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* s390/uv: Convert to use flag output macrosHeiko Carstens10 days1-6/+6
| | | | | | | | Use flag output macros in inline asm to allow for better code generation if the compiler has support for the flag output constraint. Reviewed-by: Juergen Christ <jchrist@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uv: Retrieve UV secrets sysfs supportSteffen Eiden2024-10-291-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Reflect the updated content in the query information UVC to the sysfs at /sys/firmware/query * new UV-query sysfs entry for the maximum number of retrievable secrets the UV can store for one secure guest. * new UV-query sysfs entry for the maximum number of association secrets the UV can store for one secure guest. * max_secrets contains the sum of max association and max retrievable secrets. Reviewed-by: Christoph Schlameuss <schlameuss@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241024062638.1465970-7-seiden@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uv: Retrieve UV secrets supportSteffen Eiden2024-10-291-2/+134
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide a kernel API to retrieve secrets from the UV secret store. Add two new functions: * `uv_get_secret_metadata` - get metadata for a given secret identifier * `uv_retrieve_secret` - get the secret value for the secret index With those two functions one can extract the secret for a given secret id, if the secret is retrievable. Reviewed-by: Christoph Schlameuss <schlameuss@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241024084107.2418186-1-seiden@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uv: Use a constant for more-data rcSteffen Eiden2024-10-291-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a define for the UVC rc 0x0100 that indicates that a UV-call was successful but may serve more data if called with a larger buffer again. Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Schlameuss <schlameuss@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241024062638.1465970-2-seiden@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uv: Provide host-key hashes in sysfsSteffen Eiden2024-10-291-0/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Utilize the new Query Ultravisor Keys UVC to give user space the information which host-keys are installed on the system. Create a new sysfs directory 'firmware/uv/keys' that contains the hash of the host-key and the backup host-key of that system. Additionally, the file 'all' contains the response from the UVC possibly containing more key-hashes than currently known. Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241023075529.2561384-1-seiden@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uv: Panic for set and remove shared access UVC errorsClaudio Imbrenda2024-08-071-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The return value uv_set_shared() and uv_remove_shared() (which are wrappers around the share() function) is not always checked. The system integrity of a protected guest depends on the Share and Unshare UVCs being successful. This means that any caller that fails to check the return value will compromise the security of the protected guest. No code path that would lead to such violation of the security guarantees is currently exercised, since all the areas that are shared never get unshared during the lifetime of the system. This might change and become an issue in the future. The Share and Unshare UVCs can only fail in case of hypervisor misbehaviour (either a bug or malicious behaviour). In such cases there is no reasonable way forward, and the system needs to panic. This patch replaces the return at the end of the share() function with a panic, to guarantee system integrity. Fixes: 5abb9351dfd9 ("s390/uv: introduce guest side ultravisor code") Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240801112548.85303-1-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-ID: <20240801112548.85303-1-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> [frankja@linux.ibm.com: Fixed up patch subject] Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
* s390: Remove protvirt and kvm config guards for uv codeJanosch Frank2024-07-231-32/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Removing the CONFIG_PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST ifdefs and config option as well as CONFIG_KVM ifdefs in uv files. Having this configurable has been more of a pain than a help. It's time to remove the ifdefs and the config option. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uv: Convert uv_convert_owned_from_secure() to ↵David Hildenbrand2024-06-051-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | uv_convert_from_secure_(folio|pte)() Let's do the same as we did for uv_destroy_(folio|pte)() and have the following variants: (1) uv_convert_from_secure(): "low level" helper that operates on paddr and does not mess with folios. (2) uv_convert_from_secure_folio(): Consumes a folio to which we hold a reference. (3) uv_convert_from_secure_pte(): Consumes a PTE that holds a reference through the mapping. Unfortunately we need uv_convert_from_secure_pte(), because pfn_folio() and friends are not available in pgtable.h. Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240508182955.358628-9-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uv: Convert uv_destroy_owned_page() to uv_destroy_(folio|pte)()David Hildenbrand2024-06-051-2/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Let's have the following variants for destroying pages: (1) uv_destroy(): Like uv_pin_shared() and uv_convert_from_secure(), "low level" helper that operates on paddr and doesn't mess with folios. (2) uv_destroy_folio(): Consumes a folio to which we hold a reference. (3) uv_destroy_pte(): Consumes a PTE that holds a reference through the mapping. Unfortunately we need uv_destroy_pte(), because pfn_folio() and friends are not available in pgtable.h. Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240508182955.358628-8-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uv: Make uv_convert_from_secure() a static functionDavid Hildenbrand2024-06-051-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | It's not used outside of uv.c, so let's make it a static function. Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240508182955.358628-7-david@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com>
* KVM: s390: pv: Allow AP-instructions for pv-guestsSteffen Eiden2023-08-281-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | Introduces new feature bits and enablement flags for AP and AP IRQ support. Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Mueller <mimu@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815151415.379760-5-seiden@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20230815151415.379760-5-seiden@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uv: UV feature check utilitySteffen Eiden2023-08-281-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduces a function to check the existence of an UV feature. Refactor feature bit checks to use the new function. Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Mueller <mimu@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815151415.379760-3-seiden@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20230815151415.379760-3-seiden@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uv: export uv_pin_shared for direct usageJanosch Frank2023-08-181-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | Export the uv_pin_shared function so that it can be called from other modules that carry a GPL-compatible license. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Tony Krowiak <akrowiak@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Viktor Mihajlovski <mihajlov@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230815184333.6554-11-akrowiak@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uv: Update query for secret-UVCsSteffen Eiden2023-06-161-2/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Update the query struct such that secret-UVC related information can be parsed. Add sysfs files for these new values. 'supp_add_secret_req_ver' notes the supported versions for the Add Secret UVC. Bit 0 indicates that version 0x100 is supported, bit 1 indicates 0x200, and so on. 'supp_add_secret_pcf' notes the supported plaintext flags for the Add Secret UVC. 'supp_secret_types' notes the supported types of secrets. Bit 0 indicates secret type 1, bit 1 indicates type 2, and so on. 'max_secrets' notes the maximum amount of secrets the secret store can store per pv guest. Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230615100533.3996107-8-seiden@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20230615100533.3996107-8-seiden@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uvdevice: Add 'Lock Secret Store' UVCSteffen Eiden2023-06-161-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Userspace can call the Lock Secret Store Ultravisor Call using IOCTLs on the uvdevice. The Lock Secret Store UV call disables all additions of secrets for the future. The uvdevice is merely transporting the request from userspace to the Ultravisor. Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230615100533.3996107-6-seiden@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20230615100533.3996107-6-seiden@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uvdevice: Add 'List Secrets' UVCSteffen Eiden2023-06-161-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Userspace can call the List Secrets Ultravisor Call using IOCTLs on the uvdevice. The List Secrets UV call lists the identifier of the secrets in the UV secret store. The uvdevice is merely transporting the request from userspace to Ultravisor. It's neither checking nor manipulating the request or response data. Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230615100533.3996107-5-seiden@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20230615100533.3996107-5-seiden@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uvdevice: Add 'Add Secret' UVCSteffen Eiden2023-06-161-0/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Userspace can call the Add Secret Ultravisor Call using IOCTLs on the uvdevice. The Add Secret UV call sends an encrypted and cryptographically verified request to the Ultravisor. The request inserts a protected guest's secret into the Ultravisor for later use. The uvdevice is merely transporting the request from userspace to the Ultravisor. It's neither checking nor manipulating the request data. Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230615100533.3996107-4-seiden@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20230615100533.3996107-4-seiden@linux.ibm.com>
* KVM: s390: pv: support for Destroy fast UVCClaudio Imbrenda2022-11-231-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for the Destroy Secure Configuration Fast Ultravisor call, and take advantage of it for asynchronous destroy. When supported, the protected guest is destroyed immediately using the new UVC, leaving only the memory to be cleaned up asynchronously. Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Nico Boehr <nrb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221111170632.77622-6-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20221111170632.77622-6-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
* KVM: s390: pv: handle secure storage violations for protected guestsClaudio Imbrenda2022-07-131-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A secure storage violation is triggered when a protected guest tries to access secure memory that has been mapped erroneously, or that belongs to a different protected guest or to the ultravisor. With upcoming patches, protected guests will be able to trigger secure storage violations in normal operation. This happens for example if a protected guest is rebooted with deferred destroy enabled and the new guest is also protected. When the new protected guest touches pages that have not yet been destroyed, and thus are accounted to the previous protected guest, a secure storage violation is raised. This patch adds handling of secure storage violations for protected guests. This exception is handled by first trying to destroy the page, because it is expected to belong to a defunct protected guest where a destroy should be possible. Note that a secure page can only be destroyed if its protected VM does not have any CPUs, which only happens when the protected VM is being terminated. If that fails, a normal export of the page is attempted. This means that pages that trigger the exception will be made non-secure (in one way or another) before attempting to use them again for a different secure guest. Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220628135619.32410-3-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220628135619.32410-3-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
* s390: Add attestation query informationSteffen Eiden2022-07-111-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | We have information about the supported attestation header version and plaintext attestation flag bits. Let's expose it via the sysfs files. Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220601100245.3189993-1-seiden@linux.ibm.com/ Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com>
* KVM: s390: pv: Add dump support definitionsJanosch Frank2022-06-011-0/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | Let's add the constants and structure definitions needed for the dump support. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517163629.3443-5-frankja@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220517163629.3443-5-frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uv: Add dump fields to queryJanosch Frank2022-06-011-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The new dump feature requires us to know how much memory is needed for the "dump storage state" and "dump finalize" ultravisor call. These values are reported via the UV query call. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517163629.3443-3-frankja@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220517163629.3443-3-frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uv: Add SE hdr query informationJanosch Frank2022-06-011-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | We have information about the supported se header version and pcf bits so let's expose it via the sysfs files. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220517163629.3443-2-frankja@linux.ibm.com Message-Id: <20220517163629.3443-2-frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
* drivers/s390/char: Add Ultravisor io deviceSteffen Eiden2022-05-201-1/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds a new miscdevice to expose some Ultravisor functions to userspace. Userspace can send IOCTLs to the uvdevice that will then emit a corresponding Ultravisor Call and hands the result over to userspace. The uvdevice is available if the Ultravisor Call facility is present. Userspace can call the Retrieve Attestation Measurement Ultravisor Call using IOCTLs on the uvdevice. The uvdevice will do some sanity checks first. Then, copy the request data to kernel space, build the UVCB, perform the UV call, and copy the result back to userspace. Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20220516113335.338212-1-seiden@linux.ibm.com/ Message-Id: <20220516113335.338212-1-seiden@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> (whitespace and tristate fixes, pick)
* KVM: s390: pv: make use of ultravisor AIV supportMichael Mueller2022-02-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch enables the ultravisor adapter interruption vitualization support indicated by UV feature BIT_UV_FEAT_AIV. This allows ISC interruption injection directly into the GISA IPM for PV kvm guests. Hardware that does not support this feature will continue to use the UV interruption interception method to deliver ISC interruptions to PV kvm guests. For this purpose, the ECA_AIV bit for all guest cpus will be cleared and the GISA will be disabled during PV CPU setup. In addition a check in __inject_io() has been removed. That reduces the required instructions for interruption handling for PV and traditional kvm guests. Signed-off-by: Michael Mueller <mimu@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220209152217.1793281-2-mimu@linux.ibm.com Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>
* s390: uv: Add offset comments to UV query struct and fix namingJanosch Frank2021-12-171-17/+17
| | | | | | | | | Changes to the struct are easier to manage with offset comments so let's add some. And now that we know that the last struct member has the wrong name let's also fix this. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com>
* KVM: s390: pv: properly handle page flags for protected guestsClaudio Imbrenda2021-10-271-2/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce variants of the convert and destroy page functions that also clear the PG_arch_1 bit used to mark them as secure pages. The PG_arch_1 flag is always allowed to overindicate; using the new functions introduced here allows to reduce the extent of overindication and thus improve performance. These new functions can only be called on pages for which a reference is already being held. Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210920132502.36111-7-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
* KVM: s390: pv: add macros for UVC CC valuesClaudio Imbrenda2021-10-251-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | Add macros to describe the 4 possible CC values returned by the UVC instruction. Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20210920132502.36111-2-imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
* s390/boot: move uv function declarations to boot/uv.hAlexander Egorenkov2021-07-271-8/+0
| | | | | | | | | | The functions adjust_to_uv_max() and uv_query_info() are used only in the decompressor. Therefore, move the function declarations from the global arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h to arch/s390/boot/uv.h. Signed-off-by: Alexander Egorenkov <egorenar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
* s390: mm: Fix secure storage access exception handlingJanosch Frank2021-07-051-1/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Turns out that the bit 61 in the TEID is not always 1 and if that's the case the address space ID and the address are unpredictable. Without an address and its address space ID we can't export memory and hence we can only send a SIGSEGV to the process or panic the kernel depending on who caused the exception. Unfortunately bit 61 is only reliable if we have the "misc" UV feature bit. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Fixes: 084ea4d611a3d ("s390/mm: add (non)secure page access exceptions handlers") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
* s390: uv: Fix sysfs max number of VCPUs reportingJanosch Frank2021-01-271-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The number reported by the query is N-1 and I think people reading the sysfs file would expect N instead. For users creating VMs there's no actual difference because KVM's limit is currently below the UV's limit. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Fixes: a0f60f8431999 ("s390/protvirt: Add sysfs firmware interface for Ultravisor information") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uv: add destroy page callJanosch Frank2020-09-141-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We don't need to export pages if we destroy the VM configuration afterwards anyway. Instead we can destroy the page which will zero it and then make it accessible to the host. Destroying is about twice as fast as the export. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20200907124700.10374-2-frankja@linux.ibm.com/ Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
* KVM: s390: protvirt: Add UV cpu reset callsJanosch Frank2020-02-271-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For protected VMs, the VCPU resets are done by the Ultravisor, as KVM has no access to the VCPU registers. Note that the ultravisor will only accept a call for the exact reset that has been requested. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
* KVM: s390: protvirt: Support cmd 5 operation stateJanosch Frank2020-02-271-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Code 5 for the set cpu state UV call tells the UV to load a PSW from the SE header (first IPL) or from guest location 0x0 (diag 308 subcode 0/1). Also it sets the cpu into operating state afterwards, so we can start it. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
* KVM: s390: protvirt: Report CPU state to UltravisorJanosch Frank2020-02-271-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | VCPU states have to be reported to the ultravisor for SIGP interpretation, kdump, kexec and reboot. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
* KVM: s390: protvirt: UV calls in support of diag308 0, 1Janosch Frank2020-02-271-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | diag 308 subcode 0 and 1 require several KVM and Ultravisor interactions. Specific to these "soft" reboots are * The "unshare all" UVC * The "prepare for reset" UVC Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
* KVM: s390: protvirt: Add initial vm and cpu lifecycle handlingJanosch Frank2020-02-271-0/+69
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | This contains 3 main changes: 1. changes in SIE control block handling for secure guests 2. helper functions for create/destroy/unpack secure guests 3. KVM_S390_PV_COMMAND ioctl to allow userspace dealing with secure machines Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
* KVM: s390: add new variants of UV CALLJanosch Frank2020-02-271-5/+60
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This adds two new helper functions for doing UV CALLs. The first variant handles UV CALLs that might have longer busy conditions or just need longer when doing partial completion. We should schedule when necessary. The second variant handles UV CALLs that only need the handle but have no payload (e.g. destroying a VM). We can provide a simple wrapper for those. Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
* s390/mm: provide memory management functions for protected KVM guestsClaudio Imbrenda2020-02-271-0/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This provides the basic ultravisor calls and page table handling to cope with secure guests: - provide arch_make_page_accessible - make pages accessible after unmapping of secure guests - provide the ultravisor commands convert to/from secure - provide the ultravisor commands pin/unpin shared - provide callbacks to make pages secure (inacccessible) - we check for the expected pin count to only make pages secure if the host is not accessing them - we fence hugetlbfs for secure pages - add missing radix-tree include into gmap.h The basic idea is that a page can have 3 states: secure, normal or shared. The hypervisor can call into a firmware function called ultravisor that allows to change the state of a page: convert from/to secure. The convert from secure will encrypt the page and make it available to the host and host I/O. The convert to secure will remove the host capability to access this page. The design is that on convert to secure we will wait until writeback and page refs are indicating no host usage. At the same time the convert from secure (export to host) will be called in common code when the refcount or the writeback bit is already set. This avoids races between convert from and to secure. Then there is also the concept of shared pages. Those are kind of secure where the host can still access those pages. We need to be notified when the guest "unshares" such a page, basically doing a convert to secure by then. There is a call "pin shared page" that we use instead of convert from secure when possible. We do use PG_arch_1 as an optimization to minimize the convert from secure/pin shared. Several comments have been added in the code to explain the logic in the relevant places. Co-developed-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weigand <Ulrich.Weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Claudio Imbrenda <imbrenda@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
* s390/protvirt: add ultravisor initializationVasily Gorbik2020-02-271-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Before being able to host protected virtual machines, donate some of the memory to the ultravisor. Besides that the ultravisor might impose addressing limitations for memory used to back protected VM storage. Treat that limit as protected virtualization host's virtual memory limit. Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
* s390/protvirt: introduce host side setupVasily Gorbik2020-02-271-2/+43
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add "prot_virt" command line option which controls if the kernel protected VMs support is enabled at early boot time. This has to be done early, because it needs large amounts of memory and will disable some features like STP time sync for the lpar. Extend ultravisor info definitions and expose it via uv_info struct filled in during startup. Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com> Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> [borntraeger@de.ibm.com: patch merging, splitting, fixing] Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
* s390/uv: use EOPNOTSUPP instead of ENOTSUPPChristian Borntraeger2019-12-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | ENOTSUP is just an internal kernel error and should never reach userspace. The return value of the share function is not exported to userspace, but to avoid giving bad examples let us use EOPNOTSUPP: Suggested-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Acked-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
* s390/uv: introduce guest side ultravisor codeVasily Gorbik2019-04-101-0/+132
The Ultravisor Call Facility (stfle bit 158) defines an API to the Ultravisor (UV calls), a mini hypervisor located at machine level. With help of the Ultravisor, KVM will be able to run "protected" VMs, special VMs whose memory and management data are unavailable to KVM. The protected VMs can also request services from the Ultravisor. The guest api consists of UV calls to share and unshare memory with the kvm hypervisor. To enable this feature support PROTECTED_VIRTUALIZATION_GUEST kconfig option has been introduced. Co-developed-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Janosch Frank <frankja@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-23 05:19:34 +0000