmpfile
+ * @open_flags: flags
+ *
+ * Create a temporary file.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
+ */
+struct dentry *vfs_tmpfile(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, int open_flag)
{
struct dentry *child = NULL;
struct inode *dir = dentry->d_inode;
@@ -3274,7 +3400,7 @@ struct dentry *vfs_tmpfile(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, int open_flag)
int error;
/* we want directory to be writable */
- error = inode_permission(dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
+ error = inode_permission(mnt_userns, dir, MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC);
if (error)
goto out_err;
error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -3284,7 +3410,7 @@ struct dentry *vfs_tmpfile(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, int open_flag)
child = d_alloc(dentry, &slash_name);
if (unlikely(!child))
goto out_err;
- error = dir->i_op->tmpfile(dir, child, mode);
+ error = dir->i_op->tmpfile(mnt_userns, dir, child, mode);
if (error)
goto out_err;
error = -ENOENT;
@@ -3296,7 +3422,7 @@ struct dentry *vfs_tmpfile(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, int open_flag)
inode->i_state |= I_LINKABLE;
spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
}
- ima_post_create_tmpfile(inode);
+ ima_post_create_tmpfile(mnt_userns, inode);
return child;
out_err:
@@ -3309,6 +3435,7 @@ static int do_tmpfile(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags,
const struct open_flags *op,
struct file *file)
{
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns;
struct dentry *child;
struct path path;
int error = path_lookupat(nd, flags | LOOKUP_DIRECTORY, &path);
@@ -3317,7 +3444,8 @@ static int do_tmpfile(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags,
error = mnt_want_write(path.mnt);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out;
- child = vfs_tmpfile(path.dentry, op->mode, op->open_flag);
+ mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(path.mnt);
+ child = vfs_tmpfile(mnt_userns, path.dentry, op->mode, op->open_flag);
error = PTR_ERR(child);
if (IS_ERR(child))
goto out2;
@@ -3325,7 +3453,7 @@ static int do_tmpfile(struct nameidata *nd, unsigned flags,
path.dentry = child;
audit_inode(nd->name, child, 0);
/* Don't check for other permissions, the inode was just created */
- error = may_open(&path, 0, op->open_flag);
+ error = may_open(mnt_userns, &path, 0, op->open_flag);
if (!error)
error = vfs_open(&path, file);
out2:
@@ -3527,10 +3655,27 @@ inline struct dentry *user_path_create(int dfd, const char __user *pathname,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(user_path_create);
-int vfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
+/**
+ * vfs_mknod - create device node or file
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @dir: inode of @dentry
+ * @dentry: pointer to dentry of the base directory
+ * @mode: mode of the new device node or file
+ * @dev: device number of device to create
+ *
+ * Create a device node or file.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
+ */
+int vfs_mknod(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
{
bool is_whiteout = S_ISCHR(mode) && dev == WHITEOUT_DEV;
- int error = may_create(dir, dentry);
+ int error = may_create(mnt_userns, dir, dentry);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -3550,7 +3695,7 @@ int vfs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
if (error)
return error;
- error = dir->i_op->mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
+ error = dir->i_op->mknod(mnt_userns, dir, dentry, mode, dev);
if (!error)
fsnotify_create(dir, dentry);
return error;
@@ -3577,6 +3722,7 @@ static int may_mknod(umode_t mode)
static long do_mknodat(int dfd, const char __user *filename, umode_t mode,
unsigned int dev)
{
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct path path;
int error;
@@ -3595,18 +3741,22 @@ retry:
error = security_path_mknod(&path, dentry, mode, dev);
if (error)
goto out;
+
+ mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(path.mnt);
switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
case 0: case S_IFREG:
- error = vfs_create(path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,true);
+ error = vfs_create(mnt_userns, path.dentry->d_inode,
+ dentry, mode, true);
if (!error)
- ima_post_path_mknod(dentry);
+ ima_post_path_mknod(mnt_userns, dentry);
break;
case S_IFCHR: case S_IFBLK:
- error = vfs_mknod(path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,
- new_decode_dev(dev));
+ error = vfs_mknod(mnt_userns, path.dentry->d_inode,
+ dentry, mode, new_decode_dev(dev));
break;
case S_IFIFO: case S_IFSOCK:
- error = vfs_mknod(path.dentry->d_inode,dentry,mode,0);
+ error = vfs_mknod(mnt_userns, path.dentry->d_inode,
+ dentry, mode, 0);
break;
}
out:
@@ -3629,9 +3779,25 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(mknod, const char __user *, filename, umode_t, mode, unsigned, d
return do_mknodat(AT_FDCWD, filename, mode, dev);
}
-int vfs_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
+/**
+ * vfs_mkdir - create directory
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @dir: inode of @dentry
+ * @dentry: pointer to dentry of the base directory
+ * @mode: mode of the new directory
+ *
+ * Create a directory.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
+ */
+int vfs_mkdir(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
{
- int error = may_create(dir, dentry);
+ int error = may_create(mnt_userns, dir, dentry);
unsigned max_links = dir->i_sb->s_max_links;
if (error)
@@ -3648,7 +3814,7 @@ int vfs_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
if (max_links && dir->i_nlink >= max_links)
return -EMLINK;
- error = dir->i_op->mkdir(dir, dentry, mode);
+ error = dir->i_op->mkdir(mnt_userns, dir, dentry, mode);
if (!error)
fsnotify_mkdir(dir, dentry);
return error;
@@ -3670,8 +3836,12 @@ retry:
if (!IS_POSIXACL(path.dentry->d_inode))
mode &= ~current_umask();
error = security_path_mkdir(&path, dentry, mode);
- if (!error)
- error = vfs_mkdir(path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, mode);
+ if (!error) {
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns;
+ mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(path.mnt);
+ error = vfs_mkdir(mnt_userns, path.dentry->d_inode, dentry,
+ mode);
+ }
done_path_create(&path, dentry);
if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
@@ -3690,9 +3860,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(mkdir, const char __user *, pathname, umode_t, mode)
return do_mkdirat(AT_FDCWD, pathname, mode);
}
-int vfs_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+/**
+ * vfs_rmdir - remove directory
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @dir: inode of @dentry
+ * @dentry: pointer to dentry of the base directory
+ *
+ * Remove a directory.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
+ */
+int vfs_rmdir(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry)
{
- int error = may_delete(dir, dentry, 1);
+ int error = may_delete(mnt_userns, dir, dentry, 1);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -3732,6 +3917,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_rmdir);
long do_rmdir(int dfd, struct filename *name)
{
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns;
int error = 0;
struct dentry *dentry;
struct path path;
@@ -3772,7 +3958,8 @@ retry:
error = security_path_rmdir(&path, dentry);
if (error)
goto exit3;
- error = vfs_rmdir(path.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
+ mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(path.mnt);
+ error = vfs_rmdir(mnt_userns, path.dentry->d_inode, dentry);
exit3:
dput(dentry);
exit2:
@@ -3795,6 +3982,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(rmdir, const char __user *, pathname)
/**
* vfs_unlink - unlink a filesystem object
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
* @dir: parent directory
* @dentry: victim
* @delegated_inode: returns victim inode, if the inode is delegated.
@@ -3810,11 +3998,18 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(rmdir, const char __user *, pathname)
* Alternatively, a caller may pass NULL for delegated_inode. This may
* be appropriate for callers that expect the underlying filesystem not
* to be NFS exported.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
*/
-int vfs_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode **delegated_inode)
+int vfs_unlink(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry, struct inode **delegated_inode)
{
struct inode *target = dentry->d_inode;
- int error = may_delete(dir, dentry, 0);
+ int error = may_delete(mnt_userns, dir, dentry, 0);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -3885,6 +4080,8 @@ retry_deleg:
dentry = __lookup_hash(&last, path.dentry, lookup_flags);
error = PTR_ERR(dentry);
if (!IS_ERR(dentry)) {
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns;
+
/* Why not before? Because we want correct error value */
if (last.name[last.len])
goto slashes;
@@ -3895,7 +4092,9 @@ retry_deleg:
error = security_path_unlink(&path, dentry);
if (error)
goto exit2;
- error = vfs_unlink(path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, &delegated_inode);
+ mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(path.mnt);
+ error = vfs_unlink(mnt_userns, path.dentry->d_inode, dentry,
+ &delegated_inode);
exit2:
dput(dentry);
}
@@ -3944,9 +4143,25 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(unlink, const char __user *, pathname)
return do_unlinkat(AT_FDCWD, getname(pathname));
}
-int vfs_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *oldname)
+/**
+ * vfs_symlink - create symlink
+ * @mnt_userns: user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @dir: inode of @dentry
+ * @dentry: pointer to dentry of the base directory
+ * @oldname: name of the file to link to
+ *
+ * Create a symlink.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
+ */
+int vfs_symlink(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *dentry, const char *oldname)
{
- int error = may_create(dir, dentry);
+ int error = may_create(mnt_userns, dir, dentry);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -3958,7 +4173,7 @@ int vfs_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *oldname)
if (error)
return error;
- error = dir->i_op->symlink(dir, dentry, oldname);
+ error = dir->i_op->symlink(mnt_userns, dir, dentry, oldname);
if (!error)
fsnotify_create(dir, dentry);
return error;
@@ -3984,8 +4199,13 @@ retry:
goto out_putname;
error = security_path_symlink(&path, dentry, from->name);
- if (!error)
- error = vfs_symlink(path.dentry->d_inode, dentry, from->name);
+ if (!error) {
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns;
+
+ mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(path.mnt);
+ error = vfs_symlink(mnt_userns, path.dentry->d_inode, dentry,
+ from->name);
+ }
done_path_create(&path, dentry);
if (retry_estale(error, lookup_flags)) {
lookup_flags |= LOOKUP_REVAL;
@@ -4010,6 +4230,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(symlink, const char __user *, oldname, const char __user *, newn
/**
* vfs_link - create a new link
* @old_dentry: object to be linked
+ * @mnt_userns: the user namespace of the mount
* @dir: new parent
* @new_dentry: where to create the new link
* @delegated_inode: returns inode needing a delegation break
@@ -4025,8 +4246,16 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(symlink, const char __user *, oldname, const char __user *, newn
* Alternatively, a caller may pass NULL for delegated_inode. This may
* be appropriate for callers that expect the underlying filesystem not
* to be NFS exported.
+ *
+ * If the inode has been found through an idmapped mount the user namespace of
+ * the vfsmount must be passed through @mnt_userns. This function will then take
+ * care to map the inode according to @mnt_userns before checking permissions.
+ * On non-idmapped mounts or if permission checking is to be performed on the
+ * raw inode simply passs init_user_ns.
*/
-int vfs_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, struct inode **delegated_inode)
+int vfs_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct user_namespace *mnt_userns,
+ struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
+ struct inode **delegated_inode)
{
struct inode *inode = old_dentry->d_inode;
unsigned max_links = dir->i_sb->s_max_links;
@@ -4035,7 +4264,7 @@ int vfs_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_de
if (!inode)
return -ENOENT;
- error = may_create(dir, new_dentry);
+ error = may_create(mnt_userns, dir, new_dentry);
if (error)
return error;
@@ -4052,7 +4281,7 @@ int vfs_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_de
* be writen back improperly if their true value is unknown to
* the vfs.
*/
- if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(inode))
+ if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(mnt_userns, inode))
return -EPERM;
if (!dir->i_op->link)
return -EPERM;
@@ -4099,6 +4328,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_link);
static int do_linkat(int olddfd, const char __user *oldname, int newdfd,
const char __user *newname, int flags)
{
+ struct user_namespace *mnt_userns;
struct dentry *new_dentry;
struct path old_path, new_path;
struct inode *delegated_inode = NULL;
@@ -4134,13 +4364,15 @@ retry:
error = -EXDEV;
if (old_path.mnt != new_path.mnt)
goto out_dput;
- error = may_linkat(&old_path);
+ mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(new_path.mnt);
+ error = may_linkat(mnt_userns, &old_path);
if (unlikely(error))
goto out_dput;
error = security_path_link(old_path.dentry, &new_path, new_dentry);
if (error)
goto out_dput;
- error = vfs_link(old_path.dentry, new_path.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry, &delegated_inode);
+ error = vfs_link(old_path.dentry, mnt_userns, new_path.dentry->d_inode,
+ new_dentry, &delegated_inode);
out_dput:
done_path_create(&new_path, new_dentry);
if (delegated_inode) {
@@ -4174,12 +4406,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(link, const char __user *, oldname, const char __user *, newname
/**
* vfs_rename - rename a filesystem object
- * @old_dir: parent of source
- * @old_dentry: source
- * @new_dir: parent of destination
- * @new_dentry: destination
- * @delegated_inode: returns an inode needing a delegation break
- * @flags: rename flags
+ * @old_mnt_userns: old user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @old_dir: parent of source
+ * @old_dentry: source
+ * @new_mnt_userns: new user namespace of the mount the inode was found from
+ * @new_dir: parent of destination
+ * @new_dentry: destination
+ * @delegated_inode: returns an inode needing a delegation break
+ * @flags: rename flags
*
* The caller must hold multiple mutexes--see lock_rename()).
*
@@ -4222,11 +4456,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(link, const char __user *, oldname, const char __user *, newname
* ->i_mutex on parents, which works but leads to some truly excessive
* locking].
*/
-int vfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
- struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
- struct inode **delegated_inode, unsigned int flags)
+int vfs_rename(struct renamedata *rd)
{
int error;
+ struct inode *old_dir = rd->old_dir, *new_dir = rd->new_dir;
+ struct dentry *old_dentry = rd->old_dentry;
+ struct dentry *new_dentry = rd->new_dentry;
+ struct inode **delegated_inode = rd->delegated_inode;
+ unsigned int flags = rd->flags;
bool is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
struct inode *source = old_dentry->d_inode;
struct inode *target = new_dentry->d_inode;
@@ -4237,19 +4474,21 @@ int vfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
if (source == target)
return 0;
- error = may_delete(old_dir, old_dentry, is_dir);
+ error = may_delete(rd->old_mnt_userns, old_dir, old_dentry, is_dir);
if (error)
return error;
if (!target) {
- error = may_create(new_dir, new_dentry);
+ error = may_create(rd->new_mnt_userns, new_dir, new_dentry);
} else {
new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
if (!(flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE))
- error = may_delete(new_dir, new_dentry, is_dir);
+ error = may_delete(rd->new_mnt_userns, new_dir,
+ new_dentry, is_dir);
else
- error = may_delete(new_dir, new_dentry, new_is_dir);
+ error = may_delete(rd->new_mnt_userns, new_dir,
+ new_dentry, new_is_dir);
}
if (error)
return error;
@@ -4263,12 +4502,14 @@ int vfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
*/
if (new_dir != old_dir) {
if (is_dir) {
- error = inode_permission(source, MAY_WRITE);
+ error = inode_permission(rd->old_mnt_userns, source,
+ MAY_WRITE);
if (error)
return error;
}
if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && new_is_dir) {
- error = inode_permission(target, MAY_WRITE);
+ error = inode_permission(rd->new_mnt_userns, target,
+ MAY_WRITE);
if (error)
return error;
}
@@ -4308,8 +4549,8 @@ int vfs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
if (error)
goto out;
}
- error = old_dir->i_op->rename(old_dir, old_dentry,
- new_dir, new_dentry, flags);
+ error = old_dir->i_op->rename(rd->new_mnt_userns, old_dir, old_dentry,
+ new_dir, new_dentry, flags);
if (error)
goto out;
@@ -4350,6 +4591,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(vfs_rename);
int do_renameat2(int olddfd, struct filename *from, int newdfd,
struct filename *to, unsigned int flags)
{
+ struct renamedata rd;
struct dentry *old_dentry, *new_dentry;
struct dentry *trap;
struct path old_path, new_path;
@@ -4453,9 +4695,16 @@ retry_deleg:
&new_path, new_dentry, flags);
if (error)
goto exit5;
- error = vfs_rename(old_path.dentry->d_inode, old_dentry,
- new_path.dentry->d_inode, new_dentry,
- &delegated_inode, flags);
+
+ rd.old_dir = old_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ rd.old_dentry = old_dentry;
+ rd.old_mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(old_path.mnt);
+ rd.new_dir = new_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ rd.new_dentry = new_dentry;
+ rd.new_mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(new_path.mnt);
+ rd.delegated_inode = &delegated_inode;
+ rd.flags = flags;
+ error = vfs_rename(&rd);
exit5:
dput(new_dentry);
exit4:
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-14 09:10:12 +0000