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* crypto: cipher - On clone do crypto_mod_get()Dmitry Safonov2023-06-231-1/+6
| | | | | | | | The refcounter of underlying algorithm should be incremented, otherwise it'll be destroyed with the cloned cipher, wrecking the original cipher. Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: api - Add __crypto_alloc_tfmgfpHerbert Xu2023-06-231-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | Use it straight away in crypto_clone_cipher(), as that is not meant to sleep. Fixes: 51d8d6d0f4be ("crypto: cipher - Add crypto_clone_cipher") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: cipher - Add crypto_clone_cipherHerbert Xu2023-05-241-0/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow simple ciphers to be cloned, if they don't have a cra_init function. This basically rules out those ciphers that require a fallback. In future simple ciphers will be eliminated, and replaced with a linear skcipher interface. When that happens this restriction will disappear. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: remove cipher routines from public crypto APIArd Biesheuvel2021-01-031-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The cipher routines in the crypto API are mostly intended for templates implementing skcipher modes generically in software, and shouldn't be used outside of the crypto subsystem. So move the prototypes and all related definitions to a new header file under include/crypto/internal. Also, let's use the new module namespace feature to move the symbol exports into a new namespace CRYPTO_INTERNAL. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: remove propagation of CRYPTO_TFM_RES_* flagsEric Biggers2020-01-091-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_* flags were apparently meant as a way to make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors. But these flags weren't actually being used or tested, and in many cases they weren't being set correctly anyway. So they've now been removed. Also, if someone ever actually needs to start better distinguishing ->setkey() errors (which is somewhat unlikely, as this has been unneeded for a long time), we'd be much better off just defining different return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs. -EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys". That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test. So just remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_MASK and all the unneeded logic that propagates these flags around. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: remove CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LENEric Biggers2020-01-091-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN flag was apparently meant as a way to make the ->setkey() functions provide more information about errors. However, no one actually checks for this flag, which makes it pointless. Also, many algorithms fail to set this flag when given a bad length key. Reviewing just the generic implementations, this is the case for aes-fixed-time, cbcmac, echainiv, nhpoly1305, pcrypt, rfc3686, rfc4309, rfc7539, rfc7539esp, salsa20, seqiv, and xcbc. But there are probably many more in arch/*/crypto/ and drivers/crypto/. Some algorithms can even set this flag when the key is the correct length. For example, authenc and authencesn set it when the key payload is malformed in any way (not just a bad length), the atmel-sha and ccree drivers can set it if a memory allocation fails, and the chelsio driver sets it for bad auth tag lengths, not just bad key lengths. So even if someone actually wanted to start checking this flag (which seems unlikely, since it's been unused for a long time), there would be a lot of work needed to get it working correctly. But it would probably be much better to go back to the drawing board and just define different return values, like -EINVAL if the key is invalid for the algorithm vs. -EKEYREJECTED if the key was rejected by a policy like "no weak keys". That would be much simpler, less error-prone, and easier to test. So just remove this flag. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: cipher - remove crt_u.cipher (struct cipher_tfm)Eric Biggers2019-12-111-56/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Of the three fields in crt_u.cipher (struct cipher_tfm), ->cit_setkey() is pointless because it always points to setkey() in crypto/cipher.c. ->cit_decrypt_one() and ->cit_encrypt_one() are slightly less pointless, since if the algorithm doesn't have an alignmask, they are set directly to ->cia_encrypt() and ->cia_decrypt(). However, this "optimization" isn't worthwhile because: - The "cipher" algorithm type is the only algorithm still using crt_u, so it's bloating every struct crypto_tfm for every algorithm type. - If the algorithm has an alignmask, this "optimization" actually makes things slower, as it causes 2 indirect calls per block rather than 1. - It adds extra code complexity. - Some templates already call ->cia_encrypt()/->cia_decrypt() directly instead of going through ->cit_encrypt_one()/->cit_decrypt_one(). - The "cipher" algorithm type never gives optimal performance anyway. For that, a higher-level type such as skcipher needs to be used. Therefore, just remove the extra indirection, and make crypto_cipher_setkey(), crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(), and crypto_cipher_decrypt_one() be direct calls into crypto/cipher.c. Also remove the unused function crypto_cipher_cast(). Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152Thomas Gleixner2019-05-301-6/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: remove several VLAsSalvatore Mesoraca2018-04-211-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | We avoid various VLAs[1] by using constant expressions for block size and alignment mask. [1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA+55aFzCG-zNmZwX4A2FQpadafLfEzK6CC=qPXydAacU1RqZWA@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: api - Remove no-op exit_ops codeEric Biggers2016-10-211-4/+0
| | | | | | | | crypto_exit_cipher_ops() and crypto_exit_compress_ops() are no-ops and have been for a long time, so remove them. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* crypto: cipher - Fix checkpatch errorsRichard Hartmann2010-02-161-1/+1
| | | | | Signed-off-by: Richard Hartmann <richih.mailinglist@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [CRYPTO] api: Add missing headers for setkey_unalignedHerbert Xu2007-10-101-2/+3
| | | | | | | | This patch ensures that kernel.h and slab.h are included for the setkey_unaligned function. It also breaks a couple of long lines. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [CRYPTO] api: fix writting into unallocated memory in setkey_alignedSebastian Siewior2007-08-061-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | setkey_unaligned() commited in ca7c39385ce1a7b44894a4b225a4608624e90730 overwrites unallocated memory in the following memset() because I used the wrong buffer length. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [CRYPTO] api: Handle unaligned keys in setkeySebastian Siewior2007-07-111-3/+30
| | | | | | | | | setkey() in {cipher,blkcipher,ablkcipher,hash}.c does not respect the requested alignment by the algorithm. This patch fixes it. The extra memory is allocated by kmalloc() with GFP_ATOMIC flag. Signed-off-by: Sebastian Siewior <linux-crypto@ml.breakpoint.cc> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [CRYPTO] api: Remove deprecated interfaceHerbert Xu2007-02-071-444/+3
| | | | | | This patch removes the old cipher interface and related code. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [CRYPTO] api: Mark parts of cipher interface as deprecatedHerbert Xu2006-09-211-6/+28
| | | | | | | | Mark the parts of the cipher interface that have been replaced by block ciphers as deprecated. Thanks to Andrew Morton for suggesting doing this before removing them completely. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [CRYPTO] scatterwalk: Prepare for block ciphersHerbert Xu2006-09-211-14/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch prepares the scatterwalk code for use by the new block cipher type. Firstly it halves the size of scatter_walk on 32-bit platforms. This is important as we allocate at least two of these objects on the stack for each block cipher operation. It also exports the symbols since the block cipher code can be built as a module. Finally there is a hack in scatterwalk_unmap that relies on progress being made. Unfortunately, for hardware crypto we can't guarantee progress to be made since the hardware can fail. So this also gets rid of the hack by not advancing the address returned by scatterwalk_map. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [CRYPTO] cipher: Added encrypt_one/decrypt_oneHerbert Xu2006-09-211-0/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds two new operations for the simple cipher that encrypts or decrypts a single block at a time. This will be the main interface after the existing block operations have moved over to the new block ciphers. It also adds the crypto_cipher type which is currently only used on the new operations but will be extended to setkey as well once existing users have been converted to use block ciphers where applicable. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [CRYPTO] api: Feed flag directly to crypto_yieldHerbert Xu2006-09-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | The sleeping flag used to determine whether crypto_yield can actually yield is really a per-operation flag rather than a per-tfm flag. This patch changes crypto_yield to take a flag directly so that we can start using a per-operation flag instead the tfm flag. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [CRYPTO] cipher: Removed special IV checks for ECBHerbert Xu2006-09-211-0/+2
| | | | | | | | This patch makes IV operations on ECB fail through nocrypt_iv rather than calling BUG(). This is needed to generalise CBC/ECB using the template mechanism. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [CRYPTO] api: Get rid of flags argument to setkeyHerbert Xu2006-09-211-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the tfm is passed directly to setkey instead of the ctx, we no longer need to pass the &tfm->crt_flags pointer. This patch also gets rid of a few unnecessary checks on the key length for ciphers as the cipher layer guarantees that the key length is within the bounds specified by the algorithm. Rather than testing dia_setkey every time, this patch does it only once during crypto_alloc_tfm. The redundant check from crypto_digest_setkey is also removed. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [CRYPTO] all: Pass tfm instead of ctx to algorithmsHerbert Xu2006-06-261-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Up until now algorithms have been happy to get a context pointer since they know everything that's in the tfm already (e.g., alignment, block size). However, once we have parameterised algorithms, such information will be specific to each tfm. So the algorithm API needs to be changed to pass the tfm structure instead of the context pointer. This patch is basically a text substitution. The only tricky bit is the assembly routines that need to get the context pointer offset through asm-offsets.h. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [CRYPTO] cipher: Align temporary buffer in cbc_process_decryptHerbert Xu2006-01-091-2/+3
| | | | | | | Since the temporary buffer is used as an argument to cia_decrypt, it must be aligned by cra_alignmask. This bug was found by linux@horizon.com. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [CRYPTO] Fix boundary check in standard multi-block cipher processorsHerbert Xu2005-09-061-3/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | The boundary check in the standard multi-block cipher processors are broken when nbytes is not a multiple of bsize. In those cases it will always process an extra block. This patch corrects the check so that it processes at most nbytes of data. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [CRYPTO]: Added CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP flagHerbert Xu2005-09-011-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The crypto layer currently uses in_atomic() to determine whether it is allowed to sleep. This is incorrect since spin locks don't always cause in_atomic() to return true. Instead of that, this patch returns to an earlier idea of a per-tfm flag which determines whether sleeping is allowed. Unlike the earlier version, the default is to not allow sleeping. This ensures that no existing code can break. As usual, this flag may either be set through crypto_alloc_tfm(), or just before a specific crypto operation. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [CRYPTO]: Fix zero-extension bug on 64-bit architectures.Herbert Xu2005-07-151-3/+3
| | | | | | | Noticed by Ken-ichirou MATSUZAWA. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [CRYPTO] Handle unaligned iv from encrypt_iv/decrypt_ivHerbert Xu2005-07-061-2/+27
| | | | | | | | | | Even though cit_iv is now always aligned, the user can still supply an unaligned iv through crypto_cipher_encrypt_iv/crypto_cipher_decrypt_iv. This patch will check the alignment of the user-supplied iv and copy it if necessary. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [CRYPTO] Ensure cit_iv is aligned correctlyHerbert Xu2005-07-061-6/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | This patch ensures that cit_iv is aligned according to cra_alignmask by allocating it as part of the tfm structure. As a side effect the crypto layer will also guarantee that the tfm ctx area has enough space to be aligned by cra_alignmask. This allows us to remove the extra space reservation from the Padlock driver. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [CRYPTO] Add alignmask for low-level cipher implementationsHerbert Xu2005-07-061-7/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The VIA Padlock device requires the input and output buffers to be aligned on 16-byte boundaries. This patch adds the alignmask attribute for low-level cipher implementations to indicate their alignment requirements. The mid-level crypt() function will copy the input/output buffers if they are not aligned correctly before they are passed to the low-level implementation. Strictly speaking, some of the software implementations require the buffers to be aligned on 4-byte boundaries as they do 32-bit loads. However, it is not clear whether it is better to copy the buffers or pay the penalty for unaligned loads/stores. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [CRYPTO] Add support for low-level multi-block operationsHerbert Xu2005-07-061-20/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds hooks for cipher algorithms to implement multi-block ECB/CBC operations directly. This is expected to provide significant performance boots to the VIA Padlock. It could also be used for improving software implementations such as AES where operating on multiple blocks at a time may enable certain optimisations. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [CRYPTO] Add plumbing for multi-block operationsHerbert Xu2005-07-061-90/+156
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The VIA Padlock device is able to perform much better when multiple blocks are fed to it at once. As this device offers an exceptional throughput rate it is worthwhile to optimise the infrastructure specifically for it. We shift the existing page-sized fast path down to the CBC/ECB functions. We can then replace the CBC/ECB functions with functions provided by the underlying algorithm that performs the multi-block operations. As a side-effect this improves the performance of large cipher operations for all existing algorithm implementations. I've measured the gain to be around 5% for 3DES and 15% for AES. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [CRYPTO] Don't check for NULL before kfree()Jesper Juhl2005-07-061-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | Checking a pointer for NULL before calling kfree() on it is redundant. This patch removes such checks from crypto/ Signed-off-by: Jesper Juhl <juhl-lkml@dif.dk> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds2005-04-161-0/+341
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!