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* fs/exec.c: make do_coredump() voidWANG Cong2009-01-061-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | No one cares do_coredump()'s return value, and also it seems that it is also not necessary. So make it void. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: WANG Cong <wangcong@zeuux.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* do_coredump(): check return from argv_split()Tetsuo Handa2009-01-061-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | do_coredump() accesses helper_argv[0] without checking helper_argv != NULL. This can happen if page allocation failed. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* fs/exec.c:__bprm_mm_init(): clean up error handlingLuiz Fernando N. Capitulino2009-01-061-14/+6
| | | | | | | | | Untangle the error unwinding in this function, saving a test of local variable `vma'. Signed-off-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino <lcapitulino@mandriva.com.br> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* sys_execve and sys_uselib do not call into fsnotifyEric Paris2009-01-051-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | sys_execve and sys_uselib do not call into fsnotify so inotify does not get open events for these types of syscalls. This patch simply makes the requisite fsnotify calls. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* get rid of special-casing the /sbin/loader on alphaAl Viro2009-01-031-39/+0
| | | | | | | ... just make it a binfmt handler like #! one. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* kill vfs_permissionChristoph Hellwig2008-12-311-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | With all the nameidata removal there's no point anymore for this helper. Of the three callers left two will go away with the next lookup series anyway. Also add proper kerneldoc to inode_permission as this is the main permission check routine now. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'timers-core-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2008-12-301-5/+3
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: hrtimers: fix warning in kernel/hrtimer.c x86: make sure we really have an hpet mapping before using it x86: enable HPET on Fujitsu u9200 linux/timex.h: cleanup for userspace posix-timers: simplify de_thread()->exit_itimers() path posix-timers: check ->it_signal instead of ->it_pid to validate the timer posix-timers: use "struct pid*" instead of "struct task_struct*" nohz: suppress needless timer reprogramming clocksource, acpi_pm.c: put acpi_pm_read_slow() under CONFIG_PCI nohz: no softirq pending warnings for offline cpus hrtimer: removing all ur callback modes, fix hrtimer: removing all ur callback modes, fix hotplug hrtimer: removing all ur callback modes x86: correct link to HPET timer specification rtc-cmos: export second NVRAM bank Fixed up conflicts in sound/drivers/pcsp/pcsp.c and sound/core/hrtimer.c manually.
| * posix-timers: simplify de_thread()->exit_itimers() pathOleg Nesterov2008-12-121-5/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Impact: simplify code de_thread() postpones release_task(leader) until after exit_itimers(). This was needed because !SIGEV_THREAD_ID timers could use ->group_leader without get_task_struct(). With the recent changes we can release the leader earlier and simplify the code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* | Merge branch 'next' into for-linusJames Morris2008-12-251-74/+109
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| * CRED: Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentialsDavid Howells2008-11-141-63/+86
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make execve() take advantage of copy-on-write credentials, allowing it to set up the credentials in advance, and then commit the whole lot after the point of no return. This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). The credential bits from struct linux_binprm are, for the most part, replaced with a single credentials pointer (bprm->cred). This means that all the creds can be calculated in advance and then applied at the point of no return with no possibility of failure. I would like to replace bprm->cap_effective with: cap_isclear(bprm->cap_effective) but this seems impossible due to special behaviour for processes of pid 1 (they always retain their parent's capability masks where normally they'd be changed - see cap_bprm_set_creds()). The following sequence of events now happens: (a) At the start of do_execve, the current task's cred_exec_mutex is locked to prevent PTRACE_ATTACH from obsoleting the calculation of creds that we make. (a) prepare_exec_creds() is then called to make a copy of the current task's credentials and prepare it. This copy is then assigned to bprm->cred. This renders security_bprm_alloc() and security_bprm_free() unnecessary, and so they've been removed. (b) The determination of unsafe execution is now performed immediately after (a) rather than later on in the code. The result is stored in bprm->unsafe for future reference. (c) prepare_binprm() is called, possibly multiple times. (i) This applies the result of set[ug]id binaries to the new creds attached to bprm->cred. Personality bit clearance is recorded, but now deferred on the basis that the exec procedure may yet fail. (ii) This then calls the new security_bprm_set_creds(). This should calculate the new LSM and capability credentials into *bprm->cred. This folds together security_bprm_set() and parts of security_bprm_apply_creds() (these two have been removed). Anything that might fail must be done at this point. (iii) bprm->cred_prepared is set to 1. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first pass of the security calculations, and 1 on all subsequent passes. This allows SELinux in (ii) to base its calculations only on the initial script and not on the interpreter. (d) flush_old_exec() is called to commit the task to execution. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Clear pdeath_signal and set dumpable on certain circumstances that may not be covered by commit_creds(). (ii) Clear any bits in current->personality that were deferred from (c.i). (e) install_exec_creds() [compute_creds() as was] is called to install the new credentials. This performs the following steps with regard to credentials: (i) Calls security_bprm_committing_creds() to apply any security requirements, such as flushing unauthorised files in SELinux, that must be done before the credentials are changed. This is made up of bits of security_bprm_apply_creds() and security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), both of which have been removed. This function is not allowed to fail; anything that might fail must have been done in (c.ii). (ii) Calls commit_creds() to apply the new credentials in a single assignment (more or less). Possibly pdeath_signal and dumpable should be part of struct creds. (iii) Unlocks the task's cred_replace_mutex, thus allowing PTRACE_ATTACH to take place. (iv) Clears The bprm->cred pointer as the credentials it was holding are now immutable. (v) Calls security_bprm_committed_creds() to apply any security alterations that must be done after the creds have been changed. SELinux uses this to flush signals and signal handlers. (f) If an error occurs before (d.i), bprm_free() will call abort_creds() to destroy the proposed new credentials and will then unlock cred_replace_mutex. No changes to the credentials will have been made. (2) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_bprm_alloc(), ->bprm_alloc_security() (*) security_bprm_free(), ->bprm_free_security() Removed in favour of preparing new credentials and modifying those. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() (*) security_bprm_post_apply_creds(), ->bprm_post_apply_creds() Removed; split between security_bprm_set_creds(), security_bprm_committing_creds() and security_bprm_committed_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set(), ->bprm_set_security() Removed; folded into security_bprm_set_creds(). (*) security_bprm_set_creds(), ->bprm_set_creds() New. The new credentials in bprm->creds should be checked and set up as appropriate. bprm->cred_prepared is 0 on the first call, 1 on the second and subsequent calls. (*) security_bprm_committing_creds(), ->bprm_committing_creds() (*) security_bprm_committed_creds(), ->bprm_committed_creds() New. Apply the security effects of the new credentials. This includes closing unauthorised files in SELinux. This function may not fail. When the former is called, the creds haven't yet been applied to the process; when the latter is called, they have. The former may access bprm->cred, the latter may not. (3) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) The bprm_security_struct struct has been removed in favour of using the credentials-under-construction approach. (c) flush_unauthorized_files() now takes a cred pointer and passes it on to inode_has_perm(), file_has_perm() and dentry_open(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * CRED: Inaugurate COW credentialsDavid Howells2008-11-141-10/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Inaugurate copy-on-write credentials management. This uses RCU to manage the credentials pointer in the task_struct with respect to accesses by other tasks. A process may only modify its own credentials, and so does not need locking to access or modify its own credentials. A mutex (cred_replace_mutex) is added to the task_struct to control the effect of PTRACE_ATTACHED on credential calculations, particularly with respect to execve(). With this patch, the contents of an active credentials struct may not be changed directly; rather a new set of credentials must be prepared, modified and committed using something like the following sequence of events: struct cred *new = prepare_creds(); int ret = blah(new); if (ret < 0) { abort_creds(new); return ret; } return commit_creds(new); There are some exceptions to this rule: the keyrings pointed to by the active credentials may be instantiated - keyrings violate the COW rule as managing COW keyrings is tricky, given that it is possible for a task to directly alter the keys in a keyring in use by another task. To help enforce this, various pointers to sets of credentials, such as those in the task_struct, are declared const. The purpose of this is compile-time discouragement of altering credentials through those pointers. Once a set of credentials has been made public through one of these pointers, it may not be modified, except under special circumstances: (1) Its reference count may incremented and decremented. (2) The keyrings to which it points may be modified, but not replaced. The only safe way to modify anything else is to create a replacement and commit using the functions described in Documentation/credentials.txt (which will be added by a later patch). This patch and the preceding patches have been tested with the LTP SELinux testsuite. This patch makes several logical sets of alteration: (1) execve(). This now prepares and commits credentials in various places in the security code rather than altering the current creds directly. (2) Temporary credential overrides. do_coredump() and sys_faccessat() now prepare their own credentials and temporarily override the ones currently on the acting thread, whilst preventing interference from other threads by holding cred_replace_mutex on the thread being dumped. This will be replaced in a future patch by something that hands down the credentials directly to the functions being called, rather than altering the task's objective credentials. (3) LSM interface. A number of functions have been changed, added or removed: (*) security_capset_check(), ->capset_check() (*) security_capset_set(), ->capset_set() Removed in favour of security_capset(). (*) security_capset(), ->capset() New. This is passed a pointer to the new creds, a pointer to the old creds and the proposed capability sets. It should fill in the new creds or return an error. All pointers, barring the pointer to the new creds, are now const. (*) security_bprm_apply_creds(), ->bprm_apply_creds() Changed; now returns a value, which will cause the process to be killed if it's an error. (*) security_task_alloc(), ->task_alloc_security() Removed in favour of security_prepare_creds(). (*) security_cred_free(), ->cred_free() New. Free security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_prepare_creds(), ->cred_prepare() New. Duplicate any security data attached to cred->security. (*) security_commit_creds(), ->cred_commit() New. Apply any security effects for the upcoming installation of new security by commit_creds(). (*) security_task_post_setuid(), ->task_post_setuid() Removed in favour of security_task_fix_setuid(). (*) security_task_fix_setuid(), ->task_fix_setuid() Fix up the proposed new credentials for setuid(). This is used by cap_set_fix_setuid() to implicitly adjust capabilities in line with setuid() changes. Changes are made to the new credentials, rather than the task itself as in security_task_post_setuid(). (*) security_task_reparent_to_init(), ->task_reparent_to_init() Removed. Instead the task being reparented to init is referred directly to init's credentials. NOTE! This results in the loss of some state: SELinux's osid no longer records the sid of the thread that forked it. (*) security_key_alloc(), ->key_alloc() (*) security_key_permission(), ->key_permission() Changed. These now take cred pointers rather than task pointers to refer to the security context. (4) sys_capset(). This has been simplified and uses less locking. The LSM functions it calls have been merged. (5) reparent_to_kthreadd(). This gives the current thread the same credentials as init by simply using commit_thread() to point that way. (6) __sigqueue_alloc() and switch_uid() __sigqueue_alloc() can't stop the target task from changing its creds beneath it, so this function gets a reference to the currently applicable user_struct which it then passes into the sigqueue struct it returns if successful. switch_uid() is now called from commit_creds(), and possibly should be folded into that. commit_creds() should take care of protecting __sigqueue_alloc(). (7) [sg]et[ug]id() and co and [sg]et_current_groups. The set functions now all use prepare_creds(), commit_creds() and abort_creds() to build and check a new set of credentials before applying it. security_task_set[ug]id() is called inside the prepared section. This guarantees that nothing else will affect the creds until we've finished. The calling of set_dumpable() has been moved into commit_creds(). Much of the functionality of set_user() has been moved into commit_creds(). The get functions all simply access the data directly. (8) security_task_prctl() and cap_task_prctl(). security_task_prctl() has been modified to return -ENOSYS if it doesn't want to handle a function, or otherwise return the return value directly rather than through an argument. Additionally, cap_task_prctl() now prepares a new set of credentials, even if it doesn't end up using it. (9) Keyrings. A number of changes have been made to the keyrings code: (a) switch_uid_keyring(), copy_keys(), exit_keys() and suid_keys() have all been dropped and built in to the credentials functions directly. They may want separating out again later. (b) key_alloc() and search_process_keyrings() now take a cred pointer rather than a task pointer to specify the security context. (c) copy_creds() gives a new thread within the same thread group a new thread keyring if its parent had one, otherwise it discards the thread keyring. (d) The authorisation key now points directly to the credentials to extend the search into rather pointing to the task that carries them. (e) Installing thread, process or session keyrings causes a new set of credentials to be created, even though it's not strictly necessary for process or session keyrings (they're shared). (10) Usermode helper. The usermode helper code now carries a cred struct pointer in its subprocess_info struct instead of a new session keyring pointer. This set of credentials is derived from init_cred and installed on the new process after it has been cloned. call_usermodehelper_setup() allocates the new credentials and call_usermodehelper_freeinfo() discards them if they haven't been used. A special cred function (prepare_usermodeinfo_creds()) is provided specifically for call_usermodehelper_setup() to call. call_usermodehelper_setkeys() adjusts the credentials to sport the supplied keyring as the new session keyring. (11) SELinux. SELinux has a number of changes, in addition to those to support the LSM interface changes mentioned above: (a) selinux_setprocattr() no longer does its check for whether the current ptracer can access processes with the new SID inside the lock that covers getting the ptracer's SID. Whilst this lock ensures that the check is done with the ptracer pinned, the result is only valid until the lock is released, so there's no point doing it inside the lock. (12) is_single_threaded(). This function has been extracted from selinux_setprocattr() and put into a file of its own in the lib/ directory as join_session_keyring() now wants to use it too. The code in SELinux just checked to see whether a task shared mm_structs with other tasks (CLONE_VM), but that isn't good enough. We really want to know if they're part of the same thread group (CLONE_THREAD). (13) nfsd. The NFS server daemon now has to use the COW credentials to set the credentials it is going to use. It really needs to pass the credentials down to the functions it calls, but it can't do that until other patches in this series have been applied. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * CRED: Wrap current->cred and a few other accessorsDavid Howells2008-11-141-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Wrap current->cred and a few other accessors to hide their actual implementation. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * CRED: Separate task security context from task_structDavid Howells2008-11-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers pointing to it. Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in entry.S via asm-offsets. With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the filesystem subsystemDavid Howells2008-11-141-9/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Wrap access to task credentials so that they can be separated more easily from the task_struct during the introduction of COW creds. Change most current->(|e|s|fs)[ug]id to current_(|e|s|fs)[ug]id(). Change some task->e?[ug]id to task_e?[ug]id(). In some places it makes more sense to use RCU directly rather than a convenient wrapper; these will be addressed by later patches. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | tracehook: exec double-reporting fixRoland McGrath2008-12-091-1/+9
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The patch 6341c39 "tracehook: exec" introduced a small regression in 2.6.27 regarding binfmt_misc exec event reporting. Since the reporting is now done in the common search_binary_handler() function, an exec of a misc binary will result in two (or possibly multiple) exec events being reported, instead of just a single one, because the misc handler contains a recursive call to search_binary_handler. To add to the confusion, if PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC is not active, the multiple SIGTRAP signals will in fact cause only a single ptrace intercept, as the signals are not queued. However, if PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC is on, the debugger will actually see multiple ptrace intercepts (PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC). The test program included below demonstrates the problem. This change fixes the bug by calling tracehook_report_exec() only in the outermost search_binary_handler() call (bprm->recursion_depth == 0). The additional change to restore bprm->recursion_depth after each binfmt load_binary call is actually superfluous for this bug, since we test the value saved on entry to search_binary_handler(). But it keeps the use of of the depth count to its most obvious expected meaning. Depending on what binfmt handlers do in certain cases, there could have been false-positive tests for recursion limits before this change. /* Test program using PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC. This forks and exec's the first argument with the rest of the arguments, while ptrace'ing. It expects to see one PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC stop and then a successful exit, with no other signals or events in between. Test for kernel doing two PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC stops for a binfmt_misc exec: $ gcc -g traceexec.c -o traceexec $ sudo sh -c 'echo :test:M::foobar::/bin/cat: > /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc/register' $ echo 'foobar test' > ./foobar $ chmod +x ./foobar $ ./traceexec ./foobar; echo $? ==> good <== foobar test 0 $ ==> bad <== foobar test unexpected status 0x4057f != 0 3 $ */ #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/wait.h> #include <sys/ptrace.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <signal.h> #include <stdlib.h> static void wait_for (pid_t child, int expect) { int status; pid_t p = wait (&status); if (p != child) { perror ("wait"); exit (2); } if (status != expect) { fprintf (stderr, "unexpected status %#x != %#x\n", status, expect); exit (3); } } int main (int argc, char **argv) { pid_t child = fork (); if (child < 0) { perror ("fork"); return 127; } else if (child == 0) { ptrace (PTRACE_TRACEME); raise (SIGUSR1); execv (argv[1], &argv[1]); perror ("execve"); _exit (127); } wait_for (child, W_STOPCODE (SIGUSR1)); if (ptrace (PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, child, 0L, (void *) (long) PTRACE_O_TRACEEXEC) != 0) { perror ("PTRACE_SETOPTIONS"); return 4; } if (ptrace (PTRACE_CONT, child, 0L, 0L) != 0) { perror ("PTRACE_CONT"); return 5; } wait_for (child, W_STOPCODE (SIGTRAP | (PTRACE_EVENT_EXEC << 8))); if (ptrace (PTRACE_CONT, child, 0L, 0L) != 0) { perror ("PTRACE_CONT"); return 6; } wait_for (child, W_EXITCODE (0, 0)); return 0; } Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> CC: Ulrich Weigand <ulrich.weigand@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
* coredump: format_corename: don't append .%pid if multi-threadedOleg Nesterov2008-10-201-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If the coredumping is multi-threaded, format_corename() appends .%pid to the corename. This was needed before the proper multi-thread core dump support, now all the threads in the mm go into a single unified core file. Remove this special case, it is not even documented and we have "%p" and core_uses_pid. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Cc: La Monte Yarroll <piggy@laurelnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux-2.6-for-linusLinus Torvalds2008-10-161-6/+3
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux-2.6-for-linus: module: remove CONFIG_KMOD in comment after #endif remove CONFIG_KMOD from fs remove CONFIG_KMOD from drivers Manually fix conflict due to include cleanups in drivers/md/md.c
| * remove CONFIG_KMOD from fsJohannes Berg2008-10-171-6/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Just always compile the code when the kernel is modular. Convert load_nls to use try_then_request_module to tidy up the code. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net> Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
* | pid_ns: de_thread: kill the now unneeded ->child_reaper changeOleg Nesterov2008-10-161-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | de_thread() checks if the old leader was the ->child_reaper, this is not possible any longer. With the previous patch ->group_leader itself will change ->child_reaper on exit. Henceforth find_new_reaper() is the only function (apart from initialization) which plays with ->child_reaper. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | alpha: introduce field 'taso' into struct linux_binprmKirill A. Shutemov2008-10-161-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This change is Alpha-specific. It adds field 'taso' into struct linux_binprm to remember if the application is TASO. Previously, field sh_bang was used for this purpose. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | exec.c, compat.c: fix count(), compat_count() bounds checkingJason Baron2008-10-161-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With MAX_ARG_STRINGS set to 0x7FFFFFFF, and being passed to 'count()' and compat_count(), it would appear that the current max bounds check of fs/exec.c:394: if(++i > max) return -E2BIG; would never trigger. Since 'i' is of type int, so values would wrap and the function would continue looping. Simple fix seems to be chaning ++i to i++ and checking for '>='. Signed-off-by: Jason Baron <jbaron@redhat.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: "Ollie Wild" <aaw@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm owner: fix race between swapoff and exitBalbir Singh2008-09-291-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There's a race between mm->owner assignment and swapoff, more easily seen when task slab poisoning is turned on. The condition occurs when try_to_unuse() runs in parallel with an exiting task. A similar race can occur with callers of get_task_mm(), such as /proc/<pid>/<mmstats> or ptrace or page migration. CPU0 CPU1 try_to_unuse looks at mm = task0->mm increments mm->mm_users task 0 exits mm->owner needs to be updated, but no new owner is found (mm_users > 1, but no other task has task->mm = task0->mm) mm_update_next_owner() leaves mmput(mm) decrements mm->mm_users task0 freed dereferencing mm->owner fails The fix is to notify the subsystem via mm_owner_changed callback(), if no new owner is found, by specifying the new task as NULL. Jiri Slaby: mm->owner was set to NULL prior to calling cgroup_mm_owner_callbacks(), but must be set after that, so as not to pass NULL as old owner causing oops. Daisuke Nishimura: mm_update_next_owner() may set mm->owner to NULL, but mem_cgroup_from_task() and its callers need to take account of this situation to avoid oops. Hugh Dickins: Lockdep warning and hang below exec_mmap() when testing these patches. exit_mm() up_reads mmap_sem before calling mm_update_next_owner(), so exec_mmap() now needs to do the same. And with that repositioning, there's now no point in mm_need_new_owner() allowing for NULL mm. Reported-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Signed-off-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daisuke Nishimura <nishimura@mxp.nes.nec.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: include pagemap.h again to fix buildHugh Dickins2008-07-281-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix compilation errors on avr32 and without CONFIG_SWAP, introduced by ba92a43dbaee339cf5915ef766d3d3ffbaaf103c ("exec: remove some includes") In file included from include/asm/tlb.h:24, from fs/exec.c:55: include/asm-generic/tlb.h: In function 'tlb_flush_mmu': include/asm-generic/tlb.h:76: error: implicit declaration of function 'release_pages' include/asm-generic/tlb.h: In function 'tlb_remove_page': include/asm-generic/tlb.h:105: error: implicit declaration of function 'page_cache_release' make[1]: *** [fs/exec.o] Error 1 This straightforward part-revert is nobody's favourite patch to address the underlying tlb.h needs swap.h needs pagemap.h (but sparc won't like that) mess; but appropriate to fix the build now before any overhaul. Reported-by: Yoichi Yuasa <yoichi_yuasa@tripeaks.co.jp> Reported-by: Haavard Skinnemoen <haavard.skinnemoen@atmel.com> Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Tested-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] get rid of __user_path_lookup_openAl Viro2008-07-261-4/+10
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] take noexec checks to very few callers that careAl Viro2008-07-261-0/+7
| | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Re: [PATCH 3/6] vfs: open_exec cleanupChristoph Hellwig2008-07-261-28/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | On Mon, May 19, 2008 at 12:01:49AM +0200, Marcin Slusarz wrote: > open_exec is needlessly indented, calls ERR_PTR with 0 argument > (which is not valid errno) and jumps into middle of function > just to return value. > So clean it up a bit. Still looks rather messy. See below for a better version. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* [PATCH] pass MAY_OPEN to vfs_permission() explicitlyAl Viro2008-07-261-2/+2
| | | | | | | ... and get rid of the last "let's deduce mask from nameidata->flags" bit. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* tracehook: execRoland McGrath2008-07-261-8/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This moves all the ptrace hooks related to exec into tracehook.h inlines. This also lifts the calls for tracing out of the binfmt load_binary hooks into search_binary_handler() after it calls into the binfmt module. This change has no effect, since all the binfmt modules' load_binary functions did the call at the end on success, and now search_binary_handler() does it immediately after return if successful. We consolidate the repeated code, and binfmt modules no longer need to import ptrace_notify(). Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* coredump: format_corename: fix the "core_uses_pid" logicOleg Nesterov2008-07-251-8/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I don't understand why the multi-thread coredump implies the core_uses_pid behaviour, but we shouldn't use mm->mm_users for that. This counter can be incremented by get_task_mm(). Use the valued returned by coredump_wait() instead. Also, remove the "const char *pattern" argument, format_corename() can use core_pattern directly. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* coredump: kill mm->core_doneOleg Nesterov2008-07-251-3/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that we have core_state->dumper list we can use it to wake up the sub-threads waiting for the coredump completion. This uglifies the code and .text grows by 47 bytes, but otoh mm_struct lessens by sizeof(struct completion). Also, with this change we can decouple exit_mm() from the coredumping code. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* coredump: construct the list of coredumping threads at startup timeOleg Nesterov2008-07-251-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | binfmt->core_dump() has to iterate over the all threads in system in order to find the coredumping threads and construct the list using the GFP_ATOMIC allocations. With this patch each thread allocates the list node on exit_mm()'s stack and adds itself to the list. This allows us to do further changes: - simplify ->core_dump() - change exit_mm() to clear ->mm first, then wait for ->core_done. this makes the coredumping process visible to oom_kill - kill mm->core_done Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* coredump: make mm->core_state visible to ->core_dump()Oleg Nesterov2008-07-251-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | Move the "struct core_state core_state" from coredump_wait() to do_coredump(), this makes mm->core_state visible to binfmt->core_dump(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* coredump: turn core_state->nr_threads into atomic_tOleg Nesterov2008-07-251-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Turn core_state->nr_threads into atomic_t and kill now unneeded down_write(&mm->mmap_sem) in exit_mm(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* coredump: simplify core_state->nr_threads calculationOleg Nesterov2008-07-251-17/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Change zap_process() to return int instead of incrementing mm->core_state->nr_threads directly. Change zap_threads() to set mm->core_state only on success. This patch restores the original size of .text, and more importantly now ->nr_threads is used in two places only. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* coredump: move mm->core_waiters into struct core_stateOleg Nesterov2008-07-251-10/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move mm->core_waiters into "struct core_state" allocated on stack. This shrinks mm_struct a little bit and allows further changes. This patch mostly does s/core_waiters/core_state. The only essential change is that coredump_wait() must clear mm->core_state before return. The coredump_wait()'s path is uglified and .text grows by 30 bytes, this is fixed by the next patch. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* coredump: turn mm->core_startup_done into the pointer to struct core_stateOleg Nesterov2008-07-251-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | mm->core_startup_done points to "struct completion startup_done" allocated on the coredump_wait()'s stack. Introduce the new structure, core_state, which holds this "struct completion". This way we can add more info visible to the threads participating in coredump without enlarging mm_struct. No changes in affected .o files. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* coredump: zap_threads() must skip kernel threadsOleg Nesterov2008-07-251-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The main loop in zap_threads() must skip kthreads which may use the same mm. Otherwise we "kill" this thread erroneously (for example, it can not fork or exec after that), and the coredumping task stucks in the TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE state forever because of the wrong ->core_waiters count. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* introduce PF_KTHREAD flagOleg Nesterov2008-07-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce the new PF_KTHREAD flag to mark the kernel threads. It is set by INIT_TASK() and copied to the forked childs (we could set it in kthreadd() along with PF_NOFREEZE instead). daemonize() was changed as well. In that case testing of PF_KTHREAD is racy, but daemonize() is hopeless anyway. This flag is cleared in do_execve(), before search_binary_handler(). Probably not the best place, we can do this in exec_mmap() or in start_thread(), or clear it along with PF_FORKNOEXEC. But I think this doesn't matter in practice, and if do_execve() fails kthread should die soon. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* coredump: zap_threads: comments && use while_each_thread()Oleg Nesterov2008-07-251-7/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | No changes in fs/exec.o The for_each_process() loop in zap_threads() is very subtle, it is not clear why we don't race with fork/exit/exec. Add the fat comment. Also, change the code to use while_each_thread(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: remove some includesHugh Dickins2008-07-251-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | | fs/exec.c used to need mman.h pagemap.h swap.h and rmap.h when it did mm-ish stuff in install_arg_page(); but no need for them after 2.6.22. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: unbreak arm] Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: remove double indirection on tlb parameter to free_pgd_range() & CoJan Beulich2008-07-241-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The double indirection here is not needed anywhere and hence (at least) confusing. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: fix stack excutability without PT_GNU_STACKHugh Dickins2008-07-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Kernel Bugzilla #11063 points out that on some architectures (e.g. x86_32) exec'ing an ELF without a PT_GNU_STACK program header should default to an executable stack; but this got broken by the unlimited argv feature because stack vma is now created before the right personality has been established: so breaking old binaries using nested function trampolines. Therefore re-evaluate VM_STACK_FLAGS in setup_arg_pages, where stack vm_flags used to be set, before the mprotect_fixup. Checking through our existing VM_flags, none would have changed since insert_vm_struct: so this seems safer than finding a way through the personality labyrinth. Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Include <asm/a.out.h> in fs/exec.c only for Alpha.David Woodhouse2008-06-161-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | We only need it for the /sbin/loader hack for OSF/1 executables, and we don't want to include it otherwise. While we're at it, remove the redundant '&& CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_AOUT' in the ifdef around that code. It's already dependent on __alpha__, and CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_AOUT is hard-coded to 'y' there. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Acked-by: Peter Korsgaard <jacmet@sunsite.dk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* posix timers: discard SI_TIMER signals on execOleg Nesterov2008-05-261-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on Roland's patch. This approach was suggested by Austin Clements from the very beginning, and then by Linus. As Austin pointed out, the execing task can be killed by SI_TIMER signal because exec flushes the signal handlers, but doesn't discard the pending signals generated by posix timers. Perhaps not a bug, but people find this surprising. See http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10460 Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Austin Clements <amdragon+kernelbugzilla@mit.edu> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] get rid of leak in compat_execve()Al Viro2008-05-161-4/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | Even though copy_compat_strings() doesn't cache the pages, copy_strings_kernel() and stuff indirectly called by e.g. ->load_binary() is doing that, so we need to drop the cache contents in the end. [found by WANG Cong <wangcong@zeuux.org>] Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* memcg: fix possible panic when CONFIG_MM_OWNER=yKOSAKI Motohiro2008-05-131-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When mm destruction happens, we should pass mm_update_next_owner() the old mm. But unfortunately new mm is passed in exec_mmap(). Thus, kernel panic is possible when a multi-threaded process uses exec(). Also, the owner member comment description is wrong. mm->owner does not necessarily point to the thread group leader. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Acked-by: Balbir Singh <balbir@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: "Paul Menage" <menage@google.com> Cc: "KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki" <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* [PATCH] split linux/file.hAl Viro2008-05-011-0/+1
| | | | | | Initial splitoff of the low-level stuff; taken to fdtable.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* document de_thread() with exit_notify() connectionOleg Nesterov2008-04-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | Add a couple of small comments, it is not easy to see what this code does. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* signals: de_thread: simplify the ->child_reaper switchingOleg Nesterov2008-04-301-13/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | Now that we rely on SIGNAL_UNKILLABLE flag, de_thread() doesn't need the nasty hack to kill the old ->child_reaper during the mt-exec. This also means we can avoid taking tasklist_lock around zap_other_threads(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* procfs task exe symlinkMatt Helsley2008-04-291-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The kernel implements readlink of /proc/pid/exe by getting the file from the first executable VMA. Then the path to the file is reconstructed and reported as the result. Because of the VMA walk the code is slightly different on nommu systems. This patch avoids separate /proc/pid/exe code on nommu systems. Instead of walking the VMAs to find the first executable file-backed VMA we store a reference to the exec'd file in the mm_struct. That reference would prevent the filesystem holding the executable file from being unmounted even after unmapping the VMAs. So we track the number of VM_EXECUTABLE VMAs and drop the new reference when the last one is unmapped. This avoids pinning the mounted filesystem. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: improve comments] [yamamoto@valinux.co.jp: fix dup_mmap] Signed-off-by: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc:"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com> Signed-off-by: YAMAMOTO Takashi <yamamoto@valinux.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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