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* Documentation/spec_ctrl: Do some minor cleanupsBorislav Petkov2018-07-251-12/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit dd0792699c4058e63c0715d9a7c2d40226fcdddc upstream Fix some typos, improve formulations, end sentences with a fullstop. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative Store BypassKees Cook2018-07-251-9/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f21b53b20c754021935ea43364dbf53778eeba32 upstream Unless explicitly opted out of, anything running under seccomp will have SSB mitigations enabled. Choosing the "prctl" mode will disable this. [ tglx: Adjusted it to the new arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate() mechanism ] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* prctl: Add force disable speculationThomas Gleixner2018-07-251-13/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 356e4bfff2c5489e016fdb925adbf12a1e3950ee upstream For certain use cases it is desired to enforce mitigations so they cannot be undone afterwards. That's important for loader stubs which want to prevent a child from disabling the mitigation again. Will also be used for seccomp(). The extra state preserving of the prctl state for SSB is a preparatory step for EBPF dymanic speculation control. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigationThomas Gleixner2018-07-251-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a73ec77ee17ec556fe7f165d00314cb7c047b1ac upstream Add prctl based control for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation and make it the default mitigation for Intel and AMD. Andi Kleen provided the following rationale (slightly redacted): There are multiple levels of impact of Speculative Store Bypass: 1) JITed sandbox. It cannot invoke system calls, but can do PRIME+PROBE and may have call interfaces to other code 2) Native code process. No protection inside the process at this level. 3) Kernel. 4) Between processes. The prctl tries to protect against case (1) doing attacks. If the untrusted code can do random system calls then control is already lost in a much worse way. So there needs to be system call protection in some way (using a JIT not allowing them or seccomp). Or rather if the process can subvert its environment somehow to do the prctl it can already execute arbitrary code, which is much worse than SSB. To put it differently, the point of the prctl is to not allow JITed code to read data it shouldn't read from its JITed sandbox. If it already has escaped its sandbox then it can already read everything it wants in its address space, and do much worse. The ability to control Speculative Store Bypass allows to enable the protection selectively without affecting overall system performance. Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen. Completely rewritten. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* prctl: Add speculation control prctlsThomas Gleixner2018-07-251-0/+86
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit b617cfc858161140d69cc0b5cc211996b557a1c7 upstream Add two new prctls to control aspects of speculation related vulnerabilites and their mitigations to provide finer grained control over performance impacting mitigations. PR_GET_SPECULATION_CTRL returns the state of the speculation misfeature which is selected with arg2 of prctl(2). The return value uses bit 0-2 with the following meaning: Bit Define Description 0 PR_SPEC_PRCTL Mitigation can be controlled per task by PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL 1 PR_SPEC_ENABLE The speculation feature is enabled, mitigation is disabled 2 PR_SPEC_DISABLE The speculation feature is disabled, mitigation is enabled If all bits are 0 the CPU is not affected by the speculation misfeature. If PR_SPEC_PRCTL is set, then the per task control of the mitigation is available. If not set, prctl(PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL) for the speculation misfeature will fail. PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL allows to control the speculation misfeature, which is selected by arg2 of prctl(2) per task. arg3 is used to hand in the control value, i.e. either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE. The common return values are: EINVAL prctl is not implemented by the architecture or the unused prctl() arguments are not 0 ENODEV arg2 is selecting a not supported speculation misfeature PR_SET_SPECULATION_CTRL has these additional return values: ERANGE arg3 is incorrect, i.e. it's not either PR_SPEC_ENABLE or PR_SPEC_DISABLE ENXIO prctl control of the selected speculation misfeature is disabled The first supported controlable speculation misfeature is PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS. Add the define so this can be shared between architectures. Based on an initial patch from Tim Chen and mostly rewritten. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable mitigationKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-07-251-0/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 24f7fc83b9204d20f878c57cb77d261ae825e033 upstream Contemporary high performance processors use a common industry-wide optimization known as "Speculative Store Bypass" in which loads from addresses to which a recent store has occurred may (speculatively) see an older value. Intel refers to this feature as "Memory Disambiguation" which is part of their "Smart Memory Access" capability. Memory Disambiguation can expose a cache side-channel attack against such speculatively read values. An attacker can create exploit code that allows them to read memory outside of a sandbox environment (for example, malicious JavaScript in a web page), or to perform more complex attacks against code running within the same privilege level, e.g. via the stack. As a first step to mitigate against such attacks, provide two boot command line control knobs: nospec_store_bypass_disable spec_store_bypass_disable=[off,auto,on] By default affected x86 processors will power on with Speculative Store Bypass enabled. Hence the provided kernel parameters are written from the point of view of whether to enable a mitigation or not. The parameters are as follows: - auto - Kernel detects whether your CPU model contains an implementation of Speculative Store Bypass and picks the most appropriate mitigation. - on - disable Speculative Store Bypass - off - enable Speculative Store Bypass [ tglx: Reordered the checks so that the whole evaluation is not done when the CPU does not support RDS ] Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypassKonrad Rzeszutek Wilk2018-07-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c456442cd3a59eeb1d60293c26cbe2ff2c4e42cf upstream Add the sysfs file for the new vulerability. It does not do much except show the words 'Vulnerable' for recent x86 cores. Intel cores prior to family 6 are known not to be vulnerable, and so are some Atoms and some Xeon Phi. It assumes that older Cyrix, Centaur, etc. cores are immune. Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/cpufeature: Carve out X86_FEATURE_*Borislav Petkov2018-07-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit cd4d09ec6f6c12a2cc3db5b7d8876a325a53545b upstream Move them to a separate header and have the following dependency: x86/cpufeatures.h <- x86/processor.h <- x86/cpufeature.h This makes it easier to use the header in asm code and not include the whole cpufeature.h and add guards for asm. Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1453842730-28463-5-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Srivatsa S. Bhat <srivatsa@csail.mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Matt Helsley (VMware) <matt.helsley@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Makhalov <amakhalov@vmware.com> Reviewed-by: Bo Gan <ganb@vmware.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* lib/vsprintf: Remove atomic-unsafe support for %pCrGeert Uytterhoeven2018-07-031-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 666902e42fd8344b923c02dc5b0f37948ff4f225 upstream. "%pCr" formats the current rate of a clock, and calls clk_get_rate(). The latter obtains a mutex, hence it must not be called from atomic context. Remove support for this rarely-used format, as vsprintf() (and e.g. printk()) must be callable from any context. Any remaining out-of-tree users will start seeing the clock's name printed instead of its rate. Reported-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com> Fixes: 900cca2944254edd ("lib/vsprintf: add %pC{,n,r} format specifiers for clocks") Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1527845302-12159-5-git-send-email-geert+renesas@glider.be To: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com> To: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> To: Michael Turquette <mturquette@baylibre.com> To: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> To: Zhang Rui <rui.zhang@intel.com> To: Eduardo Valentin <edubezval@gmail.com> To: Eric Anholt <eric@anholt.net> To: Stefan Wahren <stefan.wahren@i2se.com> To: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-clk@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-pm@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-serial@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Cc: linux-renesas-soc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.1+ Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be> Signed-off-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netdev-FAQ: clarify DaveM's position for stable backportsCong Wang2018-06-131-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 75d4e704fa8d2cf33ff295e5b441317603d7f9fd ] Per discussion with David at netconf 2018, let's clarify DaveM's position of handling stable backports in netdev-FAQ. This is important for people relying on upstream -stable releases. Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* dm thin: fix documentation relative to low water mark thresholdmulhern2018-05-301-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 9b28a1102efc75d81298198166ead87d643a29ce ] Fixes: 1. The use of "exceeds" when the opposite of exceeds, falls below, was meant. 2. Properly speaking, a table can not exceed a threshold. It emphasizes the important point, which is that it is the userspace daemon's responsibility to check for low free space when a device is resumed, since it won't get a special event indicating low free space in that situation. Signed-off-by: mulhern <amulhern@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* s390: introduce CPU alternativesVasily Gorbik2018-04-291-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 686140a1a9c41d85a4212a1c26d671139b76404b ] Implement CPU alternatives, which allows to optionally patch newer instructions at runtime, based on CPU facilities availability. A new kernel boot parameter "noaltinstr" disables patching. Current implementation is derived from x86 alternatives. Although ideal instructions padding (when altinstr is longer then oldinstr) is added at compile time, and no oldinstr nops optimization has to be done at runtime. Also couple of compile time sanity checks are done: 1. oldinstr and altinstr must be <= 254 bytes long, 2. oldinstr and altinstr must not have an odd length. alternative(oldinstr, altinstr, facility); alternative_2(oldinstr, altinstr1, facility1, altinstr2, facility2); Both compile time and runtime padding consists of either 6/4/2 bytes nop or a jump (brcl) + 2 bytes nop filler if padding is longer then 6 bytes. .altinstructions and .altinstr_replacement sections are part of __init_begin : __init_end region and are freed after initialization. Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Documentation: pinctrl: palmas: Add ti,palmas-powerhold-override property ↵Keerthy2018-04-081-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | definition commit 0ea66f76ba17a4b229caaadd77de694111b21769 upstream. GPIO7 is configured in POWERHOLD mode which has higher priority over DEV_ON bit and keeps the PMIC supplies on even after the DEV_ON bit is turned off. This property enables driver to over ride the POWERHOLD value to GPIO7 so as to turn off the PMIC in power off scenarios. Signed-off-by: Keerthy <j-keerthy@ti.com> Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* fs/proc: Stop trying to report thread stacksAndy Lutomirski2018-04-081-26/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit b18cb64ead400c01bf1580eeba330ace51f8087d upstream. This reverts more of: b76437579d13 ("procfs: mark thread stack correctly in proc/<pid>/maps") ... which was partially reverted by: 65376df58217 ("proc: revert /proc/<pid>/maps [stack:TID] annotation") Originally, /proc/PID/task/TID/maps was the same as /proc/TID/maps. In current kernels, /proc/PID/maps (or /proc/TID/maps even for threads) shows "[stack]" for VMAs in the mm's stack address range. In contrast, /proc/PID/task/TID/maps uses KSTK_ESP to guess the target thread's stack's VMA. This is racy, probably returns garbage and, on arches with CONFIG_TASK_INFO_IN_THREAD=y, is also crash-prone: KSTK_ESP is not safe to use on tasks that aren't known to be running ordinary process-context kernel code. This patch removes the difference and just shows "[stack]" for VMAs in the mm's stack range. This is IMO much more sensible -- the actual "stack" address really is treated specially by the VM code, and the current thread stack isn't even well-defined for programs that frequently switch stacks on their own. Reported-by: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3e678474ec14e0a0ec34c611016753eea2e1b8ba.1475257877.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/paravirt: Remove 'noreplace-paravirt' cmdline optionJosh Poimboeuf2018-02-251-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (cherry picked from commit 12c69f1e94c89d40696e83804dd2f0965b5250cd) The 'noreplace-paravirt' option disables paravirt patching, leaving the original pv indirect calls in place. That's highly incompatible with retpolines, unless we want to uglify paravirt even further and convert the paravirt calls to retpolines. As far as I can tell, the option doesn't seem to be useful for much other than introducing surprising corner cases and making the kernel vulnerable to Spectre v2. It was probably a debug option from the early paravirt days. So just remove it. Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@intel.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Cc: Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@intel.com> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180131041333.2x6blhxirc2kclrq@treble Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> [jwang: chery pick to 4.4] Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Documentation: Document array_index_nospecMark Rutland2018-02-251-0/+90
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (cherry picked from commit f84a56f73dddaeac1dba8045b007f742f61cd2da) Document the rationale and usage of the new array_index_nospec() helper. Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: alan@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727413645.33451.15878817161436755393.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> [jwang: cherry pick to 4.4] Signed-off-by: Jack Wang <jinpu.wang@profitbricks.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ext4: correct documentation for grpid mount optionErnesto A. Fernández2018-02-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | commit 9f0372488cc9243018a812e8cfbf27de650b187b upstream. The grpid option is currently described as being the same as nogrpid. Signed-off-by: Ernesto A. Fernández <ernesto.mnd.fernandez@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* arm: spear13xx: Fix dmas cellsViresh Kumar2018-02-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit cdd10409914184c7eee5ae3e11beb890c9c16c61 upstream. The "dmas" cells for the designware DMA controller need to have only 3 properties apart from the phandle: request line, src master and destination master. But the commit 6e8887f60f60 updated it incorrectly while moving from platform code to DT. Fix it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.10+ Fixes: 6e8887f60f60 ("ARM: SPEAr13xx: Pass generic DW DMAC platform data from DT") Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/pti: Document fix wrong indexzhenwei.pi2018-01-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 98f0fceec7f84d80bc053e49e596088573086421 upstream. In section <2. Runtime Cost>, fix wrong index. Signed-off-by: zhenwei.pi <zhenwei.pi@youruncloud.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1516237492-27739-1-git-send-email-zhenwei.pi@youruncloud.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/spectre: Add boot time option to select Spectre v2 mitigationDavid Woodhouse2018-01-231-0/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit da285121560e769cc31797bba6422eea71d473e0 upstream. Add a spectre_v2= option to select the mitigation used for the indirect branch speculation vulnerability. Currently, the only option available is retpoline, in its various forms. This will be expanded to cover the new IBRS/IBPB microcode features. The RETPOLINE_AMD feature relies on a serializing LFENCE for speculation control. For AMD hardware, only set RETPOLINE_AMD if LFENCE is a serializing instruction, which is indicated by the LFENCE_RDTSC feature. [ tglx: Folded back the LFENCE/AMD fixes and reworked it so IBRS integration becomes simple ] Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@google.com> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Paul Turner <pjt@google.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515707194-20531-5-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* sysfs/cpu: Fix typos in vulnerability documentationDavid Woodhouse2018-01-171-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | commit 9ecccfaa7cb5249bd31bdceb93fcf5bedb8a24d8 upstream. Fixes: 87590ce6e ("sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folder") Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* sysfs/cpu: Add vulnerability folderThomas Gleixner2018-01-171-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 87590ce6e373d1a5401f6539f0c59ef92dd924a9 upstream. As the meltdown/spectre problem affects several CPU architectures, it makes sense to have common way to express whether a system is affected by a particular vulnerability or not. If affected the way to express the mitigation should be common as well. Create /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities folder and files for meltdown, spectre_v1 and spectre_v2. Allow architectures to override the show function. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180107214913.096657732@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/Documentation: Add PTI descriptionDave Hansen2018-01-172-7/+200
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 01c9b17bf673b05bb401b76ec763e9730ccf1376 upstream. Add some details about how PTI works, what some of the downsides are, and how to debug it when things go wrong. Also document the kernel parameter: 'pti/nopti'. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Moritz Lipp <moritz.lipp@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Daniel Gruss <daniel.gruss@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Michael Schwarz <michael.schwarz@iaik.tugraz.at> Cc: Richard Fellner <richard.fellner@student.tugraz.at> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Andi Lutomirsky <luto@kernel.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180105174436.1BC6FA2B@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/kaiser: Check boottime cmdline paramsBorislav Petkov2018-01-051-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | AMD (and possibly other vendors) are not affected by the leak KAISER is protecting against. Keep the "nopti" for traditional reasons and add pti=<on|off|auto> like upstream. Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/kaiser: Rename and simplify X86_FEATURE_KAISER handlingBorislav Petkov2018-01-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | Concentrate it in arch/x86/mm/kaiser.c and use the upstream string "nopti". Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* kaiser: add "nokaiser" boot option, using ALTERNATIVEHugh Dickins2018-01-051-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Added "nokaiser" boot option: an early param like "noinvpcid". Most places now check int kaiser_enabled (#defined 0 when not CONFIG_KAISER) instead of #ifdef CONFIG_KAISER; but entry_64.S and entry_64_compat.S are using the ALTERNATIVE technique, which patches in the preferred instructions at runtime. That technique is tied to x86 cpu features, so X86_FEATURE_KAISER is fabricated. Prior to "nokaiser", Kaiser #defined _PAGE_GLOBAL 0: revert that, but be careful with both _PAGE_GLOBAL and CR4.PGE: setting them when nokaiser like when !CONFIG_KAISER, but not setting either when kaiser - neither matters on its own, but it's hard to be sure that _PAGE_GLOBAL won't get set in some obscure corner, or something add PGE into CR4. By omitting _PAGE_GLOBAL from __supported_pte_mask when kaiser_enabled, all page table setup which uses pte_pfn() masks it out of the ptes. It's slightly shameful that the same declaration versus definition of kaiser_enabled appears in not one, not two, but in three header files (asm/kaiser.h, asm/pgtable.h, asm/tlbflush.h). I felt safer that way, than with #including any of those in any of the others; and did not feel it worth an asm/kaiser_enabled.h - kernel/cpu/common.c includes them all, so we shall hear about it if they get out of synch. Cleanups while in the area: removed the silly #ifdef CONFIG_KAISER from kaiser.c; removed the unused native_get_normal_pgd(); removed the spurious reg clutter from SWITCH_*_CR3 macro stubs; corrected some comments. But more interestingly, set CR4.PSE in secondary_startup_64: the manual is clear that it does not matter whether it's 0 or 1 when 4-level-pts are enabled, but I was distracted to find cr4 different on BSP and auxiliaries - BSP alone was adding PSE, in probe_page_size_mask(). Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/mm: Add the 'nopcid' boot option to turn off PCIDAndy Lutomirski2018-01-021-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0790c9aad84901ca1bdc14746175549c8b5da215 upstream. The parameter is only present on x86_64 systems to save a few bytes, as PCID is always disabled on x86_32. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/8bbb2e65bcd249a5f18bfb8128b4689f08ac2b60.1498751203.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/mm: Add a 'noinvpcid' boot option to turn off INVPCIDAndy Lutomirski2017-12-251-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d12a72b844a49d4162f24cefdab30bed3f86730e upstream. This adds a chicken bit to turn off INVPCID in case something goes wrong. It's an early_param() because we do TLB flushes before we parse __setup() parameters. Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hp.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f586317ed1bc2b87aee652267e515b90051af385.1454096309.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Revert "drm: bridge: add DT bindings for TI ths8135"Greg Kroah-Hartman2017-11-021-46/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 11bf4a8e1d5a300b38ca4bbe1156716b0174f2da which is commit 2e644be30fcc08c736f66b60f4898d274d4873ab upstream. Ben pointed out that there is no driver or device trees referencing this device in 4.4-stable, so the patch should not be present there. Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Cc: Bartosz Golaszewski <bgolaszewski@baylibre.com> Cc: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com> Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Cc: Archit Taneja <architt@codeaurora.org> Cc: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* iio: adc: hx711: Add DT binding for avia,hx711Andreas Klinger2017-10-082-0/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ff1293f67734da68e23fecb6ecdae7112b8c43f9 ] Add DT bindings for avia,hx711 Add vendor avia to vendor list Signed-off-by: Andreas Klinger <ak@it-klinger.de> Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* drm: bridge: add DT bindings for TI ths8135Bartosz Golaszewski2017-10-081-0/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 2e644be30fcc08c736f66b60f4898d274d4873ab ] THS8135 is a configurable video DAC. Add DT bindings for this chip. Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bgolaszewski@baylibre.com> Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com> Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Archit Taneja <architt@codeaurora.org> Link: http://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/1481623759-12786-3-git-send-email-bgolaszewski@baylibre.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* sysctl: enable strict writesKees Cook2017-07-051-8/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 41662f5cc55335807d39404371cfcbb1909304c4 upstream. SYSCTL_WRITES_WARN was added in commit f4aacea2f5d1 ("sysctl: allow for strict write position handling"), and released in v3.16 in August of 2014. Since then I can find only 1 instance of non-zero offset writing[1], and it was fixed immediately in CRIU[2]. As such, it appears safe to flip this to the strict state now. [1] https://www.google.com/search?q="when%20file%20position%20was%20not%200" [2] http://lists.openvz.org/pipermail/criu/2015-April/019819.html Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Sumit Semwal <sumit.semwal@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* mm: larger stack guard gap, between vmasHugh Dickins2017-06-261-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 1be7107fbe18eed3e319a6c3e83c78254b693acb upstream. Stack guard page is a useful feature to reduce a risk of stack smashing into a different mapping. We have been using a single page gap which is sufficient to prevent having stack adjacent to a different mapping. But this seems to be insufficient in the light of the stack usage in userspace. E.g. glibc uses as large as 64kB alloca() in many commonly used functions. Others use constructs liks gid_t buffer[NGROUPS_MAX] which is 256kB or stack strings with MAX_ARG_STRLEN. This will become especially dangerous for suid binaries and the default no limit for the stack size limit because those applications can be tricked to consume a large portion of the stack and a single glibc call could jump over the guard page. These attacks are not theoretical, unfortunatelly. Make those attacks less probable by increasing the stack guard gap to 1MB (on systems with 4k pages; but make it depend on the page size because systems with larger base pages might cap stack allocations in the PAGE_SIZE units) which should cover larger alloca() and VLA stack allocations. It is obviously not a full fix because the problem is somehow inherent, but it should reduce attack space a lot. One could argue that the gap size should be configurable from userspace, but that can be done later when somebody finds that the new 1MB is wrong for some special case applications. For now, add a kernel command line option (stack_guard_gap) to specify the stack gap size (in page units). Implementation wise, first delete all the old code for stack guard page: because although we could get away with accounting one extra page in a stack vma, accounting a larger gap can break userspace - case in point, a program run with "ulimit -S -v 20000" failed when the 1MB gap was counted for RLIMIT_AS; similar problems could come with RLIMIT_MLOCK and strict non-overcommit mode. Instead of keeping gap inside the stack vma, maintain the stack guard gap as a gap between vmas: using vm_start_gap() in place of vm_start (or vm_end_gap() in place of vm_end if VM_GROWSUP) in just those few places which need to respect the gap - mainly arch_get_unmapped_area(), and and the vma tree's subtree_gap support for that. Original-patch-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Original-patch-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Tested-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> # parisc Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> [wt: backport to 4.11: adjust context] [wt: backport to 4.9: adjust context ; kernel doc was not in admin-guide] [wt: backport to 4.4: adjust context ; drop ppc hugetlb_radix changes] Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> [gkh: minor build fixes for 4.4] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* arm64: documentation: document tagged pointer stack constraintsKristina Martsenko2017-05-251-15/+47
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f0e421b1bf7af97f026e1bb8bfe4c5a7a8c08f42 upstream. Some kernel features don't currently work if a task puts a non-zero address tag in its stack pointer, frame pointer, or frame record entries (FP, LR). For example, with a tagged stack pointer, the kernel can't deliver signals to the process, and the task is killed instead. As another example, with a tagged frame pointer or frame records, perf fails to generate call graphs or resolve symbols. For now, just document these limitations, instead of finding and fixing everything that doesn't work, as it's not known if anyone needs to use tags in these places anyway. In addition, as requested by Dave Martin, generalize the limitations into a general kernel address tag policy, and refactor tagged-pointers.txt to include it. Fixes: d50240a5f6ce ("arm64: mm: permit use of tagged pointers at EL0") Reviewed-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Kristina Martsenko <kristina.martsenko@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* clk: sunxi: Add apb0 gates for H3Krzysztof Adamski2017-05-021-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 6e17b4181603d183d20c73f4535529ddf2a2a020 upstream. This patch adds support for APB0 in H3. It seems to be compatible with earlier SOCs. apb0 gates controls R_ block peripherals (R_PIO, R_IR, etc). Since this gates behave just like any Allwinner clock gate, add a generic compatible that can be reused if we don't have any clock to protect. Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Adamski <k@japko.eu> [Maxime: Removed the H3 compatible from the simple-gates driver, reworked the commit log a bit] Signed-off-by: Maxime Ripard <maxime.ripard@free-electrons.com> Cc: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mountsEric W. Biederman2017-04-301-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d29216842a85c7970c536108e093963f02714498 upstream. CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace. mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2 mount --make-rshared / for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem as some people have managed to hit this by accident. As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned. Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users as follows: > The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of > the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance > problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less > than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired. > > Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that > have been triggered and not yet expired. > > The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common > case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've > not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries. > > The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large > number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat > more active mounts. So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and malfunctioning programs. For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl. Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> [bwh: Backported to 4.4: adjust context] Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netlink: remove mmapped netlink supportFlorian Westphal2017-03-221-332/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d1b4c689d4130bcfd3532680b64db562300716b6 upstream. mmapped netlink has a number of unresolved issues: - TX zerocopy support had to be disabled more than a year ago via commit 4682a0358639b29cf ("netlink: Always copy on mmap TX.") because the content of the mmapped area can change after netlink attribute validation but before message processing. - RX support was implemented mainly to speed up nfqueue dumping packet payload to userspace. However, since commit ae08ce0021087a5d812d2 ("netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: zero copy support") we avoid one copy with the socket-based interface too (via the skb_zerocopy helper). The other problem is that skbs attached to mmaped netlink socket behave different from normal skbs: - they don't have a shinfo area, so all functions that use skb_shinfo() (e.g. skb_clone) cannot be used. - reserving headroom prevents userspace from seeing the content as it expects message to start at skb->head. See for instance commit aa3a022094fa ("netlink: not trim skb for mmaped socket when dump"). - skbs handed e.g. to netlink_ack must have non-NULL skb->sk, else we crash because it needs the sk to check if a tx ring is attached. Also not obvious, leads to non-intuitive bug fixes such as 7c7bdf359 ("netfilter: nfnetlink: use original skbuff when acking batches"). mmaped netlink also didn't play nicely with the skb_zerocopy helper used by nfqueue and openvswitch. Daniel Borkmann fixed this via commit 6bb0fef489f6 ("netlink, mmap: fix edge-case leakages in nf queue zero-copy")' but at the cost of also needing to provide remaining length to the allocation function. nfqueue also has problems when used with mmaped rx netlink: - mmaped netlink doesn't allow use of nfqueue batch verdict messages. Problem is that in the mmap case, the allocation time also determines the ordering in which the frame will be seen by userspace (A allocating before B means that A is located in earlier ring slot, but this also means that B might get a lower sequence number then A since seqno is decided later. To fix this we would need to extend the spinlocked region to also cover the allocation and message setup which isn't desirable. - nfqueue can now be configured to queue large (GSO) skbs to userspace. Queing GSO packets is faster than having to force a software segmentation in the kernel, so this is a desirable option. However, with a mmap based ring one has to use 64kb per ring slot element, else mmap has to fall back to the socket path (NL_MMAP_STATUS_COPY) for all large packets. To use the mmap interface, userspace not only has to probe for mmap netlink support, it also has to implement a recv/socket receive path in order to handle messages that exceed the size of an rx ring element. Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Ken-ichirou MATSUZAWA <chamaken@gmail.com> Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Shi Yuejie <shiyuejie@outlook.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* samples: move mic/mpssd example code from DocumentationShuah Khan2017-03-129-2428/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 6bee835dd54e279f3d3ae2eca92a9c394b4fd028 upstream. Move mic/mpssd examples to samples and remove it from Documentation Makefile. Create a new Makefile to build mic/mpssd. It can be built from top level directory or from mic/mpssd directory: Run make -C samples/mic/mpssd or cd samples/mic/mpssd; make Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <shuahkh@osg.samsung.com> [backported to 4.4-stable as this code is broken on newer versions of gcc and we don't want to break the build for a Documentation sample. - gregkh] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/platform/goldfish: Prevent unconditional loadingThomas Gleixner2017-02-261-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 47512cfd0d7a8bd6ab71d01cd89fca19eb2093eb upstream. The goldfish platform code registers the platform device unconditionally which causes havoc in several ways if the goldfish_pdev_bus driver is enabled: - Access to the hardcoded physical memory region, which is either not available or contains stuff which is completely unrelated. - Prevents that the interrupt of the serial port can be requested - In case of a spurious interrupt it goes into a infinite loop in the interrupt handler of the pdev_bus driver (which needs to be fixed seperately). Add a 'goldfish' command line option to make the registration opt-in when the platform is compiled in. I'm seriously grumpy about this engineering trainwreck, which has seven SOBs from Intel developers for 50 lines of code. And none of them figured out that this is broken. Impressive fail! Fixes: ddd70cf93d78 ("goldfish: platform device for x86") Reported-by: Gabriel C <nix.or.die@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ARM: dts: imx31: fix clock control module interrupts descriptionVladimir Zapolskiy2017-01-261-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2e575cbc930901718cc18e084566ecbb9a4b5ebb upstream. The type of AVIC interrupt controller found on i.MX31 is one-cell, namely 31 for CCM DVFS and 53 for CCM, however for clock control module its interrupts are specified as 3-cells, fix it. Fixes: ef0e4a606fb6 ("ARM: mx31: Replace clk_register_clkdev with clock DT lookup") Acked-by: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Zapolskiy <vz@mleia.com> Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Save/restore XER in checkpointed register statePaul Mackerras2017-01-091-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0d808df06a44200f52262b6eb72bcb6042f5a7c5 upstream. When switching from/to a guest that has a transaction in progress, we need to save/restore the checkpointed register state. Although XER is part of the CPU state that gets checkpointed, the code that does this saving and restoring doesn't save/restore XER. This fixes it by saving and restoring the XER. To allow userspace to read/write the checkpointed XER value, we also add a new ONE_REG specifier. The visible effect of this bug is that the guest may see its XER value being corrupted when it uses transactions. Fixes: e4e38121507a ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add transactional memory support") Fixes: 0a8eccefcb34 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Add missing code for transaction reclaim on guest exit") Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Revert "x86/mm: Expand the exception table logic to allow new handling options"Greg Kroah-Hartman2016-10-311-35/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit fcf5e5198b447969ed2a56ec335dae3c695a6b46 which is 548acf19234dbda5a52d5a8e7e205af46e9da840 upstream. Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/mm: Expand the exception table logic to allow new handling optionsTony Luck2016-10-311-0/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 548acf19234dbda5a52d5a8e7e205af46e9da840 upstream. Huge amounts of help from Andy Lutomirski and Borislav Petkov to produce this. Andy provided the inspiration to add classes to the exception table with a clever bit-squeezing trick, Boris pointed out how much cleaner it would all be if we just had a new field. Linus Torvalds blessed the expansion with: ' I'd rather not be clever in order to save just a tiny amount of space in the exception table, which isn't really criticial for anybody. ' The third field is another relative function pointer, this one to a handler that executes the actions. We start out with three handlers: 1: Legacy - just jumps the to fixup IP 2: Fault - provide the trap number in %ax to the fixup code 3: Cleaned up legacy for the uaccess error hack Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f6af78fcbd348cf4939875cfda9c19689b5e50b8.1455732970.git.tony.luck@intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Input: i8042 - skip selftest on ASUS laptopsMarcos Paulo de Souza2016-10-281-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 930e19248e9b61da36c967687ca79c4d5f977919 upstream. On suspend/resume cycle, selftest is executed to reset i8042 controller. But when this is done in Asus devices, subsequent calls to detect/init functions to elantech driver fails. Skipping selftest fixes this problem. An easier step to reproduce this problem is adding i8042.reset=1 as a kernel parameter. On Asus laptops, it'll make the system to start with the touchpad already stuck, since psmouse_probe forcibly calls the selftest function. This patch was inspired by John Hiesey's change[1], but, since this problem affects a lot of models of Asus, let's avoid running selftests on them. All models affected by this problem: A455LD K401LB K501LB K501LX R409L V502LX X302LA X450LCP X450LD X455LAB X455LDB X455LF Z450LA [1]: https://marc.info/?l=linux-input&m=144312209020616&w=2 Fixes: "ETPS/2 Elantech Touchpad dies after resume from suspend" (https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=107971) Signed-off-by: Marcos Paulo de Souza <marcos.souza.org@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* regulator: qcom_spmi: Update mvs1/mvs2 switches on pm8941Stephen Boyd2016-10-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 93bfe79b03365f410aa91caf04263173c008ecdf upstream. The mvs1 and mvs2 switches are actually called 5vs1 and 5vs2 on some datasheets. Let's rename them to match the datasheets and also match the RPM based regulator driver which calls these by their 5vs names (see qcom_smd-regulator.c). There aren't any users of these regulators so far, so there aren't any concerns of DT ABI breakage here. While we're here making updates to the switches, also mandate usage of the OCP irq for these switches too. Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Fixes: e92a4047419c ("regulator: Add QCOM SPMI regulator driver") Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <stephen.boyd@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* regulator: qcom_spmi: Add support for S4 supply on pm8941Stephen Boyd2016-10-071-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c333dfe8dba7d3e47e97e1cee3c38123e19ae73c upstream. The S4 supply is sometimes called the boost regulator because it outputs 5V. Typically it's connected to the 5vs1 and 5vs2 switches for use in USB OTG and HDMI applications. Add support for this regulator which was mistakenly left out from the initial submission of this driver. Cc: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org> Fixes: e92a4047419c ("regulator: Add QCOM SPMI regulator driver") Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <stephen.boyd@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* pinctrl: Flag strict is a field in struct pinmux_opsAndy Shevchenko2016-10-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 7440926ed9623dceca3310c5f437d06c859dc02b upstream. Documentation incorrectly refers to struct pinctrl_desc, where no such flag is available. Replace the name of the struct. Fixes: commit 8c4c2016345f ("pinctrl: move strict option to pinmux_ops") Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* mpssd: fix buffer overflow warningMike Danese2016-09-241-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3610a2add39365a0f153154c60169a66c616d50f upstream. The compilation emits a warning in function ‘snprintf’, inlined from ‘set_cmdline’ at ../Documentation/mic/mpssd/mpssd.c:1541:9: /usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu/bits/stdio2.h:64:10: warning: call to __builtin___snprintf_chk will always overflow destination buffer This was introduced in commit f4a66c204482 ("misc: mic: Update MIC host daemon with COSM changes") and is fixed by reverting the changes to the size argument of these snprintf statements. Cc: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Danese <mikedanese@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* iio: adc: rockchip_saradc: reset saradc controller before programming itCaesar Wang2016-09-241-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 543852af8e5902aee8f7c72c89e1513663e0f696 upstream. SARADC controller needs to be reset before programming it, otherwise it will not function properly. Signed-off-by: Caesar Wang <wxt@rock-chips.com> Cc: Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org> Cc: Heiko Stuebner <heiko@sntech.de> Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org> Cc: linux-iio@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-rockchip@lists.infradead.org Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Cameron <jic23@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* proc: revert /proc/<pid>/maps [stack:TID] annotationJohannes Weiner2016-09-151-6/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 65376df582174ffcec9e6471bf5b0dd79ba05e4a ] Commit b76437579d13 ("procfs: mark thread stack correctly in proc/<pid>/maps") added [stack:TID] annotation to /proc/<pid>/maps. Finding the task of a stack VMA requires walking the entire thread list, turning this into quadratic behavior: a thousand threads means a thousand stacks, so the rendering of /proc/<pid>/maps needs to look at a million combinations. The cost is not in proportion to the usefulness as described in the patch. Drop the [stack:TID] annotation to make /proc/<pid>/maps (and /proc/<pid>/numa_maps) usable again for higher thread counts. The [stack] annotation inside /proc/<pid>/task/<tid>/maps is retained, as identifying the stack VMA there is an O(1) operation. Siddesh said: "The end users needed a way to identify thread stacks programmatically and there wasn't a way to do that. I'm afraid I no longer remember (or have access to the resources that would aid my memory since I changed employers) the details of their requirement. However, I did do this on my own time because I thought it was an interesting project for me and nobody really gave any feedback then as to its utility, so as far as I am concerned you could roll back the main thread maps information since the information is available in the thread-specific files" Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh.poyarekar@gmail.com> Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-27 15:47:08 +0000