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* x86/mm: Fix kern_addr_valid() to cope with existing but not present entriesMike Rapoport2021-09-221-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 34b1999da935a33be6239226bfa6cd4f704c5c88 upstream. Jiri Olsa reported a fault when running: # cat /proc/kallsyms | grep ksys_read ffffffff8136d580 T ksys_read # objdump -d --start-address=0xffffffff8136d580 --stop-address=0xffffffff8136d590 /proc/kcore /proc/kcore: file format elf64-x86-64 Segmentation fault general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xf887ffcbff000: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 12 PID: 1079 Comm: objdump Not tainted 5.14.0-rc5qemu+ #508 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:kern_addr_valid Call Trace: read_kcore ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? trace_hardirqs_on ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? lock_acquire ? lock_acquire ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? lock_acquire ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? lock_release ? _raw_spin_unlock ? __handle_mm_fault ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? lock_acquire ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held ? lock_release proc_reg_read ? vfs_read vfs_read ksys_read do_syscall_64 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe The fault happens because kern_addr_valid() dereferences existent but not present PMD in the high kernel mappings. Such PMDs are created when free_kernel_image_pages() frees regions larger than 2Mb. In this case, a part of the freed memory is mapped with PMDs and the set_memory_np_noalias() -> ... -> __change_page_attr() sequence will mark the PMD as not present rather than wipe it completely. Have kern_addr_valid() check whether higher level page table entries are present before trying to dereference them to fix this issue and to avoid similar issues in the future. Stable backporting note: ------------------------ Note that the stable marking is for all active stable branches because there could be cases where pagetable entries exist but are not valid - see 9a14aefc1d28 ("x86: cpa, fix lookup_address"), for example. So make sure to be on the safe side here and use pXY_present() accessors rather than pXY_none() which could #GP when accessing pages in the direct map. Also see: c40a56a7818c ("x86/mm/init: Remove freed kernel image areas from alias mapping") for more info. Reported-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Tested-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.4+ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210819132717.19358-1-rppt@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/mem_encrypt: Correct physical address calculation in __set_clr_pte_enc()Isaku Yamahata2021-03-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 8249d17d3194eac064a8ca5bc5ca0abc86feecde upstream. The pfn variable contains the page frame number as returned by the pXX_pfn() functions, shifted to the right by PAGE_SHIFT to remove the page bits. After page protection computations are done to it, it gets shifted back to the physical address using page_level_shift(). That is wrong, of course, because that function determines the shift length based on the level of the page in the page table but in all the cases, it was shifted by PAGE_SHIFT before. Therefore, shift it back using PAGE_SHIFT to get the correct physical address. [ bp: Rewrite commit message. ] Fixes: dfaaec9033b8 ("x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute in early boot") Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata <isaku.yamahata@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/81abbae1657053eccc535c16151f63cd049dcb97.1616098294.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86: fix seq_file iteration for pat/memtype.cNeilBrown2021-03-041-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3d2fc4c082448e9c05792f9b2a11c1d5db408b85 upstream. The memtype seq_file iterator allocates a buffer in the ->start and ->next functions and frees it in the ->show function. The preferred handling for such resources is to free them in the subsequent ->next or ->stop function call. Since Commit 1f4aace60b0e ("fs/seq_file.c: simplify seq_file iteration code and interface") there is no guarantee that ->show will be called after ->next, so this function can now leak memory. So move the freeing of the buffer to ->next and ->stop. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/161248539022.21478.13874455485854739066.stgit@noble1 Fixes: 1f4aace60b0e ("fs/seq_file.c: simplify seq_file iteration code and interface") Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de> Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KVM: SVM: Treat SVM as unsupported when running as an SEV guestSean Christopherson2021-02-101-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit ccd85d90ce092bdb047a7f6580f3955393833b22 upstream. Don't let KVM load when running as an SEV guest, regardless of what CPUID says. Memory is encrypted with a key that is not accessible to the host (L0), thus it's impossible for L0 to emulate SVM, e.g. it'll see garbage when reading the VMCB. Technically, KVM could decrypt all memory that needs to be accessible to the L0 and use shadow paging so that L0 does not need to shadow NPT, but exposing such information to L0 largely defeats the purpose of running as an SEV guest. This can always be revisited if someone comes up with a use case for running VMs inside SEV guests. Note, VMLOAD, VMRUN, etc... will also #GP on GPAs with C-bit set, i.e. KVM is doomed even if the SEV guest is debuggable and the hypervisor is willing to decrypt the VMCB. This may or may not be fixed on CPUs that have the SVME_ADDR_CHK fix. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210202212017.2486595-1-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/mm: Fix leak of pmd ptlockDan Williams2021-01-121-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d1c5246e08eb64991001d97a3bd119c93edbc79a upstream. Commit 28ee90fe6048 ("x86/mm: implement free pmd/pte page interfaces") introduced a new location where a pmd was released, but neglected to run the pmd page destructor. In fact, this happened previously for a different pmd release path and was fixed by commit: c283610e44ec ("x86, mm: do not leak page->ptl for pmd page tables"). This issue was hidden until recently because the failure mode is silent, but commit: b2b29d6d0119 ("mm: account PMD tables like PTE tables") turns the failure mode into this signature: BUG: Bad page state in process lt-pmem-ns pfn:15943d page:000000007262ed7b refcount:0 mapcount:-1024 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x15943d flags: 0xaffff800000000() raw: 00affff800000000 dead000000000100 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 ffff913a029bcc08 00000000fffffbff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: nonzero mapcount [..] dump_stack+0x8b/0xb0 bad_page.cold+0x63/0x94 free_pcp_prepare+0x224/0x270 free_unref_page+0x18/0xd0 pud_free_pmd_page+0x146/0x160 ioremap_pud_range+0xe3/0x350 ioremap_page_range+0x108/0x160 __ioremap_caller.constprop.0+0x174/0x2b0 ? memremap+0x7a/0x110 memremap+0x7a/0x110 devm_memremap+0x53/0xa0 pmem_attach_disk+0x4ed/0x530 [nd_pmem] ? __devm_release_region+0x52/0x80 nvdimm_bus_probe+0x85/0x210 [libnvdimm] Given this is a repeat occurrence it seemed prudent to look for other places where this destructor might be missing and whether a better helper is needed. try_to_free_pmd_page() looks like a candidate, but testing with setting up and tearing down pmd mappings via the dax unit tests is thus far not triggering the failure. As for a better helper pmd_free() is close, but it is a messy fit due to requiring an @mm arg. Also, ___pmd_free_tlb() wants to call paravirt_tlb_remove_table() instead of free_page(), so open-coded pgtable_pmd_page_dtor() seems the best way forward for now. Debugged together with Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>. Fixes: 28ee90fe6048 ("x86/mm: implement free pmd/pte page interfaces") Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Yi Zhang <yi.zhang@redhat.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/160697689204.605323.17629854984697045602.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/mm/ident_map: Check for errors from ident_pud_init()Arvind Sankar2020-12-301-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 1fcd009102ee02e217f2e7635ab65517d785da8e ] Commit ea3b5e60ce80 ("x86/mm/ident_map: Add 5-level paging support") added ident_p4d_init() to support 5-level paging, but this function doesn't check and return errors from ident_pud_init(). For example, the decompressor stub uses this code to create an identity mapping. If it runs out of pages while trying to allocate a PMD pagetable, the error will be currently ignored. Fix this to propagate errors. [ bp: Space out statements for better readability. ] Fixes: ea3b5e60ce80 ("x86/mm/ident_map: Add 5-level paging support") Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201027230648.1885111-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* x86/membarrier: Get rid of a dubious optimizationAndy Lutomirski2020-12-161-2/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a493d1ca1a03b532871f1da27f8dbda2b28b04c4 upstream. sync_core_before_usermode() had an incorrect optimization. If the kernel returns from an interrupt, it can get to usermode without IRET. It just has to schedule to a different task in the same mm and do SYSRET. Fortunately, there were no callers of sync_core_before_usermode() that could have had in_irq() or in_nmi() equal to true, because it's only ever called from the scheduler. While at it, clarify a related comment. Fixes: 70216e18e519 ("membarrier: Provide core serializing command, *_SYNC_CORE") Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5afc7632be1422f91eaf7611aaaa1b5b8580a086.1607058304.git.luto@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Fix definition of PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WPArvind Sankar2020-12-161-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 29ac40cbed2bc06fa218ca25d7f5e280d3d08a25 upstream. The PAT bit is in different locations for 4k and 2M/1G page table entries. Add a definition for _PAGE_LARGE_CACHE_MASK to represent the three caching bits (PWT, PCD, PAT), similar to _PAGE_CACHE_MASK for 4k pages, and use it in the definition of PMD_FLAGS_DEC_WP to get the correct PAT index for write-protected pages. Fixes: 6ebcb060713f ("x86/mm: Add support to encrypt the kernel in-place") Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201111160946.147341-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86, fakenuma: Fix invalid starting node IDHuang Ying2020-09-091-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ccae0f36d500aef727f98acd8d0601e6b262a513 ] Commit: cc9aec03e58f ("x86/numa_emulation: Introduce uniform split capability") uses "-1" as the starting node ID, which causes the strange kernel log as follows, when "numa=fake=32G" is added to the kernel command line: Faking node -1 at [mem 0x0000000000000000-0x0000000893ffffff] (35136MB) Faking node 0 at [mem 0x0000001840000000-0x000000203fffffff] (32768MB) Faking node 1 at [mem 0x0000000894000000-0x000000183fffffff] (64192MB) Faking node 2 at [mem 0x0000002040000000-0x000000283fffffff] (32768MB) Faking node 3 at [mem 0x0000002840000000-0x000000303fffffff] (32768MB) And finally the kernel crashes: BUG: Bad page state in process swapper pfn:00011 page:(____ptrval____) refcount:0 mapcount:1 mapping:(____ptrval____) index:0x55cd7e44b270 pfn:0x11 failed to read mapping contents, not a valid kernel address? flags: 0x5(locked|uptodate) raw: 0000000000000005 000055cd7e44af30 000055cd7e44af50 0000000100000006 raw: 000055cd7e44b270 000055cd7e44b290 0000000000000000 000055cd7e44b510 page dumped because: page still charged to cgroup page->mem_cgroup:000055cd7e44b510 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.9.0-rc2 #1 Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600WFT/S2600WFT, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0008.031920191559 03/19/2019 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x57/0x80 bad_page.cold+0x63/0x94 __free_pages_ok+0x33f/0x360 memblock_free_all+0x127/0x195 mem_init+0x23/0x1f5 start_kernel+0x219/0x4f5 secondary_startup_64+0xb6/0xc0 Fix this bug via using 0 as the starting node ID. This restores the original behavior before cc9aec03e58f. [ mingo: Massaged the changelog. ] Fixes: cc9aec03e58f ("x86/numa_emulation: Introduce uniform split capability") Signed-off-by: "Huang, Ying" <ying.huang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200904061047.612950-1-ying.huang@intel.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* x86/mm: Stop printing BRK addressesArvind Sankar2020-06-221-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 67d631b7c05eff955ccff4139327f0f92a5117e5 ] This currently leaks kernel physical addresses into userspace. Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200229231120.1147527-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* x86/mmiotrace: Use cpumask_available() for cpumask_var_t variablesNathan Chancellor2020-06-071-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit d7110a26e5905ec2fe3fc88bc6a538901accb72b ] When building with Clang + -Wtautological-compare and CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK unset: arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c:375:6: warning: comparison of array 'downed_cpus' equal to a null pointer is always false [-Wtautological-pointer-compare] if (downed_cpus == NULL && ^~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ arch/x86/mm/mmio-mod.c:405:6: warning: comparison of array 'downed_cpus' equal to a null pointer is always false [-Wtautological-pointer-compare] if (downed_cpus == NULL || cpumask_weight(downed_cpus) == 0) ^~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~ 2 warnings generated. Commit f7e30f01a9e2 ("cpumask: Add helper cpumask_available()") added cpumask_available() to fix warnings of this nature. Use that here so that clang does not warn regardless of CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK's value. Reported-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/982 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200408205323.44490-1-natechancellor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* x86/mm/cpa: Flush direct map alias during cpaRick Edgecombe2020-05-271-4/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ab5130186d7476dcee0d4e787d19a521ca552ce9 ] As an optimization, cpa_flush() was changed to optionally only flush the range in @cpa if it was small enough. However, this range does not include any direct map aliases changed in cpa_process_alias(). So small set_memory_() calls that touch that alias don't get the direct map changes flushed. This situation can happen when the virtual address taking variants are passed an address in vmalloc or modules space. In these cases, force a full TLB flush. Note this issue does not extend to cases where the set_memory_() calls are passed a direct map address, or page array, etc, as the primary target. In those cases the direct map would be flushed. Fixes: 935f5839827e ("x86/mm/cpa: Optimize cpa_flush_array() TLB invalidation") Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200424105343.GA20730@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* x86/ioremap: Fix CONFIG_EFI=n buildBorislav Petkov2020-04-011-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 870b4333a62e45b0b2000d14b301b7b8b8cad9da upstream. In order to use efi_mem_type(), one needs CONFIG_EFI enabled. Otherwise that function is undefined. Use IS_ENABLED() to check and avoid the ifdeffery as the compiler optimizes away the following unreachable code then. Fixes: 985e537a4082 ("x86/ioremap: Map EFI runtime services data as encrypted for SEV") Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7561e981-0d9b-d62c-0ef2-ce6007aff1ab@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/mm: split vmalloc_sync_all()Joerg Roedel2020-03-251-2/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 763802b53a427ed3cbd419dbba255c414fdd9e7c upstream. Commit 3f8fd02b1bf1 ("mm/vmalloc: Sync unmappings in __purge_vmap_area_lazy()") introduced a call to vmalloc_sync_all() in the vunmap() code-path. While this change was necessary to maintain correctness on x86-32-pae kernels, it also adds additional cycles for architectures that don't need it. Specifically on x86-64 with CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y some people reported severe performance regressions in micro-benchmarks because it now also calls the x86-64 implementation of vmalloc_sync_all() on vunmap(). But the vmalloc_sync_all() implementation on x86-64 is only needed for newly created mappings. To avoid the unnecessary work on x86-64 and to gain the performance back, split up vmalloc_sync_all() into two functions: * vmalloc_sync_mappings(), and * vmalloc_sync_unmappings() Most call-sites to vmalloc_sync_all() only care about new mappings being synchronized. The only exception is the new call-site added in the above mentioned commit. Shile Zhang directed us to a report of an 80% regression in reaim throughput. Fixes: 3f8fd02b1bf1 ("mm/vmalloc: Sync unmappings in __purge_vmap_area_lazy()") Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Reported-by: Shile Zhang <shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> [GHES] Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191009124418.8286-1-joro@8bytes.org Link: https://lists.01.org/hyperkitty/list/lkp@lists.01.org/thread/4D3JPPHBNOSPFK2KEPC6KGKS6J25AIDB/ Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191113095530.228959-1-shile.zhang@linux.alibaba.com Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/ioremap: Map EFI runtime services data as encrypted for SEVTom Lendacky2020-03-181-0/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 985e537a4082b4635754a57f4f95430790afee6a upstream. The dmidecode program fails to properly decode the SMBIOS data supplied by OVMF/UEFI when running in an SEV guest. The SMBIOS area, under SEV, is encrypted and resides in reserved memory that is marked as EFI runtime services data. As a result, when memremap() is attempted for the SMBIOS data, it can't be mapped as regular RAM (through try_ram_remap()) and, since the address isn't part of the iomem resources list, it isn't mapped encrypted through the fallback ioremap(). Add a new __ioremap_check_other() to deal with memory types like EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA which are not covered by the resource ranges. This allows any runtime services data which has been created encrypted, to be mapped encrypted too. [ bp: Move functionality to a separate function. ] Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Tested-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.3 Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2d9e16eb5b53dc82665c95c6764b7407719df7a0.1582645327.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/mm: Fix NX bit clearing issue in kernel_map_pages_in_pgdArd Biesheuvel2020-02-241-7/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 75fbef0a8b6b4bb19b9a91b5214f846c2dc5139e ] The following commit: 15f003d20782 ("x86/mm/pat: Don't implicitly allow _PAGE_RW in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd()") modified kernel_map_pages_in_pgd() to manage writable permissions of memory mappings in the EFI page table in a different way, but in the process, it removed the ability to clear NX attributes from read-only mappings, by clobbering the clear mask if _PAGE_RW is not being requested. Failure to remove the NX attribute from read-only mappings is unlikely to be a security issue, but it does prevent us from tightening the permissions in the EFI page tables going forward, so let's fix it now. Fixes: 15f003d20782 ("x86/mm/pat: Don't implicitly allow _PAGE_RW in kernel_map_pages_in_pgd() Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200113172245.27925-5-ardb@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* mm/memory_hotplug: shrink zones when offlining memoryDavid Hildenbrand2020-01-092-6/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit feee6b2989165631b17ac6d4ccdbf6759254e85a upstream. We currently try to shrink a single zone when removing memory. We use the zone of the first page of the memory we are removing. If that memmap was never initialized (e.g., memory was never onlined), we will read garbage and can trigger kernel BUGs (due to a stale pointer): BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 000000000000353d #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 1 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u8:0 Not tainted 5.3.0-rc5-next-20190820+ #317 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.1-0-ga5cab58e9a3f-prebuilt.qemu.4 Workqueue: kacpi_hotplug acpi_hotplug_work_fn RIP: 0010:clear_zone_contiguous+0x5/0x10 Code: 48 89 c6 48 89 c3 e8 2a fe ff ff 48 85 c0 75 cf 5b 5d c3 c6 85 fd 05 00 00 01 5b 5d c3 0f 1f 840 RSP: 0018:ffffad2400043c98 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000200000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000200000 RSI: 0000000000140000 RDI: 0000000000002f40 RBP: 0000000140000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000140000 R13: 0000000000140000 R14: 0000000000002f40 R15: ffff9e3e7aff3680 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9e3e7bb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 000000000000353d CR3: 0000000058610000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __remove_pages+0x4b/0x640 arch_remove_memory+0x63/0x8d try_remove_memory+0xdb/0x130 __remove_memory+0xa/0x11 acpi_memory_device_remove+0x70/0x100 acpi_bus_trim+0x55/0x90 acpi_device_hotplug+0x227/0x3a0 acpi_hotplug_work_fn+0x1a/0x30 process_one_work+0x221/0x550 worker_thread+0x50/0x3b0 kthread+0x105/0x140 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 Modules linked in: CR2: 000000000000353d Instead, shrink the zones when offlining memory or when onlining failed. Introduce and use remove_pfn_range_from_zone(() for that. We now properly shrink the zones, even if we have DIMMs whereby - Some memory blocks fall into no zone (never onlined) - Some memory blocks fall into multiple zones (offlined+re-onlined) - Multiple memory blocks that fall into different zones Drop the zone parameter (with a potential dubious value) from __remove_pages() and __remove_section(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191006085646.5768-6-david@redhat.com Fixes: f1dd2cd13c4b ("mm, memory_hotplug: do not associate hotadded memory to zones until online") [visible after d0dc12e86b319] Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: "Matthew Wilcox (Oracle)" <willy@infradead.org> Cc: "Aneesh Kumar K.V" <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [5.0+] Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/mm: Use the correct function type for native_set_fixmap()Sami Tolvanen2019-12-311-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit f53e2cd0b8ab7d9e390414470bdbd830f660133f ] We call native_set_fixmap indirectly through the function pointer struct pv_mmu_ops::set_fixmap, which expects the first parameter to be 'unsigned' instead of 'enum fixed_addresses'. This patch changes the function type for native_set_fixmap to match the pointer, which fixes indirect call mismatches with Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) checking. Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H . Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190913211402.193018-1-samitolvanen@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* x86/mm/32: Sync only to VMALLOC_END in vmalloc_sync_all()Joerg Roedel2019-12-131-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 9a62d20027da3164a22244d9f022c0c987261687 upstream. The job of vmalloc_sync_all() is to help the lazy freeing of vmalloc() ranges: before such vmap ranges are reused we make sure that they are unmapped from every task's page tables. This is really easy on pagetable setups where the kernel page tables are shared between all tasks - this is the case on 32-bit kernels with SHARED_KERNEL_PMD = 1. But on !SHARED_KERNEL_PMD 32-bit kernels this involves iterating over the pgd_list and clearing all pmd entries in the pgds that are cleared in the init_mm.pgd, which is the reference pagetable that the vmalloc() code uses. In that context the current practice of vmalloc_sync_all() iterating until FIX_ADDR_TOP is buggy: for (address = VMALLOC_START & PMD_MASK; address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX && address < FIXADDR_TOP; address += PMD_SIZE) { struct page *page; Because iterating up to FIXADDR_TOP will involve a lot of non-vmalloc address ranges: VMALLOC -> PKMAP -> LDT -> CPU_ENTRY_AREA -> FIX_ADDR This is mostly harmless for the FIX_ADDR and CPU_ENTRY_AREA ranges that don't clear their pmds, but it's lethal for the LDT range, which relies on having different mappings in different processes, and 'synchronizing' them in the vmalloc sense corrupts those pagetable entries (clearing them). This got particularly prominent with PTI, which turns SHARED_KERNEL_PMD off and makes this the dominant mapping mode on 32-bit. To make LDT working again vmalloc_sync_all() must only iterate over the volatile parts of the kernel address range that are identical between all processes. So the correct check in vmalloc_sync_all() is "address < VMALLOC_END" to make sure the VMALLOC areas are synchronized and the LDT mapping is not falsely overwritten. The CPU_ENTRY_AREA and the FIXMAP area are no longer synced either, but this is not really a proplem since their PMDs get established during bootup and never change. This change fixes the ldt_gdt selftest in my setup. [ mingo: Fixed up the changelog to explain the logic and modified the copying to only happen up until VMALLOC_END. ] Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: hpa@zytor.com Fixes: 7757d607c6b3: ("x86/pti: Allow CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION for x86_32") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191126111119.GA110513@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* x86/pti/32: Calculate the various PTI cpu_entry_area sizes correctly, make ↵Ingo Molnar2019-11-291-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | the CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES assert precise commit 05b042a1944322844eaae7ea596d5f154166d68a upstream. When two recent commits that increased the size of the 'struct cpu_entry_area' were merged in -tip, the 32-bit defconfig build started failing on the following build time assert: ./include/linux/compiler.h:391:38: error: call to ‘__compiletime_assert_189’ declared with attribute error: BUILD_BUG_ON failed: CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE < CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE arch/x86/mm/cpu_entry_area.c:189:2: note: in expansion of macro ‘BUILD_BUG_ON’ In function ‘setup_cpu_entry_area_ptes’, Which corresponds to the following build time assert: BUILD_BUG_ON(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE < CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE); The purpose of this assert is to sanity check the fixed-value definition of CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_32_types.h: #define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES (NR_CPUS * 41) The '41' is supposed to match sizeof(struct cpu_entry_area)/PAGE_SIZE, which value we didn't want to define in such a low level header, because it would cause dependency hell. Every time the size of cpu_entry_area is changed, we have to adjust CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES accordingly - and this assert is checking that constraint. But the assert is both imprecise and buggy, primarily because it doesn't include the single readonly IDT page that is mapped at CPU_ENTRY_AREA_BASE (which begins at a PMD boundary). This bug was hidden by the fact that by accident CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES is defined too large upstream (v5.4-rc8): #define CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES (NR_CPUS * 40) While 'struct cpu_entry_area' is 155648 bytes, or 38 pages. So we had two extra pages, which hid the bug. The following commit (not yet upstream) increased the size to 40 pages: x86/iopl: ("Restrict iopl() permission scope") ... but increased CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES only 41 - i.e. shortening the gap to just 1 extra page. Then another not-yet-upstream commit changed the size again: 880a98c33996: ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Add guard page for entry stack on 32bit") Which increased the cpu_entry_area size from 38 to 39 pages, but didn't change CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES (kept it at 40). This worked fine, because we still had a page left from the accidental 'reserve'. But when these two commits were merged into the same tree, the combined size of cpu_entry_area grew from 38 to 40 pages, while CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES finally caught up to 40 as well. Which is fine in terms of functionality, but the assert broke: BUILD_BUG_ON(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES * PAGE_SIZE < CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE); because CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE is the total size of the area, which is 1 page larger due to the IDT page. To fix all this, change the assert to two precise asserts: BUILD_BUG_ON((CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES+1)*PAGE_SIZE != CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE); BUILD_BUG_ON(CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOTAL_SIZE != CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE); This takes the IDT page into account, and also connects the size-based define of CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOTAL_SIZE with the address-subtraction based define of CPU_ENTRY_AREA_MAP_SIZE. Also clean up some of the names which made it rather confusing: - 'CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOT_SIZE' wasn't actually the 'total' size of the cpu-entry-area, but the per-cpu array size, so rename this to CPU_ENTRY_AREA_ARRAY_SIZE. - Introduce CPU_ENTRY_AREA_TOTAL_SIZE that _is_ the total mapping size, with the IDT included. - Add comments where '+1' denotes the IDT mapping - it wasn't obvious and took me about 3 hours to decode... Finally, because this particular commit is actually applied after this patch: 880a98c33996: ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Add guard page for entry stack on 32bit") Fix the CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES value from 40 pages to the correct 39 pages. All future commits that change cpu_entry_area will have to adjust this value precisely. As a side note, we should probably attempt to remove CPU_ENTRY_AREA_PAGES and derive its value directly from the structure, without causing header hell - but that is an adventure for another day! :-) Fixes: 880a98c33996: ("x86/cpu_entry_area: Add guard page for entry stack on 32bit") Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Merge branch 'next-lockdown' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-09-281-0/+5
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull kernel lockdown mode from James Morris: "This is the latest iteration of the kernel lockdown patchset, from Matthew Garrett, David Howells and others. From the original description: This patchset introduces an optional kernel lockdown feature, intended to strengthen the boundary between UID 0 and the kernel. When enabled, various pieces of kernel functionality are restricted. Applications that rely on low-level access to either hardware or the kernel may cease working as a result - therefore this should not be enabled without appropriate evaluation beforehand. The majority of mainstream distributions have been carrying variants of this patchset for many years now, so there's value in providing a doesn't meet every distribution requirement, but gets us much closer to not requiring external patches. There are two major changes since this was last proposed for mainline: - Separating lockdown from EFI secure boot. Background discussion is covered here: https://lwn.net/Articles/751061/ - Implementation as an LSM, with a default stackable lockdown LSM module. This allows the lockdown feature to be policy-driven, rather than encoding an implicit policy within the mechanism. The new locked_down LSM hook is provided to allow LSMs to make a policy decision around whether kernel functionality that would allow tampering with or examining the runtime state of the kernel should be permitted. The included lockdown LSM provides an implementation with a simple policy intended for general purpose use. This policy provides a coarse level of granularity, controllable via the kernel command line: lockdown={integrity|confidentiality} Enable the kernel lockdown feature. If set to integrity, kernel features that allow userland to modify the running kernel are disabled. If set to confidentiality, kernel features that allow userland to extract confidential information from the kernel are also disabled. This may also be controlled via /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and overriden by kernel configuration. New or existing LSMs may implement finer-grained controls of the lockdown features. Refer to the lockdown_reason documentation in include/linux/security.h for details. The lockdown feature has had signficant design feedback and review across many subsystems. This code has been in linux-next for some weeks, with a few fixes applied along the way. Stephen Rothwell noted that commit 9d1f8be5cf42 ("bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode") is missing a Signed-off-by from its author. Matthew responded that he is providing this under category (c) of the DCO" * 'next-lockdown' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (31 commits) kexec: Fix file verification on S390 security: constify some arrays in lockdown LSM lockdown: Print current->comm in restriction messages efi: Restrict efivar_ssdt_load when the kernel is locked down tracefs: Restrict tracefs when the kernel is locked down debugfs: Restrict debugfs when the kernel is locked down kexec: Allow kexec_file() with appropriate IMA policy when locked down lockdown: Lock down perf when in confidentiality mode bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode lockdown: Lock down tracing and perf kprobes when in confidentiality mode lockdown: Lock down /proc/kcore x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace module lockdown: Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) lockdown: Lock down TIOCSSERIAL lockdown: Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is locked down acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been locked down ACPI: Limit access to custom_method when the kernel is locked down x86/msr: Restrict MSR access when the kernel is locked down x86: Lock down IO port access when the kernel is locked down ...
| * x86/mmiotrace: Lock down the testmmiotrace moduleDavid Howells2019-08-191-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The testmmiotrace module shouldn't be permitted when the kernel is locked down as it can be used to arbitrarily read and write MMIO space. This is a runtime check rather than buildtime in order to allow configurations where the same kernel may be run in both locked down or permissive modes depending on local policy. Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> cc: x86@kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | mm: treewide: clarify pgtable_page_{ctor,dtor}() namingMark Rutland2019-09-261-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The naming of pgtable_page_{ctor,dtor}() seems to have confused a few people, and until recently arm64 used these erroneously/pointlessly for other levels of page table. To make it incredibly clear that these only apply to the PTE level, and to align with the naming of pgtable_pmd_page_{ctor,dtor}(), let's rename them to pgtable_pte_page_{ctor,dtor}(). These changes were generated with the following shell script: ---- git grep -lw 'pgtable_page_.tor' | while read FILE; do sed -i '{s/pgtable_page_ctor/pgtable_pte_page_ctor/}' $FILE; sed -i '{s/pgtable_page_dtor/pgtable_pte_page_dtor/}' $FILE; done ---- ... with the documentation re-flowed to remain under 80 columns, and whitespace fixed up in macros to keep backslashes aligned. There should be no functional change as a result of this patch. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190722141133.3116-1-mark.rutland@arm.com Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> [m68k] Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | augmented rbtree: add new RB_DECLARE_CALLBACKS_MAX macroMichel Lespinasse2019-09-251-16/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add RB_DECLARE_CALLBACKS_MAX, which generates augmented rbtree callbacks for the case where the augmented value is a scalar whose definition follows a max(f(node)) pattern. This actually covers all present uses of RB_DECLARE_CALLBACKS, and saves some (source) code duplication in the various RBCOMPUTE function definitions. [walken@google.com: fix mm/vmalloc.c] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CANN689FXgK13wDYNh1zKxdipeTuALG4eKvKpsdZqKFJ-rvtGiQ@mail.gmail.com [walken@google.com: re-add check to check_augmented()] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190727022027.GA86863@google.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190703040156.56953-3-walken@google.com Signed-off-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Cc: Uladzislau Rezki <urezki@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | mm: consolidate pgtable_cache_init() and pgd_cache_init()Mike Rapoport2019-09-241-5/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Both pgtable_cache_init() and pgd_cache_init() are used to initialize kmem cache for page table allocations on several architectures that do not use PAGE_SIZE tables for one or more levels of the page table hierarchy. Most architectures do not implement these functions and use __weak default NOP implementation of pgd_cache_init(). Since there is no such default for pgtable_cache_init(), its empty stub is duplicated among most architectures. Rename the definitions of pgd_cache_init() to pgtable_cache_init() and drop empty stubs of pgtable_cache_init(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1566457046-22637-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> [arm64] Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> [x86] Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Merge tag 'powerpc-5.4-1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-09-201-2/+0
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman: "This is a bit late, partly due to me travelling, and partly due to a power outage knocking out some of my test systems *while* I was travelling. - Initial support for running on a system with an Ultravisor, which is software that runs below the hypervisor and protects guests against some attacks by the hypervisor. - Support for building the kernel to run as a "Secure Virtual Machine", ie. as a guest capable of running on a system with an Ultravisor. - Some changes to our DMA code on bare metal, to allow devices with medium sized DMA masks (> 32 && < 59 bits) to use more than 2GB of DMA space. - Support for firmware assisted crash dumps on bare metal (powernv). - Two series fixing bugs in and refactoring our PCI EEH code. - A large series refactoring our exception entry code to use gas macros, both to make it more readable and also enable some future optimisations. As well as many cleanups and other minor features & fixups. Thanks to: Adam Zerella, Alexey Kardashevskiy, Alistair Popple, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anju T Sudhakar, Anshuman Khandual, Balbir Singh, Benjamin Herrenschmidt, Cédric Le Goater, Christophe JAILLET, Christophe Leroy, Christopher M. Riedl, Christoph Hellwig, Claudio Carvalho, Daniel Axtens, David Gibson, David Hildenbrand, Desnes A. Nunes do Rosario, Ganesh Goudar, Gautham R. Shenoy, Greg Kurz, Guerney Hunt, Gustavo Romero, Halil Pasic, Hari Bathini, Joakim Tjernlund, Jonathan Neuschafer, Jordan Niethe, Leonardo Bras, Lianbo Jiang, Madhavan Srinivasan, Mahesh Salgaonkar, Mahesh Salgaonkar, Masahiro Yamada, Maxiwell S. Garcia, Michael Anderson, Nathan Chancellor, Nathan Lynch, Naveen N. Rao, Nicholas Piggin, Oliver O'Halloran, Qian Cai, Ram Pai, Ravi Bangoria, Reza Arbab, Ryan Grimm, Sam Bobroff, Santosh Sivaraj, Segher Boessenkool, Sukadev Bhattiprolu, Thiago Bauermann, Thiago Jung Bauermann, Thomas Gleixner, Tom Lendacky, Vasant Hegde" * tag 'powerpc-5.4-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (264 commits) powerpc/mm/mce: Keep irqs disabled during lockless page table walk powerpc: Use ftrace_graph_ret_addr() when unwinding powerpc/ftrace: Enable HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_RET_ADDR_PTR ftrace: Look up the address of return_to_handler() using helpers powerpc: dump kernel log before carrying out fadump or kdump docs: powerpc: Add missing documentation reference powerpc/xmon: Fix output of XIVE IPI powerpc/xmon: Improve output of XIVE interrupts powerpc/mm/radix: remove useless kernel messages powerpc/fadump: support holes in kernel boot memory area powerpc/fadump: remove RMA_START and RMA_END macros powerpc/fadump: update documentation about option to release opalcore powerpc/fadump: consider f/w load area powerpc/opalcore: provide an option to invalidate /sys/firmware/opal/core file powerpc/opalcore: export /sys/firmware/opal/core for analysing opal crashes powerpc/fadump: update documentation about CONFIG_PRESERVE_FA_DUMP powerpc/fadump: add support to preserve crash data on FADUMP disabled kernel powerpc/fadump: improve how crashed kernel's memory is reserved powerpc/fadump: consider reserved ranges while releasing memory powerpc/fadump: make crash memory ranges array allocation generic ...
| * | fs/core/vmcore: Move sev_active() reference to x86 arch codeThiago Jung Bauermann2019-08-091-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Secure Encrypted Virtualization is an x86-specific feature, so it shouldn't appear in generic kernel code because it forces non-x86 architectures to define the sev_active() function, which doesn't make a lot of sense. To solve this problem, add an x86 elfcorehdr_read() function to override the generic weak implementation. To do that, it's necessary to make read_from_oldmem() public so that it can be used outside of vmcore.c. Also, remove the export for sev_active() since it's only used in files that won't be built as modules. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Lianbo Jiang <lijiang@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190806044919.10622-6-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
| * | x86, s390/mm: Move sme_active() and sme_me_mask to x86-specific headerThiago Jung Bauermann2019-08-091-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that generic code doesn't reference them, move sme_active() and sme_me_mask to x86's <asm/mem_encrypt.h>. Also remove the export for sme_active() since it's only used in files that won't be built as modules. sme_me_mask on the other hand is used in arch/x86/kvm/svm.c (via __sme_set() and __psp_pa()) which can be built as a module so its export needs to stay. Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190806044919.10622-5-bauerman@linux.ibm.com
* | | Merge branch 'x86-pti-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-09-171-2/+6
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 pti updates from Thomas Gleixner: "Two small PTI updates: - Handle unaligned addresses gracefully in pti_clone_pagetable(). Not an issue with current callers, but a correctness problem. Adds a warning so any caller which hands in an unaligned address gets pointed out clearly. - Prevent PTI functions from being invoked when PTI is disabled at boottime. While this does not cause any harm today, it's pointless code executed and prone to cause subtle issues if the PTI implementation changes internally over time" * 'x86-pti-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mm/pti: Do not invoke PTI functions when PTI is disabled x86/mm/pti: Handle unaligned address gracefully in pti_clone_pagetable()
| * | | x86/mm/pti: Do not invoke PTI functions when PTI is disabledThomas Gleixner2019-08-291-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When PTI is disabled at boot time either because the CPU is not affected or PTI has been disabled on the command line, the boot code still calls into pti_finalize() which then unconditionally invokes: pti_clone_entry_text() pti_clone_kernel_text() pti_clone_kernel_text() was called unconditionally before the 32bit support was added and 32bit added the call to pti_clone_entry_text(). The call has no side effects as cloning the page tables into the available second one, which was allocated for PTI does not create damage. But it does not make sense either and in case that this functionality would be extended later this might actually lead to hard to diagnose issues. Neither function should be called when PTI is runtime disabled. Make the invocation conditional. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190828143124.063353972@linutronix.de
| * | | x86/mm/pti: Handle unaligned address gracefully in pti_clone_pagetable()Song Liu2019-08-291-2/+4
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | pti_clone_pmds() assumes that the supplied address is either: - properly PUD/PMD aligned or - the address is actually mapped which means that independently of the mapping level (PUD/PMD/PTE) the next higher mapping exists. If that's not the case the unaligned address can be incremented by PUD or PMD size incorrectly. All callers supply mapped and/or aligned addresses, but for the sake of robustness it's better to handle that case properly and to emit a warning. [ tglx: Rewrote changelog and added WARN_ON_ONCE() ] Signed-off-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1908282352470.1938@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
* | | Merge branch 'x86-mm-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-09-164-114/+4
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar: - Make cpumask_of_node() more robust against invalid node IDs - Simplify and speed up load_mm_cr4() - Unexport and remove various unused set_memory_*() APIs - Misc cleanups * 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/mm: Fix cpumask_of_node() error condition x86/mm: Remove the unused set_memory_wt() function x86/mm: Remove set_pages_x() and set_pages_nx() x86/mm: Remove the unused set_memory_array_*() functions x86/mm: Unexport set_memory_x() and set_memory_nx() x86/fixmap: Cleanup outdated comments x86/kconfig: Remove X86_DIRECT_GBPAGES dependency on !DEBUG_PAGEALLOC x86/mm: Avoid redundant interrupt disable in load_mm_cr4()
| * | | x86/mm: Fix cpumask_of_node() error conditionPeter Zijlstra2019-09-051-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When CONFIG_DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS=y we validate that the @node argument of cpumask_of_node() is a valid node_id. It however forgets to check for negative numbers. Fix this by explicitly casting to unsigned int. (unsigned)node >= nr_node_ids verifies: 0 <= node < nr_node_ids Also ammend the error message to match the condition. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190903075352.GY2369@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
| * | | x86/mm: Remove the unused set_memory_wt() functionChristoph Hellwig2019-09-031-17/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190826075558.8125-5-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
| * | | x86/mm: Remove set_pages_x() and set_pages_nx()Christoph Hellwig2019-09-032-17/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These wrappers don't provide a real benefit over just using set_memory_x() and set_memory_nx(). Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190826075558.8125-4-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
| * | | x86/mm: Remove the unused set_memory_array_*() functionsChristoph Hellwig2019-09-031-75/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190826075558.8125-3-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
| * | | x86/mm: Unexport set_memory_x() and set_memory_nx()Christoph Hellwig2019-09-031-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | No module currently messed with clearing or setting the execute permission of kernel memory, and none really should. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190826075558.8125-2-hch@lst.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
| * | | Merge tag 'v5.3-rc7' into x86/mm, to pick up fixesIngo Molnar2019-09-032-17/+24
| |\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
| * | | | x86/mm: Avoid redundant interrupt disable in load_mm_cr4()Jan Kiszka2019-07-241-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | load_mm_cr4() is always called with interrupts disabled from: - switch_mm_irqs_off() - refresh_pce(), which is a on_each_cpu() callback Thus, disabling interrupts in cr4_set/clear_bits() is redundant. Implement cr4_set/clear_bits_irqsoff() helpers, rename load_mm_cr4() to load_mm_cr4_irqsoff() and use the new helpers. The new helpers do not need a lockdep assert as __cr4_set() has one already. The renaming in combination with the checks in __cr4_set() ensure that any changes in the boundary conditions at the call sites will be detected. [ tglx: Massaged change log ] Signed-off-by: Jan Kiszka <jan.kiszka@siemens.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/0fbbcb64-5f26-4ffb-1bb9-4f5f48426893@siemens.com
* | | | | Merge branch 'efi-core-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-09-161-0/+1
|\ \ \ \ \ | |_|/ / / |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull EFI updates from Ingo Molnar: - refactor the EFI config table handling across architectures - add support for the Dell EMC OEM config table - include AER diagnostic output to CPER handling of fatal PCIe errors * 'efi-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: efi: cper: print AER info of PCIe fatal error efi: Export Runtime Configuration Interface table to sysfs efi: ia64: move SAL systab handling out of generic EFI code efi/x86: move UV_SYSTAB handling into arch/x86 efi: x86: move efi_is_table_address() into arch/x86
| * | | | efi: x86: move efi_is_table_address() into arch/x86Ard Biesheuvel2019-08-081-0/+1
| |/ / / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The function efi_is_table_address() and the associated array of table pointers is specific to x86. Since we will be adding some more x86 specific tables, let's move this code out of the generic code first. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
* | / / x86/mm/cpa: Prevent large page split when ftrace flips RW on kernel textThomas Gleixner2019-08-291-8/+18
| |/ / |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ftrace does not use text_poke() for enabling trace functionality. It uses its own mechanism and flips the whole kernel text to RW and back to RO. The CPA rework removed a loop based check of 4k pages which tried to preserve a large page by checking each 4k page whether the change would actually cover all pages in the large page. This resulted in endless loops for nothing as in testing it turned out that it actually never preserved anything. Of course testing missed to include ftrace, which is the one and only case which benefitted from the 4k loop. As a consequence enabling function tracing or ftrace based kprobes results in a full 4k split of the kernel text, which affects iTLB performance. The kernel RO protection is the only valid case where this can actually preserve large pages. All other static protections (RO data, data NX, PCI, BIOS) are truly static. So a conflict with those protections which results in a split should only ever happen when a change of memory next to a protected region is attempted. But these conflicts are rightfully splitting the large page to preserve the protected regions. In fact a change to the protected regions itself is a bug and is warned about. Add an exception for the static protection check for kernel text RO when the to be changed region spawns a full large page which allows to preserve the large mappings. This also prevents the syslog to be spammed about CPA violations when ftrace is used. The exception needs to be removed once ftrace switched over to text_poke() which avoids the whole issue. Fixes: 585948f4f695 ("x86/mm/cpa: Avoid the 4k pages check completely") Reported-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1908282355340.1938@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
* | | x86/mm: Sync also unmappings in vmalloc_sync_all()Joerg Roedel2019-07-221-8/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With huge-page ioremap areas the unmappings also need to be synced between all page-tables. Otherwise it can cause data corruption when a region is unmapped and later re-used. Make the vmalloc_sync_one() function ready to sync unmappings and make sure vmalloc_sync_all() iterates over all page-tables even when an unmapped PMD is found. Fixes: 5d72b4fba40ef ('x86, mm: support huge I/O mapping capability I/F') Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190719184652.11391-3-joro@8bytes.org
* | | x86/mm: Check for pfn instead of page in vmalloc_sync_one()Joerg Roedel2019-07-221-1/+1
|/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Do not require a struct page for the mapped memory location because it might not exist. This can happen when an ioremapped region is mapped with 2MB pages. Fixes: 5d72b4fba40ef ('x86, mm: support huge I/O mapping capability I/F') Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190719184652.11391-2-joro@8bytes.org
* | Merge tag 'dma-mapping-5.3-1' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mappingLinus Torvalds2019-07-201-0/+30
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull dma-mapping fixes from Christoph Hellwig: "Fix various regressions: - force unencrypted dma-coherent buffers if encryption bit can't fit into the dma coherent mask (Tom Lendacky) - avoid limiting request size if swiotlb is not used (me) - fix swiotlb handling in dma_direct_sync_sg_for_cpu/device (Fugang Duan)" * tag 'dma-mapping-5.3-1' of git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/dma-mapping: dma-direct: correct the physical addr in dma_direct_sync_sg_for_cpu/device dma-direct: only limit the mapping size if swiotlb could be used dma-mapping: add a dma_addressing_limited helper dma-direct: Force unencrypted DMA under SME for certain DMA masks
| * | dma-direct: Force unencrypted DMA under SME for certain DMA masksTom Lendacky2019-07-161-0/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If a device doesn't support DMA to a physical address that includes the encryption bit (currently bit 47, so 48-bit DMA), then the DMA must occur to unencrypted memory. SWIOTLB is used to satisfy that requirement if an IOMMU is not active (enabled or configured in passthrough mode). However, commit fafadcd16595 ("swiotlb: don't dip into swiotlb pool for coherent allocations") modified the coherent allocation support in SWIOTLB to use the DMA direct coherent allocation support. When an IOMMU is not active, this resulted in dma_alloc_coherent() failing for devices that didn't support DMA addresses that included the encryption bit. Addressing this requires changes to the force_dma_unencrypted() function in kernel/dma/direct.c. Since the function is now non-trivial and SME/SEV specific, update the DMA direct support to add an arch override for the force_dma_unencrypted() function. The arch override is selected when CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is set. The arch override function resides in the arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c file and forces unencrypted DMA when either SEV is active or SME is active and the device does not support DMA to physical addresses that include the encryption bit. Fixes: fafadcd16595 ("swiotlb: don't dip into swiotlb pool for coherent allocations") Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> [hch: moved the force_dma_unencrypted declaration to dma-mapping.h, fold the s390 fix from Halil Pasic] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
* | | Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-07-202-20/+12
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "A set of x86 specific fixes and updates: - The CR2 corruption fixes which store CR2 early in the entry code and hand the stored address to the fault handlers. - Revert a forgotten leftover of the dropped FSGSBASE series. - Plug a memory leak in the boot code. - Make the Hyper-V assist functionality robust by zeroing the shadow page. - Remove a useless check for dead processes with LDT - Update paravirt and VMware maintainers entries. - A few cleanup patches addressing various compiler warnings" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/entry/64: Prevent clobbering of saved CR2 value x86/hyper-v: Zero out the VP ASSIST PAGE on allocation x86, boot: Remove multiple copy of static function sanitize_boot_params() x86/boot/compressed/64: Remove unused variable x86/boot/efi: Remove unused variables x86/mm, tracing: Fix CR2 corruption x86/entry/64: Update comments and sanity tests for create_gap x86/entry/64: Simplify idtentry a little x86/entry/32: Simplify common_exception x86/paravirt: Make read_cr2() CALLEE_SAVE MAINTAINERS: Update PARAVIRT_OPS_INTERFACE and VMWARE_HYPERVISOR_INTERFACE x86/process: Delete useless check for dead process with LDT x86: math-emu: Hide clang warnings for 16-bit overflow x86/e820: Use proper booleans instead of 0/1 x86/apic: Silence -Wtype-limits compiler warnings x86/mm: Free sme_early_buffer after init x86/boot: Fix memory leak in default_get_smp_config() Revert "x86/ptrace: Prevent ptrace from clearing the FS/GS selector" and fix the test
| * | | x86/mm, tracing: Fix CR2 corruptionPeter Zijlstra2019-07-171-19/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Despite the current efforts to read CR2 before tracing happens there still exist a number of possible holes: idtentry page_fault do_page_fault has_error_code=1 call error_entry TRACE_IRQS_OFF call trace_hardirqs_off* #PF // modifies CR2 CALL_enter_from_user_mode __context_tracking_exit() trace_user_exit(0) #PF // modifies CR2 call do_page_fault address = read_cr2(); /* whoopsie */ And similar for i386. Fix it by pulling the CR2 read into the entry code, before any of that stuff gets a chance to run and ruin things. Reported-by: He Zhe <zhe.he@windriver.com> Reported-by: Eiichi Tsukata <devel@etsukata.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: bp@alien8.de Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org Cc: hpa@zytor.com Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com Cc: jgross@suse.com Cc: joel@joelfernandes.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190711114336.116812491@infradead.org Debugged-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
| * | | x86/mm: Free sme_early_buffer after initDavid Rientjes2019-07-161-1/+1
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The contents of sme_early_buffer should be cleared after __sme_early_enc_dec() because it is used to move encrypted and decrypted data, but since __sme_early_enc_dec() is __init this buffer simply can be freed after init. This saves a page that is otherwise unreferenced after init. Reported-by: Cfir Cohen <cfir@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1907101318170.197432@chino.kir.corp.google.com
* | | mm/sparsemem: convert kmalloc_section_memmap() to populate_section_memmap()Dan Williams2019-07-181-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow sub-section sized ranges to be added to the memmap. populate_section_memmap() takes an explict pfn range rather than assuming a full section, and those parameters are plumbed all the way through to vmmemap_populate(). There should be no sub-section usage in current deployments. New warnings are added to clarify which memmap allocation paths are sub-section capable. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/156092352058.979959.6551283472062305149.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Pavel Tatashin <pasha.tatashin@soleen.com> Tested-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com> [ppc64] Reviewed-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@suse.de> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com> Cc: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com> Cc: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com> Cc: Jeff Moyer <jmoyer@redhat.com> Cc: Jérôme Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Wei Yang <richardw.yang@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-02-28 15:44:59 +0000