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* Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilitiesThomas Gleixner2018-08-152-0/+600
* x86/bugs, kvm: Introduce boot-time control of L1TF mitigationsJiri Kosina2018-08-155-19/+165
* cpu/hotplug: Set CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED earlyThomas Gleixner2018-08-153-3/+18
* cpu/hotplug: Expose SMT control init functionJiri Kosina2018-08-152-3/+15
* x86/kvm: Allow runtime control of L1D flushThomas Gleixner2018-08-152-6/+9
* x86/kvm: Serialize L1D flush parameter setterThomas Gleixner2018-08-151-2/+6
* x86/kvm: Add static key for flush alwaysThomas Gleixner2018-08-151-5/+11
* x86/kvm: Move l1tf setup functionThomas Gleixner2018-08-151-47/+78
* x86/l1tf: Handle EPT disabled state properThomas Gleixner2018-08-153-45/+54
* x86/kvm: Drop L1TF MSR list approachThomas Gleixner2018-08-151-36/+7
* x86/litf: Introduce vmx status variableThomas Gleixner2018-08-153-13/+54
* cpu/hotplug: Online siblings when SMT control is turned onThomas Gleixner2018-08-151-2/+24
* x86/KVM/VMX: Use MSR save list for IA32_FLUSH_CMD if requiredKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-08-151-5/+37
* x86/KVM/VMX: Extend add_atomic_switch_msr() to allow VMENTER only MSRsKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-08-151-8/+14
* x86/KVM/VMX: Separate the VMX AUTOLOAD guest/host number accountingKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-08-151-10/+19
* x86/KVM/VMX: Add find_msr() helper functionKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-08-151-13/+18
* x86/KVM/VMX: Split the VMX MSR LOAD structures to have an host/guest numbersKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-08-151-30/+35
* x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush logicPaolo Bonzini2018-08-154-1/+34
* x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D MSR based flushPaolo Bonzini2018-08-152-4/+17
* x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush algorithmPaolo Bonzini2018-08-151-5/+66
* x86/KVM/VMX: Add module argument for L1TF mitigationKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-08-152-0/+71
* x86/KVM: Warn user if KVM is loaded SMT and L1TF CPU bug being presentKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-08-153-0/+20
* cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least onceThomas Gleixner2018-08-151-24/+48
* Revert "x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force"Thomas Gleixner2018-08-154-29/+3
* x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix up pte->pfn conversion for PAEMichal Hocko2018-08-151-6/+6
* x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PAE swap entries against L1TFVlastimil Babka2018-08-152-3/+34
* x86/CPU/AMD: Move TOPOEXT reenablement before reading smp_num_siblingsBorislav Petkov2018-08-151-20/+17
* x86/cpufeatures: Add detection of L1D cache flush support.Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-08-151-0/+1
* x86/speculation/l1tf: Extend 64bit swap file size limitVlastimil Babka2018-08-151-1/+9
* x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=forceThomas Gleixner2018-08-153-1/+23
* x86/cpu/AMD: Evaluate smp_num_siblings earlyThomas Gleixner2018-08-151-0/+13
* x86/CPU/AMD: Do not check CPUID max ext level before parsing SMP infoBorislav Petkov2018-08-151-6/+3
* x86/cpu/intel: Evaluate smp_num_siblings earlyThomas Gleixner2018-08-151-0/+7
* x86/cpu/topology: Provide detect_extended_topology_early()Thomas Gleixner2018-08-152-9/+23
* x86/cpu/common: Provide detect_ht_early()Thomas Gleixner2018-08-152-10/+15
* x86/cpu/AMD: Remove the pointless detect_ht() callThomas Gleixner2018-08-151-4/+0
* x86/cpu: Remove the pointless CPU printoutThomas Gleixner2018-08-152-25/+5
* cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMTThomas Gleixner2018-08-156-0/+215
* cpu/hotplug: Split do_cpu_down()Thomas Gleixner2018-08-151-9/+8
* cpu/hotplug: Make bringup/teardown of smp threads symmetricThomas Gleixner2018-08-151-2/+1
* x86/topology: Provide topology_smt_supported()Thomas Gleixner2018-08-152-0/+10
* x86/smp: Provide topology_is_primary_thread()Thomas Gleixner2018-08-154-1/+33
* sched/smt: Update sched_smt_present at runtimePeter Zijlstra2018-08-152-18/+13
* x86/bugs: Move the l1tf function and define pr_fmt properlyKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-08-151-26/+29
* x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2Andi Kleen2018-08-153-16/+47
* x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappingsAndi Kleen2018-08-155-10/+117
* x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tfAndi Kleen2018-08-156-0/+77
* x86/speculation/l1tf: Make sure the first page is always reservedAndi Kleen2018-08-151-0/+6
* x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculationAndi Kleen2018-08-155-13/+84
* x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect swap entries against L1TFLinus Torvalds2018-08-151-3/+8