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* doc: security: Add kern-doc for lsm_hooks.hKees Cook2019-02-221-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | There is a lot of kern-doc for the LSM internals, but it wasn't visible in the HTML output. This exposes some formatting flaws in lsm_hooks.h that will be fixed in a later series of patches. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: sctp: Merge and clean up rst filesKees Cook2019-02-223-166/+175
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The SCTP sections were ending up at the top-level table of contents under the security section when they should have be sections with the SCTP chapters. In addition to correcting the section and subsection headings, this merges the SCTP documents into a single file to organize the chapters more clearly, internally linkifies them, and adds the missing SPDX header. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-01-021-1/+30
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall. Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image. This adds additional support in IMA to prevent loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall, independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included. In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named ".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring. (David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different use case scenario, are included here)" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: integrity: Remove references to module keyring ima: Use inode_is_open_for_write ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser efi: Add EFI signature data types integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring selftests/ima: kexec_load syscall test ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfs x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0 x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86 ima: add support for arch specific policies ima: refactor ima_init_policy() ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field
| * docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0Stefan Berger2018-12-111-1/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Extend the documentation for trusted keys with documentation for how to set up a key for a TPM 2.0 so it can be used with a TPM 2.0 as well. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* | Merge tag 'docs-5.0' of git://git.lwn.net/linuxLinus Torvalds2018-12-292-5/+5
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull documentation update from Jonathan Corbet: "A fairly normal cycle for documentation stuff. We have a new document on perf security, more Italian translations, more improvements to the memory-management docs, improvements to the pathname lookup documentation, and the usual array of smaller fixes. As is often the case, there are a few reaches outside of Documentation/ to adjust kerneldoc comments" * tag 'docs-5.0' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (38 commits) docs: improve pathname-lookup document structure configfs: fix wrong name of struct in documentation docs/mm-api: link slab_common.c to "The Slab Cache" section slab: make kmem_cache_create{_usercopy} description proper kernel-doc doc:process: add links where missing docs/core-api: make mm-api.rst more structured x86, boot: documentation whitespace fixup Documentation: devres: note checking needs when converting doc:it: add some process/* translations doc:it: fixes in process/1.Intro Documentation: convert path-lookup from markdown to resturctured text Documentation/admin-guide: update admin-guide index.rst Documentation/admin-guide: introduce perf-security.rst file scripts/kernel-doc: Fix struct and struct field attribute processing Documentation: dev-tools: Fix typos in index.rst Correct gen_init_cpio tool's documentation Document /proc/pid PID reuse behavior Documentation: update path-lookup.md for parallel lookups Documentation: Use "while" instead of "whilst" dmaengine: Add mailing list address to the documentation ...
| * | Documentation: Use "while" instead of "whilst"Will Deacon2018-11-202-5/+5
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Whilst making an unrelated change to some Documentation, Linus sayeth: | Afaik, even in Britain, "whilst" is unusual and considered more | formal, and "while" is the common word. | | [...] | | Can we just admit that we work with computers, and we don't need to | use þe eald Englisc spelling of words that most of the world never | uses? dictionary.com refers to the word as "Chiefly British", which is probably an undesirable attribute for technical documentation. Replace all occurrences under Documentation/ with "while". Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Liam Girdwood <lgirdwood@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* / keys-encrypted: add nvdimm key format type to encrypted keysDave Jiang2018-12-131-1/+5
|/ | | | | | | | | Adding nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys in order to limit the size of the key to 32bytes. Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
* Merge branch 'next-keys2' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-11-011-0/+217
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull keys updates from James Morris: "Provide five new operations in the key_type struct that can be used to provide access to asymmetric key operations. These will be implemented for the asymmetric key type in a later patch and may refer to a key retained in RAM by the kernel or a key retained in crypto hardware. int (*asym_query)(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params, struct kernel_pkey_query *info); int (*asym_eds_op)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, void *out); int (*asym_verify_signature)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, const void *in2); Since encrypt, decrypt and sign are identical in their interfaces, they're rolled together in the asym_eds_op() operation and there's an operation ID in the params argument to distinguish them. Verify is different in that we supply the data and the signature instead and get an error value (or 0) as the only result on the expectation that this may well be how a hardware crypto device may work" * 'next-keys2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (22 commits) KEYS: asym_tpm: Add support for the sign operation [ver #2] KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement tpm_sign [ver #2] KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement signature verification [ver #2] KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement the decrypt operation [ver #2] KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement tpm_unbind [ver #2] KEYS: asym_tpm: Add loadkey2 and flushspecific [ver #2] KEYS: Move trusted.h to include/keys [ver #2] KEYS: trusted: Expose common functionality [ver #2] KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement encryption operation [ver #2] KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement pkey_query [ver #2] KEYS: Add parser for TPM-based keys [ver #2] KEYS: asym_tpm: extract key size & public key [ver #2] KEYS: asym_tpm: add skeleton for asym_tpm [ver #2] crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: Allow hash to be optional [ver #2] KEYS: Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key parser [ver #2] KEYS: Implement encrypt, decrypt and sign for software asymmetric key [ver #2] KEYS: Allow the public_key struct to hold a private key [ver #2] KEYS: Provide software public key query function [ver #2] KEYS: Make the X.509 and PKCS7 parsers supply the sig encoding type [ver #2] KEYS: Provide missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops [ver #2] ...
| * KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]David Howells2018-10-261-0/+111
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide five keyctl functions that permit userspace to make use of the new key type ops for accessing and driving asymmetric keys. (*) Query an asymmetric key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY, key_serial_t key, unsigned long reserved, struct keyctl_pkey_query *info); Get information about an asymmetric key. The information is returned in the keyctl_pkey_query struct: __u32 supported_ops; A bit mask of flags indicating which ops are supported. This is constructed from a bitwise-OR of: KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_{ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY} __u32 key_size; The size in bits of the key. __u16 max_data_size; __u16 max_sig_size; __u16 max_enc_size; __u16 max_dec_size; The maximum sizes in bytes of a blob of data to be signed, a signature blob, a blob to be encrypted and a blob to be decrypted. reserved must be set to 0. This is intended for future use to hand over one or more passphrases needed unlock a key. If successful, 0 is returned. If the key is not an asymmetric key, EOPNOTSUPP is returned. (*) Encrypt, decrypt, sign or verify a blob using an asymmetric key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, void *out); long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, void *out); long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, void *out); long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, const void *in2); Use an asymmetric key to perform a public-key cryptographic operation a blob of data. The parameter block pointed to by params contains a number of integer values: __s32 key_id; __u32 in_len; __u32 out_len; __u32 in2_len; For a given operation, the in and out buffers are used as follows: Operation ID in,in_len out,out_len in2,in2_len ======================= =============== =============== =========== KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT Raw data Encrypted data - KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT Encrypted data Raw data - KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN Raw data Signature - KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Raw data - Signature info is a string of key=value pairs that supply supplementary information. The __spare space in the parameter block must be set to 0. This is intended, amongst other things, to allow the passing of passphrases required to unlock a key. If successful, encrypt, decrypt and sign all return the amount of data written into the output buffer. Verification returns 0 on success. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
| * KEYS: Provide key type operations for asymmetric key ops [ver #2]David Howells2018-10-261-0/+106
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide five new operations in the key_type struct that can be used to provide access to asymmetric key operations. These will be implemented for the asymmetric key type in a later patch and may refer to a key retained in RAM by the kernel or a key retained in crypto hardware. int (*asym_query)(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params, struct kernel_pkey_query *info); int (*asym_eds_op)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, void *out); int (*asym_verify_signature)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, const void *in2); Since encrypt, decrypt and sign are identical in their interfaces, they're rolled together in the asym_eds_op() operation and there's an operation ID in the params argument to distinguish them. Verify is different in that we supply the data and the signature instead and get an error value (or 0) as the only result on the expectation that this may well be how a hardware crypto device may work. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* | Merge tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-11-011-5/+5
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull stackleak gcc plugin from Kees Cook: "Please pull this new GCC plugin, stackleak, for v4.20-rc1. This plugin was ported from grsecurity by Alexander Popov. It provides efficient stack content poisoning at syscall exit. This creates a defense against at least two classes of flaws: - Uninitialized stack usage. (We continue to work on improving the compiler to do this in other ways: e.g. unconditional zero init was proposed to GCC and Clang, and more plugin work has started too). - Stack content exposure. By greatly reducing the lifetime of valid stack contents, exposures via either direct read bugs or unknown cache side-channels become much more difficult to exploit. This complements the existing buddy and heap poisoning options, but provides the coverage for stacks. The x86 hooks are included in this series (which have been reviewed by Ingo, Dave Hansen, and Thomas Gleixner). The arm64 hooks have already been merged through the arm64 tree (written by Laura Abbott and reviewed by Mark Rutland and Will Deacon). With VLAs having been removed this release, there is no need for alloca() protection, so it has been removed from the plugin" * tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: arm64: Drop unneeded stackleak_check_alloca() stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
| * doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK featureAlexander Popov2018-09-041-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add information about STACKLEAK feature to the "Memory poisoning" section of self-protection.rst. Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | Merge tag 'docs-4.20' of git://git.lwn.net/linuxLinus Torvalds2018-10-241-4/+4
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet: "This is a fairly typical cycle for documentation. There's some welcome readability improvements for the formatted output, some LICENSES updates including the addition of the ISC license, the removal of the unloved and unmaintained 00-INDEX files, the deprecated APIs document from Kees, more MM docs from Mike Rapoport, and the usual pile of typo fixes and corrections" * tag 'docs-4.20' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (41 commits) docs: Fix typos in histogram.rst docs: Introduce deprecated APIs list kernel-doc: fix declaration type determination doc: fix a typo in adding-syscalls.rst docs/admin-guide: memory-hotplug: remove table of contents doc: printk-formats: Remove bogus kobject references for device nodes Documentation: preempt-locking: Use better example dm flakey: Document "error_writes" feature docs/completion.txt: Fix a couple of punctuation nits LICENSES: Add ISC license text LICENSES: Add note to CDDL-1.0 license that it should not be used docs/core-api: memory-hotplug: add some details about locking internals docs/core-api: rename memory-hotplug-notifier to memory-hotplug docs: improve readability for people with poorer eyesight yama: clarify ptrace_scope=2 in Yama documentation docs/vm: split memory hotplug notifier description to Documentation/core-api docs: move memory hotplug description into admin-guide/mm doc: Fix acronym "FEKEK" in ecryptfs docs: fix some broken documentation references iommu: Fix passthrough option documentation ...
| * | doc: Fix acronym "FEKEK" in ecryptfsFelix Eckhofer2018-09-201-4/+4
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | "FEFEK" was incorrectly used as acronym for "File Encryption Key Encryption Key". This replaces all occurences with "FEKEK". Signed-off-by: Felix Eckhofer <felix@eckhofer.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* / security: fix LSM description locationRandy Dunlap2018-10-091-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Fix Documentation location reference for where LSM descriptions should be placed. Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* Kbuild: rename CC_STACKPROTECTOR[_STRONG] config variablesLinus Torvalds2018-06-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The changes to automatically test for working stack protector compiler support in the Kconfig files removed the special STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO option that picked the strongest stack protector that the compiler supported. That was all a nice cleanup - it makes no sense to have the AUTO case now that the Kconfig phase can just determine the compiler support directly. HOWEVER. It also meant that doing "make oldconfig" would now _disable_ the strong stackprotector if you had AUTO enabled, because in a legacy config file, the sane stack protector configuration would look like CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_AUTO=y and when you ran this through "make oldconfig" with the Kbuild changes, it would ask you about the regular CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR (that had been renamed from CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR to just CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR), but it would think that the STRONG version used to be disabled (because it was really enabled by AUTO), and would disable it in the new config, resulting in: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y # CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y That's dangerously subtle - people could suddenly find themselves with the weaker stack protector setup without even realizing. The solution here is to just rename not just the old RECULAR stack protector option, but also the strong one. This does that by just removing the CC_ prefix entirely for the user choices, because it really is not about the compiler support (the compiler support now instead automatially impacts _visibility_ of the options to users). This results in "make oldconfig" actually asking the user for their choice, so that we don't have any silent subtle security model changes. The end result would generally look like this: CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR=y CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG=y CONFIG_CC_HAS_SANE_STACKPROTECTOR=y where the "CC_" versions really are about internal compiler infrastructure, not the user selections. Acked-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* docs: */index.rst: Add newer documents to their respective index.rstMauro Carvalho Chehab2018-05-081-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | A number of new docs were added, but they're currently not on the index.rst from the session they're supposed to be, causing Sphinx warnings. Add them. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* selinux: Update SELinux SCTP documentationRichard Haines2018-03-201-5/+6
| | | | | | | | | Update SELinux-sctp.rst "SCTP Peer Labeling" section to reflect how the association permission is validated. Reported-by: Dominick Grift <dac.override@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* selinux: Add SCTP supportRichard Haines2018-02-261-0/+157
| | | | | | | | The SELinux SCTP implementation is explained in: Documentation/security/SELinux-sctp.rst Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* security: Add support for SCTP security hooksRichard Haines2018-02-221-0/+175
| | | | | | | | The SCTP security hooks are explained in: Documentation/security/LSM-sctp.rst Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Documentation: security/credentials.rst: explain need to sort group_listNeilBrown2018-01-081-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | This patch updates the documentation with the observations that led to commit bdcf0a423ea1 ("kernel: make groups_sort calling a responsibility group_info allocators") and the new behaviour required. Specifically that groups_sort() should be called on a new group_list before set_groups() or set_current_groups() is called. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> [jc: use proper :c:func: references] Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: add documentation on printing kernel addressesTobin C. Harding2017-12-211-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | Hashing addresses printed with printk specifier %p was implemented recently. During development a number of issues were raised regarding leaking kernel addresses to userspace. Other documentation was updated but security/self-protection missed out. Add self-protection documentation regarding printing kernel addresses. Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@tobin.cc> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* KEYS: fix in-kernel documentation for keyctl_read()Eric Biggers2017-11-151-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | When keyctl_read() is passed a buffer that is too small, the behavior is inconsistent. Some key types will fill as much of the buffer as possible, while others won't copy anything. Moreover, the in-kernel documentation contradicted the man page on this point. Update the in-kernel documentation to say that this point is unspecified. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* Documentation: fix security related doc refsTom Saeger2017-10-123-3/+3
| | | | | | | Make security document refs valid. Signed-off-by: Tom Saeger <tom.saeger@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* docs: ReSTify table of contents in core.rstJosh Holland2017-08-301-11/+1
| | | | | | | | Sphinx will now generate the table of contents automatically, which avoids having the ToC getting out of sync with the rest of the document. Signed-off-by: Josh Holland <anowlcalledjosh@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* docs: Fix paths in security/keysJosh Holland2017-08-243-4/+4
| | | | | | | Several paths in the security/keys documentation were incorrect. Signed-off-by: Josh Holland <anowlcalledjosh@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* KEYS: Add documentation for asymmetric keyring restrictionsMat Martineau2017-07-141-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | Provide more specific examples of keyring restrictions as applied to X.509 signature chain verification. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* docs: Fix some formatting issues in request-key.rstJonathan Corbet2017-05-181-3/+3
| | | | | | | The white space in the big enumerated list was inconsistent, leading to some strange formatting artifacts. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify keys-trusted-encrypted.txtKees Cook2017-05-184-24/+21
| | | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify keys-request-key.txtKees Cook2017-05-183-38/+34
| | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify keys-ecryptfs.txtKees Cook2017-05-183-9/+13
| | | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify keys.txtKees Cook2017-05-184-165/+160
| | | | | | | | | This creates a new section in the security development index for kernel keys, and adjusts for ReST markup. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify Smack.txtKees Cook2017-05-182-754/+0
| | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify LoadPin.txtKees Cook2017-05-181-17/+0
| | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify Yama.txtKees Cook2017-05-182-73/+0
| | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify tomoyo.txtKees Cook2017-05-182-57/+0
| | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide. Cc: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify apparmor.txtKees Cook2017-05-182-41/+0
| | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide. Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify SELinux.txtKees Cook2017-05-182-29/+0
| | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under LSM admin guide. Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify and split LSM.txtKees Cook2017-05-184-43/+15
| | | | | | | | | | The existing LSM.txt file covered both usage and development, so split this into two files, one under admin-guide and one under kernel development. Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify self-protection.txtKees Cook2017-05-182-36/+64
| | | | | | | | This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify credentials.txtKees Cook2017-05-183-153/+125
| | | | | | | | | This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify IMA-templates.txtKees Cook2017-05-183-23/+29
| | | | | | | | | Adjust IMA-templates.txt for ReST markup and add to the index for security/, under the Kernel API Documentation. Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* KEYS: add SP800-56A KDF support for DHStephan Mueller2017-04-041-8/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SP800-56A defines the use of DH with key derivation function based on a counter. The input to the KDF is defined as (DH shared secret || other information). The value for the "other information" is to be provided by the caller. The KDF is implemented using the hash support from the kernel crypto API. The implementation uses the symmetric hash support as the input to the hash operation is usually very small. The caller is allowed to specify the hash name that he wants to use to derive the key material allowing the use of all supported hashes provided with the kernel crypto API. As the KDF implements the proper truncation of the DH shared secret to the requested size, this patch fills the caller buffer up to its size. The patch is tested with a new test added to the keyutils user space code which uses a CAVS test vector testing the compliance with SP800-56A. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* KEYS: Add KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRINGMat Martineau2017-04-041-0/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Keyrings recently gained restrict_link capabilities that allow individual keys to be validated prior to linking. This functionality was only available using internal kernel APIs. With the KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING command existing keyrings can be configured to check the content of keys before they are linked, and then allow or disallow linkage of that key to the keyring. To restrict a keyring, call: keyctl(KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING, key_serial_t keyring, const char *type, const char *restriction) where 'type' is the name of a registered key type and 'restriction' is a string describing how key linkage is to be restricted. The restriction option syntax is specific to each key type. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
* KEYS: Add an optional lookup_restriction hook to key_typeMat Martineau2017-04-041-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | The restrict_link functions used to validate keys as they are linked to a keyring can be associated with specific key types. Each key type may be loaded (or not) at runtime, so lookup of restrict_link functions needs to be part of the key type implementation to ensure that the requested keys can be examined. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
* KEYS: Use structure to capture key restriction function and dataMat Martineau2017-04-041-9/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace struct key's restrict_link function pointer with a pointer to the new struct key_restriction. The structure contains pointers to the restriction function as well as relevant data for evaluating the restriction. The garbage collector checks restrict_link->keytype when key types are unregistered. Restrictions involving a removed key type are converted to use restrict_link_reject so that restrictions cannot be removed by unregistering key types. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
* KEYS: Split role of the keyring pointer for keyring restrict functionsMat Martineau2017-04-031-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring. Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
* KEYS: Use a typedef for restrict_link function pointersMat Martineau2017-04-031-4/+1
| | | | | | | This pointer type needs to be returned from a lookup function, and without a typedef the syntax gets cumbersome. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
* KEYS: Differentiate uses of rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload()David Howells2017-03-021-2/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in two different, incompatible ways: (1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used to protect the key. (2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is used to protect the key and the may be being modified. Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce: (1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked: dereference_key_locked() user_key_payload_locked() (2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock: dereference_key_rcu() user_key_payload_rcu() This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W ------------------------------- ./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987: #0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable) lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190 nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4] nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4] nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4] rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc] call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc] __rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc] rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc] nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4] _nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4] nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4] nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4] nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4] nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4] nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 do_mount+0x254/0xf70 SyS_mount+0x94/0x100 system_call+0x38/0xe0 Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* Merge tag 'rodata-v4.11-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-02-211-2/+8
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull rodata updates from Kees Cook: "This renames the (now inaccurate) DEBUG_RODATA and related SET_MODULE_RONX configs to the more sensible STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and STRICT_MODULE_RWX" * tag 'rodata-v4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: arch: Rename CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_DEBUG_MODULE_RONX arch: Move CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA and CONFIG_SET_MODULE_RONX to be common