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* KEYS: asymmetric: Copy sig and digest in public_key_verify_signature()Roberto Sassu2023-06-211-16/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit c3d03e8e35e005e1a614e51bb59053eeb5857f76 ] Commit ac4e97abce9b8 ("scatterlist: sg_set_buf() argument must be in linear mapping") checks that both the signature and the digest reside in the linear mapping area. However, more recently commit ba14a194a434c ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") made it possible to move the stack in the vmalloc area, which is not contiguous, and thus not suitable for sg_set_buf() which needs adjacent pages. Always make a copy of the signature and digest in the same buffer used to store the key and its parameters, and pass them to sg_init_one(). Prefer it to conditionally doing the copy if necessary, to keep the code simple. The buffer allocated with kmalloc() is in the linear mapping area. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.9.x Fixes: ba14a194a434 ("fork: Add generic vmalloced stack support") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y4pIpxbjBdajymBJ@sol.localdomain/ Suggested-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Tested-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: drbg - Only fail when jent is unavailable in FIPS modeHerbert Xu2023-05-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 686cd976b6ddedeeb1a1fb09ba53a891d3cc9a03 ] When jent initialisation fails for any reason other than ENOENT, the entire drbg fails to initialise, even when we're not in FIPS mode. This is wrong because we can still use the kernel RNG when we're not in FIPS mode. Change it so that it only fails when we are in FIPS mode. Fixes: 57225e679788 ("crypto: drbg - Use callback API for random readiness") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: drbg - make drbg_prepare_hrng() handle jent instantiation errorsNicolai Stange2023-05-171-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 559edd47cce4cc407d606b4d7f376822816fd4b8 ] Now that drbg_prepare_hrng() doesn't do anything but to instantiate a jitterentropy crypto_rng instance, it looks a little odd to have the related error handling at its only caller, drbg_instantiate(). Move the handling of jitterentropy allocation failures from drbg_instantiate() close to the allocation itself in drbg_prepare_hrng(). There is no change in behaviour. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Stable-dep-of: 686cd976b6dd ("crypto: drbg - Only fail when jent is unavailable in FIPS mode") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* asymmetric_keys: log on fatal failures in PE/pkcs7Robbie Harwood2023-04-202-17/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 3584c1dbfffdabf8e3dc1dd25748bb38dd01cd43 ] These particular errors can be encountered while trying to kexec when secureboot lockdown is in place. Without this change, even with a signed debug build, one still needs to reboot the machine to add the appropriate dyndbg parameters (since lockdown blocks debugfs). Accordingly, upgrade all pr_debug() before fatal error into pr_warn(). Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220171254.592347-3-rharwood@redhat.com/ # v2 Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* verify_pefile: relax wrapper length checkRobbie Harwood2023-04-201-4/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 4fc5c74dde69a7eda172514aaeb5a7df3600adb3 ] The PE Format Specification (section "The Attribute Certificate Table (Image Only)") states that `dwLength` is to be rounded up to 8-byte alignment when used for traversal. Therefore, the field is not required to be an 8-byte multiple in the first place. Accordingly, pesign has not performed this alignment since version 0.110. This causes kexec failure on pesign'd binaries with "PEFILE: Signature wrapper len wrong". Update the comment and relax the check. Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood <rharwood@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org Link: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/pe-format#the-attribute-certificate-table-image-only Link: https://github.com/rhboot/pesign Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230220171254.592347-2-rharwood@redhat.com/ # v2 Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Use akcipher_request_completeHerbert Xu2023-03-111-19/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 564cabc0ca0bdfa8f0fc1ae74b24d0a7554522c5 ] Use the akcipher_request_complete helper instead of calling the completion function directly. In fact the previous code was buggy in that EINPROGRESS was never passed back to the original caller. Fixes: 3d5b1ecdea6f ("crypto: rsa - RSA padding algorithm") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: seqiv - Handle EBUSY correctlyHerbert Xu2023-03-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 32e62025e5e52fbe4812ef044759de7010b15dbc ] As it is seqiv only handles the special return value of EINPROGERSS, which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the request. However, as the caller of seqiv may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way. Otherwise backlogged requests will trigger a use-after-free. Fixes: 0a270321dbf9 ("[CRYPTO] seqiv: Add Sequence Number IV Generator") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: essiv - Handle EBUSY correctlyHerbert Xu2023-03-111-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit b5a772adf45a32c68bef28e60621f12617161556 ] As it is essiv only handles the special return value of EINPROGERSS, which means that in all other cases it will free data related to the request. However, as the caller of essiv may specify MAY_BACKLOG, we also need to expect EBUSY and treat it in the same way. Otherwise backlogged requests will trigger a use-after-free. Fixes: be1eb7f78aa8 ("crypto: essiv - create wrapper template...") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: essiv - remove redundant null pointer check before kfreeChen Wandun2023-03-111-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit e18036da5c23530994faf7243b592e581f1efed2 ] kfree has taken null pointer check into account. so it is safe to remove the unnecessary check. Signed-off-by: Chen Wandun <chenwandun@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Stable-dep-of: b5a772adf45a ("crypto: essiv - Handle EBUSY correctly") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: tcrypt - Fix multibuffer skcipher speed test mem leakZhang Yiqun2023-01-181-9/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 1aa33fc8d4032227253ceb736f47c52b859d9683 ] In the past, the data for mb-skcipher test has been allocated twice, that means the first allcated memory area is without free, which may cause a potential memory leakage. So this patch is to remove one allocation to fix this error. Fixes: e161c5930c15 ("crypto: tcrypt - add multibuf skcipher...") Signed-off-by: Zhang Yiqun <zhangyiqun@phytium.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: akcipher - default implementation for setting a private keyIgnat Korchagin2022-10-261-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit bc155c6c188c2f0c5749993b1405673d25a80389 ] Changes from v1: * removed the default implementation from set_pub_key: it is assumed that an implementation must always have this callback defined as there are no use case for an algorithm, which doesn't need a public key Many akcipher implementations (like ECDSA) support only signature verifications, so they don't have all callbacks defined. Commit 78a0324f4a53 ("crypto: akcipher - default implementations for request callbacks") introduced default callbacks for sign/verify operations, which just return an error code. However, these are not enough, because before calling sign the caller would likely call set_priv_key first on the instantiated transform (as the in-kernel testmgr does). This function does not have a default stub, so the kernel crashes, when trying to set a private key on an akcipher, which doesn't support signature generation. I've noticed this, when trying to add a KAT vector for ECDSA signature to the testmgr. With this patch the testmgr returns an error in dmesg (as it should) instead of crashing the kernel NULL ptr dereference. Fixes: 78a0324f4a53 ("crypto: akcipher - default implementations for request callbacks") Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: drbg - make reseeding from get_random_bytes() synchronousNicolai Stange2022-06-221-50/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 074bcd4000e0d812bc253f86fedc40f81ed59ccc upstream. get_random_bytes() usually hasn't full entropy available by the time DRBG instances are first getting seeded from it during boot. Thus, the DRBG implementation registers random_ready_callbacks which would in turn schedule some work for reseeding the DRBGs once get_random_bytes() has sufficient entropy available. For reference, the relevant history around handling DRBG (re)seeding in the context of a not yet fully seeded get_random_bytes() is: commit 16b369a91d0d ("random: Blocking API for accessing nonblocking_pool") commit 4c7879907edd ("crypto: drbg - add async seeding operation") commit 205a525c3342 ("random: Add callback API for random pool readiness") commit 57225e679788 ("crypto: drbg - Use callback API for random readiness") commit c2719503f5e1 ("random: Remove kernel blocking API") However, some time later, the initialization state of get_random_bytes() has been made queryable via rng_is_initialized() introduced with commit 9a47249d444d ("random: Make crng state queryable"). This primitive now allows for streamlining the DRBG reseeding from get_random_bytes() by replacing that aforementioned asynchronous work scheduling from random_ready_callbacks with some simpler, synchronous code in drbg_generate() next to the related logic already present therein. Apart from improving overall code readability, this change will also enable DRBG users to rely on wait_for_random_bytes() for ensuring that the initial seeding has completed, if desired. The previous patches already laid the grounds by making drbg_seed() to record at each DRBG instance whether it was being seeded at a time when rng_is_initialized() still had been false as indicated by ->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL. All that remains to be done now is to make drbg_generate() check for this condition, determine whether rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true in the meanwhile and invoke a reseed from get_random_bytes() if so. Make this move: - rename the former drbg_async_seed() work handler, i.e. the one in charge of reseeding a DRBG instance from get_random_bytes(), to "drbg_seed_from_random()", - change its signature as appropriate, i.e. make it take a struct drbg_state rather than a work_struct and change its return type from "void" to "int" in order to allow for passing error information from e.g. its __drbg_seed() invocation onwards to callers, - make drbg_generate() invoke this drbg_seed_from_random() once it encounters a DRBG instance with ->seeded == DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL by the time rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true and - prune everything related to the former, random_ready_callback based mechanism. As drbg_seed_from_random() is now getting invoked from drbg_generate() with the ->drbg_mutex being held, it must not attempt to recursively grab it once again. Remove the corresponding mutex operations from what is now drbg_seed_from_random(). Furthermore, as drbg_seed_from_random() can now report errors directly to its caller, there's no need for it to temporarily switch the DRBG's ->seeded state to DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED so that a failure of the subsequently invoked __drbg_seed() will get signaled to drbg_generate(). Don't do it then. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> [Jason: for stable, undid the modifications for the backport of 5acd3548.] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: drbg - always try to free Jitter RNG instanceStephan Müller2022-06-221-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 819966c06b759022e9932f328284314d9272b9f3 upstream. The Jitter RNG is unconditionally allocated as a seed source follwoing the patch 97f2650e5040. Thus, the instance must always be deallocated. Reported-by: syzbot+2e635807decef724a1fa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 97f2650e5040 ("crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B ...") Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: drbg - move dynamic ->reseed_threshold adjustments to __drbg_seed()Nicolai Stange2022-06-221-9/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 262d83a4290c331cd4f617a457408bdb82fbb738 upstream. Since commit 42ea507fae1a ("crypto: drbg - reseed often if seedsource is degraded"), the maximum seed lifetime represented by ->reseed_threshold gets temporarily lowered if the get_random_bytes() source cannot provide sufficient entropy yet, as is common during boot, and restored back to the original value again once that has changed. More specifically, if the add_random_ready_callback() invoked from drbg_prepare_hrng() in the course of DRBG instantiation does not return -EALREADY, that is, if get_random_bytes() has not been fully initialized at this point yet, drbg_prepare_hrng() will lower ->reseed_threshold to a value of 50. The drbg_async_seed() scheduled from said random_ready_callback will eventually restore the original value. A future patch will replace the random_ready_callback based notification mechanism and thus, there will be no add_random_ready_callback() return value anymore which could get compared to -EALREADY. However, there's __drbg_seed() which gets invoked in the course of both, the DRBG instantiation as well as the eventual reseeding from get_random_bytes() in aforementioned drbg_async_seed(), if any. Moreover, it knows about the get_random_bytes() initialization state by the time the seed data had been obtained from it: the new_seed_state argument introduced with the previous patch would get set to DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL in case get_random_bytes() had not been fully initialized yet and to DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL otherwise. Thus, __drbg_seed() provides a convenient alternative for managing that ->reseed_threshold lowering and restoring at a central place. Move all ->reseed_threshold adjustment code from drbg_prepare_hrng() and drbg_async_seed() respectively to __drbg_seed(). Make __drbg_seed() lower the ->reseed_threshold to 50 in case its new_seed_state argument equals DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL and let it restore the original value otherwise. There is no change in behaviour. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: drbg - track whether DRBG was seeded with !rng_is_initialized()Nicolai Stange2022-06-221-4/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2bcd25443868aa8863779a6ebc6c9319633025d2 upstream. Currently, the DRBG implementation schedules asynchronous works from random_ready_callbacks for reseeding the DRBG instances with output from get_random_bytes() once the latter has sufficient entropy available. However, as the get_random_bytes() initialization state can get queried by means of rng_is_initialized() now, there is no real need for this asynchronous reseeding logic anymore and it's better to keep things simple by doing it synchronously when needed instead, i.e. from drbg_generate() once rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true. Of course, for this to work, drbg_generate() would need some means by which it can tell whether or not rng_is_initialized() has flipped to true since the last seeding from get_random_bytes(). Or equivalently, whether or not the last seed from get_random_bytes() has happened when rng_is_initialized() was still evaluating to false. As it currently stands, enum drbg_seed_state allows for the representation of two different DRBG seeding states: DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED and DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. The former makes drbg_generate() to invoke a full reseeding operation involving both, the rather expensive jitterentropy as well as the get_random_bytes() randomness sources. The DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL state on the other hand implies that no reseeding at all is required for a !->pr DRBG variant. Introduce the new DRBG_SEED_STATE_PARTIAL state to enum drbg_seed_state for representing the condition that a DRBG was being seeded when rng_is_initialized() had still been false. In particular, this new state implies that - the given DRBG instance has been fully seeded from the jitterentropy source (if enabled) - and drbg_generate() is supposed to reseed from get_random_bytes() *only* once rng_is_initialized() turns to true. Up to now, the __drbg_seed() helper used to set the given DRBG instance's ->seeded state to constant DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. Introduce a new argument allowing for the specification of the to be written ->seeded value instead. Make the first of its two callers, drbg_seed(), determine the appropriate value based on rng_is_initialized(). The remaining caller, drbg_async_seed(), is known to get invoked only once rng_is_initialized() is true, hence let it pass constant DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL for the new argument to __drbg_seed(). There is no change in behaviour, except for that the pr_devel() in drbg_generate() would now report "unseeded" for ->pr DRBG instances which had last been seeded when rng_is_initialized() was still evaluating to false. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: drbg - prepare for more fine-grained tracking of seeding stateNicolai Stange2022-06-221-9/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit ce8ce31b2c5c8b18667784b8c515650c65d57b4e upstream. There are two different randomness sources the DRBGs are getting seeded from, namely the jitterentropy source (if enabled) and get_random_bytes(). At initial DRBG seeding time during boot, the latter might not have collected sufficient entropy for seeding itself yet and thus, the DRBG implementation schedules a reseed work from a random_ready_callback once that has happened. This is particularly important for the !->pr DRBG instances, for which (almost) no further reseeds are getting triggered during their lifetime. Because collecting data from the jitterentropy source is a rather expensive operation, the aforementioned asynchronously scheduled reseed work restricts itself to get_random_bytes() only. That is, it in some sense amends the initial DRBG seed derived from jitterentropy output at full (estimated) entropy with fresh randomness obtained from get_random_bytes() once that has been seeded with sufficient entropy itself. With the advent of rng_is_initialized(), there is no real need for doing the reseed operation from an asynchronously scheduled work anymore and a subsequent patch will make it synchronous by moving it next to related logic already present in drbg_generate(). However, for tracking whether a full reseed including the jitterentropy source is required or a "partial" reseed involving only get_random_bytes() would be sufficient already, the boolean struct drbg_state's ->seeded member must become a tristate value. Prepare for this by introducing the new enum drbg_seed_state and change struct drbg_state's ->seeded member's type from bool to that type. For facilitating review, enum drbg_seed_state is made to only contain two members corresponding to the former ->seeded values of false and true resp. at this point: DRBG_SEED_STATE_UNSEEDED and DRBG_SEED_STATE_FULL. A third one for tracking the intermediate state of "seeded from jitterentropy only" will be introduced with a subsequent patch. There is no change in behaviour at this point. Signed-off-by: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: drbg - always seeded with SP800-90B compliant noise sourceStephan Müller2022-06-221-7/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 97f2650e504033376e8813691cb6eccf73151676 upstream. As the Jitter RNG provides an SP800-90B compliant noise source, use this noise source always for the (re)seeding of the DRBG. To make sure the DRBG is always properly seeded, the reseed threshold is reduced to 1<<20 generate operations. The Jitter RNG may report health test failures. Such health test failures are treated as transient as follows. The DRBG will not reseed from the Jitter RNG (but from get_random_bytes) in case of a health test failure. Though, it produces the requested random number. The Jitter RNG has a failure counter where at most 1024 consecutive resets due to a health test failure are considered as a transient error. If more consecutive resets are required, the Jitter RNG will return a permanent error which is returned to the caller by the DRBG. With this approach, the worst case reseed threshold is significantly lower than mandated by SP800-90A in order to seed with an SP800-90B noise source: the DRBG has a reseed threshold of 2^20 * 1024 = 2^30 generate requests. Yet, in case of a transient Jitter RNG health test failure, the DRBG is seeded with the data obtained from get_random_bytes. However, if the Jitter RNG fails during the initial seeding operation even due to a health test error, the DRBG will send an error to the caller because at that time, the DRBG has received no seed that is SP800-90B compliant. Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* random: replace custom notifier chain with standard oneJason A. Donenfeld2022-06-221-9/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 5acd35487dc911541672b3ffc322851769c32a56 upstream. We previously rolled our own randomness readiness notifier, which only has two users in the whole kernel. Replace this with a more standard atomic notifier block that serves the same purpose with less code. Also unexport the symbols, because no modules use it, only unconditional builtins. The only drawback is that it's possible for a notification handler returning the "stop" code to prevent further processing, but given that there are only two users, and that we're unexporting this anyway, that doesn't seem like a significant drawback for the simplification we receive here. Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> [Jason: for stable, also backported to crypto/drbg.c, not unexporting.] Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: cryptd - Protect per-CPU resource by disabling BH.Sebastian Andrzej Siewior2022-06-141-12/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 91e8bcd7b4da182e09ea19a2c73167345fe14c98 ] The access to cryptd_queue::cpu_queue is synchronized by disabling preemption in cryptd_enqueue_request() and disabling BH in cryptd_queue_worker(). This implies that access is allowed from BH. If cryptd_enqueue_request() is invoked from preemptible context _and_ soft interrupt then this can lead to list corruption since cryptd_enqueue_request() is not protected against access from soft interrupt. Replace get_cpu() in cryptd_enqueue_request() with local_bh_disable() to ensure BH is always disabled. Remove preempt_disable() from cryptd_queue_worker() since it is not needed because local_bh_disable() ensures synchronisation. Fixes: 254eff771441 ("crypto: cryptd - Per-CPU thread implementation...") Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: ecrdsa - Fix incorrect use of vli_cmpVitaly Chikunov2022-06-061-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 7cc7ab73f83ee6d50dc9536bc3355495d8600fad upstream. Correctly compare values that shall be greater-or-equal and not just greater. Fixes: 0d7a78643f69 ("crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: authenc - Fix sleep in atomic context in decrypt_tailHerbert Xu2022-04-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 66eae850333d639fc278d6f915c6fc01499ea893 ] The function crypto_authenc_decrypt_tail discards its flags argument and always relies on the flags from the original request when starting its sub-request. This is clearly wrong as it may cause the SLEEPABLE flag to be set when it shouldn't. Fixes: 92d95ba91772 ("crypto: authenc - Convert to new AEAD interface") Reported-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Tested-by: Corentin Labbe <clabbe.montjoie@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - fix buffer overread in pkcs1pad_verify_complete()Eric Biggers2022-04-151-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a24611ea356c7f3f0ec926da11b9482ac1f414fd upstream. Before checking whether the expected digest_info is present, we need to check that there are enough bytes remaining. Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - restore signature length checkEric Biggers2022-04-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d3481accd974541e6a5d6a1fb588924a3519c36e upstream. RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures are required to be the same length as the RSA key size. RFC8017 specifically requires the verifier to check this (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8017#section-8.2.2). Commit a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") changed the kernel to allow longer signatures, but didn't explain this part of the change; it seems to be unrelated to the rest of the commit. Revert this change, since it doesn't appear to be correct. We can be pretty sure that no one is relying on overly-long signatures (which would have to be front-padded with zeroes) being supported, given that they would have been broken since commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms"). Fixes: a49de377e051 ("crypto: Add hash param to pkcs1pad") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.6+ Cc: Tadeusz Struk <tadeusz.struk@linaro.org> Suggested-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - correctly get hash from source scatterlistEric Biggers2022-04-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e316f7179be22912281ce6331d96d7c121fb2b17 upstream. Commit c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms") changed akcipher_alg::verify to take in both the signature and the actual hash and do the signature verification, rather than just return the hash expected by the signature as was the case before. To do this, it implemented a hack where the signature and hash are concatenated with each other in one scatterlist. Obviously, for this to work correctly, akcipher_alg::verify needs to correctly extract the two items from the scatterlist it is given. Unfortunately, it doesn't correctly extract the hash in the case where the signature is longer than the RSA key size, as it assumes that the signature's length is equal to the RSA key size. This causes a prefix of the hash, or even the entire hash, to be taken from the *signature*. (Note, the case of a signature longer than the RSA key size should not be allowed in the first place; a separate patch will fix that.) It is unclear whether the resulting scheme has any useful security properties. Fix this by correctly extracting the hash from the scatterlist. Fixes: c7381b012872 ("crypto: akcipher - new verify API for public key algorithms") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.2+ Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: pcrypt - Delay write to padata->infoDaniel Jordan2021-11-171-4/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 68b6dea802cea0dbdd8bd7ccc60716b5a32a5d8a ] These three events can race when pcrypt is used multiple times in a template ("pcrypt(pcrypt(...))"): 1. [taskA] The caller makes the crypto request via crypto_aead_encrypt() 2. [kworkerB] padata serializes the inner pcrypt request 3. [kworkerC] padata serializes the outer pcrypt request 3 might finish before the call to crypto_aead_encrypt() returns in 1, resulting in two possible issues. First, a use-after-free of the crypto request's memory when, for example, taskA writes to the outer pcrypt request's padata->info in pcrypt_aead_enc() after kworkerC completes the request. Second, the outer pcrypt request overwrites the inner pcrypt request's return code with -EINPROGRESS, making a successful request appear to fail. For instance, kworkerB writes the outer pcrypt request's padata->info in pcrypt_aead_done() and then taskA overwrites it in pcrypt_aead_enc(). Avoid both situations by delaying the write of padata->info until after the inner crypto request's return code is checked. This prevents the use-after-free by not touching the crypto request's memory after the next-inner crypto request is made, and stops padata->info from being overwritten. Fixes: 5068c7a883d16 ("crypto: pcrypt - Add pcrypt crypto parallelization wrapper") Reported-by: syzbot+b187b77c8474f9648fae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: ecc - fix CRYPTO_DEFAULT_RNG dependencyArnd Bergmann2021-11-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 38aa192a05f22f9778f9420e630f0322525ef12e ] The ecc.c file started out as part of the ECDH algorithm but got moved out into a standalone module later. It does not build without CRYPTO_DEFAULT_RNG, so now that other modules are using it as well we can run into this link error: aarch64-linux-ld: ecc.c:(.text+0xfc8): undefined reference to `crypto_default_rng' aarch64-linux-ld: ecc.c:(.text+0xff4): undefined reference to `crypto_put_default_rng' Move the 'select CRYPTO_DEFAULT_RNG' statement into the correct symbol. Fixes: 0d7a78643f69 ("crypto: ecrdsa - add EC-RDSA (GOST 34.10) algorithm") Fixes: 4e6602916bc6 ("crypto: ecdsa - Add support for ECDSA signature verification") Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: shash - avoid comparing pointers to exported functions under CFIArd Biesheuvel2021-07-141-3/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 22ca9f4aaf431a9413dcc115dd590123307f274f ] crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() is implemented by testing whether the .setkey() member of a struct shash_alg points to the default version, called shash_no_setkey(). As crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() is a static inline, this requires shash_no_setkey() to be exported to modules. Unfortunately, when building with CFI, function pointers are routed via CFI stubs which are private to each module (or to the kernel proper) and so this function pointer comparison may fail spuriously. Let's fix this by turning crypto_shash_alg_has_setkey() into an out of line function. Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: rng - fix crypto_rng_reset() refcounting when !CRYPTO_STATSEric Biggers2021-05-111-7/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 30d0f6a956fc74bb2e948398daf3278c6b08c7e9 upstream. crypto_stats_get() is a no-op when the kernel is compiled without CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS, so pairing it with crypto_alg_put() unconditionally (as crypto_rng_reset() does) is wrong. Fix this by moving the call to crypto_stats_get() to just before the actual algorithm operation which might need it. This makes it always paired with crypto_stats_rng_seed(). Fixes: eed74b3eba9e ("crypto: rng - Fix a refcounting bug in crypto_rng_reset()") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: api - check for ERR pointers in crypto_destroy_tfm()Ard Biesheuvel2021-05-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 83681f2bebb34dbb3f03fecd8f570308ab8b7c2c ] Given that crypto_alloc_tfm() may return ERR pointers, and to avoid crashes on obscure error paths where such pointers are presented to crypto_destroy_tfm() (such as [0]), add an ERR_PTR check there before dereferencing the second argument as a struct crypto_tfm pointer. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/000000000000de949705bc59e0f6@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+12cf5fbfdeba210a89dd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: x86 - Regularize glue function prototypesKees Cook2021-03-202-10/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 9c1e8836edbbaf3656bc07437b59c04be034ac4e upstream. The crypto glue performed function prototype casting via macros to make indirect calls to assembly routines. Instead of performing casts at the call sites (which trips Control Flow Integrity prototype checking), switch each prototype to a common standard set of arguments which allows the removal of the existing macros. In order to keep pointer math unchanged, internal casting between u128 pointers and u8 pointers is added. Co-developed-by: João Moreira <joao.moreira@intel.com> Signed-off-by: João Moreira <joao.moreira@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@google.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: tcrypt - avoid signed overflow in byte countArd Biesheuvel2021-03-071-10/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 303fd3e1c771077e32e96e5788817f025f0067e2 ] The signed long type used for printing the number of bytes processed in tcrypt benchmarks limits the range to -/+ 2 GiB, which is not sufficient to cover the performance of common accelerated ciphers such as AES-NI when benchmarked with sec=1. So switch to u64 instead. While at it, fix up a missing printk->pr_cont conversion in the AEAD benchmark. Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: ecdh_helper - Ensure 'len >= secret.len' in decode_key()Daniele Alessandrelli2021-03-041-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit a53ab94eb6850c3657392e2d2ce9b38c387a2633 ] The length ('len' parameter) passed to crypto_ecdh_decode_key() is never checked against the length encoded in the passed buffer ('buf' parameter). This could lead to an out-of-bounds access when the passed length is less than the encoded length. Add a check to prevent that. Fixes: 3c4b23901a0c7 ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support") Signed-off-by: Daniele Alessandrelli <daniele.alessandrelli@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: asym_tpm: correct zero out potential secretsGreg Kroah-Hartman2021-01-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f93274ef0fe972c120c96b3207f8fce376231a60 upstream. The function derive_pub_key() should be calling memzero_explicit() instead of memset() in case the complier decides to optimize away the call to memset() because it "knows" no one is going to touch the memory anymore. Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> Reported-by: Ilil Blum Shem-Tov <ilil.blum.shem-tov@intel.com> Tested-by: Ilil Blum Shem-Tov <ilil.blum.shem-tov@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/X8ns4AfwjKudpyfe@kroah.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: ecdh - avoid buffer overflow in ecdh_set_secret()Ard Biesheuvel2021-01-121-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0aa171e9b267ce7c52d3a3df7bc9c1fc0203dec5 upstream. Pavel reports that commit 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()") fixes one problem but introduces another: the unconditional memcpy() introduced by that commit may overflow the target buffer if the source data is invalid, which could be the result of intentional tampering. So check params.key_size explicitly against the size of the target buffer before validating the key further. Fixes: 17858b140bf4 ("crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()") Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: ecdh - avoid unaligned accesses in ecdh_set_secret()Ard Biesheuvel2020-12-301-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 17858b140bf49961b71d4e73f1c3ea9bc8e7dda0 upstream. ecdh_set_secret() casts a void* pointer to a const u64* in order to feed it into ecc_is_key_valid(). This is not generally permitted by the C standard, and leads to actual misalignment faults on ARMv6 cores. In some cases, these are fixed up in software, but this still leads to performance hits that are entirely avoidable. So let's copy the key into the ctx buffer first, which we will do anyway in the common case, and which guarantees correct alignment. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: af_alg - avoid undefined behavior accessing salg_nameEric Biggers2020-12-301-3/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 92eb6c3060ebe3adf381fd9899451c5b047bb14d upstream. Commit 3f69cc60768b ("crypto: af_alg - Allow arbitrarily long algorithm names") made the kernel start accepting arbitrarily long algorithm names in sockaddr_alg. However, the actual length of the salg_name field stayed at the original 64 bytes. This is broken because the kernel can access indices >= 64 in salg_name, which is undefined behavior -- even though the memory that is accessed is still located within the sockaddr structure. It would only be defined behavior if the array were properly marked as arbitrary-length (either by making it a flexible array, which is the recommended way these days, or by making it an array of length 0 or 1). We can't simply change salg_name into a flexible array, since that would break source compatibility with userspace programs that embed sockaddr_alg into another struct, or (more commonly) declare a sockaddr_alg like 'struct sockaddr_alg sa = { .salg_name = "foo" };'. One solution would be to change salg_name into a flexible array only when '#ifdef __KERNEL__'. However, that would keep userspace without an easy way to actually use the longer algorithm names. Instead, add a new structure 'sockaddr_alg_new' that has the flexible array field, and expose it to both userspace and the kernel. Make the kernel use it correctly in alg_bind(). This addresses the syzbot report "UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in alg_bind" (https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=92ead4eb8e26a26d465e). Reported-by: syzbot+92ead4eb8e26a26d465e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 3f69cc60768b ("crypto: af_alg - Allow arbitrarily long algorithm names") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.12+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: algif_skcipher - EBUSY on aio should be an errorHerbert Xu2020-10-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 2a05b029c1ee045b886ebf9efef9985ca23450de ] I removed the MAY_BACKLOG flag on the aio path a while ago but the error check still incorrectly interpreted EBUSY as success. This may cause the submitter to wait for a request that will never complete. Fixes: dad419970637 ("crypto: algif_skcipher - Do not set...") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: algif_aead - Do not set MAY_BACKLOG on the async pathHerbert Xu2020-10-291-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit cbdad1f246dd98e6c9c32a6e5212337f542aa7e0 upstream. The async path cannot use MAY_BACKLOG because it is not meant to block, which is what MAY_BACKLOG does. On the other hand, both the sync and async paths can make use of MAY_SLEEP. Fixes: 83094e5e9e49 ("crypto: af_alg - add async support to...") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: af_alg - Work around empty control messages without MSG_MOREHerbert Xu2020-09-031-3/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c195d66a8a75c60515819b101975f38b7ec6577f upstream. The iwd daemon uses libell which sets up the skcipher operation with two separate control messages. As the first control message is sent without MSG_MORE, it is interpreted as an empty request. While libell should be fixed to use MSG_MORE where appropriate, this patch works around the bug in the kernel so that existing binaries continue to work. We will print a warning however. A separate issue is that the new kernel code no longer allows the control message to be sent twice within the same request. This restriction is obviously incompatible with what iwd was doing (first setting an IV and then sending the real control message). This patch changes the kernel so that this is explicitly allowed. Reported-by: Caleb Jorden <caljorden@hotmail.com> Fixes: f3c802a1f300 ("crypto: algif_aead - Only wake up when...") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: algif_aead - fix uninitialized ctx->initOndrej Mosnacek2020-08-212-12/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 21dfbcd1f5cbff9cf2f9e7e43475aed8d072b0dd ] In skcipher_accept_parent_nokey() the whole af_alg_ctx structure is cleared by memset() after allocation, so add such memset() also to aead_accept_parent_nokey() so that the new "init" field is also initialized to zero. Without that the initial ctx->init checks might randomly return true and cause errors. While there, also remove the redundant zero assignments in both functions. Found via libkcapi testsuite. Cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Fixes: f3c802a1f300 ("crypto: algif_aead - Only wake up when ctx->more is zero") Suggested-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: af_alg - Fix regression on empty requestsHerbert Xu2020-08-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 662bb52f50bca16a74fe92b487a14d7dccb85e1a ] Some user-space programs rely on crypto requests that have no control metadata. This broke when a check was added to require the presence of control metadata with the ctx->init flag. This patch fixes the regression by setting ctx->init as long as one sendmsg(2) has been made, with or without a control message. Reported-by: Sachin Sant <sachinp@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reported-by: Naresh Kamboju <naresh.kamboju@linaro.org> Fixes: f3c802a1f300 ("crypto: algif_aead - Only wake up when...") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: algif_aead - Only wake up when ctx->more is zeroHerbert Xu2020-08-213-7/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit f3c802a1f30013f8f723b62d7fa49eb9e991da23 ] AEAD does not support partial requests so we must not wake up while ctx->more is set. In order to distinguish between the case of no data sent yet and a zero-length request, a new init flag has been added to ctx. SKCIPHER has also been modified to ensure that at least a block of data is available if there is more data to come. Fixes: 2d97591ef43d ("crypto: af_alg - consolidation of...") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* keys: asymmetric: fix error return code in software_key_query()Wei Yongjun2020-07-221-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 6cbba1f9114a8134cff9138c79add15012fd52b9 ] Fix to return negative error code -ENOMEM from kmalloc() error handling case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function. Fixes: f1774cb8956a ("X.509: parse public key parameters from x509 for akcipher") Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* crypto: af_alg - fix use-after-free in af_alg_accept() due to bh_lock_sock()Herbert Xu2020-07-094-33/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 34c86f4c4a7be3b3e35aa48bd18299d4c756064d upstream. The locking in af_alg_release_parent is broken as the BH socket lock can only be taken if there is a code-path to handle the case where the lock is owned by process-context. Instead of adding such handling, we can fix this by changing the ref counts to atomic_t. This patch also modifies the main refcnt to include both normal and nokey sockets. This way we don't have to fudge the nokey ref count when a socket changes from nokey to normal. Credits go to Mauricio Faria de Oliveira who diagnosed this bug and sent a patch for it: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/20200605161657.535043-1-mfo@canonical.com/ Reported-by: Brian Moyles <bmoyles@netflix.com> Reported-by: Mauricio Faria de Oliveira <mfo@canonical.com> Fixes: 37f96694cf73 ("crypto: af_alg - Use bh_lock_sock in...") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: algboss - don't wait during notifier callbackEric Biggers2020-06-241-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 77251e41f89a813b4090f5199442f217bbf11297 upstream. When a crypto template needs to be instantiated, CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_REQUEST is sent to crypto_chain. cryptomgr_schedule_probe() handles this by starting a thread to instantiate the template, then waiting for this thread to complete via crypto_larval::completion. This can deadlock because instantiating the template may require loading modules, and this (apparently depending on userspace) may need to wait for the crc-t10dif module (lib/crc-t10dif.c) to be loaded. But crc-t10dif's module_init function uses crypto_register_notifier() and therefore takes crypto_chain.rwsem for write. That can't proceed until the notifier callback has finished, as it holds this semaphore for read. Fix this by removing the wait on crypto_larval::completion from within cryptomgr_schedule_probe(). It's actually unnecessary because crypto_alg_mod_lookup() calls crypto_larval_wait() itself after sending CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_REQUEST. This only actually became a problem in v4.20 due to commit b76377543b73 ("crc-t10dif: Pick better transform if one becomes available"), but the unnecessary wait was much older. BugLink: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=207159 Reported-by: Mike Gerow <gerow@google.com> Fixes: 398710379f51 ("crypto: algapi - Move larval completion into algboss") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.6+ Cc: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reported-by: Kai Lüke <kai@kinvolk.io> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: algif_skcipher - Cap recv SG list at ctx->usedHerbert Xu2020-06-241-5/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 7cf81954705b7e5b057f7dc39a7ded54422ab6e1 upstream. Somewhere along the line the cap on the SG list length for receive was lost. This patch restores it and removes the subsequent test which is now redundant. Fixes: 2d97591ef43d ("crypto: af_alg - consolidation of...") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: drbg - fix error return code in drbg_alloc_state()Wei Yongjun2020-06-171-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e0664ebcea6ac5e16da703409fb4bd61f8cd37d9 upstream. Fix to return negative error code -ENOMEM from the kzalloc error handling case instead of 0, as done elsewhere in this function. Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com> Fixes: db07cd26ac6a ("crypto: drbg - add FIPS 140-2 CTRNG for noise source") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <weiyongjun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: algapi - Avoid spurious modprobe on LOADEDEric Biggers2020-06-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit beeb460cd12ac9b91640b484b6a52dcba9d9fc8f upstream. Currently after any algorithm is registered and tested, there's an unnecessary request_module("cryptomgr") even if it's already loaded. Also, CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_LOADED is sent twice, and thus if the algorithm is "crct10dif", lib/crc-t10dif.c replaces the tfm twice rather than once. This occurs because CRYPTO_MSG_ALG_LOADED is sent using crypto_probing_notify(), which tries to load "cryptomgr" if the notification is not handled (NOTIFY_DONE). This doesn't make sense because "cryptomgr" doesn't handle this notification. Fix this by using crypto_notify() instead of crypto_probing_notify(). Fixes: dd8b083f9a5e ("crypto: api - Introduce notifier for new crypto algorithms") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.20+ Cc: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* gcc-10: avoid shadowing standard library 'free()' in cryptoLinus Torvalds2020-05-202-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 1a263ae60b04de959d9ce9caea4889385eefcc7b upstream. gcc-10 has started warning about conflicting types for a few new built-in functions, particularly 'free()'. This results in warnings like: crypto/xts.c:325:13: warning: conflicting types for built-in function ‘free’; expected ‘void(void *)’ [-Wbuiltin-declaration-mismatch] because the crypto layer had its local freeing functions called 'free()'. Gcc-10 is in the wrong here, since that function is marked 'static', and thus there is no chance of confusion with any standard library function namespace. But the simplest thing to do is to just use a different name here, and avoid this gcc mis-feature. [ Side note: gcc knowing about 'free()' is in itself not the mis-feature: the semantics of 'free()' are special enough that a compiler can validly do special things when seeing it. So the mis-feature here is that gcc thinks that 'free()' is some restricted name, and you can't shadow it as a local static function. Making the special 'free()' semantics be a function attribute rather than tied to the name would be the much better model ] Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* crypto: rng - Fix a refcounting bug in crypto_rng_reset()Dan Carpenter2020-04-171-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit eed74b3eba9eda36d155c11a12b2b4b50c67c1d8 upstream. We need to decrement this refcounter on these error paths. Fixes: f7d76e05d058 ("crypto: user - fix use_after_free of struct xxx_request") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>