| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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bpi.S was introduced as we were starting to build the Spectre v2
mitigation framework, and it was rather unclear that it would
become strictly KVM specific.
Now that the picture is a lot clearer, let's move the content
of that file to hyp-entry.S, where it actually belong.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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The very existence of __smccc_workaround_1_hvc_* is a thinko, as
KVM will never use a HVC call to perform the branch prediction
invalidation. Even as a nested hypervisor, it would use an SMC
instruction.
Let's get rid of it.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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The function SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 was introduced as part of SMC
V1.1 Calling Convention to mitigate CVE-2017-5715. This patch uses
the standard call SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 for Falkor chips instead
of Silicon provider service ID 0xC2001700.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org>
[maz: reworked errata framework integration]
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
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Creates far too many conflicts with arm64/for-next/core, to be
resent post -rc1.
This reverts commit f9f5dc19509bbef6f5e675346f1a7d7b846bdb12.
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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The function SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 was introduced as part of SMC
V1.1 Calling Convention to mitigate CVE-2017-5715. This patch uses
the standard call SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 for Falkor chips instead
of Silicon provider service ID 0xC2001700.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.14+
Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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We're about to need to allocate hardening slots from other parts
of the kernel (in order to support ARM64_HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS).
Turn the counter into an atomic_t and make it available to the
rest of the kernel. Also add BP_HARDEN_EL2_SLOTS as the number of
slots instead of the hardcoded 4...
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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So far, the branch from the vector slots to the main vectors can at
most be 4GB from the main vectors (the reach of ADRP), and this
distance is known at compile time. If we were to remap the slots
to an unrelated VA, things would break badly.
A way to achieve VA independence would be to load the absolute
address of the vectors (__kvm_hyp_vector), either using a constant
pool or a series of movs, followed by an indirect branch.
This patches implements the latter solution, using another instance
of a patching callback. Note that since we have to save a register
pair on the stack, we branch to the *second* instruction in the
vectors in order to compensate for it. This also results in having
to adjust this balance in the invalid vector entry point.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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So far, we only reserve a single instruction in the BPI template in
order to branch to the vectors. As we're going to stuff a few more
instructions there, let's reserve a total of 5 instructions, which
we're going to patch later on as required.
We also introduce a small refactor of the vectors themselves, so that
we stop carrying the target branch around.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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There is no reason why the BP hardening vectors shouldn't be part
of the HYP text at compile time, rather than being mapped at runtime.
Also introduce a new config symbol that controls the compilation
of bpi.S.
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
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Now that we've standardised on SMCCC v1.1 to perform the branch
prediction invalidation, let's drop the previous band-aid.
If vendors haven't updated their firmware to do SMCCC 1.1, they
haven't updated PSCI either, so we don't loose anything.
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Add the detection and runtime code for ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1.
It is lovely. Really.
Tested-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Falkor is susceptible to branch predictor aliasing and can
theoretically be attacked by malicious code. This patch
implements a mitigation for these attacks, preventing any
malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts.
Signed-off-by: Shanker Donthineni <shankerd@codeaurora.org>
[will: fix label name when !CONFIG_KVM and remove references to MIDR_FALKOR]
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Cortex-A57, A72, A73 and A75 are susceptible to branch predictor aliasing
and can theoretically be attacked by malicious code.
This patch implements a PSCI-based mitigation for these CPUs when available.
The call into firmware will invalidate the branch predictor state, preventing
any malicious entries from affecting other victim contexts.
Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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Aliasing attacks against CPU branch predictors can allow an attacker to
redirect speculative control flow on some CPUs and potentially divulge
information from one context to another.
This patch adds initial skeleton code behind a new Kconfig option to
enable implementation-specific mitigations against these attacks for
CPUs that are affected.
Co-developed-by: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
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