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* Merge tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscryptLinus Torvalds2019-03-094-9/+7
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull fscrypt updates from Eric Biggers: "First: Ted, Jaegeuk, and I have decided to add me as a co-maintainer for fscrypt, and we're now using a shared git tree. So we've updated MAINTAINERS accordingly, and I'm doing the pull request this time. The actual changes for v5.1 are: - Remove the fs-specific kconfig options like CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION and make fscrypt support for all fscrypt-capable filesystems be controlled by CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION, similar to how CONFIG_QUOTA works. - Improve error code for rename() and link() into encrypted directories. - Various cleanups" * tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt: MAINTAINERS: add Eric Biggers as an fscrypt maintainer fscrypt: return -EXDEV for incompatible rename or link into encrypted dir fscrypt: remove filesystem specific build config option f2fs: use IS_ENCRYPTED() to check encryption status ext4: use IS_ENCRYPTED() to check encryption status fscrypt: remove CRYPTO_CTR dependency
| * fscrypt: return -EXDEV for incompatible rename or link into encrypted dirEric Biggers2019-01-232-5/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, trying to rename or link a regular file, directory, or symlink into an encrypted directory fails with EPERM when the source file is unencrypted or is encrypted with a different encryption policy, and is on the same mountpoint. It is correct for the operation to fail, but the choice of EPERM breaks tools like 'mv' that know to copy rather than rename if they see EXDEV, but don't know what to do with EPERM. Our original motivation for EPERM was to encourage users to securely handle their data. Encrypting files by "moving" them into an encrypted directory can be insecure because the unencrypted data may remain in free space on disk, where it can later be recovered by an attacker. It's much better to encrypt the data from the start, or at least try to securely delete the source data e.g. using the 'shred' program. However, the current behavior hasn't been effective at achieving its goal because users tend to be confused, hack around it, and complain; see e.g. https://github.com/google/fscrypt/issues/76. And in some cases it's actually inconsistent or unnecessary. For example, 'mv'-ing files between differently encrypted directories doesn't work even in cases where it can be secure, such as when in userspace the same passphrase protects both directories. Yet, you *can* already 'mv' unencrypted files into an encrypted directory if the source files are on a different mountpoint, even though doing so is often insecure. There are probably better ways to teach users to securely handle their files. For example, the 'fscrypt' userspace tool could provide a command that migrates unencrypted files into an encrypted directory, acting like 'shred' on the source files and providing appropriate warnings depending on the type of the source filesystem and disk. Receiving errors on unimportant files might also force some users to disable encryption, thus making the behavior counterproductive. It's desirable to make encryption as unobtrusive as possible. Therefore, change the error code from EPERM to EXDEV so that tools looking for EXDEV will fall back to a copy. This, of course, doesn't prevent users from still doing the right things to securely manage their files. Note that this also matches the behavior when a file is renamed between two project quota hierarchies; so there's precedent for using EXDEV for things other than mountpoints. xfstests generic/398 will require an update with this change. [Rewritten from an earlier patch series by Michael Halcrow.] Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Cc: Joe Richey <joerichey@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
| * fscrypt: remove filesystem specific build config optionChandan Rajendra2019-01-232-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In order to have a common code base for fscrypt "post read" processing for all filesystems which support encryption, this commit removes filesystem specific build config option (e.g. CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION) and replaces it with a build option (i.e. CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION) whose value affects all the filesystems making use of fscrypt. Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Chandan Rajendra <chandan@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
| * fscrypt: remove CRYPTO_CTR dependencyEric Biggers2019-01-231-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | fscrypt doesn't use the CTR mode of operation for anything, so there's no need to select CRYPTO_CTR. It was added by commit 71dea01ea2ed ("ext4 crypto: require CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTR if ext4 encryption is enabled"). But, I've been unable to identify the arm64 crypto bug it was supposedly working around. I suspect the issue was seen only on some old Android device kernel (circa 3.10?). So if the fix wasn't mistaken, the real bug is probably already fixed. Or maybe it was actually a bug in a non-upstream crypto driver. So, remove the dependency. If it turns out there's actually still a bug, we'll fix it properly. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
* | Merge tag 'for-5.1/block-20190302' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-blockLinus Torvalds2019-03-081-1/+2
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull block layer updates from Jens Axboe: "Not a huge amount of changes in this round, the biggest one is that we finally have Mings multi-page bvec support merged. Apart from that, this pull request contains: - Small series that avoids quiescing the queue for sysfs changes that match what we currently have (Aleksei) - Series of bcache fixes (via Coly) - Series of lightnvm fixes (via Mathias) - NVMe pull request from Christoph. Nothing major, just SPDX/license cleanups, RR mp policy (Hannes), and little fixes (Bart, Chaitanya). - BFQ series (Paolo) - Save blk-mq cpu -> hw queue mapping, removing a pointer indirection for the fast path (Jianchao) - fops->iopoll() added for async IO polling, this is a feature that the upcoming io_uring interface will use (Christoph, me) - Partition scan loop fixes (Dongli) - mtip32xx conversion from managed resource API (Christoph) - cdrom registration race fix (Guenter) - MD pull from Song, two minor fixes. - Various documentation fixes (Marcos) - Multi-page bvec feature. This brings a lot of nice improvements with it, like more efficient splitting, larger IOs can be supported without growing the bvec table size, and so on. (Ming) - Various little fixes to core and drivers" * tag 'for-5.1/block-20190302' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: (117 commits) block: fix updating bio's front segment size block: Replace function name in string with __func__ nbd: propagate genlmsg_reply return code floppy: remove set but not used variable 'q' null_blk: fix checking for REQ_FUA block: fix NULL pointer dereference in register_disk fs: fix guard_bio_eod to check for real EOD errors blk-mq: use HCTX_TYPE_DEFAULT but not 0 to index blk_mq_tag_set->map block: optimize bvec iteration in bvec_iter_advance block: introduce mp_bvec_for_each_page() for iterating over page block: optimize blk_bio_segment_split for single-page bvec block: optimize __blk_segment_map_sg() for single-page bvec block: introduce bvec_nth_page() iomap: wire up the iopoll method block: add bio_set_polled() helper block: wire up block device iopoll method fs: add an iopoll method to struct file_operations loop: set GENHD_FL_NO_PART_SCAN after blkdev_reread_part() loop: do not print warn message if partition scan is successful block: bounce: make sure that bvec table is updated ...
| * | block: allow bio_for_each_segment_all() to iterate over multi-page bvecMing Lei2019-02-151-1/+2
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch introduces one extra iterator variable to bio_for_each_segment_all(), then we can allow bio_for_each_segment_all() to iterate over multi-page bvec. Given it is just one mechannical & simple change on all bio_for_each_segment_all() users, this patch does tree-wide change in one single patch, so that we can avoid to use a temporary helper for this conversion. Reviewed-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
* / crypto: clarify name of WEAK_KEY request flagEric Biggers2019-01-251-2/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_WEAK_KEY confuses newcomers to the crypto API because it sounds like it is requesting a weak key. Actually, it is requesting that weak keys be forbidden (for algorithms that have the notion of "weak keys"; currently only DES and XTS do). Also it is only one letter away from CRYPTO_TFM_RES_WEAK_KEY, with which it can be easily confused. (This in fact happened in the UX500 driver, though just in some debugging messages.) Therefore, make the intent clear by renaming it to CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* fscrypt: add Adiantum supportEric Biggers2019-01-065-110/+363
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound. It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper "Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors" (https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see commit 059c2a4d8e16 ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support"). On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7, on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster. In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information. Adiantum does not have this problem. Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* crypto: speck - remove SpeckJason A. Donenfeld2018-09-042-14/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These are unused, undesired, and have never actually been used by anybody. The original authors of this code have changed their mind about its inclusion. While originally proposed for disk encryption on low-end devices, the idea was discarded [1] in favor of something else before that could really get going. Therefore, this patch removes Speck. [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=153359499015659 Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* Merge tag 'f2fs-for-4.18' of ↵Linus Torvalds2018-06-113-15/+29
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim: "In this round, we've mainly focused on discard, aka unmap, control along with fstrim for Android-specific usage model. In addition, we've fixed writepage flow which returned EAGAIN previously resulting in EIO of fsync(2) due to mapping's error state. In order to avoid old MM bug [1], we decided not to use __GFP_ZERO for the mapping for node and meta page caches. As always, we've cleaned up many places for future fsverity and symbol conflicts. Enhancements: - do discard/fstrim in lower priority considering fs utilization - split large discard commands into smaller ones for better responsiveness - add more sanity checks to address syzbot reports - add a mount option, fsync_mode=nobarrier, which can reduce # of cache flushes - clean up symbol namespace with modified function names - be strict on block allocation and IO control in corner cases Bug fixes: - don't use __GFP_ZERO for mappings - fix error reports in writepage to avoid fsync() failure - avoid selinux denial on CAP_RESOURCE on resgid/resuid - fix some subtle race conditions in GC/atomic writes/shutdown - fix overflow bugs in sanity_check_raw_super - fix missing bits on get_flags Clean-ups: - prepare the generic flow for future fsverity integration - fix some broken coding standard" [1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/4/8/661 * tag 'f2fs-for-4.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (79 commits) f2fs: fix to clear FI_VOLATILE_FILE correctly f2fs: let sync node IO interrupt async one f2fs: don't change wbc->sync_mode f2fs: fix to update mtime correctly fs: f2fs: insert space around that ':' and ', ' fs: f2fs: add missing blank lines after declarations fs: f2fs: changed variable type of offset "unsigned" to "loff_t" f2fs: clean up symbol namespace f2fs: make set_de_type() static f2fs: make __f2fs_write_data_pages() static f2fs: fix to avoid accessing cross the boundary f2fs: fix to let caller retry allocating block address disable loading f2fs module on PAGE_SIZE > 4KB f2fs: fix error path of move_data_page f2fs: don't drop dentry pages after fs shutdown f2fs: fix to avoid race during access gc_thread pointer f2fs: clean up with clear_radix_tree_dirty_tag f2fs: fix to don't trigger writeback during recovery f2fs: clear discard_wake earlier f2fs: let discard thread wait a little longer if dev is busy ...
| * fscrypt: allow synchronous bio decryptionEric Biggers2018-05-023-15/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, fscrypt provides fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages() which decrypts a bio's pages asynchronously, then unlocks them afterwards. But, this assumes that decryption is the last "postprocessing step" for the bio, so it's incompatible with additional postprocessing steps such as authenticity verification after decryption. Therefore, rename the existing fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages() to fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_bio(). Then, add fscrypt_decrypt_bio() which decrypts the pages in the bio synchronously without unlocking the pages, nor setting them Uptodate; and add fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(), which enqueues work on the fscrypt_read_workqueue. The new functions will be used by filesystems that support both fscrypt and fs-verity. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
* | fscrypt: log the crypto algorithm implementationsEric Biggers2018-05-201-34/+68
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Log the crypto algorithm driver name for each fscrypt encryption mode on its first use, also showing a friendly name for the mode. This will help people determine whether the expected implementations are being used. In some cases we've seen people do benchmarks and reject using encryption for performance reasons, when in fact they used a much slower implementation of AES-XTS than was possible on the hardware. It can make an enormous difference; e.g., AES-XTS on ARM is about 10x faster with the crypto extensions (AES instructions) than without. This also makes it more obvious which modes are being used, now that fscrypt supports multiple combinations of modes. Example messages (with default modes, on x86_64): [ 35.492057] fscrypt: AES-256-CTS-CBC using implementation "cts(cbc-aes-aesni)" [ 35.492171] fscrypt: AES-256-XTS using implementation "xts-aes-aesni" Note: algorithms can be dynamically added to the crypto API, which can result in different implementations being used at different times. But this is rare; for most users, showing the first will be good enough. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypt: add Speck128/256 supportEric Biggers2018-05-202-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | fscrypt currently only supports AES encryption. However, many low-end mobile devices have older CPUs that don't have AES instructions, e.g. the ARMv8 Cryptography Extensions. Currently, user data on such devices is not encrypted at rest because AES is too slow, even when the NEON bit-sliced implementation of AES is used. Unfortunately, it is infeasible to encrypt these devices at all when AES is the only option. Therefore, this patch updates fscrypt to support the Speck block cipher, which was recently added to the crypto API. The C implementation of Speck is not especially fast, but Speck can be implemented very efficiently with general-purpose vector instructions, e.g. ARM NEON. For example, on an ARMv7 processor, we measured the NEON-accelerated Speck128/256-XTS at 69 MB/s for both encryption and decryption, while AES-256-XTS with the NEON bit-sliced implementation was only 22 MB/s encryption and 19 MB/s decryption. There are multiple variants of Speck. This patch only adds support for Speck128/256, which is the variant with a 128-bit block size and 256-bit key size -- the same as AES-256. This is believed to be the most secure variant of Speck, and it's only about 6% slower than Speck128/128. Speck64/128 would be at least 20% faster because it has 20% rounds, and it can be even faster on CPUs that can't efficiently do the 64-bit operations needed for Speck128. However, Speck64's 64-bit block size is not preferred security-wise. ARM NEON also supports the needed 64-bit operations even on 32-bit CPUs, resulting in Speck128 being fast enough for our targeted use cases so far. The chosen modes of operation are XTS for contents and CTS-CBC for filenames. These are the same modes of operation that fscrypt defaults to for AES. Note that as with the other fscrypt modes, Speck will not be used unless userspace chooses to use it. Nor are any of the existing modes (which are all AES-based) being removed, of course. We intentionally don't make CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION select CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK, so people will have to enable Speck support themselves if they need it. This is because we shouldn't bloat the FS_ENCRYPTION dependencies with every new cipher, especially ones that aren't recommended for most users. Moreover, CRYPTO_SPECK is just the generic implementation, which won't be fast enough for many users; in practice, they'll need to enable CRYPTO_SPECK_NEON to get acceptable performance. More details about our choice of Speck can be found in our patches that added Speck to the crypto API, and the follow-on discussion threads. We're planning a publication that explains the choice in more detail. But briefly, we can't use ChaCha20 as we previously proposed, since it would be insecure to use a stream cipher in this context, with potential IV reuse during writes on f2fs and/or on wear-leveling flash storage. We also evaluated many other lightweight and/or ARX-based block ciphers such as Chaskey-LTS, RC5, LEA, CHAM, Threefish, RC6, NOEKEON, SPARX, and XTEA. However, all had disadvantages vs. Speck, such as insufficient performance with NEON, much less published cryptanalysis, or an insufficient security level. Various design choices in Speck make it perform better with NEON than competing ciphers while still having a security margin similar to AES, and in the case of Speck128 also the same available security levels. Unfortunately, Speck does have some political baggage attached -- it's an NSA designed cipher, and was rejected from an ISO standard (though for context, as far as I know none of the above-mentioned alternatives are ISO standards either). Nevertheless, we believe it is a good solution to the problem from a technical perspective. Certain algorithms constructed from ChaCha or the ChaCha permutation, such as MEM (Masked Even-Mansour) or HPolyC, may also meet our performance requirements. However, these are new constructions that need more time to receive the cryptographic review and acceptance needed to be confident in their security. HPolyC hasn't been published yet, and we are concerned that MEM makes stronger assumptions about the underlying permutation than the ChaCha stream cipher does. In contrast, the XTS mode of operation is relatively well accepted, and Speck has over 70 cryptanalysis papers. Of course, these ChaCha-based algorithms can still be added later if they become ready. The best known attack on Speck128/256 is a differential cryptanalysis attack on 25 of 34 rounds with 2^253 time complexity and 2^125 chosen plaintexts, i.e. only marginally faster than brute force. There is no known attack on the full 34 rounds. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypt: only derive the needed portion of the keyEric Biggers2018-05-201-23/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently the key derivation function in fscrypt uses the master key length as the amount of output key material to derive. This works, but it means we can waste time deriving more key material than is actually used, e.g. most commonly, deriving 64 bytes for directories which only take a 32-byte AES-256-CTS-CBC key. It also forces us to validate that the master key length is a multiple of AES_BLOCK_SIZE, which wouldn't otherwise be necessary. Fix it to only derive the needed length key. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypt: separate key lookup from key derivationEric Biggers2018-05-201-48/+74
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Refactor the confusingly-named function 'validate_user_key()' into a new function 'find_and_derive_key()' which first finds the keyring key, then does the key derivation. Among other benefits this avoids the strange behavior we had previously where if key derivation failed for some reason, then we would fall back to the alternate key prefix. Now, we'll only fall back to the alternate key prefix if a valid key isn't found. This patch also improves the warning messages that are logged when the keyring key's payload is invalid. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypt: use a common logging functionEric Biggers2018-05-205-21/+57
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use a common function for fscrypt warning and error messages so that all the messages are consistently ratelimited, include the "fscrypt:" prefix, and include the filesystem name if applicable. Also fix up a few of the log messages to be more descriptive. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypt: remove internal key size constantsEric Biggers2018-05-202-20/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With one exception, the internal key size constants such as FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE are only used for the 'available_modes' array, where they really only serve to obfuscate what the values are. Also some of the constants are unused, and the key sizes tend to be in the names of the algorithms anyway. In the past these values were also misused, e.g. we used to have FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE in places that technically should have been FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE. The exception is that FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE is used for key derivation. But it's more appropriate to use FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE for that instead. Thus, just put the sizes directly in the 'available_modes' array. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypt: remove unnecessary check for non-logon key typeEric Biggers2018-05-201-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We're passing 'key_type_logon' to request_key(), so the found key is guaranteed to be of type "logon". Thus, there is no reason to check later that the key is really a "logon" key. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypt: make fscrypt_operations.max_namelen an integerEric Biggers2018-05-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now ->max_namelen() is only called to limit the filename length when adding NUL padding, and only for real filenames -- not symlink targets. It also didn't give the correct length for symlink targets anyway since it forgot to subtract 'sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data)'. Thus, change ->max_namelen from a function to a simple 'unsigned int' that gives the filesystem's maximum filename length. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypt: drop empty name check from fname_decrypt()Eric Biggers2018-05-201-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | fname_decrypt() is validating that the encrypted filename is nonempty. However, earlier a stronger precondition was already enforced: the encrypted filename must be at least 16 (FS_CRYPTO_BLOCK_SIZE) bytes. Drop the redundant check for an empty filename. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypt: drop max_namelen check from fname_decrypt()Eric Biggers2018-05-201-5/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | fname_decrypt() returns an error if the input filename is longer than the inode's ->max_namelen() as given by the filesystem. But, this doesn't actually make sense because the filesystem provided the input filename in the first place, where it was subject to the filesystem's limits. And fname_decrypt() has no internal limit itself. Thus, remove this unnecessary check. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypt: don't special-case EOPNOTSUPP from fscrypt_get_encryption_info()Eric Biggers2018-05-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In fscrypt_setup_filename(), remove the unnecessary check for fscrypt_get_encryption_info() returning EOPNOTSUPP. There's no reason to handle this error differently from any other. I think there may have been some confusion because the "notsupp" version of fscrypt_get_encryption_info() returns EOPNOTSUPP -- but that's not applicable from inside fs/crypto/. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypt: don't clear flags on crypto transformEric Biggers2018-05-201-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | fscrypt is clearing the flags on the crypto_skcipher it allocates for each inode. But, this is unnecessary and may cause problems in the future because it will even clear flags that are meant to be internal to the crypto API, e.g. CRYPTO_TFM_NEED_KEY. Remove the unnecessary flag clearing. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypt: remove stale comment from fscrypt_d_revalidate()Eric Biggers2018-05-201-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypt: remove error messages for skcipher_request_alloc() failureEric Biggers2018-05-202-13/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | skcipher_request_alloc() can only fail due to lack of memory, and in that case the memory allocator will have already printed a detailed error message. Thus, remove the redundant error messages from fscrypt. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypt: remove unnecessary NULL check when allocating skcipherEric Biggers2018-05-201-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | crypto_alloc_skcipher() returns an ERR_PTR() on failure, not NULL. Remove the unnecessary check for NULL. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypt: clean up after fscrypt_prepare_lookup() conversionsEric Biggers2018-05-202-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that all filesystems have been converted to use fscrypt_prepare_lookup(), we can remove the fscrypt_set_d_op() and fscrypt_set_encrypted_dentry() functions as well as un-export fscrypt_d_ops. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | fscrypt: use unbound workqueue for decryptionEric Biggers2018-05-201-1/+10
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Improve fscrypt read performance by switching the decryption workqueue from bound to unbound. With the bound workqueue, when multiple bios completed on the same CPU, they were decrypted on that same CPU. But with the unbound queue, they are now decrypted in parallel on any CPU. Although fscrypt read performance can be tough to measure due to the many sources of variation, this change is most beneficial when decryption is slow, e.g. on CPUs without AES instructions. For example, I timed tarring up encrypted directories on f2fs. On x86 with AES-NI instructions disabled, the unbound workqueue improved performance by about 25-35%, using 1 to NUM_CPUs jobs with 4 or 8 CPUs available. But with AES-NI enabled, performance was unchanged to within ~2%. I also did the same test on a quad-core ARM CPU using xts-speck128-neon encryption. There performance was usually about 10% better with the unbound workqueue, bringing it closer to the unencrypted speed. The unbound workqueue may be worse in some cases due to worse locality, but I think it's still the better default. dm-crypt uses an unbound workqueue by default too, so this change makes fscrypt match. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: fix build with pre-4.6 gcc versionsEric Biggers2018-02-011-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | gcc versions prior to 4.6 require an extra level of braces when using a designated initializer for a member in an anonymous struct or union. This caused a compile error with the 'struct qstr' initialization in __fscrypt_encrypt_symlink(). Fix it by using QSTR_INIT(). Reported-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Fixes: 76e81d6d5048 ("fscrypt: new helper functions for ->symlink()") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: remove 'ci' parameter from fscrypt_put_encryption_info()Eric Biggers2018-01-111-13/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | fscrypt_put_encryption_info() is only called when evicting an inode, so the 'struct fscrypt_info *ci' parameter is always NULL, and there cannot be races with other threads. This was cruft left over from the broken key revocation code. Remove the unused parameter and the cmpxchg(). Also remove the #ifdefs around the fscrypt_put_encryption_info() calls, since fscrypt_notsupp.h defines a no-op stub for it. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: fix up fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size() for internal useEric Biggers2018-01-113-21/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Filesystems don't need fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size() anymore, so unexport it and move it to fscrypt_private.h. We also never calculate the encrypted size of a filename without having the fscrypt_info present since it is needed to know the amount of NUL-padding which is determined by the encryption policy, and also we will always truncate the NUL-padding to the maximum filename length. Therefore, also make fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size() assume that the fscrypt_info is present, and make it truncate the returned length to the specified max_len. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: define fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer() to be for presented namesEric Biggers2018-01-111-15/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Previously fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer() was used to allocate buffers for both presented (decrypted or encoded) and encrypted filenames. That was confusing, because it had to allocate the worst-case size for either, e.g. including NUL-padding even when it was meaningless. But now that fscrypt_setup_filename() no longer calls it, it is only used in the ->get_link() and ->readdir() paths, which specifically want a buffer for presented filenames. Therefore, switch the behavior over to allocating the buffer for presented filenames only. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: calculate NUL-padding length in one place onlyEric Biggers2018-01-113-35/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, when encrypting a filename (either a real filename or a symlink target) we calculate the amount of NUL-padding twice: once before encryption and once during encryption in fname_encrypt(). It is needed before encryption to allocate the needed buffer size as well as calculate the size the symlink target will take up on-disk before creating the symlink inode. Calculating the size during encryption as well is redundant. Remove this redundancy by always calculating the exact size beforehand, and making fname_encrypt() just add as much NUL padding as is needed to fill the output buffer. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: move fscrypt_symlink_data to fscrypt_private.hEric Biggers2018-01-111-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | Now that all filesystems have been converted to use the symlink helper functions, they no longer need the declaration of 'struct fscrypt_symlink_data'. Move it from fscrypt.h to fscrypt_private.h. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: remove fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk()Eric Biggers2018-01-111-29/+0
| | | | | | | | | fscrypt_fname_usr_to_disk() sounded very generic but was actually only used to encrypt symlinks. Remove it now that all filesystems have been switched over to fscrypt_encrypt_symlink(). Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_get_symlink()Eric Biggers2018-01-111-0/+73
| | | | | | | | | | | Filesystems also have duplicate code to support ->get_link() on encrypted symlinks. Factor it out into a new function fscrypt_get_symlink(). It takes in the contents of the encrypted symlink on-disk and provides the target (decrypted or encoded) that should be returned from ->get_link(). Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: new helper functions for ->symlink()Eric Biggers2018-01-113-3/+99
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, filesystems supporting fscrypt need to implement some tricky logic when creating encrypted symlinks, including handling a peculiar on-disk format (struct fscrypt_symlink_data) and correctly calculating the size of the encrypted symlink. Introduce helper functions to make things a bit easier: - fscrypt_prepare_symlink() computes and validates the size the symlink target will require on-disk. - fscrypt_encrypt_symlink() creates the encrypted target if needed. The new helpers actually fix some subtle bugs. First, when checking whether the symlink target was too long, filesystems didn't account for the fact that the NUL padding is meant to be truncated if it would cause the maximum length to be exceeded, as is done for filenames in directories. Consequently users would receive ENAMETOOLONG when creating symlinks close to what is supposed to be the maximum length. For example, with EXT4 with a 4K block size, the maximum symlink target length in an encrypted directory is supposed to be 4093 bytes (in comparison to 4095 in an unencrypted directory), but in FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32-mode only up to 4064 bytes were accepted. Second, symlink targets of "." and ".." were not being encrypted, even though they should be, as these names are special in *directory entries* but not in symlink targets. Fortunately, we can fix this simply by starting to encrypt them, as old kernels already accept them in encrypted form. Third, the output string length the filesystems were providing when doing the actual encryption was incorrect, as it was forgotten to exclude 'sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data)'. Fortunately though, this bug didn't make a difference. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: trim down fscrypt.h includesEric Biggers2018-01-113-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | fscrypt.h included way too many other headers, given that it is included by filesystems both with and without encryption support. Trim down the includes list by moving the needed includes into more appropriate places, and removing the unneeded ones. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: move fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot() to fs/crypto/fname.cEric Biggers2018-01-111-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | Only fs/crypto/fname.c cares about treating the "." and ".." filenames specially with regards to encryption, so move fscrypt_is_dot_dotdot() from fscrypt.h to there. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: move fscrypt_valid_enc_modes() to fscrypt_private.hEric Biggers2018-01-111-0/+14
| | | | | | | | | The encryption modes are validated by fs/crypto/, not by individual filesystems. Therefore, move fscrypt_valid_enc_modes() from fscrypt.h to fscrypt_private.h. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* fscrypt: move fscrypt_info_cachep declaration to fscrypt_private.hEric Biggers2018-01-111-0/+1
| | | | | | | | The fscrypt_info kmem_cache is internal to fscrypt; filesystems don't need to access it. So move its declaration into fscrypt_private.h. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* Merge tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-11-147-14/+123
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt Pull fscrypt updates from Ted Ts'o: "Lots of cleanups, mostly courtesy by Eric Biggers" * tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt: fscrypt: lock mutex before checking for bounce page pool fscrypt: add a documentation file for filesystem-level encryption ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_setattr() ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_lookup() ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_rename() ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_link() ext4: switch to fscrypt_file_open() fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_setattr() fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_lookup() fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_rename() fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_link() fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_file_open() fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_require_key() fscrypt: remove unneeded empty fscrypt_operations structs fscrypt: remove ->is_encrypted() fscrypt: switch from ->is_encrypted() to IS_ENCRYPTED() fs, fscrypt: add an S_ENCRYPTED inode flag fscrypt: clean up include file mess
| * fscrypt: lock mutex before checking for bounce page poolEric Biggers2017-10-311-5/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | fscrypt_initialize(), which allocates the global bounce page pool when an encrypted file is first accessed, uses "double-checked locking" to try to avoid locking fscrypt_init_mutex. However, it doesn't use any memory barriers, so it's theoretically possible for a thread to observe a bounce page pool which has not been fully initialized. This is a classic bug with "double-checked locking". While "only a theoretical issue" in the latest kernel, in pre-4.8 kernels the pointer that was checked was not even the last to be initialized, so it was easily possible for a crash (NULL pointer dereference) to happen. This was changed only incidentally by the large refactor to use fs/crypto/. Solve both problems in a trivial way that can easily be backported: just always take the mutex. It's theoretically less efficient, but it shouldn't be noticeable in practice as the mutex is only acquired very briefly once per encrypted file. Later I'd like to make this use a helper macro like DO_ONCE(). However, DO_ONCE() runs in atomic context, so we'd need to add a new macro that allows blocking. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.1+ Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
| * fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_lookup()Eric Biggers2017-10-181-0/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce a helper function which prepares to look up the given dentry in the given directory. If the directory is encrypted, it handles loading the directory's encryption key, setting the dentry's ->d_op to fscrypt_d_ops, and setting DCACHE_ENCRYPTED_WITH_KEY if the directory's encryption key is available. Note: once all filesystems switch over to this, we'll be able to move fscrypt_d_ops and fscrypt_set_encrypted_dentry() to fscrypt_private.h. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
| * fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_rename()Eric Biggers2017-10-181-0/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce a helper function which prepares to rename a file into a possibly encrypted directory. It handles loading the encryption keys for the source and target directories if needed, and it handles enforcing that if the target directory (and the source directory for a cross-rename) is encrypted, then the file being moved into the directory has the same encryption policy as its containing directory. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
| * fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_link()Eric Biggers2017-10-181-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce a helper function which prepares to link an inode into a possibly-encrypted directory. It handles setting up the target directory's encryption key, then verifying that the link won't violate the constraint that all files in an encrypted directory tree use the same encryption policy. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
| * fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_file_open()Eric Biggers2017-10-182-1/+50
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a helper function which prepares to open a regular file which may be encrypted. It handles setting up the file's encryption key, then checking that the file's encryption policy matches that of its parent directory (if the parent directory is encrypted). It may be set as the ->open() method or it can be called from another ->open() method. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
| * fscrypt: switch from ->is_encrypted() to IS_ENCRYPTED()Eric Biggers2017-10-184-7/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IS_ENCRYPTED() now gives the same information as i_sb->s_cop->is_encrypted() but is more efficient, since IS_ENCRYPTED() is just a simple flag check. Prepare to remove ->is_encrypted() by switching all callers to IS_ENCRYPTED(). Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
| * fscrypt: clean up include file messDave Chinner2017-10-181-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Filesystems have to include different header files based on whether they are compiled with encryption support or not. That's nasty and messy. Instead, rationalise the headers so we have a single include fscrypt.h and let it decide what internal implementation to include based on the __FS_HAS_ENCRYPTION define. Filesystems set __FS_HAS_ENCRYPTION to 1 before including linux/fscrypt.h if they are built with encryption support. Otherwise, they must set __FS_HAS_ENCRYPTION to 0. Add guards to prevent fscrypt_supp.h and fscrypt_notsupp.h from being directly included by filesystems. Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> [EB: use 1 and 0 rather than defined/undefined] Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
* | Merge branch 'linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-11-144-82/+13
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6 Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu: "Here is the crypto update for 4.15: API: - Disambiguate EBUSY when queueing crypto request by adding ENOSPC. This change touches code outside the crypto API. - Reset settings when empty string is written to rng_current. Algorithms: - Add OSCCA SM3 secure hash. Drivers: - Remove old mv_cesa driver (replaced by marvell/cesa). - Enable rfc3686/ecb/cfb/ofb AES in crypto4xx. - Add ccm/gcm AES in crypto4xx. - Add support for BCM7278 in iproc-rng200. - Add hash support on Exynos in s5p-sss. - Fix fallback-induced error in vmx. - Fix output IV in atmel-aes. - Fix empty GCM hash in mediatek. Others: - Fix DoS potential in lib/mpi. - Fix potential out-of-order issues with padata" * 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (162 commits) lib/mpi: call cond_resched() from mpi_powm() loop crypto: stm32/hash - Fix return issue on update crypto: dh - Remove pointless checks for NULL 'p' and 'g' crypto: qat - Clean up error handling in qat_dh_set_secret() crypto: dh - Don't permit 'key' or 'g' size longer than 'p' crypto: dh - Don't permit 'p' to be 0 crypto: dh - Fix double free of ctx->p hwrng: iproc-rng200 - Add support for BCM7278 dt-bindings: rng: Document BCM7278 RNG200 compatible crypto: chcr - Replace _manual_ swap with swap macro crypto: marvell - Add a NULL entry at the end of mv_cesa_plat_id_table[] hwrng: virtio - Virtio RNG devices need to be re-registered after suspend/resume crypto: atmel - remove empty functions crypto: ecdh - remove empty exit() MAINTAINERS: update maintainer for qat crypto: caam - remove unused param of ctx_map_to_sec4_sg() crypto: caam - remove unneeded edesc zeroization crypto: atmel-aes - Reset the controller before each use crypto: atmel-aes - properly set IV after {en,de}crypt hwrng: core - Reset user selected rng by writing "" to rng_current ...