diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4/tcp_input.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 62 |
1 files changed, 39 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c index bcb55d98004c..df7b13f0e5e0 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c @@ -202,23 +202,17 @@ static void bpf_skops_established(struct sock *sk, int bpf_op, } #endif -static void tcp_gro_dev_warn(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, - unsigned int len) +static __cold void tcp_gro_dev_warn(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, + unsigned int len) { - static bool __once __read_mostly; + struct net_device *dev; - if (!__once) { - struct net_device *dev; - - __once = true; - - rcu_read_lock(); - dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif); - if (!dev || len >= dev->mtu) - pr_warn("%s: Driver has suspect GRO implementation, TCP performance may be compromised.\n", - dev ? dev->name : "Unknown driver"); - rcu_read_unlock(); - } + rcu_read_lock(); + dev = dev_get_by_index_rcu(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif); + if (!dev || len >= READ_ONCE(dev->mtu)) + pr_warn("%s: Driver has suspect GRO implementation, TCP performance may be compromised.\n", + dev ? dev->name : "Unknown driver"); + rcu_read_unlock(); } /* Adapt the MSS value used to make delayed ack decision to the @@ -250,9 +244,8 @@ static void tcp_measure_rcv_mss(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss = min_t(unsigned int, len, tcp_sk(sk)->advmss); /* Account for possibly-removed options */ - if (unlikely(len > icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss + - MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE)) - tcp_gro_dev_warn(sk, skb, len); + DO_ONCE_LITE_IF(len > icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss + MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE, + tcp_gro_dev_warn, sk, skb, len); /* If the skb has a len of exactly 1*MSS and has the PSH bit * set then it is likely the end of an application write. So * more data may not be arriving soon, and yet the data sender @@ -3871,8 +3864,12 @@ static int tcp_ack(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb, int flag) * then we can probably ignore it. */ if (before(ack, prior_snd_una)) { + u32 max_window; + + /* do not accept ACK for bytes we never sent. */ + max_window = min_t(u64, tp->max_window, tp->bytes_acked); /* RFC 5961 5.2 [Blind Data Injection Attack].[Mitigation] */ - if (before(ack, prior_snd_una - tp->max_window)) { + if (before(ack, prior_snd_una - max_window)) { if (!(flag & FLAG_NO_CHALLENGE_ACK)) tcp_send_challenge_ack(sk); return -SKB_DROP_REASON_TCP_TOO_OLD_ACK; @@ -4364,6 +4361,23 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_do_parse_auth_options); * up to bandwidth of 18Gigabit/sec. 8) ] */ +/* Estimates max number of increments of remote peer TSval in + * a replay window (based on our current RTO estimation). + */ +static u32 tcp_tsval_replay(const struct sock *sk) +{ + /* If we use usec TS resolution, + * then expect the remote peer to use the same resolution. + */ + if (tcp_sk(sk)->tcp_usec_ts) + return inet_csk(sk)->icsk_rto * (USEC_PER_SEC / HZ); + + /* RFC 7323 recommends a TSval clock between 1ms and 1sec. + * We know that some OS (including old linux) can use 1200 Hz. + */ + return inet_csk(sk)->icsk_rto * 1200 / HZ; +} + static int tcp_disordered_ack(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) { const struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk); @@ -4371,7 +4385,7 @@ static int tcp_disordered_ack(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) u32 seq = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq; u32 ack = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq; - return (/* 1. Pure ACK with correct sequence number. */ + return /* 1. Pure ACK with correct sequence number. */ (th->ack && seq == TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq && seq == tp->rcv_nxt) && /* 2. ... and duplicate ACK. */ @@ -4381,7 +4395,8 @@ static int tcp_disordered_ack(const struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb) !tcp_may_update_window(tp, ack, seq, ntohs(th->window) << tp->rx_opt.snd_wscale) && /* 4. ... and sits in replay window. */ - (s32)(tp->rx_opt.ts_recent - tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsval) <= (inet_csk(sk)->icsk_rto * 1024) / HZ); + (s32)(tp->rx_opt.ts_recent - tp->rx_opt.rcv_tsval) <= + tcp_tsval_replay(sk); } static inline bool tcp_paws_discard(const struct sock *sk, @@ -7182,11 +7197,12 @@ int tcp_conn_request(struct request_sock_ops *rsk_ops, if (tcp_parse_auth_options(tcp_hdr(skb), NULL, &aoh)) goto drop_and_release; /* Invalid TCP options */ if (aoh) { - tcp_rsk(req)->maclen = aoh->length - sizeof(struct tcp_ao_hdr); + tcp_rsk(req)->used_tcp_ao = true; tcp_rsk(req)->ao_rcv_next = aoh->keyid; tcp_rsk(req)->ao_keyid = aoh->rnext_keyid; + } else { - tcp_rsk(req)->maclen = 0; + tcp_rsk(req)->used_tcp_ao = false; } #endif tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn = isn; |