| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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[ Upstream commit 7bc36e3ce91471b6377c8eadc0a2f220a2280083 ]
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c: In function ocfs2_xattr_bucket_find:
fs/ocfs2/xattr.c:3828:6: warning: variable last_hash set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
It's never used and can be removed.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190716132110.34836-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 8d33096a460d5b9bd13300f01615df5bb454db10 upstream.
We had a report of a server which did not do a DFS referral
because the session setup Capabilities field was set to 0
(unlike negotiate protocol where we set CAP_DFS). Better to
send it session setup in the capabilities as well (this also
more closely matches Windows client behavior).
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit e99c63e4d86d3a94818693147b469fa70de6f945 upstream.
Currently we skip SMB2_TREE_CONNECT command when checking during
reconnect because Tree Connect happens when establishing
an SMB session. For SMB 3.0 protocol version the code also calls
validate negotiate which results in SMB2_IOCL command being sent
over the wire. This may deadlock on trying to acquire a mutex when
checking for reconnect. Fix this by skipping SMB2_IOCL command
when doing the reconnect check.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <stfrench@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 055d88242a6046a1ceac3167290f054c72571cd9 ]
Support for handling the PPPOEIOCSFWD ioctl in compat mode was added in
linux-2.5.69 along with hundreds of other commands, but was always broken
sincen only the structure is compatible, but the command number is not,
due to the size being sizeof(size_t), or at first sizeof(sizeof((struct
sockaddr_pppox)), which is different on 64-bit architectures.
Guillaume Nault adds:
And the implementation was broken until 2016 (see 29e73269aa4d ("pppoe:
fix reference counting in PPPoE proxy")), and nobody ever noticed. I
should probably have removed this ioctl entirely instead of fixing it.
Clearly, it has never been used.
Fix it by adding a compat_ioctl handler for all pppoe variants that
translates the command number and then calls the regular ioctl function.
All other ioctl commands handled by pppoe are compatible between 32-bit
and 64-bit, and require compat_ptr() conversion.
This should apply to all stable kernels.
Acked-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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dumping
commit 04f5866e41fb70690e28397487d8bd8eea7d712a upstream.
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[akaher@vmware.com: stable 4.9 backport
- handle binder_update_page_range - mhocko@suse.com]
Signed-off-by: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit b4f9a1a87a48c255bb90d8a6c3d555a1abb88130 upstream.
When doing an incremental send operation we can fail if we previously did
deduplication operations against a file that exists in both snapshots. In
that case we will fail the send operation with -EIO and print a message
to dmesg/syslog like the following:
BTRFS error (device sdc): Send: inconsistent snapshot, found updated \
extent for inode 257 without updated inode item, send root is 258, \
parent root is 257
This requires that we deduplicate to the same file in both snapshots for
the same amount of times on each snapshot. The issue happens because a
deduplication only updates the iversion of an inode and does not update
any other field of the inode, therefore if we deduplicate the file on
each snapshot for the same amount of time, the inode will have the same
iversion value (stored as the "sequence" field on the inode item) on both
snapshots, therefore it will be seen as unchanged between in the send
snapshot while there are new/updated/deleted extent items when comparing
to the parent snapshot. This makes the send operation return -EIO and
print an error message.
Example reproducer:
$ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb
$ mount /dev/sdb /mnt
# Create our first file. The first half of the file has several 64Kb
# extents while the second half as a single 512Kb extent.
$ xfs_io -f -s -c "pwrite -S 0xb8 -b 64K 0 512K" /mnt/foo
$ xfs_io -c "pwrite -S 0xb8 512K 512K" /mnt/foo
# Create the base snapshot and the parent send stream from it.
$ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt /mnt/mysnap1
$ btrfs send -f /tmp/1.snap /mnt/mysnap1
# Create our second file, that has exactly the same data as the first
# file.
$ xfs_io -f -c "pwrite -S 0xb8 0 1M" /mnt/bar
# Create the second snapshot, used for the incremental send, before
# doing the file deduplication.
$ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt /mnt/mysnap2
# Now before creating the incremental send stream:
#
# 1) Deduplicate into a subrange of file foo in snapshot mysnap1. This
# will drop several extent items and add a new one, also updating
# the inode's iversion (sequence field in inode item) by 1, but not
# any other field of the inode;
#
# 2) Deduplicate into a different subrange of file foo in snapshot
# mysnap2. This will replace an extent item with a new one, also
# updating the inode's iversion by 1 but not any other field of the
# inode.
#
# After these two deduplication operations, the inode items, for file
# foo, are identical in both snapshots, but we have different extent
# items for this inode in both snapshots. We want to check this doesn't
# cause send to fail with an error or produce an incorrect stream.
$ xfs_io -r -c "dedupe /mnt/bar 0 0 512K" /mnt/mysnap1/foo
$ xfs_io -r -c "dedupe /mnt/bar 512K 512K 512K" /mnt/mysnap2/foo
# Create the incremental send stream.
$ btrfs send -p /mnt/mysnap1 -f /tmp/2.snap /mnt/mysnap2
ERROR: send ioctl failed with -5: Input/output error
This issue started happening back in 2015 when deduplication was updated
to not update the inode's ctime and mtime and update only the iversion.
Back then we would hit a BUG_ON() in send, but later in 2016 send was
updated to return -EIO and print the error message instead of doing the
BUG_ON().
A test case for fstests follows soon.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203933
Fixes: 1c919a5e13702c ("btrfs: don't update mtime/ctime on deduped inodes")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 02551c23bcd85f0c68a8259c7b953d49d44f86af ]
When fget fails, the lack of error-handling code may cause unexpected
results.
This patch adds error-handling code after calling fget.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/2514ec03df9c33b86e56748513267a80dd8004d9.1558117389.git.jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu
Signed-off-by: Zhouyang Jia <jiazhouyang09@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Harkes <jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Mikko Rapeli <mikko.rapeli@iki.fi>
Cc: Sam Protsenko <semen.protsenko@linaro.org>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3b421018f48c482bdc9650f894aa1747cf90e51d ]
The getxattr manpage states that we should return ERANGE if the
destination buffer size is too small to hold the value.
ceph_vxattrcb_layout does this internally, but we should be doing
this for all vxattrs.
Fix the only caller of getxattr_cb to check the returned size
against the buffer length and return -ERANGE if it doesn't fit.
Drop the same check in ceph_vxattrcb_layout and just rely on the
caller to handle it.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 749607731e26dfb2558118038c40e9c0c80d23b5 ]
This barrier only applies to the read-modify-write operations; in
particular, it does not apply to the atomic64_set() primitive.
Replace the barrier with an smp_mb().
Fixes: fdd4e15838e59 ("ceph: rework dcache readdir")
Reported-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Parri <andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com>
Reviewed-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0ee5f8ae082e1f675a2fb6db601c31ac9958a134 ]
The list of profiles in btrfs_chunk_max_errors lists DUP as a profile
DUP able to tolerate 1 device missing. Though this profile is special
with 2 copies, it still needs the device, unlike the others.
Looking at the history of changes, thre's no clear reason why DUP is
there, functions were refactored and blocks of code merged to one
helper.
d20983b40e828 Btrfs: fix writing data into the seed filesystem
- factor code to a helper
de11cc12df173 Btrfs: don't pre-allocate btrfs bio
- unrelated change, DUP still in the list with max errors 1
a236aed14ccb0 Btrfs: Deal with failed writes in mirrored configurations
- introduced the max errors, leaves DUP and RAID1 in the same group
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5808b14a1f52554de612fee85ef517199855e310 ]
Fix a use-after-free bug during filesystem initialisation, where we
access the disc record (which is stored in a buffer) after we have
released the buffer.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit d6e47819721ae2d9d090058ad5570a66f3c42e39 upstream.
ceph_d_revalidate(, LOOKUP_RCU) may call __ceph_caps_issued_mask()
on a freeing inode.
Signed-off-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 16d51a590a8ce3befb1308e0e7ab77f3b661af33 upstream.
When going through execve(), zero out the NUMA fault statistics instead of
freeing them.
During execve, the task is reachable through procfs and the scheduler. A
concurrent /proc/*/sched reader can read data from a freed ->numa_faults
allocation (confirmed by KASAN) and write it back to userspace.
I believe that it would also be possible for a use-after-free read to occur
through a race between a NUMA fault and execve(): task_numa_fault() can
lead to task_numa_compare(), which invokes task_weight() on the currently
running task of a different CPU.
Another way to fix this would be to make ->numa_faults RCU-managed or add
extra locking, but it seems easier to wipe the NUMA fault statistics on
execve.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Fixes: 82727018b0d3 ("sched/numa: Call task_numa_free() from do_execve()")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190716152047.14424-1-jannh@google.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d7852fbd0f0423937fa287a598bfde188bb68c22 upstream.
It turns out that 'access()' (and 'faccessat()') can cause a lot of RCU
work because it installs a temporary credential that gets allocated and
freed for each system call.
The allocation and freeing overhead is mostly benign, but because
credentials can be accessed under the RCU read lock, the freeing
involves a RCU grace period.
Which is not a huge deal normally, but if you have a lot of access()
calls, this causes a fair amount of seconday damage: instead of having a
nice alloc/free patterns that hits in hot per-CPU slab caches, you have
all those delayed free's, and on big machines with hundreds of cores,
the RCU overhead can end up being enormous.
But it turns out that all of this is entirely unnecessary. Exactly
because access() only installs the credential as the thread-local
subjective credential, the temporary cred pointer doesn't actually need
to be RCU free'd at all. Once we're done using it, we can just free it
synchronously and avoid all the RCU overhead.
So add a 'non_rcu' flag to 'struct cred', which can be set by users that
know they only use it in non-RCU context (there are other potential
users for this). We can make it a union with the rcu freeing list head
that we need for the RCU case, so this doesn't need any extra storage.
Note that this also makes 'get_current_cred()' clear the new non_rcu
flag, in case we have filesystems that take a long-term reference to the
cred and then expect the RCU delayed freeing afterwards. It's not
entirely clear that this is required, but it makes for clear semantics:
the subjective cred remains non-RCU as long as you only access it
synchronously using the thread-local accessors, but you _can_ use it as
a generic cred if you want to.
It is possible that we should just remove the whole RCU markings for
->cred entirely. Only ->real_cred is really supposed to be accessed
through RCU, and the long-term cred copies that nfs uses might want to
explicitly re-enable RCU freeing if required, rather than have
get_current_cred() do it implicitly.
But this is a "minimal semantic changes" change for the immediate
problem.
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Glauber <jglauber@marvell.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Jayachandran Chandrasekharan Nair <jnair@marvell.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f053cbd4366051d7eb6ba1b8d529d20f719c2963 ]
Fix the callback 9p passes to read_cache_page to actually have the
proper type expected. Casting around function pointers can easily
hide typing bugs, and defeats control flow protection.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520055731.24538-5-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 56f3ce675103e3fb9e631cfb4131fc768bc23e9a ]
blkoff_off might over 512 due to fs corrupt or security
vulnerability. That should be checked before being using.
Use ENTRIES_IN_SUM to protect invalid value in cur_data_blkoff.
Signed-off-by: Ocean Chen <oceanchen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3b2d4dcf71c4a91b420f835e52ddea8192300a3b ]
Since commit 10a68cdf10 (nfsd: fix performance-limiting session
calculation) (Linux 5.1-rc1 and 4.19.31), shares from NFS servers with
1 TB of memory cannot be mounted anymore. The mount just hangs on the
client.
The gist of commit 10a68cdf10 is the change below.
-avail = clamp_t(int, avail, slotsize, avail/3);
+avail = clamp_t(int, avail, slotsize, total_avail/3);
Here are the macros.
#define min_t(type, x, y) __careful_cmp((type)(x), (type)(y), <)
#define clamp_t(type, val, lo, hi) min_t(type, max_t(type, val, lo), hi)
`total_avail` is 8,434,659,328 on the 1 TB machine. `clamp_t()` casts
the values to `int`, which for 32-bit integers can only hold values
−2,147,483,648 (−2^31) through 2,147,483,647 (2^31 − 1).
`avail` (in the function signature) is just 65536, so that no overflow
was happening. Before the commit the assignment would result in 21845,
and `num = 4`.
When using `total_avail`, it is causing the assignment to be
18446744072226137429 (printed as %lu), and `num` is then 4164608182.
My next guess is, that `nfsd_drc_mem_used` is then exceeded, and the
server thinks there is no memory available any more for this client.
Updating the arguments of `clamp_t()` and `min_t()` to `unsigned long`
fixes the issue.
Now, `avail = 65536` (before commit 10a68cdf10 `avail = 21845`), but
`num = 4` remains the same.
Fixes: c54f24e338ed (nfsd: fix performance-limiting session calculation)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c54f24e338ed2a35218f117a4a1afb5f9e2b4e64 ]
We're unintentionally limiting the number of slots per nfsv4.1 session
to 10. Often more than 10 simultaneous RPCs are needed for the best
performance.
This calculation was meant to prevent any one client from using up more
than a third of the limit we set for total memory use across all clients
and sessions. Instead, it's limiting the client to a third of the
maximum for a single session.
Fix this.
Reported-by: Chris Tracy <ctracy@engr.scu.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: de766e570413 "nfsd: give out fewer session slots as limit approaches"
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit de766e570413bd0484af0b580299b495ada625c3 ]
Instead of granting client's full requests until we hit our DRC size
limit and then failing CREATE_SESSIONs (and hence mounts) completely,
start granting clients smaller slot tables as we approach the limit.
The factor chosen here is pretty much arbitrary.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 44d8660d3bb0a1c8363ebcb906af2343ea8e15f6 ]
An NFSv4.1+ client negotiates the size of its duplicate reply cache size
in the initial CREATE_SESSION request. The server preallocates the
memory for the duplicate reply cache to ensure that we'll never fail to
record the response to a nonidempotent operation.
To prevent a few CREATE_SESSIONs from consuming all of memory we set an
upper limit based on nr_free_buffer_pages(). 1/2^10 has been too
limiting in practice; 1/2^7 is still less than one percent.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8fd1ab747d2b1ec7ec663ad0b41a32eaa35117a8 ]
If the server that does not implement NFSv4.1 persistent session
semantics reboots while we are performing an exclusive create,
then the return value of NFS4ERR_DELAY when we replay the open
during the grace period causes us to lose the verifier.
When the grace period expires, and we present a new verifier,
the server will then correctly reply NFS4ERR_EXIST.
This commit ensures that we always present the same verifier when
replaying the OPEN.
Reported-by: Tigran Mkrtchyan <tigran.mkrtchyan@desy.de>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 4e19d6b65fb4fc42e352ce9883649e049da14743 upstream.
The largedir feature was intended to allow ext4 directories to have
unmapped directory blocks (e.g., directory holes). And so the
released e2fsprogs no longer enforces this for largedir file systems;
however, the corresponding change to the kernel-side code was not made.
This commit fixes this oversight.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 0bdf8a8245fdea6f075a5fede833a5fcf1b3466c upstream.
ECRYPTFS_SIZE_AND_MARKER_BYTES is type size_t, so if "rc" is negative
that gets type promoted to a high positive value and treated as success.
Fixes: 778aeb42a708 ("eCryptfs: Cleanup and optimize ecryptfs_lookup_interpose()")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
[tyhicks: Use "if/else if" rather than "if/if"]
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 7fa0a1da3dadfd9216df7745a1331fdaa0940d1c upstream.
Patch series "Coda updates".
The following patch series is a collection of various fixes for Coda,
most of which were collected from linux-fsdevel or linux-kernel but
which have as yet not found their way upstream.
This patch (of 22):
Various file systems expect that vma->vm_file points at their own file
handle, several use file_inode(vma->vm_file) to get at their inode or
use vma->vm_file->private_data. However the way Coda wrapped mmap on a
host file broke this assumption, vm_file was still pointing at the Coda
file and the host file systems would scribble over Coda's inode and
private file data.
This patch fixes the incorrect expectation and wraps vm_ops->open and
vm_ops->close to allow Coda to track when the vm_area_struct is
destroyed so we still release the reference on the Coda file handle at
the right time.
[This patch differs from the original upstream patch because older stable
kernels do not have the call_mmap vfs helper so we call f_ops->mmap
directly.]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0e850c6e59c0b147dc2dcd51a3af004c948c3697.1558117389.git.jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu
Signed-off-by: Jan Harkes <jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Cc: Mikko Rapeli <mikko.rapeli@iki.fi>
Cc: Sam Protsenko <semen.protsenko@linaro.org>
Cc: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
Cc: Zhouyang Jia <jiazhouyang09@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jan Harkes <jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 179006688a7e888cbff39577189f2e034786d06a upstream.
If the range for which we are punching a hole covers only part of a page,
we end up updating the inode item but we skip the update of the inode's
iversion, mtime and ctime. Fix that by ensuring we update those properties
of the inode.
A patch for fstests test case generic/059 that tests this as been sent
along with this fix.
Fixes: 2aaa66558172b0 ("Btrfs: add hole punching")
Fixes: e8c1c76e804b18 ("Btrfs: add missing inode update when punching hole")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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inodes.
commit 5ec27ec735ba0477d48c80561cc5e856f0c5dfaf upstream.
Normally, the inode's i_uid/i_gid are translated relative to s_user_ns,
but this is not a correct behavior for proc. Since sysctl permission
check in test_perm is done against GLOBAL_ROOT_[UG]ID, it makes more
sense to use these values in u_[ug]id of proc inodes. In other words:
although uid/gid in the inode is not read during test_perm, the inode
logically belongs to the root of the namespace. I have confirmed this
with Eric Biederman at LPC and in this thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/87k1kzjdff.fsf@xmission.com
Consequences
============
Since the i_[ug]id values of proc nodes are not used for permissions
checks, this change usually makes no functional difference. However, it
causes an issue in a setup where:
* a namespace container is created without root user in container -
hence the i_[ug]id of proc nodes are set to INVALID_[UG]ID
* container creator tries to configure it by writing /proc/sys files,
e.g. writing /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax to configure shared memory limit
Kernel does not allow to open an inode for writing if its i_[ug]id are
invalid, making it impossible to write shmmax and thus - configure the
container.
Using a container with no root mapping is apparently rare, but we do use
this configuration at Google. Also, we use a generic tool to configure
the container limits, and the inability to write any of them causes a
failure.
History
=======
The invalid uids/gids in inodes first appeared due to 81754357770e (fs:
Update i_[ug]id_(read|write) to translate relative to s_user_ns).
However, AFAIK, this did not immediately cause any issues. The
inability to write to these "invalid" inodes was only caused by a later
commit 0bd23d09b874 (vfs: Don't modify inodes with a uid or gid unknown
to the vfs).
Tested: Used a repro program that creates a user namespace without any
mapping and stat'ed /proc/$PID/root/proc/sys/kernel/shmmax from outside.
Before the change, it shows the overflow uid, with the change it's 0.
The overflow uid indicates that the uid in the inode is not correct and
thus it is not possible to open the file for writing.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190708115130.250149-1-rburny@google.com
Fixes: 0bd23d09b874 ("vfs: Don't modify inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs")
Signed-off-by: Radoslaw Burny <rburny@google.com>
Acked-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Cc: John Sperbeck <jsperbeck@google.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [4.8+]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 44942b4e457beda00981f616402a1a791e8c616e upstream.
According to the open() manpage, Linux reserves the access mode 3
to mean "check for read and write permission on the file and return
a file descriptor that can't be used for reading or writing."
Currently, the NFSv4 code will ask the server to open the file,
and will use an incorrect share access mode of 0. Since it has
an incorrect share access mode, the client later forgets to send
a corresponding close, meaning it can leak stateids on the server.
Fixes: ce4ef7c0a8a05 ("NFS: Split out NFS v4 file operations")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.6+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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arbitration
[ Upstream commit 6631142229005e1b1c311a09efe9fb3cfdac8559 ]
wbc_account_io() collects information on cgroup ownership of writeback
pages to determine which cgroup should own the inode. Pages can stay
associated with dead memcgs but we want to avoid attributing IOs to
dead blkcgs as much as possible as the association is likely to be
stale. However, currently, pages associated with dead memcgs
contribute to the accounting delaying and/or confusing the
arbitration.
Fix it by ignoring pages associated with dead memcgs.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 5858bdad4d0d0fc18bf29f34c3ac836e0b59441f upstream.
The directory may have been removed when entering
fscrypt_ioctl_set_policy(). If so, the empty_dir() check will return
error for ext4 file system.
ext4_rmdir() sets i_size = 0, then ext4_empty_dir() reports an error
because 'inode->i_size < EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(1) + EXT4_DIR_REC_LEN(2)'. If
the fs is mounted with errors=panic, it will trigger a panic issue.
Add the check IS_DEADDIR() to fix this problem.
Fixes: 9bd8212f981e ("ext4 crypto: add encryption policy and password salt support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.1+
Signed-off-by: Hongjie Fang <hongjiefang@asrmicro.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fa33cdbf3eceb0206a4f844fe91aeebcf6ff2b7a upstream.
In some cases, using the 'truncate' command to extend a UDF file results
in a mismatch between the length of the file's extents (specifically, due
to incorrect length of the final NOT_ALLOCATED extent) and the information
(file) length. The discrepancy can prevent other operating systems
(i.e., Windows 10) from opening the file.
Two particular errors have been observed when extending a file:
1. The final extent is larger than it should be, having been rounded up
to a multiple of the block size.
B. The final extent is not shorter than it should be, due to not having
been updated when the file's information length was increased.
[JK: simplified udf_do_extend_final_block(), fixed up some types]
Fixes: 2c948b3f86e5 ("udf: Avoid IO in udf_clear_inode")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <steve@digidescorp.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1561948775-5878-1-git-send-email-steve@digidescorp.com
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit debd1c065d2037919a7da67baf55cc683fee09f0 upstream.
Recent FITRIM work, namely bbbf7243d62d ("btrfs: combine device update
operations during transaction commit") combined the way certain
operations are recoded in a transaction. As a result an ASSERT was added
in dev_replace_finish to ensure the new code works correctly.
Unfortunately I got reports that it's possible to trigger the assert,
meaning that during a device replace it's possible to have an unfinished
chunk allocation on the source device.
This is supposed to be prevented by the fact that a transaction is
committed before finishing the replace oepration and alter acquiring the
chunk mutex. This is not sufficient since by the time the transaction is
committed and the chunk mutex acquired it's possible to allocate a chunk
depending on the workload being executed on the replaced device. This
bug has been present ever since device replace was introduced but there
was never code which checks for it.
The correct way to fix is to ensure that there is no pending device
modification operation when the chunk mutex is acquire and if there is
repeat transaction commit. Unfortunately it's not possible to just
exclude the source device from btrfs_fs_devices::dev_alloc_list since
this causes ENOSPC to be hit in transaction commit.
Fixing that in another way would need to add special cases to handle the
last writes and forbid new ones. The looped transaction fix is more
obvious, and can be easily backported. The runtime of dev-replace is
long so there's no noticeable delay caused by that.
Reported-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Fixes: 391cd9df81ac ("Btrfs: fix unprotected alloc list insertion during the finishing procedure of replace")
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov <nborisov@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 68f461593f76bd5f17e87cdd0bea28f4278c7268 upstream.
Fix a typo where we're confusing the default TCP retrans value
(NFS_DEF_TCP_RETRANS) for the default TCP timeout value.
Fixes: 15d03055cf39f ("pNFS/flexfiles: Set reasonable default ...")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.8+
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 867bfa4a5fcee66f2b25639acae718e8b28b25a5 upstream.
load_flat_shared_library() is broken: It only calls load_flat_file() if
prepare_binprm() returns zero, but prepare_binprm() returns the number of
bytes read - so this only happens if the file is empty.
Instead, call into load_flat_file() if the number of bytes read is
non-negative. (Even if the number of bytes is zero - in that case,
load_flat_file() will see nullbytes and return a nice -ENOEXEC.)
In addition, remove the code related to bprm creds and stop using
prepare_binprm() - this code is loading a library, not a main executable,
and it only actually uses the members "buf", "file" and "filename" of the
linux_binprm struct. Instead, call kernel_read() directly.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190524201817.16509-1-jannh@google.com
Fixes: 287980e49ffc ("remove lots of IS_ERR_VALUE abuses")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Nicolas Pitre <nicolas.pitre@linaro.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cb8f381f1613cafe3aec30809991cd56e7135d92 upstream.
0a1eb2d474ed ("fs/proc: Stop reporting eip and esp in /proc/PID/stat")
stopped reporting eip/esp and fd7d56270b52 ("fs/proc: Report eip/esp in
/prod/PID/stat for coredumping") reintroduced the feature to fix a
regression with userspace core dump handlers (such as minicoredumper).
Because PF_DUMPCORE is only set for the primary thread, this didn't fix
the original problem for secondary threads. Allow reporting the eip/esp
for all threads by checking for PF_EXITING as well. This is set for all
the other threads when they are killed. coredump_wait() waits for all the
tasks to become inactive before proceeding to invoke a core dumper.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87y32p7i7a.fsf@linutronix.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190522161614.628-1-jlu@pengutronix.de
Fixes: fd7d56270b526ca3 ("fs/proc: Report eip/esp in /prod/PID/stat for coredumping")
Signed-off-by: John Ogness <john.ogness@linutronix.de>
Reported-by: Jan Luebbe <jlu@pengutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jan Luebbe <jlu@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e02a53d92e197706cad1627bd84705d4aa20a145 ]
iattr is passed to v9fs_vfs_setattr_dotl which does send various
values from iattr over the wire, even if it tells the server to
only look at iattr.ia_valid fields this could leak some stack data.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536339057-21974-2-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.org
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1195601 ("Uninitalized scalar variable")
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit c4e0540d0ad49c8ceab06cceed1de27c4fe29f6e upstream.
Currently, btrfs does not consult seed devices to start readahead. As a
result, if readahead zone is added to the seed devices, btrfs_reada_wait()
indefinitely wait for the reada_ctl to finish.
You can reproduce the hung by modifying btrfs/163 to have larger initial
file size (e.g. xfs_io pwrite 4M instead of current 256K).
Fixes: 7414a03fbf9e ("btrfs: initial readahead code and prototypes")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.2+: ce7791ffee1e: Btrfs: fix race between readahead and device replace/removal
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.2+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <naohiro.aota@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f69e749a49353d96af1a293f56b5b56de59c668a upstream.
file_remove_privs() might be called for non-regular files, e.g.
blkdev inode. There is no reason to do its job on things
like blkdev inodes, pipes, or cdevs. Hence, abort if
file does not refer to a regular inode.
AV: more to the point, for devices there might be any number of
inodes refering to given device. Which one to strip the permissions
from, even if that made any sense in the first place? All of them
will be observed with contents modified, after all.
Found by LockDoc (Alexander Lochmann, Horst Schirmeier and Olaf
Spinczyk)
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Lochmann <alexander.lochmann@tu-dortmund.de>
Signed-off-by: Horst Schirmeier <horst.schirmeier@tu-dortmund.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f6122ed2a4f9c9c1c073ddf6308d1b2ac10e0781 ]
In the vfs_statx() context, during path lookup, the dentry gets
added to sd->s_dentry via configfs_attach_attr(). In the end,
vfs_statx() kills the dentry by calling path_put(), which invokes
configfs_d_iput(). Ideally, this dentry must be removed from
sd->s_dentry but it doesn't if the sd->s_count >= 3. As a result,
sd->s_dentry is holding reference to a stale dentry pointer whose
memory is already freed up. This results in use-after-free issue,
when this stale sd->s_dentry is accessed later in
configfs_readdir() path.
This issue can be easily reproduced, by running the LTP test case -
sh fs_racer_file_list.sh /config
(https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp/blob/master/testcases/kernel/fs/racer/fs_racer_file_list.sh)
Fixes: 76ae281f6307 ('configfs: fix race between dentry put and lookup')
Signed-off-by: Sahitya Tummala <stummala@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit be99ca2716972a712cde46092c54dee5e6192bf8 upstream.
ocfs2_dentry_attach_lock() can be executed in parallel threads against the
same dentry. Make that race safe. The race is like this:
thread A thread B
(A1) enter ocfs2_dentry_attach_lock,
seeing dentry->d_fsdata is NULL,
and no alias found by
ocfs2_find_local_alias, so kmalloc
a new ocfs2_dentry_lock structure
to local variable "dl", dl1
.....
(B1) enter ocfs2_dentry_attach_lock,
seeing dentry->d_fsdata is NULL,
and no alias found by
ocfs2_find_local_alias so kmalloc
a new ocfs2_dentry_lock structure
to local variable "dl", dl2.
......
(A2) set dentry->d_fsdata with dl1,
call ocfs2_dentry_lock() and increase
dl1->dl_lockres.l_ro_holders to 1 on
success.
......
(B2) set dentry->d_fsdata with dl2
call ocfs2_dentry_lock() and increase
dl2->dl_lockres.l_ro_holders to 1 on
success.
......
(A3) call ocfs2_dentry_unlock()
and decrease
dl2->dl_lockres.l_ro_holders to 0
on success.
....
(B3) call ocfs2_dentry_unlock(),
decreasing
dl2->dl_lockres.l_ro_holders, but
see it's zero now, panic
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190529174636.22364-1-wen.gang.wang@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Wengang Wang <wen.gang.wang@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Daniel Sobe <daniel.sobe@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Daniel Sobe <daniel.sobe@nxp.com>
Reviewed-by: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0b8f62625dc309651d0efcb6a6247c933acd8b45 ]
A fuzzer recently triggered lockdep warnings about potential sb_writers
deadlocks caused by fh_want_write().
Looks like we aren't careful to pair each fh_want_write() with an
fh_drop_write().
It's not normally a problem since fh_put() will call fh_drop_write() for
us. And was OK for NFSv3 where we'd do one operation that might call
fh_want_write(), and then put the filehandle.
But an NFSv4 protocol fuzzer can do weird things like call unlink twice
in a compound, and then we get into trouble.
I'm a little worried about this approach of just leaving everything to
fh_put(). But I think there are probably a lot of
fh_want_write()/fh_drop_write() imbalances so for now I think we need it
to be more forgiving.
Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 7640682e67b33cab8628729afec8ca92b851394f ]
FUSE filesystem server and kernel client negotiate during initialization
phase, what should be the maximum write size the client will ever issue.
Correspondingly the filesystem server then queues sys_read calls to read
requests with buffer capacity large enough to carry request header + that
max_write bytes. A filesystem server is free to set its max_write in
anywhere in the range between [1*page, fc->max_pages*page]. In particular
go-fuse[2] sets max_write by default as 64K, wheres default fc->max_pages
corresponds to 128K. Libfuse also allows users to configure max_write, but
by default presets it to possible maximum.
If max_write is < fc->max_pages*page, and in NOTIFY_RETRIEVE handler we
allow to retrieve more than max_write bytes, corresponding prepared
NOTIFY_REPLY will be thrown away by fuse_dev_do_read, because the
filesystem server, in full correspondence with server/client contract, will
be only queuing sys_read with ~max_write buffer capacity, and
fuse_dev_do_read throws away requests that cannot fit into server request
buffer. In turn the filesystem server could get stuck waiting indefinitely
for NOTIFY_REPLY since NOTIFY_RETRIEVE handler returned OK which is
understood by clients as that NOTIFY_REPLY was queued and will be sent
back.
Cap requested size to negotiate max_write to avoid the problem. This
aligns with the way NOTIFY_RETRIEVE handler works, which already
unconditionally caps requested retrieve size to fuse_conn->max_pages. This
way it should not hurt NOTIFY_RETRIEVE semantic if we return less data than
was originally requested.
Please see [1] for context where the problem of stuck filesystem was hit
for real, how the situation was traced and for more involving patch that
did not make it into the tree.
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-fsdevel&m=155057023600853&w=2
[2] https://github.com/hanwen/go-fuse
Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com>
Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
Cc: Jakob Unterwurzacher <jakobunt@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 35399f87e271f7cf3048eab00a421a6519ac8441 ]
In configfs_register_group(), if create_default_group() failed, we
forget to unlink the group. It will left a invalid item in the parent list,
which may trigger the use-after-free issue seen below:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __list_add_valid+0xd4/0xe0 lib/list_debug.c:26
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881ef61ae20 by task syz-executor.0/5996
CPU: 1 PID: 5996 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0xa9/0x10e lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description+0x65/0x270 mm/kasan/report.c:187
kasan_report+0x149/0x18d mm/kasan/report.c:317
__list_add_valid+0xd4/0xe0 lib/list_debug.c:26
__list_add include/linux/list.h:60 [inline]
list_add_tail include/linux/list.h:93 [inline]
link_obj+0xb0/0x190 fs/configfs/dir.c:759
link_group+0x1c/0x130 fs/configfs/dir.c:784
configfs_register_group+0x56/0x1e0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1751
configfs_register_default_group+0x72/0xc0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1834
? 0xffffffffc1be0000
iio_sw_trigger_init+0x23/0x1000 [industrialio_sw_trigger]
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f494ecbcc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f494ecbcc70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f494ecbd6bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Allocated by task 5987:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.3+0xa0/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:497
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:545 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:740 [inline]
configfs_register_default_group+0x4c/0xc0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1829
0xffffffffc1bd0023
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 5987:
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:87 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180 mm/kasan/common.c:459
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1429 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1456 [inline]
slab_free mm/slub.c:3003 [inline]
kfree+0xe1/0x270 mm/slub.c:3955
configfs_register_default_group+0x9a/0xc0 fs/configfs/dir.c:1836
0xffffffffc1bd0023
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:887
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881ef61ae00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-192 of size 192
The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of
192-byte region [ffff8881ef61ae00, ffff8881ef61aec0)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007bd8680 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8881f6c03000 index:0xffff8881ef61a700
flags: 0x2fffc0000000200(slab)
raw: 02fffc0000000200 ffffea0007ca4740 0000000500000005 ffff8881f6c03000
raw: ffff8881ef61a700 000000008010000c 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8881ef61ad00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffff8881ef61ad80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8881ef61ae00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8881ef61ae80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8881ef61af00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
Fixes: 5cf6a51e6062 ("configfs: allow dynamic group creation")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e95bcdb2fefa129f37bd9035af1d234ca92ee4ef ]
As Jungyeon reported in bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203233
- Overview
When mounting the attached crafted image and running program, following errors are reported.
Additionally, it hangs on sync after running program.
The image is intentionally fuzzed from a normal f2fs image for testing.
Compile options for F2FS are as follows.
CONFIG_F2FS_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS=y
- Reproduces
cc poc_13.c
mkdir test
mount -t f2fs tmp.img test
cp a.out test
cd test
sudo ./a.out
sync
- Kernel messages
F2FS-fs (sdb): Bitmap was wrongly set, blk:4608
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.c:2102!
RIP: 0010:update_sit_entry+0x394/0x410
Call Trace:
f2fs_allocate_data_block+0x16f/0x660
do_write_page+0x62/0x170
f2fs_do_write_node_page+0x33/0xa0
__write_node_page+0x270/0x4e0
f2fs_sync_node_pages+0x5df/0x670
f2fs_write_checkpoint+0x372/0x1400
f2fs_sync_fs+0xa3/0x130
f2fs_do_sync_file+0x1a6/0x810
do_fsync+0x33/0x60
__x64_sys_fsync+0xb/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
sit.vblocks and sum valid block count in sit.valid_map may be
inconsistent, segment w/ zero vblocks will be treated as free
segment, while allocating in free segment, we may allocate a
free block, if its bitmap is valid previously, it can cause
kernel crash due to bitmap verification failure.
Anyway, to avoid further serious metadata inconsistence and
corruption, it is necessary and worth to detect SIT
inconsistence. So let's enable check_block_count() to verify
vblocks and valid_map all the time rather than do it only
CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 546d22f070d64a7b96f57c93333772085d3a5e6d ]
As Jungyeon reported in bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203217
- Overview
When mounting the attached crafted image and running program, I got this error.
Additionally, it hangs on sync after running the program.
The image is intentionally fuzzed from a normal f2fs image for testing and I enabled option CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS on.
- Reproduces
cc poc_test_05.c
mkdir test
mount -t f2fs tmp.img test
sudo ./a.out
sync
- Messages
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/inode.c:707!
RIP: 0010:f2fs_evict_inode+0x33f/0x3a0
Call Trace:
evict+0xba/0x180
f2fs_iget+0x598/0xdf0
f2fs_lookup+0x136/0x320
__lookup_slow+0x92/0x140
lookup_slow+0x30/0x50
walk_component+0x1c1/0x350
path_lookupat+0x62/0x200
filename_lookup+0xb3/0x1a0
do_readlinkat+0x56/0x110
__x64_sys_readlink+0x16/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
During inode loading, __recover_inline_status() can recovery inode status
and set inode dirty, once we failed in following process, it will fail
the check in f2fs_evict_inode, result in trigger BUG_ON().
Let's clear dirty inode in error path of f2fs_iget() to avoid panic.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 22d61e286e2d9097dae36f75ed48801056b77cac ]
As Jungyeon reported in bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203227
- Overview
When mounting the attached crafted image, following errors are reported.
Additionally, it hangs on sync after trying to mount it.
The image is intentionally fuzzed from a normal f2fs image for testing.
Compile options for F2FS are as follows.
CONFIG_F2FS_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS=y
- Reproduces
mkdir test
mount -t f2fs tmp.img test
sync
- Messages
kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/recovery.c:549!
RIP: 0010:recover_data+0x167a/0x1780
Call Trace:
f2fs_recover_fsync_data+0x613/0x710
f2fs_fill_super+0x1043/0x1aa0
mount_bdev+0x16d/0x1a0
mount_fs+0x4a/0x170
vfs_kern_mount+0x5d/0x100
do_mount+0x200/0xcf0
ksys_mount+0x79/0xc0
__x64_sys_mount+0x1c/0x20
do_syscall_64+0x43/0xf0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
During recovery, if ofs_of_node is inconsistent in between recovered
node page and original checkpointed node page, let's just fail recovery
instead of making kernel panic.
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit bd8309de0d60838eef6fb575b0c4c7e95841cf73 ]
fsync() needs to make sure the data & meta-data of file are persistent
after the return of fsync(), even when a power-failure occurs later. In
the case of fat-fs, the FAT belongs to the meta-data of file, so we need
to issue a flush after the writeback of FAT instead before.
Also bail out early when any stage of fsync fails.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190409030158.136316-1-houtao1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit bbd84f33652f852ce5992d65db4d020aba21f882 upstream.
Starting from commit 9c225f2655e3 ("vfs: atomic f_pos accesses as per
POSIX") files opened even via nonseekable_open gate read and write via lock
and do not allow them to be run simultaneously. This can create read vs
write deadlock if a filesystem is trying to implement a socket-like file
which is intended to be simultaneously used for both read and write from
filesystem client. See commit 10dce8af3422 ("fs: stream_open - opener for
stream-like files so that read and write can run simultaneously without
deadlock") for details and e.g. commit 581d21a2d02a ("xenbus: fix deadlock
on writes to /proc/xen/xenbus") for a similar deadlock example on
/proc/xen/xenbus.
To avoid such deadlock it was tempting to adjust fuse_finish_open to use
stream_open instead of nonseekable_open on just FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flags,
but grepping through Debian codesearch shows users of FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE,
and in particular GVFS which actually uses offset in its read and write
handlers
https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=-%3Enonseekable+%3D
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1080
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1247-1346
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1399-1481
so if we would do such a change it will break a real user.
Add another flag (FOPEN_STREAM) for filesystem servers to indicate that the
opened handler is having stream-like semantics; does not use file position
and thus the kernel is free to issue simultaneous read and write request on
opened file handle.
This patch together with stream_open() should be added to stable kernels
starting from v3.14+. This will allow to patch OSSPD and other FUSE
filesystems that provide stream-like files to return FOPEN_STREAM |
FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE in open handler and this way avoid the deadlock on all
kernel versions. This should work because fuse_finish_open ignores unknown
open flags returned from a filesystem and so passing FOPEN_STREAM to a
kernel that is not aware of this flag cannot hurt. In turn the kernel that
is not aware of FOPEN_STREAM will be < v3.14 where just FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE
is sufficient to implement streams without read vs write deadlock.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.14+
Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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run simultaneously without deadlock
commit 10dce8af34226d90fa56746a934f8da5dcdba3df upstream.
Commit 9c225f2655e3 ("vfs: atomic f_pos accesses as per POSIX") added
locking for file.f_pos access and in particular made concurrent read and
write not possible - now both those functions take f_pos lock for the
whole run, and so if e.g. a read is blocked waiting for data, write will
deadlock waiting for that read to complete.
This caused regression for stream-like files where previously read and
write could run simultaneously, but after that patch could not do so
anymore. See e.g. commit 581d21a2d02a ("xenbus: fix deadlock on writes
to /proc/xen/xenbus") which fixes such regression for particular case of
/proc/xen/xenbus.
The patch that added f_pos lock in 2014 did so to guarantee POSIX thread
safety for read/write/lseek and added the locking to file descriptors of
all regular files. In 2014 that thread-safety problem was not new as it
was already discussed earlier in 2006.
However even though 2006'th version of Linus's patch was adding f_pos
locking "only for files that are marked seekable with FMODE_LSEEK (thus
avoiding the stream-like objects like pipes and sockets)", the 2014
version - the one that actually made it into the tree as 9c225f2655e3 -
is doing so irregardless of whether a file is seekable or not.
See
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/53022DB1.4070805@gmail.com/
https://lwn.net/Articles/180387
https://lwn.net/Articles/180396
for historic context.
The reason that it did so is, probably, that there are many files that
are marked non-seekable, but e.g. their read implementation actually
depends on knowing current position to correctly handle the read. Some
examples:
kernel/power/user.c snapshot_read
fs/debugfs/file.c u32_array_read
fs/fuse/control.c fuse_conn_waiting_read + ...
drivers/hwmon/asus_atk0110.c atk_debugfs_ggrp_read
arch/s390/hypfs/inode.c hypfs_read_iter
...
Despite that, many nonseekable_open users implement read and write with
pure stream semantics - they don't depend on passed ppos at all. And for
those cases where read could wait for something inside, it creates a
situation similar to xenbus - the write could be never made to go until
read is done, and read is waiting for some, potentially external, event,
for potentially unbounded time -> deadlock.
Besides xenbus, there are 14 such places in the kernel that I've found
with semantic patch (see below):
drivers/xen/evtchn.c:667:8-24: ERROR: evtchn_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/isdn/capi/capi.c:963:8-24: ERROR: capi_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/input/evdev.c:527:1-17: ERROR: evdev_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/char/pcmcia/cm4000_cs.c:1685:7-23: ERROR: cm4000_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
net/rfkill/core.c:1146:8-24: ERROR: rfkill_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/s390/char/fs3270.c:488:1-17: ERROR: fs3270_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/usb/misc/ldusb.c:310:1-17: ERROR: ld_usb_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/hid/uhid.c:635:1-17: ERROR: uhid_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
net/batman-adv/icmp_socket.c:80:1-17: ERROR: batadv_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/media/rc/lirc_dev.c:198:1-17: ERROR: lirc_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/leds/uleds.c:77:1-17: ERROR: uleds_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/input/misc/uinput.c:400:1-17: ERROR: uinput_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/infiniband/core/user_mad.c:985:7-23: ERROR: umad_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
drivers/gnss/core.c:45:1-17: ERROR: gnss_fops: .read() can deadlock .write()
In addition to the cases above another regression caused by f_pos
locking is that now FUSE filesystems that implement open with
FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, can no longer implement bidirectional
stream-like files - for the same reason as above e.g. read can deadlock
write locking on file.f_pos in the kernel.
FUSE's FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE was added in 2008 in a7c1b990f715 ("fuse:
implement nonseekable open") to support OSSPD. OSSPD implements /dev/dsp
in userspace with FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flag, with corresponding read and
write routines not depending on current position at all, and with both
read and write being potentially blocking operations:
See
https://github.com/libfuse/osspd
https://lwn.net/Articles/308445
https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1406
https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1438-L1477
https://github.com/libfuse/osspd/blob/14a9cff0/osspd.c#L1479-L1510
Corresponding libfuse example/test also describes FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE as
"somewhat pipe-like files ..." with read handler not using offset.
However that test implements only read without write and cannot exercise
the deadlock scenario:
https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L124-L131
https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L146-L163
https://github.com/libfuse/libfuse/blob/fuse-3.4.2-3-ga1bff7d/example/poll.c#L209-L216
I've actually hit the read vs write deadlock for real while implementing
my FUSE filesystem where there is /head/watch file, for which open
creates separate bidirectional socket-like stream in between filesystem
and its user with both read and write being later performed
simultaneously. And there it is semantically not easy to split the
stream into two separate read-only and write-only channels:
https://lab.nexedi.com/kirr/wendelin.core/blob/f13aa600/wcfs/wcfs.go#L88-169
Let's fix this regression. The plan is:
1. We can't change nonseekable_open to include &~FMODE_ATOMIC_POS -
doing so would break many in-kernel nonseekable_open users which
actually use ppos in read/write handlers.
2. Add stream_open() to kernel to open stream-like non-seekable file
descriptors. Read and write on such file descriptors would never use
nor change ppos. And with that property on stream-like files read and
write will be running without taking f_pos lock - i.e. read and write
could be running simultaneously.
3. With semantic patch search and convert to stream_open all in-kernel
nonseekable_open users for which read and write actually do not
depend on ppos and where there is no other methods in file_operations
which assume @offset access.
4. Add FOPEN_STREAM to fs/fuse/ and open in-kernel file-descriptors via
steam_open if that bit is present in filesystem open reply.
It was tempting to change fs/fuse/ open handler to use stream_open
instead of nonseekable_open on just FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE flags, but
grepping through Debian codesearch shows users of FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE,
and in particular GVFS which actually uses offset in its read and
write handlers
https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=-%3Enonseekable+%3D
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1080
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1247-1346
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gvfs/blob/1.40.0-6-gcbc54396/client/gvfsfusedaemon.c#L1399-1481
so if we would do such a change it will break a real user.
5. Add stream_open and FOPEN_STREAM handling to stable kernels starting
from v3.14+ (the kernel where 9c225f2655 first appeared).
This will allow to patch OSSPD and other FUSE filesystems that
provide stream-like files to return FOPEN_STREAM | FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE
in their open handler and this way avoid the deadlock on all kernel
versions. This should work because fs/fuse/ ignores unknown open
flags returned from a filesystem and so passing FOPEN_STREAM to a
kernel that is not aware of this flag cannot hurt. In turn the kernel
that is not aware of FOPEN_STREAM will be < v3.14 where just
FOPEN_NONSEEKABLE is sufficient to implement streams without read vs
write deadlock.
This patch adds stream_open, converts /proc/xen/xenbus to it and adds
semantic patch to automatically locate in-kernel places that are either
required to be converted due to read vs write deadlock, or that are just
safe to be converted because read and write do not use ppos and there
are no other funky methods in file_operations.
Regarding semantic patch I've verified each generated change manually -
that it is correct to convert - and each other nonseekable_open instance
left - that it is either not correct to convert there, or that it is not
converted due to current stream_open.cocci limitations.
The script also does not convert files that should be valid to convert,
but that currently have .llseek = noop_llseek or generic_file_llseek for
unknown reason despite file being opened with nonseekable_open (e.g.
drivers/input/mousedev.c)
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Yongzhi Pan <panyongzhi@gmail.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Julia Lawall <Julia.Lawall@lip6.fr>
Cc: Nikolaus Rath <Nikolaus@rath.org>
Cc: Han-Wen Nienhuys <hanwen@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Smelkov <kirr@nexedi.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 35d6fcbb7c3e296a52136347346a698a35af3fda upstream.
Do the proper cleanup in case the size check fails.
Tested with xfstests:generic/228
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: 0cbade024ba5 ("fuse: honor RLIMIT_FSIZE in fuse_file_fallocate")
Cc: Liu Bo <bo.liu@linux.alibaba.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.5
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 15fab63e1e57be9fdb5eec1bbc5916e9825e9acb upstream.
Change pipe_buf_get() to return a bool indicating whether it succeeded
in raising the refcount of the page (if the thing in the pipe is a page).
This removes another mechanism for overflowing the page refcount. All
callers converted to handle a failure.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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