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* Merge tag 'v6.7-p2' of ↵Linus Torvalds2023-11-092-3/+26
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto fixes from Herbert Xu: "This fixes a regression in ahash and hides the Kconfig sub-options for the jitter RNG" * tag 'v6.7-p2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: crypto: ahash - Set using_shash for cloned ahash wrapper over shash crypto: jitterentropy - Hide esoteric Kconfig options under FIPS and EXPERT
| * crypto: ahash - Set using_shash for cloned ahash wrapper over shashDmitry Safonov2023-11-071-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The cloned child of ahash that uses shash under the hood should use shash helpers (like crypto_shash_setkey()). The following panic may be observed on TCP-AO selftests: > ================================================================== > BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in crypto_mod_get+0x1b/0x60 > Write of size 4 at addr 5d5be0ff5c415e14 by task connect_ipv4/1397 > > CPU: 0 PID: 1397 Comm: connect_ipv4 Tainted: G W 6.6.0+ #47 > Call Trace: > <TASK> > dump_stack_lvl+0x46/0x70 > kasan_report+0xc3/0xf0 > kasan_check_range+0xec/0x190 > crypto_mod_get+0x1b/0x60 > crypto_spawn_alg+0x53/0x140 > crypto_spawn_tfm2+0x13/0x60 > hmac_init_tfm+0x25/0x60 > crypto_ahash_setkey+0x8b/0x100 > tcp_ao_add_cmd+0xe7a/0x1120 > do_tcp_setsockopt+0x5ed/0x12a0 > do_sock_setsockopt+0x82/0x100 > __sys_setsockopt+0xe9/0x160 > __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x60/0x70 > do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xe0 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e > ================================================================== > general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x5d5be0ff5c415e14: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN > CPU: 0 PID: 1397 Comm: connect_ipv4 Tainted: G B W 6.6.0+ #47 > Call Trace: > <TASK> > ? die_addr+0x3c/0xa0 > ? exc_general_protection+0x144/0x210 > ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x22/0x30 > ? add_taint+0x26/0x90 > ? crypto_mod_get+0x20/0x60 > ? crypto_mod_get+0x1b/0x60 > ? ahash_def_finup_done1+0x58/0x80 > crypto_spawn_alg+0x53/0x140 > crypto_spawn_tfm2+0x13/0x60 > hmac_init_tfm+0x25/0x60 > crypto_ahash_setkey+0x8b/0x100 > tcp_ao_add_cmd+0xe7a/0x1120 > do_tcp_setsockopt+0x5ed/0x12a0 > do_sock_setsockopt+0x82/0x100 > __sys_setsockopt+0xe9/0x160 > __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x60/0x70 > do_syscall_64+0x3c/0xe0 > entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0x4e > </TASK> > RIP: 0010:crypto_mod_get+0x20/0x60 Make sure that the child/clone has using_shash set when parent is an shash user. Fixes: 2f1f34c1bf7b ("crypto: ahash - optimize performance when wrapping shash") Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri05@gmail.com> To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Cc: Salam Noureddine <noureddine@arista.com> Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <dima@arista.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: jitterentropy - Hide esoteric Kconfig options under FIPS and EXPERTHerbert Xu2023-11-071-3/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As JITTERENTROPY is selected by default if you enable the CRYPTO API, any Kconfig options added there will show up for every single user. Hide the esoteric options under EXPERT as well as FIPS so that only distro makers will see them. Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* | Merge tag 'v6.7-p1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2023-11-0257-1349/+1981
|\| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "API: - Add virtual-address based lskcipher interface - Optimise ahash/shash performance in light of costly indirect calls - Remove ahash alignmask attribute Algorithms: - Improve AES/XTS performance of 6-way unrolling for ppc - Remove some uses of obsolete algorithms (md4, md5, sha1) - Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support in pkcs1pad - Add fast path for single-page messages in adiantum - Remove zlib-deflate Drivers: - Add support for S4 in meson RNG driver - Add STM32MP13x support in stm32 - Add hwrng interface support in qcom-rng - Add support for deflate algorithm in hisilicon/zip" * tag 'v6.7-p1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (283 commits) crypto: adiantum - flush destination page before unmapping crypto: testmgr - move pkcs1pad(rsa,sha3-*) to correct place Documentation/module-signing.txt: bring up to date module: enable automatic module signing with FIPS 202 SHA-3 crypto: asymmetric_keys - allow FIPS 202 SHA-3 signatures crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support crypto: FIPS 202 SHA-3 register in hash info for IMA x509: Add OIDs for FIPS 202 SHA-3 hash and signatures crypto: ahash - optimize performance when wrapping shash crypto: ahash - check for shash type instead of not ahash type crypto: hash - move "ahash wrapping shash" functions to ahash.c crypto: talitos - stop using crypto_ahash::init crypto: chelsio - stop using crypto_ahash::init crypto: ahash - improve file comment crypto: ahash - remove struct ahash_request_priv crypto: ahash - remove crypto_ahash_alignmask crypto: gcm - stop using alignmask of ahash crypto: chacha20poly1305 - stop using alignmask of ahash crypto: ccm - stop using alignmask of ahash net: ipv6: stop checking crypto_ahash_alignmask ...
| * crypto: adiantum - flush destination page before unmappingEric Biggers2023-11-011-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Upon additional review, the new fast path in adiantum_finish() is missing the call to flush_dcache_page() that scatterwalk_map_and_copy() was doing. It's apparently debatable whether flush_dcache_page() is actually needed, as per the discussion at https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/YYP1lAq46NWzhOf0@casper.infradead.org/T/#u. However, it appears that currently all the helper functions that write to a page, such as scatterwalk_map_and_copy(), memcpy_to_page(), and memzero_page(), do the dcache flush. So do it to be consistent. Fixes: dadf5e56c967 ("crypto: adiantum - add fast path for single-page messages") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: testmgr - move pkcs1pad(rsa,sha3-*) to correct placeEric Biggers2023-11-011-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | alg_test_descs[] needs to be in sorted order, since it is used for binary search. This fixes the following boot-time warning: testmgr: alg_test_descs entries in wrong order: 'pkcs1pad(rsa,sha512)' before 'pkcs1pad(rsa,sha3-256)' Fixes: ee62afb9d02d ("crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 support") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: asymmetric_keys - allow FIPS 202 SHA-3 signaturesDimitri John Ledkov2023-10-274-1/+49
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 hash signature support in x509 certificates, pkcs7 signatures, and authenticode signatures. Supports hashes of size 256 and up, as 224 is too weak for any practical purposes. Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - Add FIPS 202 SHA-3 supportDimitri John Ledkov2023-10-272-1/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support in rsa-pkcs1pad for FIPS 202 SHA-3 hashes, sizes 256 and up. As 224 is too weak for any practical purposes. Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: FIPS 202 SHA-3 register in hash info for IMADimitri John Ledkov2023-10-271-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Register FIPS 202 SHA-3 hashes in hash info for IMA and other users. Sizes 256 and up, as 224 is too weak for any practical purposes. Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: ahash - optimize performance when wrapping shashEric Biggers2023-10-273-141/+162
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The "ahash" API provides access to both CPU-based and hardware offload- based implementations of hash algorithms. Typically the former are implemented as "shash" algorithms under the hood, while the latter are implemented as "ahash" algorithms. The "ahash" API provides access to both. Various kernel subsystems use the ahash API because they want to support hashing hardware offload without using a separate API for it. Yet, the common case is that a crypto accelerator is not actually being used, and ahash is just wrapping a CPU-based shash algorithm. This patch optimizes the ahash API for that common case by eliminating the extra indirect call for each ahash operation on top of shash. It also fixes the double-counting of crypto stats in this scenario (though CONFIG_CRYPTO_STATS should *not* be enabled by anyone interested in performance anyway...), and it eliminates redundant checking of CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY. As a bonus, it also shrinks struct crypto_ahash. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: ahash - check for shash type instead of not ahash typeEric Biggers2023-10-271-5/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since the previous patch made crypto_shash_type visible to ahash.c, change checks for '->cra_type != &crypto_ahash_type' to '->cra_type == &crypto_shash_type'. This makes more sense and avoids having to forward-declare crypto_ahash_type. The result is still the same, since the type is either shash or ahash here. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: hash - move "ahash wrapping shash" functions to ahash.cEric Biggers2023-10-273-191/+188
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The functions that are involved in implementing the ahash API on top of an shash algorithm belong better in ahash.c, not in shash.c where they currently are. Move them. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: ahash - improve file commentEric Biggers2023-10-271-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Improve the file comment for crypto/ahash.c. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: ahash - remove struct ahash_request_privEric Biggers2023-10-271-8/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | struct ahash_request_priv is unused, so remove it. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: gcm - stop using alignmask of ahashEric Biggers2023-10-271-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the alignmask for ahash and shash algorithms is always 0, simplify crypto_gcm_create_common() accordingly. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: chacha20poly1305 - stop using alignmask of ahashEric Biggers2023-10-271-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the alignmask for ahash and shash algorithms is always 0, simplify chachapoly_create() accordingly. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: ccm - stop using alignmask of ahashEric Biggers2023-10-271-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the alignmask for ahash and shash algorithms is always 0, simplify crypto_ccm_create_common() accordingly. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: testmgr - stop checking crypto_ahash_alignmaskEric Biggers2023-10-271-6/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the alignmask for ahash and shash algorithms is always 0, crypto_ahash_alignmask() always returns 0 and will be removed. In preparation for this, stop checking crypto_ahash_alignmask() in testmgr. As a result of this change, test_sg_division::offset_relative_to_alignmask and testvec_config::key_offset_relative_to_alignmask no longer have any effect on ahash (or shash) algorithms. Therefore, also stop setting these flags in default_hash_testvec_configs[]. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: authencesn - stop using alignmask of ahashEric Biggers2023-10-271-14/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the alignmask for ahash and shash algorithms is always 0, simplify the code in authenc accordingly. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: authenc - stop using alignmask of ahashEric Biggers2023-10-271-10/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the alignmask for ahash and shash algorithms is always 0, simplify the code in authenc accordingly. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: ahash - remove support for nonzero alignmaskEric Biggers2023-10-272-113/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, the ahash API checks the alignment of all key and result buffers against the algorithm's declared alignmask, and for any unaligned buffers it falls back to manually aligned temporary buffers. This is virtually useless, however. First, since it does not apply to the message, its effect is much more limited than e.g. is the case for the alignmask for "skcipher". Second, the key and result buffers are given as virtual addresses and cannot (in general) be DMA'ed into, so drivers end up having to copy to/from them in software anyway. As a result it's easy to use memcpy() or the unaligned access helpers. The crypto_hash_walk_*() helper functions do use the alignmask to align the message. But with one exception those are only used for shash algorithms being exposed via the ahash API, not for native ahashes, and aligning the message is not required in this case, especially now that alignmask support has been removed from shash. The exception is the n2_core driver, which doesn't set an alignmask. In any case, no ahash algorithms actually set a nonzero alignmask anymore. Therefore, remove support for it from ahash. The benefit is that all the code to handle "misaligned" buffers in the ahash API goes away, reducing the overhead of the ahash API. This follows the same change that was made to shash. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * treewide: Add SPDX identifier to IETF ASN.1 modulesLukas Wunner2023-10-276-0/+39
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Per section 4.c. of the IETF Trust Legal Provisions, "Code Components" in IETF Documents are licensed on the terms of the BSD-3-Clause license: https://trustee.ietf.org/documents/trust-legal-provisions/tlp-5/ The term "Code Components" specifically includes ASN.1 modules: https://trustee.ietf.org/documents/trust-legal-provisions/code-components-list-3/ Add an SPDX identifier as well as a copyright notice pursuant to section 6.d. of the Trust Legal Provisions to all ASN.1 modules in the tree which are derived from IETF Documents. Section 4.d. of the Trust Legal Provisions requests that each Code Component identify the RFC from which it is taken, so link that RFC in every ASN.1 module. Signed-off-by: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: jitter - use permanent health test storageStephan Müller2023-10-271-51/+74
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The health test result in the current code is only given for the currently processed raw time stamp. This implies to react on the health test error, the result must be checked after each raw time stamp being processed. To avoid this constant checking requirement, any health test error is recorded and stored to be analyzed at a later time, if needed. This change ensures that the power-up test catches any health test error. Without that patch, the power-up health test result is not enforced. The introduced changes are already in use with the user space version of the Jitter RNG. Fixes: 04597c8dd6c4 ("jitter - add RCT/APT support for different OSRs") Reported-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: hctr2 - stop using alignmask of shash_algEric Biggers2023-10-271-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the shash algorithm type does not support nonzero alignmasks, shash_alg::base.cra_alignmask is always 0, so OR-ing it into another value is a no-op. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: adiantum - stop using alignmask of shash_algEric Biggers2023-10-271-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the shash algorithm type does not support nonzero alignmasks, shash_alg::base.cra_alignmask is always 0, so OR-ing it into another value is a no-op. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: testmgr - stop checking crypto_shash_alignmaskEric Biggers2023-10-271-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the shash algorithm type does not support nonzero alignmasks, crypto_shash_alignmask() always returns 0 and will be removed. In preparation for this, stop checking crypto_shash_alignmask() in testmgr. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: drbg - stop checking crypto_shash_alignmaskEric Biggers2023-10-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that the shash algorithm type does not support nonzero alignmasks, crypto_shash_alignmask() always returns 0 and will be removed. In preparation for this, stop checking crypto_shash_alignmask() in drbg. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: shash - remove support for nonzero alignmaskEric Biggers2023-10-271-120/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, the shash API checks the alignment of all message, key, and digest buffers against the algorithm's declared alignmask, and for any unaligned buffers it falls back to manually aligned temporary buffers. This is virtually useless, however. In the case of the message buffer, cryptographic hash functions internally operate on fixed-size blocks, so implementations end up needing to deal with byte-aligned data anyway because the length(s) passed to ->update might not be divisible by the block size. Word-alignment of the message can theoretically be helpful for CRCs, like what was being done in crc32c-sparc64. But in practice it's better for the algorithms to use unaligned accesses or align the message themselves. A similar argument applies to the key and digest. In any case, no shash algorithms actually set a nonzero alignmask anymore. Therefore, remove support for it from shash. The benefit is that all the code to handle "misaligned" buffers in the shash API goes away, reducing the overhead of the shash API. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: xcbc - remove unnecessary alignment logicEric Biggers2023-10-271-22/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The xcbc template is setting its alignmask to that of its underlying 'cipher'. Yet, it doesn't care itself about how its inputs and outputs are aligned, which is ostensibly the point of the alignmask. Instead, xcbc actually just uses its alignmask itself to runtime-align certain fields in its tfm and desc contexts appropriately for its underlying cipher. That is almost entirely pointless too, though, since xcbc is already using the cipher API functions that handle alignment themselves, and few ciphers set a nonzero alignmask anyway. Also, even without runtime alignment, an alignment of at least 4 bytes can be guaranteed. Thus, at best this code is optimizing for the rare case of ciphers that set an alignmask >= 7, at the cost of hurting the common cases. Therefore, this patch removes the manual alignment code from xcbc and makes it stop setting an alignmask. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: vmac - don't set alignmaskEric Biggers2023-10-271-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The vmac template is setting its alignmask to that of its underlying 'cipher'. This doesn't actually accomplish anything useful, though, so stop doing it. (vmac_update() does have an alignment bug, where it assumes u64 alignment when it shouldn't, but that bug exists both before and after this patch.) This is a prerequisite for removing support for nonzero alignmasks from shash. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: hmac - remove unnecessary alignment logicEric Biggers2023-10-271-34/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The hmac template is setting its alignmask to that of its underlying unkeyed hash algorithm, and it is aligning the ipad and opad fields in its tfm context to that alignment. However, hmac does not actually need any sort of alignment itself, which makes this pointless except to keep the pads aligned to what the underlying algorithm prefers. But very few shash algorithms actually set an alignmask, and it is being removed from those remaining ones; also, after setkey, the pads are only passed to crypto_shash_import and crypto_shash_export which ignore the alignmask. Therefore, make the hmac template stop setting an alignmask and simply use natural alignment for ipad and opad. Note, this change also moves the pads from the beginning of the tfm context to the end, which makes much more sense; the variable-length fields should be at the end. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: cmac - remove unnecessary alignment logicEric Biggers2023-10-271-28/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The cmac template is setting its alignmask to that of its underlying 'cipher'. Yet, it doesn't care itself about how its inputs and outputs are aligned, which is ostensibly the point of the alignmask. Instead, cmac actually just uses its alignmask itself to runtime-align certain fields in its tfm and desc contexts appropriately for its underlying cipher. That is almost entirely pointless too, though, since cmac is already using the cipher API functions that handle alignment themselves, and few ciphers set a nonzero alignmask anyway. Also, even without runtime alignment, an alignment of at least 4 bytes can be guaranteed. Thus, at best this code is optimizing for the rare case of ciphers that set an alignmask >= 7, at the cost of hurting the common cases. Therefore, this patch removes the manual alignment code from cmac and makes it stop setting an alignmask. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: cbcmac - remove unnecessary alignment logicEric Biggers2023-10-271-10/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The cbcmac template is aligning a field in its desc context to the alignmask of its underlying 'cipher', at runtime. This is almost entirely pointless, since cbcmac is already using the cipher API functions that handle alignment themselves, and few ciphers set a nonzero alignmask anyway. Also, even without runtime alignment, an alignment of at least 4 bytes can be guaranteed. Thus, at best this code is optimizing for the rare case of ciphers that set an alignmask >= 7, at the cost of hurting the common cases. Therefore, remove the manual alignment code from cbcmac. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: shash - eliminate indirect call for default import and exportEric Biggers2023-10-271-8/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Most shash algorithms don't have custom ->import and ->export functions, resulting in the memcpy() based default being used. Yet, crypto_shash_import() and crypto_shash_export() still make an indirect call, which is expensive. Therefore, change how the default import and export are called to make it so that crypto_shash_import() and crypto_shash_export() don't do an indirect call in this case. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: rsa - Add module alias for pkcs1padHerbert Xu2023-10-271-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a module alias for pkcs1pas so that it can be auto-loaded by modprobe. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * certs: Break circular dependency when selftest is modularHerbert Xu2023-10-275-21/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The modular build fails because the self-test code depends on pkcs7 which in turn depends on x509 which contains the self-test. Split the self-test out into its own module to break the cycle. Fixes: 3cde3174eb91 ("certs: Add FIPS selftests") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: skcipher - fix weak key check for lskciphersEric Biggers2023-10-203-11/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When an algorithm of the new "lskcipher" type is exposed through the "skcipher" API, calls to crypto_skcipher_setkey() don't pass on the CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS flag to the lskcipher. This causes self-test failures for ecb(des), as weak keys are not rejected anymore. Fix this. Fixes: 31865c4c4db2 ("crypto: skcipher - Add lskcipher") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: lskcipher - Return EINVAL when ecb_name fails sanity checksHerbert Xu2023-10-201-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Set the error value to -EINVAL instead of zero when the underlying name (within "ecb()") fails basic sanity checks. Fixes: 8aee5d4ebd11 ("crypto: lskcipher - Add compatibility wrapper around ECB") Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/202310111323.ZjK7bzjw-lkp@intel.com/ Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: mscode_parser - remove sha224 authenticode supportDimitri John Ledkov2023-10-201-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It is possible to stand up own certificates and sign PE-COFF binaries using SHA-224. However it never became popular or needed since it has similar costs as SHA-256. Windows Authenticode infrastructure never had support for SHA-224, and all secureboot keys used fro linux vmlinuz have always been using at least SHA-256. Given the point of mscode_parser is to support interoperatiblity with typical de-facto hashes, remove support for SHA-224 to avoid posibility of creating interoperatibility issues with rhboot/shim, grub, and non-linux systems trying to sign or verify vmlinux. SHA-224 itself is not removed from the kernel, as it is truncated SHA-256. If requested I can write patches to remove SHA-224 support across all of the drivers. Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: pkcs7 - remove sha1 supportDimitri John Ledkov2023-10-206-98/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Removes support for sha1 signed kernel modules, importing sha1 signed x.509 certificates. rsa-pkcs1pad keeps sha1 padding support, which seems to be used by virtio driver. sha1 remains available as there are many drivers and subsystems using it. Note only hmac(sha1) with secret keys remains cryptographically secure. In the kernel there are filesystems, IMA, tpm/pcr that appear to be using sha1. Maybe they can all start to be slowly upgraded to something else i.e. blake3, ParallelHash, SHAKE256 as needed. Signed-off-by: Dimitri John Ledkov <dimitri.ledkov@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: adiantum - add fast path for single-page messagesEric Biggers2023-10-201-18/+47
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the source scatterlist is a single page, optimize the first hash step of adiantum to use crypto_shash_digest() instead of init/update/final, and use the same local kmap for both hashing the bulk part and loading the narrow part of the source data. Likewise, when the destination scatterlist is a single page, optimize the second hash step of adiantum to use crypto_shash_digest() instead of init/update/final, and use the same local kmap for both hashing the bulk part and storing the narrow part of the destination data. In some cases these optimizations improve performance significantly. Note: ideally, for optimal performance each architecture should implement the full "adiantum(xchacha12,aes)" algorithm and fully optimize the contiguous buffer case to use no indirect calls. That's not something I've gotten around to doing, though. This commit just makes a relatively small change that provides some benefit with the existing template-based approach. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: shash - fold shash_digest_unaligned() into crypto_shash_digest()Eric Biggers2023-10-201-9/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fold shash_digest_unaligned() into its only remaining caller. Also, avoid a redundant check of CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY by replacing the call to crypto_shash_init() with shash->init(desc). Finally, replace shash_update_unaligned() + shash_final_unaligned() with shash_finup_unaligned() which does exactly that. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: shash - optimize the default digest and finupEric Biggers2023-10-201-2/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For an shash algorithm that doesn't implement ->digest, currently crypto_shash_digest() with aligned input makes 5 indirect calls: 1 to shash_digest_unaligned(), 1 to ->init, 2 to ->update ('alignmask + 1' bytes, then the rest), then 1 to ->final. This is true even if the algorithm implements ->finup. This is caused by an unnecessary fallback to code meant to handle unaligned inputs. In fact, crypto_shash_digest() already does the needed alignment check earlier. Therefore, optimize the number of indirect calls for aligned inputs to 3 when the algorithm implements ->finup. It remains at 5 when the algorithm implements neither ->finup nor ->digest. Similarly, for an shash algorithm that doesn't implement ->finup, currently crypto_shash_finup() with aligned input makes 4 indirect calls: 1 to shash_finup_unaligned(), 2 to ->update, and 1 to ->final. Optimize this to 3 calls. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: xts - use 'spawn' for underlying single-block cipherEric Biggers2023-10-201-8/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since commit adad556efcdd ("crypto: api - Fix built-in testing dependency failures"), the following warning appears when booting an x86_64 kernel that is configured with CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_EXTRA_TESTS=y and CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_NI_INTEL=y, even when CONFIG_CRYPTO_XTS=y and CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES=y: alg: skcipher: skipping comparison tests for xts-aes-aesni because xts(ecb(aes-generic)) is unavailable This is caused by an issue in the xts template where it allocates an "aes" single-block cipher without declaring a dependency on it via the crypto_spawn mechanism. This issue was exposed by the above commit because it reversed the order that the algorithms are tested in. Specifically, when "xts(ecb(aes-generic))" is instantiated and tested during the comparison tests for "xts-aes-aesni", the "xts" template allocates an "aes" crypto_cipher for encrypting tweaks. This resolves to "aes-aesni". (Getting "aes-aesni" instead of "aes-generic" here is a bit weird, but it's apparently intended.) Due to the above-mentioned commit, the testing of "aes-aesni", and the finalization of its registration, now happens at this point instead of before. At the end of that, crypto_remove_spawns() unregisters all algorithm instances that depend on a lower-priority "aes" implementation such as "aes-generic" but that do not depend on "aes-aesni". However, because "xts" does not use the crypto_spawn mechanism for its "aes", its dependency on "aes-aesni" is not recognized by crypto_remove_spawns(). Thus, crypto_remove_spawns() unexpectedly unregisters "xts(ecb(aes-generic))". Fix this issue by making the "xts" template use the crypto_spawn mechanism for its "aes" dependency, like what other templates do. Note, this fix could be applied as far back as commit f1c131b45410 ("crypto: xts - Convert to skcipher"). However, the issue only got exposed by the much more recent changes to how the crypto API runs the self-tests, so there should be no need to backport this to very old kernels. Also, an alternative fix would be to flip the list iteration order in crypto_start_tests() to restore the original testing order. I'm thinking we should do that too, since the original order seems more natural, but it shouldn't be relied on for correctness. Fixes: adad556efcdd ("crypto: api - Fix built-in testing dependency failures") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: jitter - reuse allocated entropy collectorStephan Müller2023-10-133-12/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In case a health test error occurs during runtime, the power-up health tests are rerun to verify that the noise source is still good and that the reported health test error was an outlier. For performing this power-up health test, the already existing entropy collector instance is used instead of allocating a new one. This change has the following implications: * The noise that is collected as part of the newly run health tests is inserted into the entropy collector and thus stirs the existing data present in there further. Thus, the entropy collected during the health test is not wasted. This is also allowed by SP800-90B. * The power-on health test is not affected by the state of the entropy collector, because it resets the APT / RCT state. The remainder of the state is unrelated to the health test as it is only applied to newly obtained time stamps. This change also fixes a bug report about an allocation while in an atomic lock (the lock is taken in jent_kcapi_random, jent_read_entropy is called and this can call jent_entropy_init). Fixes: 04597c8dd6c4 ("jitter - add RCT/APT support for different OSRs") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: xts - Only access common skcipher fields on spawnHerbert Xu2023-10-131-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As skcipher spawns may be of the type lskcipher, only the common fields may be accessed. This was already the case but use the correct helpers to make this more obvious. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: lrw - Only access common skcipher fields on spawnHerbert Xu2023-10-131-7/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As skcipher spawns may be of the type lskcipher, only the common fields may be accessed. This was already the case but use the correct helpers to make this more obvious. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: hctr2 - Only access common skcipher fields on spawnHerbert Xu2023-10-131-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As skcipher spawns may be of the type lskcipher, only the common fields may be accessed. This was already the case but use the correct helpers to make this more obvious. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: gcm - Only access common skcipher fields on spawnHerbert Xu2023-10-131-5/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As skcipher spawns may be of the type lskcipher, only the common fields may be accessed. This was already the case but use the correct helpers to make this more obvious. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
| * crypto: cts - Only access common skcipher fields on spawnHerbert Xu2023-10-131-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As skcipher spawns may be of the type lskcipher, only the common fields may be accessed. This was already the case but use the correct helpers to make this more obvious. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>