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* Linux 5.10.133v5.10.133Greg Kroah-Hartman2022-07-251-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220723095224.302504400@linuxfoundation.org Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Tested-by: Rudi Heitbaum <rudi@heitbaum.com> Tested-by: Sudip Mukherjee <sudip.mukherjee@codethink.co.uk> Tested-by: Jon Hunter <jonathanh@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* tools headers: Remove broken definition of __LITTLE_ENDIANArnaldo Carvalho de Melo2022-07-251-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit fa2c02e5798c17c89cbb3135940086ebe07e5c9f upstream. The linux/kconfig.h file was copied from the kernel but the line where with the generated/autoconf.h include from where the CONFIG_ entries would come from was deleted, as tools/ build system don't create that file, so we ended up always defining just __LITTLE_ENDIAN as CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN was nowhere to be found. This in turn ended up breaking the build in some systems where __LITTLE_ENDIAN was already defined, such as the androind NDK. So just ditch that block that depends on the CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN define. The kconfig.h file was copied just to get IS_ENABLED() and a 'make -C tools/all' doesn't breaks with this removal. Fixes: 93281c4a96572a34 ("x86/insn: Add an insn_decode() API") Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YO8hK7lqJcIWuBzx@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* tools arch: Update arch/x86/lib/mem{cpy,set}_64.S copies used in 'perf bench ↵Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo2022-07-253-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | mem memcpy' - again commit fb24e308b6310541e70d11a3f19dc40742974b95 upstream. To bring in the change made in this cset: 5e21a3ecad1500e3 ("x86/alternative: Merge include files") This just silences these perf tools build warnings, no change in the tools: Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S' diff -u tools/arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S arch/x86/lib/memcpy_64.S Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S' diff -u tools/arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S arch/x86/lib/memset_64.S Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* objtool: Fix elf_create_undef_symbol() endiannessVasily Gorbik2022-07-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 46c7405df7de8deb97229eacebcee96d61415f3f upstream. Currently x86 cross-compilation fails on big endian system with: x86_64-cross-ld: init/main.o: invalid string offset 488112128 >= 6229 for section `.strtab' Mark new ELF data in elf_create_undef_symbol() as symbol, so that libelf does endianness handling correctly. Fixes: 2f2f7e47f052 ("objtool: Add elf_create_undef_symbol()") Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/patch-1.thread-6c9df9.git-d39264656387.your-ad-here.call-01620841104-ext-2554@work.hours Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* kvm: fix objtool relocation warningLinus Torvalds2022-07-251-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 291073a566b2094c7192872cc0f17ce73d83cb76 upstream. The recent change to make objtool aware of more symbol relocation types (commit 24ff65257375: "objtool: Teach get_alt_entry() about more relocation types") also added another check, and resulted in this objtool warning when building kvm on x86: arch/x86/kvm/emulate.o: warning: objtool: __ex_table+0x4: don't know how to handle reloc symbol type: kvm_fastop_exception The reason seems to be that kvm_fastop_exception() is marked as a global symbol, which causes the relocation to ke kept around for objtool. And at the same time, the kvm_fastop_exception definition (which is done as an inline asm statement) doesn't actually set the type of the global, which then makes objtool unhappy. The minimal fix is to just not mark kvm_fastop_exception as being a global symbol. It's only used in that one compilation unit anyway, so it was always pointless. That's how all the other local exception table labels are done. I'm not entirely happy about the kinds of games that the kvm code plays with doing its own exception handling, and the fact that it confused objtool is most definitely a symptom of the code being a bit too subtle and ad-hoc. But at least this trivial one-liner makes objtool no longer upset about what is going on. Fixes: 24ff65257375 ("objtool: Teach get_alt_entry() about more relocation types") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wiZwq-0LknKhXN4M+T8jbxn_2i9mcKpO+OaBSSq_Eh7tg@mail.gmail.com/ Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86: Use -mindirect-branch-cs-prefix for RETPOLINE buildsPeter Zijlstra2022-07-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 68cf4f2a72ef8786e6b7af6fd9a89f27ac0f520d upstream. In order to further enable commit: bbe2df3f6b6d ("x86/alternative: Try inline spectre_v2=retpoline,amd") add the new GCC flag -mindirect-branch-cs-prefix: https://gcc.gnu.org/g:2196a681d7810ad8b227bf983f38ba716620545e https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=102952 https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=52323 to RETPOLINE=y builds. This should allow fully inlining retpoline,amd for GCC builds. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211119165630.276205624@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* um: Add missing apply_returns()Peter Zijlstra2022-07-251-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 564d998106397394b6aad260f219b882b3347e62 upstream. Implement apply_returns() stub for UM, just like all the other patching routines. Fixes: 15e67227c49a ("x86: Undo return-thunk damage") Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org) Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Ys%2Ft45l%2FgarIrD0u@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/bugs: Remove apostrophe typoKim Phillips2022-07-251-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | commit bcf163150cd37348a0cb59e95c916a83a9344b0e upstream. Remove a superfluous ' in the mitigation string. Fixes: e8ec1b6e08a2 ("x86/bugs: Enable STIBP for JMP2RET") Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* tools headers cpufeatures: Sync with the kernel sourcesArnaldo Carvalho de Melo2022-07-252-3/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f098addbdb44c8a565367f5162f3ab170ed9404a upstream. To pick the changes from: f43b9876e857c739 ("x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobs") a149180fbcf336e9 ("x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk") 15e67227c49a5783 ("x86: Undo return-thunk damage") 369ae6ffc41a3c11 ("x86/retpoline: Cleanup some #ifdefery") 4ad3278df6fe2b08 x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior 26aae8ccbc197223 x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NO 9756bba28470722d x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRS 3ebc170068885b6f x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb 2dbb887e875b1de3 x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementation 6b80b59b35557065 x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerability a149180fbcf336e9 x86: Add magic AMD return-thunk 15e67227c49a5783 x86: Undo return-thunk damage a883d624aed463c8 x86/cpufeatures: Move RETPOLINE flags to word 11 51802186158c74a0 x86/speculation/mmio: Enumerate Processor MMIO Stale Data bug This only causes these perf files to be rebuilt: CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memcpy-x86-64-asm.o CC /tmp/build/perf/bench/mem-memset-x86-64-asm.o And addresses this perf build warning: Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h' diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h' diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YtQM40VmiLTkPND2@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* tools arch x86: Sync the msr-index.h copy with the kernel sourcesArnaldo Carvalho de Melo2022-07-251-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 91d248c3b903b46a58cbc7e8d38d684d3e4007c2 upstream. To pick up the changes from these csets: 4ad3278df6fe2b08 ("x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behavior") d7caac991feeef1b ("x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral Chicken") That cause no changes to tooling: $ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > before $ cp arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h $ tools/perf/trace/beauty/tracepoints/x86_msr.sh > after $ diff -u before after $ Just silences this perf build warning: Warning: Kernel ABI header at 'tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' differs from latest version at 'arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h' diff -u tools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org> Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YtQTm9wsB3hxQWvy@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KVM: emulate: do not adjust size of fastop and setcc subroutinesPaolo Bonzini2022-07-251-10/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 79629181607e801c0b41b8790ac4ee2eb5d7bc3e upstream. Instead of doing complicated calculations to find the size of the subroutines (which are even more complicated because they need to be stringified into an asm statement), just hardcode to 16. It is less dense for a few combinations of IBT/SLS/retbleed, but it has the advantage of being really simple. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.15.x: 84e7051c0bc1: x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabled Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/kvm: fix FASTOP_SIZE when return thunks are enabledThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo2022-07-251-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 84e7051c0bc1f2a13101553959b3a9d9a8e24939 upstream. The return thunk call makes the fastop functions larger, just like IBT does. Consider a 16-byte FASTOP_SIZE when CONFIG_RETHUNK is enabled. Otherwise, functions will be incorrectly aligned and when computing their position for differently sized operators, they will executed in the middle or end of a function, which may as well be an int3, leading to a crash like: [ 36.091116] int3: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 36.091119] CPU: 3 PID: 1371 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 5.15.0-41-generic #44 [ 36.091120] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 36.091121] RIP: 0010:xaddw_ax_dx+0x9/0x10 [kvm] [ 36.091185] Code: 00 0f bb d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 0f bb d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f c0 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 66 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc [ 36.091186] RSP: 0018:ffffb1f541143c98 EFLAGS: 00000202 [ 36.091188] RAX: 0000000089abcdef RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 36.091188] RDX: 0000000076543210 RSI: ffffffffc073c6d0 RDI: 0000000000000200 [ 36.091189] RBP: ffffb1f541143ca0 R08: ffff9f1803350a70 R09: 0000000000000002 [ 36.091190] R10: ffff9f1803350a70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9f1803350a70 [ 36.091190] R13: ffffffffc077fee0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 36.091191] FS: 00007efdfce8d640(0000) GS:ffff9f187dd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 36.091192] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 36.091192] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000009b62002 CR4: 0000000000772ee0 [ 36.091195] PKRU: 55555554 [ 36.091195] Call Trace: [ 36.091197] <TASK> [ 36.091198] ? fastop+0x5a/0xa0 [kvm] [ 36.091222] x86_emulate_insn+0x7b8/0xe90 [kvm] [ 36.091244] x86_emulate_instruction+0x2f4/0x630 [kvm] [ 36.091263] ? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x7c/0x230 [kvm] [ 36.091283] ? vmx_prepare_switch_to_host+0xf7/0x190 [kvm_intel] [ 36.091290] complete_emulated_mmio+0x297/0x320 [kvm] [ 36.091310] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x32f/0x550 [kvm] [ 36.091330] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x29e/0x6d0 [kvm] [ 36.091344] ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x120/0x6d0 [kvm] [ 36.091357] ? __fget_files+0x86/0xc0 [ 36.091362] ? __fget_files+0x86/0xc0 [ 36.091363] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x92/0xd0 [ 36.091366] do_syscall_64+0x59/0xc0 [ 36.091369] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50 [ 36.091370] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [ 36.091371] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50 [ 36.091372] ? __x64_sys_writev+0x1c/0x30 [ 36.091374] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [ 36.091374] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x37/0xb0 [ 36.091378] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x50 [ 36.091379] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [ 36.091379] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [ 36.091380] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [ 36.091381] ? do_syscall_64+0x69/0xc0 [ 36.091381] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x61/0xcb [ 36.091384] RIP: 0033:0x7efdfe6d1aff [ 36.091390] Code: 00 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 48 8d 44 24 60 c7 04 24 10 00 00 00 48 89 44 24 08 48 8d 44 24 20 48 89 44 24 10 b8 10 00 00 00 0f 05 <41> 89 c0 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 1f 48 8b 44 24 18 64 48 2b 04 25 28 00 [ 36.091391] RSP: 002b:00007efdfce8c460 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 [ 36.091393] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000000ae80 RCX: 00007efdfe6d1aff [ 36.091393] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000000000000ae80 RDI: 000000000000000c [ 36.091394] RBP: 0000558f1609e220 R08: 0000558f13fb8190 R09: 00000000ffffffff [ 36.091394] R10: 0000558f16b5e950 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 36.091394] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 36.091396] </TASK> [ 36.091397] Modules linked in: isofs nls_iso8859_1 kvm_intel joydev kvm input_leds serio_raw sch_fq_codel dm_multipath scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler drm msr ip_tables x_tables autofs4 btrfs blake2b_generic zstd_compress raid10 raid456 async_raid6_recov async_memcpy async_pq async_xor async_tx xor raid6_pq libcrc32c raid1 raid0 multipath linear crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel virtio_net net_failover crypto_simd ahci xhci_pci cryptd psmouse virtio_blk libahci xhci_pci_renesas failover [ 36.123271] ---[ end trace db3c0ab5a48fabcc ]--- [ 36.123272] RIP: 0010:xaddw_ax_dx+0x9/0x10 [kvm] [ 36.123319] Code: 00 0f bb d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 0f bb d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f c0 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 66 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc cc cc 48 0f c1 d0 c3 cc cc [ 36.123320] RSP: 0018:ffffb1f541143c98 EFLAGS: 00000202 [ 36.123321] RAX: 0000000089abcdef RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 36.123321] RDX: 0000000076543210 RSI: ffffffffc073c6d0 RDI: 0000000000000200 [ 36.123322] RBP: ffffb1f541143ca0 R08: ffff9f1803350a70 R09: 0000000000000002 [ 36.123322] R10: ffff9f1803350a70 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9f1803350a70 [ 36.123323] R13: ffffffffc077fee0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 36.123323] FS: 00007efdfce8d640(0000) GS:ffff9f187dd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 36.123324] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 36.123325] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000009b62002 CR4: 0000000000772ee0 [ 36.123327] PKRU: 55555554 [ 36.123328] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt [ 36.123410] Kernel Offset: 0x1400000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) [ 36.135305] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]--- Fixes: aa3d480315ba ("x86: Use return-thunk in asm code") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Message-Id: <20220713171241.184026-1-cascardo@canonical.com> Tested-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@ionos.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* efi/x86: use naked RET on mixed mode call wrapperThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo2022-07-251-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 51a6fa0732d6be6a44e0032752ad2ac10d67c796 upstream. When running with return thunks enabled under 32-bit EFI, the system crashes with: kernel tried to execute NX-protected page - exploit attempt? (uid: 0) BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000005bc02900 #PF: supervisor instruction fetch in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0011) - permissions violation PGD 18f7063 P4D 18f7063 PUD 18ff063 PMD 190e063 PTE 800000005bc02063 Oops: 0011 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc6+ #166 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015 RIP: 0010:0x5bc02900 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at RIP 0x5bc028d6. RSP: 0018:ffffffffb3203e10 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000048 RDX: 000000000190dfac RSI: 0000000000001710 RDI: 000000007eae823b RBP: ffffffffb3203e70 R08: 0000000001970000 R09: ffffffffb3203e28 R10: 747563657865206c R11: 6c6977203a696665 R12: 0000000000001710 R13: 0000000000000030 R14: 0000000001970000 R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8e013ca00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000005bc02900 CR3: 0000000001930000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: ? efi_set_virtual_address_map+0x9c/0x175 efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x4a6/0x53e start_kernel+0x67c/0x71e x86_64_start_reservations+0x24/0x2a x86_64_start_kernel+0xe9/0xf4 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0xe5/0xeb That's because it cannot jump to the return thunk from the 32-bit code. Using a naked RET and marking it as safe allows the system to proceed booting. Fixes: aa3d480315ba ("x86: Use return-thunk in asm code") Reported-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/speculation: Use DECLARE_PER_CPU for x86_spec_ctrl_currentNathan Chancellor2022-07-251-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit db886979683a8360ced9b24ab1125ad0c4d2cf76 upstream. Clang warns: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:58:21: error: section attribute is specified on redeclared variable [-Werror,-Wsection] DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current); ^ arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h:283:12: note: previous declaration is here extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_current; ^ 1 error generated. The declaration should be using DECLARE_PER_CPU instead so all attributes stay in sync. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: fc02735b14ff ("KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRS") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/asm/32: Fix ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE use on 32-bitJiri Slaby2022-07-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3131ef39fb03bbde237d0b8260445898f3dfda5b upstream. The build on x86_32 currently fails after commit 9bb2ec608a20 (objtool: Update Retpoline validation) with: arch/x86/kernel/../../x86/xen/xen-head.S:35: Error: no such instruction: `annotate_unret_safe' ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE is defined in nospec-branch.h. And head_32.S is missing this include. Fix this. Fixes: 9bb2ec608a20 ("objtool: Update Retpoline validation") Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/63e23f80-033f-f64e-7522-2816debbc367@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/ftrace: Add UNWIND_HINT_FUNC annotation for ftrace_stubJosh Poimboeuf2022-07-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 18660698a3d30868524cefb60dcd4e0e297f71bb upstream. Prevent an unreachable objtool warning after the sibling call detection gets improved. ftrace_stub() is basically a function, annotate it as such. Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6845e1b2fb0723a95740c6674e548ba38c5ea489.1611263461.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/xen: Fix initialisation in hypercall_page after rethunkBen Hutchings2022-07-251-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | The hypercall_page is special and the RETs there should not be changed into rethunk calls (but can have SLS mitigation). Change the initial instructions to ret + int3 padding, as was done in upstream commit 5b2fc51576ef "x86/ibt,xen: Sprinkle the ENDBR". Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86, kvm: use proper ASM macros for kvm_vcpu_is_preemptedGreg Kroah-Hartman2022-07-251-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit edbaf6e5e93acda96aae23ba134ef3c1466da3b5 upstream. The build rightfully complains about: arch/x86/kernel/kvm.o: warning: objtool: __raw_callee_save___kvm_vcpu_is_preempted()+0x12: missing int3 after ret because the ASM_RET call is not being used correctly in kvm_vcpu_is_preempted(). This was hand-fixed-up in the kvm merge commit a4cfff3f0f8c ("Merge branch 'kvm-older-features' into HEAD") which of course can not be backported to stable kernels, so just fix this up directly instead. Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Ben Hutchings <bwh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* tools/insn: Restore the relative include paths for cross buildingBorislav Petkov2022-07-251-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0705ef64d1ff52b817e278ca6e28095585ff31e1 upstream. Building perf on ppc causes: In file included from util/intel-pt-decoder/intel-pt-insn-decoder.c:15: util/intel-pt-decoder/../../../arch/x86/lib/insn.c:14:10: fatal error: asm/inat.h: No such file or directory 14 | #include <asm/inat.h> /*__ignore_sync_check__ */ | ^~~~~~~~~~~~ Restore the relative include paths so that the compiler can find the headers. Fixes: 93281c4a9657 ("x86/insn: Add an insn_decode() API") Reported-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com> Tested-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210317150858.02b1bbc8@canb.auug.org.au Cc: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/static_call: Serialize __static_call_fixup() properlyThomas Gleixner2022-07-251-5/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c27c753ea6fd1237f4f96abf8b623d7bab505513 upstream. __static_call_fixup() invokes __static_call_transform() without holding text_mutex, which causes lockdep to complain in text_poke_bp(). Adding the proper locking cures that, but as this is either used during early boot or during module finalizing, it's not required to use text_poke_bp(). Add an argument to __static_call_transform() which tells it to use text_poke_early() for it. Fixes: ee88d363d156 ("x86,static_call: Use alternative RET encoding") Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behaviorPawan Gupta2022-07-255-1/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 4ad3278df6fe2b0852b00d5757fc2ccd8e92c26e upstream. Some Intel processors may use alternate predictors for RETs on RSB-underflow. This condition may be vulnerable to Branch History Injection (BHI) and intramode-BTI. Kernel earlier added spectre_v2 mitigation modes (eIBRS+Retpolines, eIBRS+LFENCE, Retpolines) which protect indirect CALLs and JMPs against such attacks. However, on RSB-underflow, RET target prediction may fallback to alternate predictors. As a result, RET's predicted target may get influenced by branch history. A new MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL bit (RRSBA_DIS_S) controls this fallback behavior when in kernel mode. When set, RETs will not take predictions from alternate predictors, hence mitigating RETs as well. Support for this is enumerated by CPUID.7.2.EDX[RRSBA_CTRL] (bit2). For spectre v2 mitigation, when a user selects a mitigation that protects indirect CALLs and JMPs against BHI and intramode-BTI, set RRSBA_DIS_S also to protect RETs for RSB-underflow case. Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [bwh: Backported to 5.15: adjust context in scattered.c] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/kexec: Disable RET on kexecKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2022-07-252-12/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 697977d8415d61f3acbc4ee6d564c9dcf0309507 upstream. All the invocations unroll to __x86_return_thunk and this file must be PIC independent. This fixes kexec on 64-bit AMD boxes. [ bp: Fix 32-bit build. ] Reported-by: Edward Tran <edward.tran@oracle.com> Reported-by: Awais Tanveer <awais.tanveer@oracle.com> Suggested-by: Ankur Arora <ankur.a.arora@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/bugs: Do not enable IBPB-on-entry when IBPB is not supportedThadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo2022-07-251-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2259da159fbe5dba8ac00b560cf00b6a6537fa18 upstream. There are some VM configurations which have Skylake model but do not support IBPB. In those cases, when using retbleed=ibpb, userspace is going to be killed and kernel is going to panic. If the CPU does not support IBPB, warn and proceed with the auto option. Also, do not fallback to IBPB on AMD/Hygon systems if it is not supported. Fixes: 3ebc17006888 ("x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpb") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/bugs: Add Cannon lake to RETBleed affected CPU listPawan Gupta2022-07-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | commit f54d45372c6ac9c993451de5e51312485f7d10bc upstream. Cannon lake is also affected by RETBleed, add it to the list. Fixes: 6ad0ad2bf8a6 ("x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability") Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/retbleed: Add fine grained Kconfig knobsPeter Zijlstra2022-07-2519-69/+172
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f43b9876e857c739d407bc56df288b0ebe1a9164 upstream. Do fine-grained Kconfig for all the various retbleed parts. NOTE: if your compiler doesn't support return thunks this will silently 'upgrade' your mitigation to IBPB, you might not like this. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: there is no CONFIG_OBJTOOL] [cascardo: objtool calling and option parsing has changed] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: - In scripts/Makefile.build, add the objtool option with an ifdef block, same as for other options - Adjust filename, context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/cpu/amd: Enumerate BTC_NOAndrew Cooper2022-07-253-8/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 26aae8ccbc1972233afd08fb3f368947c0314265 upstream. BTC_NO indicates that hardware is not susceptible to Branch Type Confusion. Zen3 CPUs don't suffer BTC. Hypervisors are expected to synthesise BTC_NO when it is appropriate given the migration pool, to prevent kernels using heuristics. [ bp: Massage. ] Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: no X86_FEATURE_BRS] [cascardo: no X86_FEATURE_CPPC] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/common: Stamp out the stepping madnessPeter Zijlstra2022-07-251-21/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 7a05bc95ed1c5a59e47aaade9fb4083c27de9e62 upstream. The whole MMIO/RETBLEED enumeration went overboard on steppings. Get rid of all that and simply use ANY. If a future stepping of these models would not be affected, it had better set the relevant ARCH_CAP_$FOO_NO bit in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRSJosh Poimboeuf2022-07-253-9/+62
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 9756bba28470722dacb79ffce554336dd1f6a6cd upstream. Prevent RSB underflow/poisoning attacks with RSB. While at it, add a bunch of comments to attempt to document the current state of tribal knowledge about RSB attacks and what exactly is being mitigated. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KVM: VMX: Fix IBRS handling after vmexitJosh Poimboeuf2022-07-251-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit bea7e31a5caccb6fe8ed989c065072354f0ecb52 upstream. For legacy IBRS to work, the IBRS bit needs to be always re-written after vmexit, even if it's already on. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRSJosh Poimboeuf2022-07-256-31/+73
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit fc02735b14fff8c6678b521d324ade27b1a3d4cf upstream. On eIBRS systems, the returns in the vmexit return path from __vmx_vcpu_run() to vmx_vcpu_run() are exposed to RSB poisoning attacks. Fix that by moving the post-vmexit spec_ctrl handling to immediately after the vmexit. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KVM: VMX: Convert launched argument to flagsJosh Poimboeuf2022-07-255-9/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit bb06650634d3552c0f8557e9d16aa1a408040e28 upstream. Convert __vmx_vcpu_run()'s 'launched' argument to 'flags', in preparation for doing SPEC_CTRL handling immediately after vmexit, which will need another flag. This is much easier than adding a fourth argument, because this code supports both 32-bit and 64-bit, and the fourth argument on 32-bit would have to be pushed on the stack. Note that __vmx_vcpu_run_flags() is called outside of the noinstr critical section because it will soon start calling potentially traceable functions. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KVM: VMX: Flatten __vmx_vcpu_run()Josh Poimboeuf2022-07-251-73/+45
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 8bd200d23ec42d66ccd517a72dd0b9cc6132d2fd upstream. Move the vmx_vm{enter,exit}() functionality into __vmx_vcpu_run(). This will make it easier to do the spec_ctrl handling before the first RET. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: remove ENDBR] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* objtool: Re-add UNWIND_HINT_{SAVE_RESTORE}Josh Poimboeuf2022-07-255-6/+59
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 8faea26e611189e933ea2281975ff4dc7c1106b6 upstream. Commit c536ed2fffd5 ("objtool: Remove SAVE/RESTORE hints") removed the save/restore unwind hints because they were no longer needed. Now they're going to be needed again so re-add them. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_maskJosh Poimboeuf2022-07-251-30/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit acac5e98ef8d638a411cfa2ee676c87e1973f126 upstream. This mask has been made redundant by kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(). And it doesn't even work when MSR interception is disabled, as the guest can just write to SPEC_CTRL directly. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exitJosh Poimboeuf2022-07-251-11/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit bbb69e8bee1bd882784947095ffb2bfe0f7c9470 upstream. There's no need to recalculate the host value for every entry/exit. Just use the cached value in spec_ctrl_current(). Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state changeJosh Poimboeuf2022-07-251-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 56aa4d221f1ee2c3a49b45b800778ec6e0ab73c5 upstream. If the SMT state changes, SSBD might get accidentally disabled. Fix that. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/speculation: Fix firmware entry SPEC_CTRL handlingJosh Poimboeuf2022-07-251-6/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e6aa13622ea8283cc699cac5d018cc40a2ba2010 upstream. The firmware entry code may accidentally clear STIBP or SSBD. Fix that. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/speculation: Fix RSB filling with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=nJosh Poimboeuf2022-07-253-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit b2620facef4889fefcbf2e87284f34dcd4189bce upstream. If a kernel is built with CONFIG_RETPOLINE=n, but the user still wants to mitigate Spectre v2 using IBRS or eIBRS, the RSB filling will be silently disabled. There's nothing retpoline-specific about RSB buffer filling. Remove the CONFIG_RETPOLINE guards around it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/cpu/amd: Add Spectral ChickenPeter Zijlstra2022-07-254-1/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d7caac991feeef1b871ee6988fd2c9725df09039 upstream. Zen2 uarchs have an undocumented, unnamed, MSR that contains a chicken bit for some speculation behaviour. It needs setting. Note: very belatedly AMD released naming; it's now officially called MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2 and MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG2_SUPPRESS_NOBR_PRED_BIT but shall remain the SPECTRAL CHICKEN. Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* objtool: Add entry UNRET validationPeter Zijlstra2022-07-2513-15/+217
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a09a6e2399ba0595c3042b3164f3ca68a3cff33e upstream. Since entry asm is tricky, add a validation pass that ensures the retbleed mitigation has been done before the first actual RET instruction. Entry points are those that either have UNWIND_HINT_ENTRY, which acts as UNWIND_HINT_EMPTY but marks the instruction as an entry point, or those that have UWIND_HINT_IRET_REGS at +0. This is basically a variant of validate_branch() that is intra-function and it will simply follow all branches from marked entry points and ensures that all paths lead to ANNOTATE_UNRET_END. If a path hits RET or an indirection the path is a fail and will be reported. There are 3 ANNOTATE_UNRET_END instances: - UNTRAIN_RET itself - exception from-kernel; this path doesn't need UNTRAIN_RET - all early exceptions; these also don't need UNTRAIN_RET Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S no pt_regs return at .Lerror_entry_done_lfence] [cascardo: tools/objtool/builtin-check.c no link option validation] [cascardo: tools/objtool/check.c opts.ibt is ibt] [cascardo: tools/objtool/include/objtool/builtin.h leave unret option as bool, no struct opts] [cascardo: objtool is still called from scripts/link-vmlinux.sh] [cascardo: no IBT support] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: - In scripts/link-vmlinux.sh, use "test -n" instead of is_enabled - Adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/bugs: Do IBPB fallback check only onceJosh Poimboeuf2022-07-251-10/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0fe4aeea9c01baabecc8c3afc7889c809d939bc2 upstream. When booting with retbleed=auto, if the kernel wasn't built with CONFIG_CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK, the mitigation falls back to IBPB. Make sure a warning is printed in that case. The IBPB fallback check is done twice, but it really only needs to be done once. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/bugs: Add retbleed=ibpbPeter Zijlstra2022-07-256-13/+67
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3ebc170068885b6fc7bedda6c667bb2c4d533159 upstream. jmp2ret mitigates the easy-to-attack case at relatively low overhead. It mitigates the long speculation windows after a mispredicted RET, but it does not mitigate the short speculation window from arbitrary instruction boundaries. On Zen2, there is a chicken bit which needs setting, which mitigates "arbitrary instruction boundaries" down to just "basic block boundaries". But there is no fix for the short speculation window on basic block boundaries, other than to flush the entire BTB to evict all attacker predictions. On the spectrum of "fast & blurry" -> "safe", there is (on top of STIBP or no-SMT): 1) Nothing System wide open 2) jmp2ret May stop a script kiddy 3) jmp2ret+chickenbit Raises the bar rather further 4) IBPB Only thing which can count as "safe". Tentative numbers put IBPB-on-entry at a 2.5x hit on Zen2, and a 10x hit on Zen1 according to lmbench. [ bp: Fixup feature bit comments, document option, 32-bit build fix. ] Suggested-by: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@citrix.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/xen: Rename SYS* entry pointsPeter Zijlstra2022-07-253-16/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit b75b7f8ef1148be1b9321ffc2f6c19238904b438 upstream. Native SYS{CALL,ENTER} entry points are called entry_SYS{CALL,ENTER}_{64,compat}, make sure the Xen versions are named consistently. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* objtool: Update Retpoline validationPeter Zijlstra2022-07-254-6/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 9bb2ec608a209018080ca262f771e6a9ff203b6f upstream. Update retpoline validation with the new CONFIG_RETPOLINE requirement of not having bare naked RET instructions. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: conflict fixup at arch/x86/xen/xen-head.S] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idlePeter Zijlstra2022-07-253-6/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit bf5835bcdb9635c97f85120dba9bfa21e111130f upstream. Having IBRS enabled while the SMT sibling is idle unnecessarily slows down the running sibling. OTOH, disabling IBRS around idle takes two MSR writes, which will increase the idle latency. Therefore, only disable IBRS around deeper idle states. Shallow idle states are bounded by the tick in duration, since NOHZ is not allowed for them by virtue of their short target residency. Only do this for mwait-driven idle, since that keeps interrupts disabled across idle, which makes disabling IBRS vs IRQ-entry a non-issue. Note: C6 is a random threshold, most importantly C1 probably shouldn't disable IBRS, benchmarking needed. Suggested-by: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: no CPUIDLE_FLAG_IRQ_ENABLE] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerabilityPeter Zijlstra2022-07-253-18/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 6ad0ad2bf8a67e27d1f9d006a1dabb0e1c360cc3 upstream. Skylake suffers from RSB underflow speculation issues; report this vulnerability and it's mitigation (spectre_v2=ibrs). [jpoimboe: cleanups, eibrs] Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and ↵Peter Zijlstra2022-07-251-8/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() commit 166115c08a9b0b846b783088808a27d739be6e8d upstream. retbleed will depend on spectre_v2, while spectre_v2_user depends on retbleed. Break this cycle. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRSPawan Gupta2022-07-253-14/+54
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 7c693f54c873691a4b7da05c7e0f74e67745d144 upstream. Extend spectre_v2= boot option with Kernel IBRS. [jpoimboe: no STIBP with IBRS] Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writesPeter Zijlstra2022-07-253-8/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c779bc1a9002fa474175b80e72b85c9bf628abb0 upstream. When changing SPEC_CTRL for user control, the WRMSR can be delayed until return-to-user when KERNEL_IBRS has been enabled. This avoids an MSR write during context switch. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/entry: Add kernel IBRS implementationPeter Zijlstra2022-07-254-10/+111
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2dbb887e875b1de3ca8f40ddf26bcfe55798c609 upstream. Implement Kernel IBRS - currently the only known option to mitigate RSB underflow speculation issues on Skylake hardware. Note: since IBRS_ENTER requires fuller context established than UNTRAIN_RET, it must be placed after it. However, since UNTRAIN_RET itself implies a RET, it must come after IBRS_ENTER. This means IBRS_ENTER needs to also move UNTRAIN_RET. Note 2: KERNEL_IBRS is sub-optimal for XenPV. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> [cascardo: conflict at arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S, skip_r11rcx] [cascardo: conflict at arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S] [cascardo: conflict fixups, no ANNOTATE_NOENDBR] Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com> [bwh: Backported to 5.10: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-03-02 14:52:19 +0000