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* KVM: x86: Fix NULL dereference at kvm_msr_ignored_check()Takashi Iwai2020-10-301-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The newly introduced kvm_msr_ignored_check() tries to print error or debug messages via vcpu_*() macros, but those may cause Oops when NULL vcpu is passed for KVM_GET_MSRS ioctl. Fix it by replacing the print calls with kvm_*() macros. (Note that this will leave vcpu argument completely unused in the function, but I didn't touch it to make the fix as small as possible. A clean up may be applied later.) Fixes: 12bc2132b15e ("KVM: X86: Do the same ignore_msrs check for feature msrs") BugLink: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1178280 Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Message-Id: <20201030151414.20165-1-tiwai@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* Merge branch 'kvm-fixes' into 'next'Paolo Bonzini2020-10-211-5/+6
|\ | | | | | | Pick up bugfixes from 5.9, otherwise various tests fail.
| * KVM: x86: Reset MMU context if guest toggles CR4.SMAP or CR4.PKESean Christopherson2020-09-251-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Reset the MMU context during kvm_set_cr4() if SMAP or PKE is toggled. Recent commits to (correctly) not reload PDPTRs when SMAP/PKE are toggled inadvertantly skipped the MMU context reset due to the mask of bits that triggers PDPTR loads also being used to trigger MMU context resets. Fixes: 427890aff855 ("kvm: x86: Toggling CR4.SMAP does not load PDPTEs in PAE mode") Fixes: cb957adb4ea4 ("kvm: x86: Toggling CR4.PKE does not load PDPTEs in PAE mode") Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Cc: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Message-Id: <20200923215352.17756-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * KVM: x86: fix MSR_IA32_TSC read for nested migrationMaxim Levitsky2020-09-241-2/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | MSR reads/writes should always access the L1 state, since the (nested) hypervisor should intercept all the msrs it wants to adjust, and these that it doesn't should be read by the guest as if the host had read it. However IA32_TSC is an exception. Even when not intercepted, guest still reads the value + TSC offset. The write however does not take any TSC offset into account. This is documented in Intel's SDM and seems also to happen on AMD as well. This creates a problem when userspace wants to read the IA32_TSC value and then write it. (e.g for migration) In this case it reads L2 value but write is interpreted as an L1 value. To fix this make the userspace initiated reads of IA32_TSC return L1 value as well. Huge thanks to Dave Gilbert for helping me understand this very confusing semantic of MSR writes. Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200921103805.9102-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * KVM: x86: VMX: Make smaller physical guest address space support ↵Mohammed Gamal2020-09-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | user-configurable This patch exposes allow_smaller_maxphyaddr to the user as a module parameter. Since smaller physical address spaces are only supported on VMX, the parameter is only exposed in the kvm_intel module. For now disable support by default, and let the user decide if they want to enable it. Modifications to VMX page fault and EPT violation handling will depend on whether that parameter is enabled. Signed-off-by: Mohammed Gamal <mgamal@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200903141122.72908-1-mgamal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: x86: allow kvm_x86_ops.set_efer to return an error valueMaxim Levitsky2020-10-211-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This will be used to signal an error to the userspace, in case the vendor code failed during handling of this msr. (e.g -ENOMEM) Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20201001112954.6258-4-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: x86: report negative values from wrmsr emulation to userspaceMaxim Levitsky2020-10-211-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This will allow the KVM to report such errors (e.g -ENOMEM) to the userspace. Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20201001112954.6258-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: x86: xen_hvm_config: cleanup return valuesMaxim Levitsky2020-10-211-14/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Return 1 on errors that are caused by wrong guest behavior (which will inject #GP to the guest) And return a negative error value on issues that are the kernel's fault (e.g -ENOMEM) Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20201001112954.6258-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: x86: allocate vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries dynamicallyVitaly Kuznetsov2020-10-211-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current limit for guest CPUID leaves (KVM_MAX_CPUID_ENTRIES, 80) is reported to be insufficient but before we bump it let's switch to allocating vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[] array dynamically. Currently, 'struct kvm_cpuid_entry2' is 40 bytes so vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries is 3200 bytes which accounts for 1/4 of the whole 'struct kvm_vcpu_arch' but having it pre-allocated (for all vCPUs which we also pre-allocate) gives us no real benefits. Another plus of the dynamic allocation is that we now do kvm_check_cpuid() check before we assign anything to vcpu->arch.cpuid_nent/cpuid_entries so no changes are made in case the check fails. Opportunistically remove unneeded 'out' labels from kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid()/kvm_vcpu_ioctl_set_cpuid2() and return directly whenever possible. Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20201001130541.1398392-3-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
* | kvm: x86: only provide PV features if enabled in guest's CPUIDOliver Upton2020-10-211-5/+62
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | KVM unconditionally provides PV features to the guest, regardless of the configured CPUID. An unwitting guest that doesn't check KVM_CPUID_FEATURES before use could access paravirt features that userspace did not intend to provide. Fix this by checking the guest's CPUID before performing any paravirtual operations. Introduce a capability, KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID, to gate the aforementioned enforcement. Migrating a VM from a host w/o this patch to a host with this patch could silently change the ABI exposed to the guest, warranting that we default to the old behavior and opt-in for the new one. Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Change-Id: I202a0926f65035b872bfe8ad15307c026de59a98 Message-Id: <20200818152429.1923996-4-oupton@google.com> Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | kvm: x86: set wall_clock in kvm_write_wall_clock()Oliver Upton2020-10-211-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Small change to avoid meaningless duplication in the subsequent patch. No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Change-Id: I77ab9cdad239790766b7a49d5cbae5e57a3005ea Message-Id: <20200818152429.1923996-3-oupton@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | kvm: x86: encapsulate wrmsr(MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME) emulation in helper fnOliver Upton2020-10-211-26/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | No functional change intended. Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Change-Id: I7cbe71069db98d1ded612fd2ef088b70e7618426 Message-Id: <20200818152429.1923996-2-oupton@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: VMX: Forbid userspace MSR filters for x2APICPaolo Bonzini2020-10-211-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allowing userspace to intercept reads to x2APIC MSRs when APICV is fully enabled for the guest simply can't work. But more in general, the LAPIC could be set to in-kernel after the MSR filter is setup and allowing accesses by userspace would be very confusing. We could in principle allow userspace to intercept reads and writes to TPR, and writes to EOI and SELF_IPI, but while that could be made it work, it would still be silly. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Cc: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: VMX: Ignore userspace MSR filters for x2APICSean Christopherson2020-10-211-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rework the resetting of the MSR bitmap for x2APIC MSRs to ignore userspace filtering. Allowing userspace to intercept reads to x2APIC MSRs when APICV is fully enabled for the guest simply can't work; the LAPIC and thus virtual APIC is in-kernel and cannot be directly accessed by userspace. To keep things simple we will in fact forbid intercepting x2APIC MSRs altogether, independent of the default_allow setting. Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Cc: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com> Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Message-Id: <20201005195532.8674-3-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> [Modified to operate even if APICv is disabled, adjust documentation. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: x86: do not attempt TSC synchronization on guest writesPaolo Bonzini2020-09-281-20/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | KVM special-cases writes to MSR_IA32_TSC so that all CPUs have the same base for the TSC. This logic is complicated, and we do not want it to have any effect once the VM is started. In particular, if any guest started to synchronize its TSCs with writes to MSR_IA32_TSC rather than MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST, the additional effect of kvm_write_tsc code would be uncharted territory. Therefore, this patch makes writes to MSR_IA32_TSC behave essentially the same as writes to MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST when they come from the guest. A new selftest (which passes both before and after the patch) checks the current semantics of writes to MSR_IA32_TSC and MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST originating from both the host and the guest. Upcoming work to remove the special side effects of host-initiated writes to MSR_IA32_TSC and MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST will be able to build onto this test, adjusting the host side to use the new APIs and achieve the same effect. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: x86: rename KVM_REQ_GET_VMCS12_PAGESPaolo Bonzini2020-09-281-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | We are going to use it for SVM too, so use a more generic name. Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: x86: Introduce MSR filteringAlexander Graf2020-09-281-1/+144
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It's not desireable to have all MSRs always handled by KVM kernel space. Some MSRs would be useful to handle in user space to either emulate behavior (like uCode updates) or differentiate whether they are valid based on the CPU model. To allow user space to specify which MSRs it wants to see handled by KVM, this patch introduces a new ioctl to push filter rules with bitmaps into KVM. Based on these bitmaps, KVM can then decide whether to reject MSR access. With the addition of KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR it can also deflect the denied MSR events to user space to operate on. If no filter is populated, MSR handling stays identical to before. Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Message-Id: <20200925143422.21718-8-graf@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: x86: Add infrastructure for MSR filteringAlexander Graf2020-09-281-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the following commits we will add pieces of MSR filtering. To ensure that code compiles even with the feature half-merged, let's add a few stubs and struct definitions before the real patches start. Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Message-Id: <20200925143422.21718-4-graf@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: x86: Allow deflecting unknown MSR accesses to user spaceAlexander Graf2020-09-281-4/+116
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | MSRs are weird. Some of them are normal control registers, such as EFER. Some however are registers that really are model specific, not very interesting to virtualization workloads, and not performance critical. Others again are really just windows into package configuration. Out of these MSRs, only the first category is necessary to implement in kernel space. Rarely accessed MSRs, MSRs that should be fine tunes against certain CPU models and MSRs that contain information on the package level are much better suited for user space to process. However, over time we have accumulated a lot of MSRs that are not the first category, but still handled by in-kernel KVM code. This patch adds a generic interface to handle WRMSR and RDMSR from user space. With this, any future MSR that is part of the latter categories can be handled in user space. Furthermore, it allows us to replace the existing "ignore_msrs" logic with something that applies per-VM rather than on the full system. That way you can run productive VMs in parallel to experimental ones where you don't care about proper MSR handling. Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Message-Id: <20200925143422.21718-3-graf@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: x86: Return -ENOENT on unimplemented MSRsAlexander Graf2020-09-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When we find an MSR that we can not handle, bubble up that error code as MSR error return code. Follow up patches will use that to expose the fact that an MSR is not handled by KVM to user space. Suggested-by: Aaron Lewis <aaronlewis@google.com> Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com> Message-Id: <20200925143422.21718-2-graf@amazon.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: x86: Rename "shared_msrs" to "user_return_msrs"Sean Christopherson2020-09-281-48/+53
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rename the "shared_msrs" mechanism, which is used to defer restoring MSRs that are only consumed when running in userspace, to a more banal but less likely to be confusing "user_return_msrs". The "shared" nomenclature is confusing as it's not obvious who is sharing what, e.g. reasonable interpretations are that the guest value is shared by vCPUs in a VM, or that the MSR value is shared/common to guest and host, both of which are wrong. "shared" is also misleading as the MSR value (in hardware) is not guaranteed to be shared/reused between VMs (if that's indeed the correct interpretation of the name), as the ability to share values between VMs is simply a side effect (albiet a very nice side effect) of deferring restoration of the host value until returning from userspace. "user_return" avoids the above confusion by describing the mechanism itself instead of its effects. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Message-Id: <20200923180409.32255-2-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: x86: Add RIP to the kvm_entry, i.e. VM-Enter, tracepointSean Christopherson2020-09-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add RIP to the kvm_entry tracepoint to help debug if the kvm_exit tracepoint is disabled or if VM-Enter fails, in which case the kvm_exit tracepoint won't be hit. Read RIP from within the tracepoint itself to avoid a potential VMREAD and retpoline if the guest's RIP isn't available. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Message-Id: <20200923201349.16097-2-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: x86: Add kvm_x86_ops hook to short circuit emulationSean Christopherson2020-09-281-3/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace the existing kvm_x86_ops.need_emulation_on_page_fault() with a more generic is_emulatable(), and unconditionally call the new function in x86_emulate_instruction(). KVM will use the generic hook to support multiple security related technologies that prevent emulation in one way or another. Similar to the existing AMD #NPF case where emulation of the current instruction is not possible due to lack of information, AMD's SEV-ES and Intel's SGX and TDX will introduce scenarios where emulation is impossible due to the guest's register state being inaccessible. And again similar to the existing #NPF case, emulation can be initiated by kvm_mmu_page_fault(), i.e. outside of the control of vendor-specific code. While the cause and architecturally visible behavior of the various cases are different, e.g. SGX will inject a #UD, AMD #NPF is a clean resume or complete shutdown, and SEV-ES and TDX "return" an error, the impact on the common emulation code is identical: KVM must stop emulation immediately and resume the guest. Query is_emulatable() in handle_ud() as well so that the force_emulation_prefix code doesn't incorrectly modify RIP before calling emulate_instruction() in the absurdly unlikely scenario that KVM encounters forced emulation in conjunction with "do not emulate". Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Message-Id: <20200915232702.15945-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: x86: fix MSR_IA32_TSC read for nested migrationMaxim Levitsky2020-09-281-2/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | MSR reads/writes should always access the L1 state, since the (nested) hypervisor should intercept all the msrs it wants to adjust, and these that it doesn't should be read by the guest as if the host had read it. However IA32_TSC is an exception. Even when not intercepted, guest still reads the value + TSC offset. The write however does not take any TSC offset into account. This is documented in Intel's SDM and seems also to happen on AMD as well. This creates a problem when userspace wants to read the IA32_TSC value and then write it. (e.g for migration) In this case it reads L2 value but write is interpreted as an L1 value. To fix this make the userspace initiated reads of IA32_TSC return L1 value as well. Huge thanks to Dave Gilbert for helping me understand this very confusing semantic of MSR writes. Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200921103805.9102-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: X86: Move handling of INVPCID types to x86Babu Moger2020-09-281-0/+78
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | INVPCID instruction handling is mostly same across both VMX and SVM. So, move the code to common x86.c. Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Message-Id: <159985255212.11252.10322694343971983487.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: X86: Rename and move the function vmx_handle_memory_failure to x86.cBabu Moger2020-09-281-0/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Handling of kvm_read/write_guest_virt*() errors can be moved to common code. The same code can be used by both VMX and SVM. Signed-off-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Message-Id: <159985254493.11252.6603092560732507607.stgit@bmoger-ubuntu> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | KVM: LAPIC: Narrow down the kick target vCPUWanpeng Li2020-09-281-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The kick after setting KVM_REQ_PENDING_TIMER is used to handle the timer fires on a different pCPU which vCPU is running on. This kick costs about 1000 clock cycles and we don't need this when injecting already-expired timer or when using the VMX preemption timer because kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer() is called from the target vCPU. Reviewed-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> Message-Id: <1599731444-3525-6-git-send-email-wanpengli@tencent.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | Merge branch 'x86-seves-for-paolo' of ↵Paolo Bonzini2020-09-221-7/+4
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip into HEAD
| * treewide: Use fallthrough pseudo-keywordGustavo A. R. Silva2020-08-231-7/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary fall-through markings when it is the case. [1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.7/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
| * Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds2020-08-221-2/+4
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini: - PAE and PKU bugfixes for x86 - selftests fix for new binutils - MMU notifier fix for arm64 * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: KVM: arm64: Only reschedule if MMU_NOTIFIER_RANGE_BLOCKABLE is not set KVM: Pass MMU notifier range flags to kvm_unmap_hva_range() kvm: x86: Toggling CR4.PKE does not load PDPTEs in PAE mode kvm: x86: Toggling CR4.SMAP does not load PDPTEs in PAE mode KVM: x86: fix access code passed to gva_to_gpa selftests: kvm: Use a shorter encoding to clear RAX
* | | KVM: x86: always allow writing '0' to MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_ENVitaly Kuznetsov2020-09-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Even without in-kernel LAPIC we should allow writing '0' to MSR_KVM_ASYNC_PF_EN as we're not enabling the mechanism. In particular, QEMU with 'kernel-irqchip=off' fails to start a guest with qemu-system-x86_64: error: failed to set MSR 0x4b564d02 to 0x0 Fixes: 9d3c447c72fb2 ("KVM: X86: Fix async pf caused null-ptr-deref") Reported-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200911093147.484565-1-vkuznets@redhat.com> [Actually commit the version proposed by Sean Christopherson. - Paolo] Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | | Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-5.9-1' of ↵Paolo Bonzini2020-09-111-2/+13
|\ \ \ | |_|/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for Linux 5.9, take #1 - Multiple stolen time fixes, with a new capability to match x86 - Fix for hugetlbfs mappings when PUD and PMD are the same level - Fix for hugetlbfs mappings when PTE mappings are enforced (dirty logging, for example) - Fix tracing output of 64bit values
| * | arm64/x86: KVM: Introduce steal-time capAndrew Jones2020-08-211-0/+3
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | arm64 requires a vcpu fd (KVM_HAS_DEVICE_ATTR vcpu ioctl) to probe support for steal-time. However this is unnecessary, as only a KVM fd is required, and it complicates userspace (userspace may prefer delaying vcpu creation until after feature probing). Introduce a cap that can be checked instead. While x86 can already probe steal-time support with a kvm fd (KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID), we add the cap there too for consistency. Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Steven Price <steven.price@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200804170604.42662-7-drjones@redhat.com
| * Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds2020-08-121-12/+12
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull more KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini: "PPC: - Improvements and bugfixes for secure VM support, giving reduced startup time and memory hotplug support. - Locking fixes in nested KVM code - Increase number of guests supported by HV KVM to 4094 - Preliminary POWER10 support ARM: - Split the VHE and nVHE hypervisor code bases, build the EL2 code separately, allowing for the VHE code to now be built with instrumentation - Level-based TLB invalidation support - Restructure of the vcpu register storage to accomodate the NV code - Pointer Authentication available for guests on nVHE hosts - Simplification of the system register table parsing - MMU cleanups and fixes - A number of post-32bit cleanups and other fixes MIPS: - compilation fixes x86: - bugfixes - support for the SERIALIZE instruction" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (70 commits) KVM: MIPS/VZ: Fix build error caused by 'kvm_run' cleanup x86/kvm/hyper-v: Synic default SCONTROL MSR needs to be enabled MIPS: KVM: Convert a fallthrough comment to fallthrough MIPS: VZ: Only include loongson_regs.h for CPU_LOONGSON64 x86: Expose SERIALIZE for supported cpuid KVM: x86: Don't attempt to load PDPTRs when 64-bit mode is enabled KVM: arm64: Move S1PTW S2 fault logic out of io_mem_abort() KVM: arm64: Don't skip cache maintenance for read-only memslots KVM: arm64: Handle data and instruction external aborts the same way KVM: arm64: Rename kvm_vcpu_dabt_isextabt() KVM: arm: Add trace name for ARM_NISV KVM: arm64: Ensure that all nVHE hyp code is in .hyp.text KVM: arm64: Substitute RANDOMIZE_BASE for HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS KVM: arm64: Make nVHE ASLR conditional on RANDOMIZE_BASE KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Rework secure mem slot dropping KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Move kvmppc_svm_page_out up KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Migrate hot plugged memory KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: In H_SVM_INIT_DONE, migrate remaining normal-GFNs to secure-GFNs KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Track the state GFNs associated with secure VMs KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Disable page merging in H_SVM_INIT_START ...
| * \ Merge tag 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mst/vhostLinus Torvalds2020-08-111-2/+10
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull virtio updates from Michael Tsirkin: - IRQ bypass support for vdpa and IFC - MLX5 vdpa driver - Endianness fixes for virtio drivers - Misc other fixes * tag 'for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mst/vhost: (71 commits) vdpa/mlx5: fix up endian-ness for mtu vdpa: Fix pointer math bug in vdpasim_get_config() vdpa/mlx5: Fix pointer math in mlx5_vdpa_get_config() vdpa/mlx5: fix memory allocation failure checks vdpa/mlx5: Fix uninitialised variable in core/mr.c vdpa_sim: init iommu lock virtio_config: fix up warnings on parisc vdpa/mlx5: Add VDPA driver for supported mlx5 devices vdpa/mlx5: Add shared memory registration code vdpa/mlx5: Add support library for mlx5 VDPA implementation vdpa/mlx5: Add hardware descriptive header file vdpa: Modify get_vq_state() to return error code net/vdpa: Use struct for set/get vq state vdpa: remove hard coded virtq num vdpasim: support batch updating vhost-vdpa: support IOTLB batching hints vhost-vdpa: support get/set backend features vhost: generialize backend features setting/getting vhost-vdpa: refine ioctl pre-processing vDPA: dont change vq irq after DRIVER_OK ...
| | * | kvm: detect assigned device via irqbypass managerZhu Lingshan2020-08-051-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | vDPA devices has dedicated backed hardware like passthrough-ed devices. Then it is possible to setup irq offloading to vCPU for vDPA devices. Thus this patch tries to manipulated assigned device counters by kvm_arch_start/end_assignment() in irqbypass manager, so that assigned devices could be detected in update_pi_irte() We will increase/decrease the assigned device counter in kvm/x86. Both vDPA and VFIO would go through this code path. Only X86 uses these counters and kvm_arch_start/end_assignment(), so this code path only affect x86 for now. Signed-off-by: Zhu Lingshan <lingshan.zhu@intel.com> Suggested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200731065533.4144-3-lingshan.zhu@intel.com Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
* | | | kvm: x86: Toggling CR4.PKE does not load PDPTEs in PAE modeJim Mattson2020-08-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | See the SDM, volume 3, section 4.4.1: If PAE paging would be in use following an execution of MOV to CR0 or MOV to CR4 (see Section 4.1.1) and the instruction is modifying any of CR0.CD, CR0.NW, CR0.PG, CR4.PAE, CR4.PGE, CR4.PSE, or CR4.SMEP; then the PDPTEs are loaded from the address in CR3. Fixes: b9baba8614890 ("KVM, pkeys: expose CPUID/CR4 to guest") Cc: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Message-Id: <20200817181655.3716509-1-jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | | | kvm: x86: Toggling CR4.SMAP does not load PDPTEs in PAE modeJim Mattson2020-08-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | See the SDM, volume 3, section 4.4.1: If PAE paging would be in use following an execution of MOV to CR0 or MOV to CR4 (see Section 4.1.1) and the instruction is modifying any of CR0.CD, CR0.NW, CR0.PG, CR4.PAE, CR4.PGE, CR4.PSE, or CR4.SMEP; then the PDPTEs are loaded from the address in CR3. Fixes: 0be0226f07d14 ("KVM: MMU: fix SMAP virtualization") Cc: Xiao Guangrong <guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Reviewed-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Message-Id: <20200817181655.3716509-2-jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | | | KVM: x86: fix access code passed to gva_to_gpaPaolo Bonzini2020-08-171-1/+3
| |_|/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The PK bit of the error code is computed dynamically in permission_fault and therefore need not be passed to gva_to_gpa: only the access bits (fetch, user, write) need to be passed down. Not doing so causes a splat in the pku test: WARNING: CPU: 25 PID: 5465 at arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h:197 paging64_walk_addr_generic+0x594/0x750 [kvm] Hardware name: Intel Corporation WilsonCity/WilsonCity, BIOS WLYDCRB1.SYS.0014.D62.2001092233 01/09/2020 RIP: 0010:paging64_walk_addr_generic+0x594/0x750 [kvm] Code: <0f> 0b e9 db fe ff ff 44 8b 43 04 4c 89 6c 24 30 8b 13 41 39 d0 89 RSP: 0018:ff53778fc623fb60 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ff53778fc623fbf0 RCX: 0000000000000007 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000002 RDI: ff4501efba818000 RBP: 0000000000000020 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 00000000004000e7 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000007 R13: ff4501efba818388 R14: 10000000004000e7 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f2dcf31a700(0000) GS:ff4501f1c8040000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000001dea475005 CR4: 0000000000763ee0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: paging64_gva_to_gpa+0x3f/0xb0 [kvm] kvm_fixup_and_inject_pf_error+0x48/0xa0 [kvm] handle_exception_nmi+0x4fc/0x5b0 [kvm_intel] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x911/0x1c10 [kvm] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x23e/0x5d0 [kvm] ksys_ioctl+0x92/0xb0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20 do_syscall_64+0x3e/0xb0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 ---[ end trace d17eb998aee991da ]--- Reported-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Fixes: 897861479c064 ("KVM: x86: Add helper functions for illegal GPA checking and page fault injection") Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | | KVM: x86: Don't attempt to load PDPTRs when 64-bit mode is enabledSean Christopherson2020-08-091-12/+12
|/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't attempt to load PDPTRs if EFER.LME=1, i.e. if 64-bit mode is enabled. A recent change to reload the PDTPRs when CR0.CD or CR0.NW is toggled botched the EFER.LME handling and sends KVM down the PDTPR path when is_paging() is true, i.e. when the guest toggles CD/NW in 64-bit mode. Split the CR0 checks for 64-bit vs. 32-bit PAE into separate paths. The 64-bit path is specifically checking state when paging is toggled on, i.e. CR0.PG transititions from 0->1. The PDPTR path now needs to run if the new CR0 state has paging enabled, irrespective of whether paging was already enabled. Trying to shave a few cycles to make the PDPTR path an "else if" case is a mess. Fixes: d42e3fae6faed ("kvm: x86: Read PDPTEs on CR0.CD and CR0.NW changes") Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Cc: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com> Cc: Peter Shier <pshier@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200714015732.32426-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* | Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvmLinus Torvalds2020-08-061-83/+148
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini: "s390: - implement diag318 x86: - Report last CPU for debugging - Emulate smaller MAXPHYADDR in the guest than in the host - .noinstr and tracing fixes from Thomas - nested SVM page table switching optimization and fixes Generic: - Unify shadow MMU cache data structures across architectures" * tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (127 commits) KVM: SVM: Fix sev_pin_memory() error handling KVM: LAPIC: Set the TDCR settable bits KVM: x86: Specify max TDP level via kvm_configure_mmu() KVM: x86/mmu: Rename max_page_level to max_huge_page_level KVM: x86: Dynamically calculate TDP level from max level and MAXPHYADDR KVM: VXM: Remove temporary WARN on expected vs. actual EPTP level mismatch KVM: x86: Pull the PGD's level from the MMU instead of recalculating it KVM: VMX: Make vmx_load_mmu_pgd() static KVM: x86/mmu: Add separate helper for shadow NPT root page role calc KVM: VMX: Drop a duplicate declaration of construct_eptp() KVM: nSVM: Correctly set the shadow NPT root level in its MMU role KVM: Using macros instead of magic values MIPS: KVM: Fix build error caused by 'kvm_run' cleanup KVM: nSVM: remove nonsensical EXITINFO1 adjustment on nested NPF KVM: x86: Add a capability for GUEST_MAXPHYADDR < HOST_MAXPHYADDR support KVM: VMX: optimize #PF injection when MAXPHYADDR does not match KVM: VMX: Add guest physical address check in EPT violation and misconfig KVM: VMX: introduce vmx_need_pf_intercept KVM: x86: update exception bitmap on CPUID changes KVM: x86: rename update_bp_intercept to update_exception_bitmap ...
| * | KVM: x86: Specify max TDP level via kvm_configure_mmu()Sean Christopherson2020-07-301-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Capture the max TDP level during kvm_configure_mmu() instead of using a kvm_x86_ops hook to do it at every vCPU creation. Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Message-Id: <20200716034122.5998-10-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * | KVM: x86: Dynamically calculate TDP level from max level and MAXPHYADDRSean Christopherson2020-07-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Calculate the desired TDP level on the fly using the max TDP level and MAXPHYADDR instead of doing the same when CPUID is updated. This avoids the hidden dependency on cpuid_maxphyaddr() in vmx_get_tdp_level() and also standardizes the "use 5-level paging iff MAXPHYADDR > 48" behavior across x86. Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Message-Id: <20200716034122.5998-8-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * | KVM: x86: Add a capability for GUEST_MAXPHYADDR < HOST_MAXPHYADDR supportMohammed Gamal2020-07-101-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds a new capability KVM_CAP_SMALLER_MAXPHYADDR which allows userspace to query if the underlying architecture would support GUEST_MAXPHYADDR < HOST_MAXPHYADDR and hence act accordingly (e.g. qemu can decide if it should warn for -cpu ..,phys-bits=X) The complications in this patch are due to unexpected (but documented) behaviour we see with NPF vmexit handling in AMD processor. If SVM is modified to add guest physical address checks in the NPF and guest #PF paths, we see the followning error multiple times in the 'access' test in kvm-unit-tests: test pte.p pte.36 pde.p: FAIL: pte 2000021 expected 2000001 Dump mapping: address: 0x123400000000 ------L4: 24c3027 ------L3: 24c4027 ------L2: 24c5021 ------L1: 1002000021 This is because the PTE's accessed bit is set by the CPU hardware before the NPF vmexit. This is handled completely by hardware and cannot be fixed in software. Therefore, availability of the new capability depends on a boolean variable allow_smaller_maxphyaddr which is set individually by VMX and SVM init routines. On VMX it's always set to true, on SVM it's only set to true when NPT is not enabled. CC: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> CC: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Mohammed Gamal <mgamal@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200710154811.418214-10-mgamal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * | KVM: x86: rename update_bp_intercept to update_exception_bitmapPaolo Bonzini2020-07-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We would like to introduce a callback to update the #PF intercept when CPUID changes. Just reuse update_bp_intercept since VMX is already using update_exception_bitmap instead of a bespoke function. While at it, remove an unnecessary assignment in the SVM version, which is already done in the caller (kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_guest_debug) and has nothing to do with the exception bitmap. Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * | KVM: x86: Add helper functions for illegal GPA checking and page fault injectionMohammed Gamal2020-07-101-0/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds two helper functions that will be used to support virtualizing MAXPHYADDR in both kvm-intel.ko and kvm.ko. kvm_fixup_and_inject_pf_error() injects a page fault for a user-specified GVA, while kvm_mmu_is_illegal_gpa() checks whether a GPA exceeds vCPU address limits. Signed-off-by: Mohammed Gamal <mgamal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200710154811.418214-2-mgamal@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * | KVM: x86: move MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES emulation to common x86 codeVitaly Kuznetsov2020-07-101-0/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | state_test/smm_test selftests are failing on AMD with: "Unexpected result from KVM_GET_MSRS, r: 51 (failed MSR was 0x345)" MSR_IA32_PERF_CAPABILITIES is an emulated MSR on Intel but it is not known to AMD code, we can move the emulation to common x86 code. For AMD, we basically just allow the host to read and write zero to the MSR. Fixes: 27461da31089 ("KVM: x86/pmu: Support full width counting") Suggested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com> Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200710152559.1645827-1-vkuznets@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * | x86/kvm/vmx: Move guest enter/exit into .noinstr.textThomas Gleixner2020-07-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the functions which are inside the RCU off region into the non-instrumentable text section. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200708195322.037311579@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * | x86/kvm: Move context tracking where it belongsThomas Gleixner2020-07-091-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Context tracking for KVM happens way too early in the vcpu_run() code. Anything after guest_enter_irqoff() and before guest_exit_irqoff() cannot use RCU and should also be not instrumented. The current way of doing this covers way too much code. Move it closer to the actual vmenter/exit code. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200708195321.724574345@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
| * | kvm: x86: replace kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value with runtime test on the hostMaxim Levitsky2020-07-091-17/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To avoid complex and in some cases incorrect logic in kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value, just try the guest's given value on the host processor instead, and if it doesn't #GP, allow the guest to set it. One such case is when host CPU supports STIBP mitigation but doesn't support IBRS (as is the case with some Zen2 AMD cpus), and in this case we were giving guest #GP when it tried to use STIBP The reason why can can do the host test is that IA32_SPEC_CTRL msr is passed to the guest, after the guest sets it to a non zero value for the first time (due to performance reasons), and as as result of this, it is pointless to emulate #GP condition on this first access, in a different way than what the host CPU does. This is based on a patch from Sean Christopherson, who suggested this idea. Fixes: 6441fa6178f5 ("KVM: x86: avoid incorrect writes to host MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20200708115731.180097-1-mlevitsk@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
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