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* Linux 3.16.85v3.16.85linux-3.16.yBen Hutchings2020-06-111-1/+1
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* fs/binfmt_elf.c: allocate initialized memory in fill_thread_core_info()Alexander Potapenko2020-06-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 1d605416fb7175e1adf094251466caa52093b413 upstream. KMSAN reported uninitialized data being written to disk when dumping core. As a result, several kilobytes of kmalloc memory may be written to the core file and then read by a non-privileged user. Reported-by: sam <sunhaoyl@outlook.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200419100848.63472-1-glider@google.com Link: https://github.com/google/kmsan/issues/76 Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* random: always use batched entropy for get_random_u{32,64}Jason A. Donenfeld2020-06-111-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 69efea712f5b0489e67d07565aad5c94e09a3e52 upstream. It turns out that RDRAND is pretty slow. Comparing these two constructions: for (i = 0; i < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(ret)) arch_get_random_long(&ret); and long buf[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(long)]; extract_crng((u8 *)buf); it amortizes out to 352 cycles per long for the top one and 107 cycles per long for the bottom one, on Coffee Lake Refresh, Intel Core i9-9880H. And importantly, the top one has the drawback of not benefiting from the real rng, whereas the bottom one has all the nice benefits of using our own chacha rng. As get_random_u{32,64} gets used in more places (perhaps beyond what it was originally intended for when it was introduced as get_random_{int,long} back in the md5 monstrosity era), it seems like it might be a good thing to strengthen its posture a tiny bit. Doing this should only be stronger and not any weaker because that pool is already initialized with a bunch of rdrand data (when available). This way, we get the benefits of the hardware rng as well as our own rng. Another benefit of this is that we no longer hit pitfalls of the recent stream of AMD bugs in RDRAND. One often used code pattern for various things is: do { val = get_random_u32(); } while (hash_table_contains_key(val)); That recent AMD bug rendered that pattern useless, whereas we're really very certain that chacha20 output will give pretty distributed numbers, no matter what. So, this simplification seems better both from a security perspective and from a performance perspective. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200221201037.30231-1-Jason@zx2c4.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: Only get_random_int() exists here] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* x86/speculation: Add Ivy Bridge to affected listJosh Poimboeuf2020-06-111-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | commit 3798cc4d106e91382bfe016caa2edada27c2bb3f upstream. Make the docs match the code. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* x86/speculation: Add SRBDS vulnerability and mitigation documentationMark Gross2020-06-111-0/+148
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 7222a1b5b87417f22265c92deea76a6aecd0fb0f upstream. Add documentation for the SRBDS vulnerability and its mitigation. [ bp: Massage. jpoimboe: sysfs table strings. ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigationMark Gross2020-06-118-0/+173
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 7e5b3c267d256822407a22fdce6afdf9cd13f9fb upstream. SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the random number generator (RNG) across cores and threads. New microcode serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for reuse. While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL. The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom. * Enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using either mitigations=off or srbds=off. * Export vulnerability status via sysfs * Rename file-scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations. [ bp: Massage, - s/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPING/VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS/g, - do not read arch cap MSR a second time in tsx_fused_off() - just pass it in, - flip check in cpu_set_bug_bits() to save an indentation level, - reflow comments. jpoimboe: s/Mitigated/Mitigation/ in user-visible strings tglx: Dropped the fused off magic for now ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Tested-by: Neelima Krishnan <neelima.krishnan@intel.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - CPU feature words and bugs are numbered differently - Adjust filename for <asm/msr-index.h>] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* x86/cpu: Add 'table' argument to cpu_matches()Mark Gross2020-06-111-10/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 93920f61c2ad7edb01e63323832585796af75fc9 upstream. To make cpu_matches() reusable for other matching tables, have it take a pointer to a x86_cpu_id table as an argument. [ bp: Flip arguments order. ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* x86/cpu: Add a steppings field to struct x86_cpu_idMark Gross2020-06-113-1/+39
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e9d7144597b10ff13ff2264c059f7d4a7fbc89ac upstream. Intel uses the same family/model for several CPUs. Sometimes the stepping must be checked to tell them apart. On x86 there can be at most 16 steppings. Add a steppings bitmask to x86_cpu_id and a X86_MATCH_VENDOR_FAMILY_MODEL_STEPPING_FEATURE macro and support for matching against family/model/stepping. [ bp: Massage. tglx: Lightweight variant for backporting ] Signed-off-by: Mark Gross <mgross@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* x86/cpu: Rename cpu_data.x86_mask to cpu_data.x86_steppingJia Zhang2020-06-1133-69/+69
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit b399151cb48db30ad1e0e93dd40d68c6d007b637 upstream. x86_mask is a confusing name which is hard to associate with the processor's stepping. Additionally, correct an indent issue in lib/cpu.c. Signed-off-by: Jia Zhang <qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com> [ Updated it to more recent kernels. ] Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: tony.luck@intel.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1514771530-70829-1-git-send-email-qianyue.zj@alibaba-inc.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Drop changes in arch/x86/lib/cpu.c - Adjust filenames, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* ext4: add cond_resched() to ext4_protect_reserved_inodeShijie Luo2020-06-111-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit af133ade9a40794a37104ecbcc2827c0ea373a3c upstream. When journal size is set too big by "mkfs.ext4 -J size=", or when we mount a crafted image to make journal inode->i_size too big, the loop, "while (i < num)", holds cpu too long. This could cause soft lockup. [ 529.357541] Call trace: [ 529.357551] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x198 [ 529.357555] show_stack+0x24/0x30 [ 529.357562] dump_stack+0xa4/0xcc [ 529.357568] watchdog_timer_fn+0x300/0x3e8 [ 529.357574] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x114/0x358 [ 529.357576] hrtimer_interrupt+0x104/0x2d8 [ 529.357580] arch_timer_handler_virt+0x38/0x58 [ 529.357584] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x90/0x248 [ 529.357588] generic_handle_irq+0x34/0x50 [ 529.357590] __handle_domain_irq+0x68/0xc0 [ 529.357593] gic_handle_irq+0x6c/0x150 [ 529.357595] el1_irq+0xb8/0x140 [ 529.357599] __ll_sc_atomic_add_return_acquire+0x14/0x20 [ 529.357668] ext4_map_blocks+0x64/0x5c0 [ext4] [ 529.357693] ext4_setup_system_zone+0x330/0x458 [ext4] [ 529.357717] ext4_fill_super+0x2170/0x2ba8 [ext4] [ 529.357722] mount_bdev+0x1a8/0x1e8 [ 529.357746] ext4_mount+0x44/0x58 [ext4] [ 529.357748] mount_fs+0x50/0x170 [ 529.357752] vfs_kern_mount.part.9+0x54/0x188 [ 529.357755] do_mount+0x5ac/0xd78 [ 529.357758] ksys_mount+0x9c/0x118 [ 529.357760] __arm64_sys_mount+0x28/0x38 [ 529.357764] el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130 [ 529.357766] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78 [ 529.357769] el0_svc+0x8/0xc [ 541.356516] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 23s! [mount:18674] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200211011752.29242-1-luoshijie1@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Shijie Luo <luoshijie1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* ext4: don't perform block validity checks on the journal inodeTheodore Ts'o2020-06-111-4/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0a944e8a6c66ca04c7afbaa17e22bf208a8b37f0 upstream. Since the journal inode is already checked when we added it to the block validity's system zone, if we check it again, we'll just trigger a failure. This was causing failures like this: [ 53.897001] EXT4-fs error (device sda): ext4_find_extent:909: inode #8: comm jbd2/sda-8: pblk 121667583 bad header/extent: invalid extent entries - magic f30a, entries 8, max 340(340), depth 0(0) [ 53.931430] jbd2_journal_bmap: journal block not found at offset 49 on sda-8 [ 53.938480] Aborting journal on device sda-8. ... but only if the system was under enough memory pressure that logical->physical mapping for the journal inode gets pushed out of the extent cache. (This is why it wasn't noticed earlier.) Fixes: 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity") Reported-by: Dan Rue <dan.rue@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Tested-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: Use EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* ext4: fix block validity checks for journal inodes using indirect blocksTheodore Ts'o2020-06-111-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 170417c8c7bb2cbbdd949bf5c443c0c8f24a203b upstream. Commit 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity") failed to add an exception for the journal inode in ext4_check_blockref(), which is the function used by ext4_get_branch() for indirect blocks. This caused attempts to read from the ext3-style journals to fail with: [ 848.968550] EXT4-fs error (device sdb7): ext4_get_branch:171: inode #8: block 30343695: comm jbd2/sdb7-8: invalid block Fix this by adding the missing exception check. Fixes: 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity") Reported-by: Arthur Marsh <arthur.marsh@internode.on.net> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: Use EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* ext4: unsigned int compared against zeroColin Ian King2020-06-111-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit fbbbbd2f28aec991f3fbc248df211550fbdfd58c upstream. There are two cases where u32 variables n and err are being checked for less than zero error values, the checks is always false because the variables are not signed. Fix this by making the variables ints. Addresses-Coverity: ("Unsigned compared against 0") Fixes: 345c0dbf3a30 ("ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validity") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* ext4: protect journal inode's blocks using block_validityTheodore Ts'o2020-06-112-0/+54
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 345c0dbf3a30872d9b204db96b5857cd00808cae upstream. Add the blocks which belong to the journal inode to block_validity's system zone so attempts to deallocate or overwrite the journal due a corrupted file system where the journal blocks are also claimed by another inode. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=202879 Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@kernel.org [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Use EXT4_HAS_COMPAT_FEATURE() - Use EIO instead of EFSCORRUPTED] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* ext4: Make checks for metadata_csum feature saferTahsin Erdogan2020-06-111-8/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | This is just a small part of commit dec214d00e0d7 "ext4: xattr inode deduplication" that makes checks for metadata_csum feature safer and is actually needed by following fixes. Signed-off-by: Tahsin Erdogan <tahsin@google.com> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> [bwh: Ported to 3.16: Use EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE()] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* USB: gadget: fix illegal array access in binding with UDCKyungtae Kim2020-06-111-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 15753588bcd4bbffae1cca33c8ced5722477fe1f upstream. FuzzUSB (a variant of syzkaller) found an illegal array access using an incorrect index while binding a gadget with UDC. Reference: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-usb/msg194331.html This bug occurs when a size variable used for a buffer is misused to access its strcpy-ed buffer. Given a buffer along with its size variable (taken from user input), from which, a new buffer is created using kstrdup(). Due to the original buffer containing 0 value in the middle, the size of the kstrdup-ed buffer becomes smaller than that of the original. So accessing the kstrdup-ed buffer with the same size variable triggers memory access violation. The fix makes sure no zero value in the buffer, by comparing the strlen() of the orignal buffer with the size variable, so that the access to the kstrdup-ed buffer is safe. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0x1ba/0x200 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:266 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88806a55dd7e by task syz-executor.0/17208 CPU: 2 PID: 17208 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.6.8 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xce/0x128 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.4+0x21/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:374 __kasan_report+0x131/0x1b0 mm/kasan/report.c:506 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:641 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132 gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0x1ba/0x200 drivers/usb/gadget/configfs.c:266 flush_write_buffer fs/configfs/file.c:251 [inline] configfs_write_file+0x2f1/0x4c0 fs/configfs/file.c:283 __vfs_write+0x85/0x110 fs/read_write.c:494 vfs_write+0x1cd/0x510 fs/read_write.c:558 ksys_write+0x18a/0x220 fs/read_write.c:611 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:623 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:620 [inline] __x64_sys_write+0x73/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:620 do_syscall_64+0x9e/0x510 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe Signed-off-by: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com> Reported-and-tested-by: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com> Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org> Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200510054326.GA19198@pizza01 Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* signal: Extend exec_id to 64bitsEric W. Biederman2020-06-113-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d1e7fd6462ca9fc76650fbe6ca800e35b24267da upstream. Replace the 32bit exec_id with a 64bit exec_id to make it impossible to wrap the exec_id counter. With care an attacker can cause exec_id wrap and send arbitrary signals to a newly exec'd parent. This bypasses the signal sending checks if the parent changes their credentials during exec. The severity of this problem can been seen that in my limited testing of a 32bit exec_id it can take as little as 19s to exec 65536 times. Which means that it can take as little as 14 days to wrap a 32bit exec_id. Adam Zabrocki has succeeded wrapping the self_exe_id in 7 days. Even my slower timing is in the uptime of a typical server. Which means self_exec_id is simply a speed bump today, and if exec gets noticably faster self_exec_id won't even be a speed bump. Extending self_exec_id to 64bits introduces a problem on 32bit architectures where reading self_exec_id is no longer atomic and can take two read instructions. Which means that is is possible to hit a window where the read value of exec_id does not match the written value. So with very lucky timing after this change this still remains expoiltable. I have updated the update of exec_id on exec to use WRITE_ONCE and the read of exec_id in do_notify_parent to use READ_ONCE to make it clear that there is no locking between these two locations. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/20200324215049.GA3710@pi3.com.pl Fixes: 2.3.23pre2 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Use ACCESS_ONCE() - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: add sg_remove_request in sg_writeWu Bo2020-06-111-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 83c6f2390040f188cc25b270b4befeb5628c1aee upstream. If the __copy_from_user function failed we need to call sg_remove_request in sg_write. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/610618d9-e983-fd56-ed0f-639428343af7@huawei.com Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Signed-off-by: Wu Bo <wubo40@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> [groeck: Backport to v5.4.y and older kernels] Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: add sg_remove_request in sg_common_writeLi Bin2020-06-111-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 849f8583e955dbe3a1806e03ecacd5e71cce0a08 upstream. If the dxfer_len is greater than 256M then the request is invalid and we need to call sg_remove_request in sg_common_write. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1586777361-17339-1-git-send-email-huawei.libin@huawei.com Fixes: f930c7043663 ("scsi: sg: only check for dxfer_len greater than 256M") Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Signed-off-by: Li Bin <huawei.libin@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: fix minor memory leak in error pathTony Battersby2020-06-111-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c170e5a8d222537e98aa8d4fddb667ff7a2ee114 upstream. Fix a minor memory leak when there is an error opening a /dev/sg device. Fixes: cc833acbee9d ("sg: O_EXCL and other lock handling") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Ewan D. Milne <emilne@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Battersby <tonyb@cybernetics.com> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: don't return bogus Sg_requestsJohannes Thumshirn2020-06-111-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 48ae8484e9fc324b4968d33c585e54bc98e44d61 upstream. If the list search in sg_get_rq_mark() fails to find a valid request, we return a bogus element. This then can later lead to a GPF in sg_remove_scat(). So don't return bogus Sg_requests in sg_get_rq_mark() but NULL in case the list search doesn't find a valid request. Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Acked-by: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Cc: Tony Battersby <tonyb@cybernetics.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: only check for dxfer_len greater than 256MJohannes Thumshirn2020-06-111-30/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f930c7043663188429cd9b254e9d761edfc101ce upstream. Don't make any assumptions on the sg_io_hdr_t::dxfer_direction or the sg_io_hdr_t::dxferp in order to determine if it is a valid request. The only way we can check for bad requests is by checking if the length exceeds 256M. Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Fixes: 28676d869bbb (scsi: sg: check for valid direction before starting the request) Reported-by: Jason L Tibbitts III <tibbs@math.uh.edu> Tested-by: Jason L Tibbitts III <tibbs@math.uh.edu> Suggested-by: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Cc: Doug Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: Include <linux/sizes.h>] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: fix static checker warning in sg_is_valid_dxferJohannes Thumshirn2020-06-111-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 14074aba4bcda3764c9a702b276308b89901d5b6 upstream. dxfer_len is an unsigned int and we always assign a value > 0 to it, so it doesn't make any sense to check if it is < 0. We can't really check dxferp as well as we have both NULL and not NULL cases in the possible call paths. So just return true for SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV transfer in sg_is_valid_dxfer(). Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Cc: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: fix SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV transfersJohannes Thumshirn2020-06-111-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 68c59fcea1f2c6a54c62aa896cc623c1b5bc9b47 upstream. SG_DXFER_FROM_DEV transfers do not necessarily have a dxferp as we set it to NULL for the old sg_io read/write interface, but must have a length bigger than 0. This fixes a regression introduced by commit 28676d869bbb ("scsi: sg: check for valid direction before starting the request") Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Fixes: 28676d869bbb ("scsi: sg: check for valid direction before starting the request") Reported-by: Chris Clayton <chris2553@googlemail.com> Tested-by: Chris Clayton <chris2553@googlemail.com> Cc: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Tested-by: Chris Clayton <chris2553@googlemail.com> Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Cc: Cristian Crinteanu <crinteanu.cristian@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: close race condition in sg_remove_sfp_usercontext()Hannes Reinecke2020-06-111-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 97d27b0dd015e980ade63fda111fd1353276e28b upstream. sg_remove_sfp_usercontext() is clearing any sg requests, but needs to take 'rq_list_lock' when modifying the list. Reported-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: check for valid direction before starting the requestJohannes Thumshirn2020-06-111-12/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 28676d869bbb5257b5f14c0c95ad3af3a7019dd5 upstream. Check for a valid direction before starting the request, otherwise we risk running into an assertion in the scsi midlayer checking for valid requests. [mkp: fixed typo] Signed-off-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Link: http://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-scsi/msg104400.html Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: disable SET_FORCE_LOW_DMAHannes Reinecke2020-06-112-22/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 745dfa0d8ec26b24f3304459ff6e9eacc5c8351b upstream. The ioctl SET_FORCE_LOW_DMA has never worked since the initial git check-in, and the respective setting is nowadays handled correctly. So disable it entirely. Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: Re-fix off by one in sg_fill_request_table()Ben Hutchings2020-06-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 587c3c9f286cee5c9cac38d28c8ae1875f4ec85b upstream. Commit 109bade9c625 ("scsi: sg: use standard lists for sg_requests") introduced an off-by-one error in sg_ioctl(), which was fixed by commit bd46fc406b30 ("scsi: sg: off by one in sg_ioctl()"). Unfortunately commit 4759df905a47 ("scsi: sg: factor out sg_fill_request_table()") moved that code, and reintroduced the bug (perhaps due to a botched rebase). Fix it again. Fixes: 4759df905a47 ("scsi: sg: factor out sg_fill_request_table()") Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: fixup infoleak when using SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLEHannes Reinecke2020-06-111-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3e0097499839e0fe3af380410eababe5a47c4cf9 upstream. When calling SG_GET_REQUEST_TABLE ioctl only a half-filled table is returned; the remaining part will then contain stale kernel memory information. This patch zeroes out the entire table to avoid this issue. Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: factor out sg_fill_request_table()Hannes Reinecke2020-06-111-26/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 4759df905a474d245752c9dc94288e779b8734dd upstream. Factor out sg_fill_request_table() for better readability. [mkp: typos, applied by hand] Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: off by one in sg_ioctl()Dan Carpenter2020-06-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit bd46fc406b30d1db1aff8dabaff8d18bb423fdcf upstream. If "val" is SG_MAX_QUEUE then we are one element beyond the end of the "rinfo" array so the > should be >=. Fixes: 109bade9c625 ("scsi: sg: use standard lists for sg_requests") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: use standard lists for sg_requestsHannes Reinecke2020-06-111-86/+61
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 109bade9c625c89bb5ea753aaa1a0a97e6fbb548 upstream. 'Sg_request' is using a private list implementation; convert it to standard lists. Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: remove 'save_scat_len'Hannes Reinecke2020-06-111-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 136e57bf43dc4babbfb8783abbf707d483cacbe3 upstream. Unused. Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: recheck MMAP_IO request length with lock heldTodd Poynor2020-06-111-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 8d26f491116feaa0b16de370b6a7ba40a40fa0b4 upstream. Commit 1bc0eb044615 ("scsi: sg: protect accesses to 'reserved' page array") adds needed concurrency protection for the "reserve" buffer. Some checks that are initially made outside the lock are replicated once the lock is taken to ensure the checks and resulting decisions are made using consistent state. The check that a request with flag SG_FLAG_MMAP_IO set fits in the reserve buffer also needs to be performed again under the lock to ensure the reserve buffer length compared against matches the value in effect when the request is linked to the reserve buffer. An -ENOMEM should be returned in this case, instead of switching over to an indirect buffer as for non-MMAP_IO requests. Signed-off-by: Todd Poynor <toddpoynor@google.com> Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: protect against races between mmap() and SG_SET_RESERVED_SIZETodd Poynor2020-06-111-3/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 6a8dadcca81fceff9976e8828cceb072873b7bd5 upstream. Take f_mutex around mmap() processing to protect against races with the SG_SET_RESERVED_SIZE ioctl. Ensure the reserve buffer length remains consistent during the mapping operation, and set the "mmap called" flag to prevent further changes to the reserved buffer size as an atomic operation with the mapping. [mkp: fixed whitespace] Signed-off-by: Todd Poynor <toddpoynor@google.com> Acked-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: reset 'res_in_use' after unlinking reserved arrayHannes Reinecke2020-06-111-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e791ce27c3f6a1d3c746fd6a8f8e36c9540ec6f9 upstream. Once the reserved page array is unused we can reset the 'res_in_use' state; here we can do a lazy update without holding the mutex as we only need to check against concurrent access, not concurrent release. [mkp: checkpatch] Fixes: 1bc0eb044615 ("scsi: sg: protect accesses to 'reserved' page array") Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Cc: Todd Poynor <toddpoynor@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: protect accesses to 'reserved' page arrayHannes Reinecke2020-06-111-21/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 1bc0eb0446158cc76562176b80623aa119afee5b upstream. The 'reserved' page array is used as a short-cut for mapping data, saving us to allocate pages per request. However, the 'reserved' array is only capable of holding one request, so this patch introduces a mutex for protect 'sg_fd' against concurrent accesses. Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> [toddpoynor@google.com: backport to 3.18-4.9, fixup for bad ioctl SG_SET_FORCE_LOW_DMA code removed in later versions and not modified by the original patch.] Signed-off-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Tested-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Todd Poynor <toddpoynor@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: sg: Change next_cmd_len handling to mirror upstreamBen Hutchings2020-06-111-7/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | Change the type of next_cmd_len to unsigned char, done in upstream commit 65c26a0f3969 "sg: relax 16 byte cdb restriction". Move the range check from sg_write() to sg_ioctl(), which was done by that commit and commit bf33f87dd04c "scsi: sg: check length passed to SG_NEXT_CMD_LEN". Continue limiting the command length to MAX_COMMAND_SIZE (16). Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* sg: prevent integer overflow when converting from sectors to bytesAkinobu Mita2020-06-111-4/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 46f69e6a6bbbf3858617c8729e31895846c15a79 upstream. This prevents integer overflow when converting the request queue's max_sectors from sectors to bytes. However, this is a preparation for extending the data type of max_sectors in struct Scsi_Host and scsi_host_template. So, it is impossible to happen this integer overflow for now, because SCSI low-level drivers can not specify max_sectors greater than 0xffff due to the data type limitation. Signed-off-by: Akinobu Mita <akinobu.mita@gmail.com> Acked by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* sg: O_EXCL and other lock handlingDouglas Gilbert2020-06-111-194/+230
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit cc833acbee9db5ca8c6162b015b4c93863c6f821 upstream. This addresses a problem reported by Vaughan Cao concerning the correctness of the O_EXCL logic in the sg driver. POSIX doesn't defined O_EXCL semantics on devices but "allow only one open file descriptor at a time per sg device" is a rough definition. The sg driver's semantics have been to wait on an open() when O_NONBLOCK is not given and there are O_EXCL headwinds. Nasty things can happen during that wait such as the device being detached (removed). So multiple locks are reworked in this patch making it large and hard to break down into digestible bits. This patch is against Linus's current git repository which doesn't include any sg patches sent in the last few weeks. Hence this patch touches as little as possible that it doesn't need to and strips out most SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT() changes in v3 because Hannes said he was going to rework all that stuff. The sg3_utils package has several test programs written to test this patch. See examples/sg_tst_excl*.cpp . Not all the locks and flags in sg have been re-worked in this patch, notably sg_request::done . That can wait for a follow-up patch if this one meets with approval. Signed-off-by: Douglas Gilbert <dgilbert@interlog.com> Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* mwifiex: Fix possible buffer overflows in mwifiex_ret_wmm_get_status()Qing Xu2020-06-111-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3a9b153c5591548612c3955c9600a98150c81875 upstream. mwifiex_ret_wmm_get_status() calls memcpy() without checking the destination size.Since the source is given from remote AP which contains illegal wmm elements , this may trigger a heap buffer overflow. Fix it by putting the length check before calling memcpy(). Signed-off-by: Qing Xu <m1s5p6688@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* mwifiex: Fix possible buffer overflows in mwifiex_cmd_append_vsie_tlv()Qing Xu2020-06-111-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit b70261a288ea4d2f4ac7cd04be08a9f0f2de4f4d upstream. mwifiex_cmd_append_vsie_tlv() calls memcpy() without checking the destination size may trigger a buffer overflower, which a local user could use to cause denial of service or the execution of arbitrary code. Fix it by putting the length check before calling memcpy(). Signed-off-by: Qing Xu <m1s5p6688@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: - Use dev_info() instead of mwifiex_dbg() - Adjust filename] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: mptfusion: Fix double fetch bug in ioctlDan Carpenter2020-06-111-163/+50
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 28d76df18f0ad5bcf5fa48510b225f0ed262a99b upstream. Tom Hatskevich reported that we look up "iocp" then, in the called functions we do a second copy_from_user() and look it up again. The problem that could cause is: drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c 674 /* All of these commands require an interrupt or 675 * are unknown/illegal. 676 */ 677 if ((ret = mptctl_syscall_down(iocp, nonblock)) != 0) ^^^^ We take this lock. 678 return ret; 679 680 if (cmd == MPTFWDOWNLOAD) 681 ret = mptctl_fw_download(arg); ^^^ Then the user memory changes and we look up "iocp" again but a different one so now we are holding the incorrect lock and have a race condition. 682 else if (cmd == MPTCOMMAND) 683 ret = mptctl_mpt_command(arg); The security impact of this bug is not as bad as it could have been because these operations are all privileged and root already has enormous destructive power. But it's still worth fixing. This patch passes the "iocp" pointer to the functions to avoid the second lookup. That deletes 100 lines of code from the driver so it's a nice clean up as well. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200114123414.GA7957@kadam Reported-by: Tom Hatskevich <tom2001tom.23@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* scsi: mptfusion: Add bounds check in mptctl_hp_targetinfo()Dan Carpenter2020-06-111-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a7043e9529f3c367cc4d82997e00be034cbe57ca upstream. My static checker complains about an out of bounds read: drivers/message/fusion/mptctl.c:2786 mptctl_hp_targetinfo() error: buffer overflow 'hd->sel_timeout' 255 <= u32max. It's true that we probably should have a bounds check here. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* USB: core: Fix free-while-in-use bug in the USB S-GlibraryAlan Stern2020-06-111-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 056ad39ee9253873522f6469c3364964a322912b upstream. FuzzUSB (a variant of syzkaller) found a free-while-still-in-use bug in the USB scatter-gather library: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:26 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in usb_hcd_unlink_urb+0x5f/0x170 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1607 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888065379610 by task kworker/u4:1/27 CPU: 1 PID: 27 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted 5.5.11 #2 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014 Workqueue: scsi_tmf_2 scmd_eh_abort_handler Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0xce/0x128 lib/dump_stack.c:118 print_address_description.constprop.4+0x21/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:374 __kasan_report+0x153/0x1cb mm/kasan/report.c:506 kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:639 check_memory_region_inline mm/kasan/generic.c:185 [inline] check_memory_region+0x152/0x1b0 mm/kasan/generic.c:192 __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:95 atomic_read include/asm-generic/atomic-instrumented.h:26 [inline] usb_hcd_unlink_urb+0x5f/0x170 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1607 usb_unlink_urb+0x72/0xb0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:657 usb_sg_cancel+0x14e/0x290 drivers/usb/core/message.c:602 usb_stor_stop_transport+0x5e/0xa0 drivers/usb/storage/transport.c:937 This bug occurs when cancellation of the S-G transfer races with transfer completion. When that happens, usb_sg_cancel() may continue to access the transfer's URBs after usb_sg_wait() has freed them. The bug is caused by the fact that usb_sg_cancel() does not take any sort of reference to the transfer, and so there is nothing to prevent the URBs from being deallocated while the routine is trying to use them. The fix is to take such a reference by incrementing the transfer's io->count field while the cancellation is in progres and decrementing it afterward. The transfer's URBs are not deallocated until io->complete is triggered, which happens when io->count reaches zero. Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Reported-and-tested-by: Kyungtae Kim <kt0755@gmail.com> CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Pine.LNX.4.44L0.2003281615140.14837-100000@netrider.rowland.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* drivers: usb: core: Minimize irq disabling in usb_sg_cancel()David Mosberger2020-06-111-20/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | commit 5f2e5fb873e269fcb806165715d237f0de4ecf1d upstream. Restructure usb_sg_cancel() so we don't have to disable interrupts while cancelling the URBs. Suggested-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Signed-off-by: David Mosberger <davidm@egauge.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* drivers: usb: core: Don't disable irqs in usb_sg_wait() during URB submit.David Mosberger2020-06-111-8/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 98b74b0ee57af1bcb6e8b2e76e707a71c5ef8ec9 upstream. usb_submit_urb() may take quite long to execute. For example, a single sg list may have 30 or more entries, possibly leading to that many calls to DMA-map pages. This can cause interrupt latency of several hundred micro-seconds. Avoid the problem by releasing the io->lock spinlock and re-enabling interrupts before calling usb_submit_urb(). This opens races with usb_sg_cancel() and sg_complete(). Handle those races by using usb_block_urb() to stop URBs from being submitted after usb_sg_cancel() or sg_complete() with error. Note that usb_unlink_urb() is guaranteed to return -ENODEV if !io->urbs[i]->dev and since the -ENODEV case is already handled, we don't have to check for !io->urbs[i]->dev explicitly. Before this change, reading 512MB from an ext3 filesystem on a USB memory stick showed a throughput of 12 MB/s with about 500 missed deadlines. With this change, reading the same file gave the same throughput but only one or two missed deadlines. Signed-off-by: David Mosberger <davidm@egauge.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* selinux: properly handle multiple messages in selinux_netlink_send()Paul Moore2020-06-111-24/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit fb73974172ffaaf57a7c42f35424d9aece1a5af6 upstream. Fix the SELinux netlink_send hook to properly handle multiple netlink messages in a single sk_buff; each message is parsed and subject to SELinux access control. Prior to this patch, SELinux only inspected the first message in the sk_buff. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> [bwh: Backported to 3.16: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* selinux: rate-limit netlink message warnings in selinux_nlmsg_perm()Vladis Dronov2020-06-111-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 76319946f321e30872dd72af7de867cb26e7a373 upstream. Any process is able to send netlink messages with invalid types. Make the warning rate-limited to prevent too much log spam. The warning is supposed to help to find misbehaving programs, so print the triggering command name and pid. Reported-by: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> [PM: subject line tweak to make checkpatch.pl happy] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
* selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occursMarek Milkovic2020-06-111-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit cded3fffbeab777e6ad2ec05d4a3b62c5caca0f3 upstream. This prints the 'sclass' field as string instead of index in unrecognized netlink message. The textual representation makes it easier to distinguish the right class. Signed-off-by: Marek Milkovic <mmilkovi@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: 80-char width fixes] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
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