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* lockd: double unregister of inetaddr notifiersVasily Averin2017-11-301-11/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit dc3033e16c59a2c4e62b31341258a5786cbcee56 upstream. lockd_up() can call lockd_unregister_notifiers twice: inside lockd_start_svc() when it calls lockd_svc_exit_thread() and then in error path of lockd_up() Patch forces lockd_start_svc() to unregister notifiers in all error cases and removes extra unregister in error path of lockd_up(). Fixes: cb7d224f82e4 "lockd: unregister notifier blocks if the service ..." Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* fs/9p: Compare qid.path in v9fs_test_inodeTuomas Tynkkynen2017-11-302-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 8ee031631546cf2f7859cc69593bd60bbdd70b46 upstream. Commit fd2421f54423 ("fs/9p: When doing inode lookup compare qid details and inode mode bits.") transformed v9fs_qid_iget() to use iget5_locked() instead of iget_locked(). However, the test() callback is not checking fid.path at all, which means that a lookup in the inode cache can now accidentally locate a completely wrong inode from the same inode hash bucket if the other fields (qid.type and qid.version) match. Fixes: fd2421f54423 ("fs/9p: When doing inode lookup compare qid details and inode mode bits.") Reviewed-by: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net> Signed-off-by: Tuomas Tynkkynen <tuomas@tuxera.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ext4: fix interaction between i_size, fallocate, and delalloc after a crashTheodore Ts'o2017-11-301-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 51e3ae81ec58e95f10a98ef3dd6d7bce5d8e35a2 upstream. If there are pending writes subject to delayed allocation, then i_size will show size after the writes have completed, while i_disksize contains the value of i_size on the disk (since the writes have not been persisted to disk). If fallocate(2) is called with the FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE flag, either with or without the FALLOC_FL_ZERO_RANGE flag set, and the new size after the fallocate(2) is between i_size and i_disksize, then after a crash, if a journal commit has resulted in the changes made by the fallocate() call to be persisted after a crash, but the delayed allocation write has not resolved itself, i_size would not be updated, and this would cause the following e2fsck complaint: Inode 12, end of extent exceeds allowed value (logical block 33, physical block 33441, len 7) This can only take place on a sparse file, where the fallocate(2) call is allocating blocks in a range which is before a pending delayed allocation write which is extending i_size. Since this situation is quite rare, and the window in which the crash must take place is typically < 30 seconds, in practice this condition will rarely happen. Nevertheless, it can be triggered in testing, and in particular by xfstests generic/456. Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Reported-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* nfsd: deal with revoked delegations appropriatelyAndrew Elble2017-11-301-1/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 95da1b3a5aded124dd1bda1e3cdb876184813140 upstream. If a delegation has been revoked by the server, operations using that delegation should error out with NFS4ERR_DELEG_REVOKED in the >4.1 case, and NFS4ERR_BAD_STATEID otherwise. The server needs NFSv4.1 clients to explicitly free revoked delegations. If the server returns NFS4ERR_DELEG_REVOKED, the client will do that; otherwise it may just forget about the delegation and be unable to recover when it later sees SEQ4_STATUS_RECALLABLE_STATE_REVOKED set on a SEQUENCE reply. That can cause the Linux 4.1 client to loop in its stage manager. Signed-off-by: Andrew Elble <aweits@rit.edu> Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* NFS: Avoid RCU usage in tracepointsAnna Schumaker2017-11-301-18/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3944369db701f075092357b511fd9f5755771585 upstream. There isn't an obvious way to acquire and release the RCU lock during a tracepoint, so we can't use the rpc_peeraddr2str() function here. Instead, rely on the client's cl_hostname, which should have similar enough information without needing an rcu_dereference(). Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@codemonkey.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* nfs: Fix ugly referral attributesChuck Lever2017-11-301-10/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c05cefcc72416a37eba5a2b35f0704ed758a9145 upstream. Before traversing a referral and performing a mount, the mounted-on directory looks strange: dr-xr-xr-x. 2 4294967294 4294967294 0 Dec 31 1969 dir.0 nfs4_get_referral is wiping out any cached attributes with what was returned via GETATTR(fs_locations), but the bit mask for that operation does not request any file attributes. Retrieve owner and timestamp information so that the memcpy in nfs4_get_referral fills in more attributes. Changes since v1: - Don't request attributes that the client unconditionally replaces - Request only MOUNTED_ON_FILEID or FILEID attribute, not both - encode_fs_locations() doesn't use the third bitmask word Fixes: 6b97fd3da1ea ("NFSv4: Follow a referral") Suggested-by: Pradeep Thomas <pradeepthomas@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* NFS: Fix typo in nomigration mount optionJoshua Watt2017-11-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | commit f02fee227e5f21981152850744a6084ff3fa94ee upstream. The option was incorrectly masking off all other options. Signed-off-by: Joshua Watt <JPEWhacker@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* isofs: fix timestamps beyond 2027Arnd Bergmann2017-11-303-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 34be4dbf87fc3e474a842305394534216d428f5d upstream. isofs uses a 'char' variable to load the number of years since 1900 for an inode timestamp. On architectures that use a signed char type by default, this results in an invalid date for anything beyond 2027. This changes the function argument to a 'u8' array, which is defined the same way on all architectures, and unambiguously lets us use years until 2155. This should be backported to all kernels that might still be in use by that date. Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* eCryptfs: use after free in ecryptfs_release_messaging()Dan Carpenter2017-11-301-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit db86be3a12d0b6e5c5b51c2ab2a48f06329cb590 upstream. We're freeing the list iterator so we should be using the _safe() version of hlist_for_each_entry(). Fixes: 88b4a07e6610 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key transport mechanism") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* nilfs2: fix race condition that causes file system corruptionAndreas Rohner2017-11-301-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 31ccb1f7ba3cfe29631587d451cf5bb8ab593550 upstream. There is a race condition between nilfs_dirty_inode() and nilfs_set_file_dirty(). When a file is opened, nilfs_dirty_inode() is called to update the access timestamp in the inode. It calls __nilfs_mark_inode_dirty() in a separate transaction. __nilfs_mark_inode_dirty() caches the ifile buffer_head in the i_bh field of the inode info structure and marks it as dirty. After some data was written to the file in another transaction, the function nilfs_set_file_dirty() is called, which adds the inode to the ns_dirty_files list. Then the segment construction calls nilfs_segctor_collect_dirty_files(), which goes through the ns_dirty_files list and checks the i_bh field. If there is a cached buffer_head in i_bh it is not marked as dirty again. Since nilfs_dirty_inode() and nilfs_set_file_dirty() use separate transactions, it is possible that a segment construction that writes out the ifile occurs in-between the two. If this happens the inode is not on the ns_dirty_files list, but its ifile block is still marked as dirty and written out. In the next segment construction, the data for the file is written out and nilfs_bmap_propagate() updates the b-tree. Eventually the bmap root is written into the i_bh block, which is not dirty, because it was written out in another segment construction. As a result the bmap update can be lost, which leads to file system corruption. Either the virtual block address points to an unallocated DAT block, or the DAT entry will be reused for something different. The error can remain undetected for a long time. A typical error message would be one of the "bad btree" errors or a warning that a DAT entry could not be found. This bug can be reproduced reliably by a simple benchmark that creates and overwrites millions of 4k files. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1509367935-3086-2-git-send-email-konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp Signed-off-by: Andreas Rohner <andreas.rohner@gmx.net> Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp> Tested-by: Andreas Rohner <andreas.rohner@gmx.net> Tested-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* autofs: don't fail mount for transient errorNeilBrown2017-11-301-1/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit ecc0c469f27765ed1e2b967be0aa17cee1a60b76 upstream. Currently if the autofs kernel module gets an error when writing to the pipe which links to the daemon, then it marks the whole moutpoint as catatonic, and it will stop working. It is possible that the error is transient. This can happen if the daemon is slow and more than 16 requests queue up. If a subsequent process tries to queue a request, and is then signalled, the write to the pipe will return -ERESTARTSYS and autofs will take that as total failure. So change the code to assess -ERESTARTSYS and -ENOMEM as transient failures which only abort the current request, not the whole mountpoint. It isn't a crash or a data corruption, but having autofs mountpoints suddenly stop working is rather inconvenient. Ian said: : And given the problems with a half dozen (or so) user space applications : consuming large amounts of CPU under heavy mount and umount activity this : could happen more easily than we expect. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/87y3norvgp.fsf@notabene.neil.brown.name Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* coda: fix 'kernel memory exposure attempt' in fsyncJan Harkes2017-11-241-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d337b66a4c52c7b04eec661d86c2ef6e168965a2 upstream. When an application called fsync on a file in Coda a small request with just the file identifier was allocated, but the declared length was set to the size of union of all possible upcall requests. This bug has been around for a very long time and is now caught by the extra checking in usercopy that was introduced in Linux-4.8. The exposure happens when the Coda cache manager process reads the fsync upcall request at which point it is killed. As a result there is nobody servicing any further upcalls, trapping any processes that try to access the mounted Coda filesystem. Signed-off-by: Jan Harkes <jaharkes@cs.cmu.edu> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()alex chen2017-11-241-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 28f5a8a7c033cbf3e32277f4cc9c6afd74f05300 upstream. we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen: process 1 process 2 process 3 truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages ocfs2_setattr ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker ocfs2_inode_lock_full inode_dio_wait __inode_dio_wait -->waiting for all dio requests finish dlm_proxy_ast_handler dlm_do_local_bast ocfs2_blocking_ast ocfs2_generic_handle_bast set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag dio_end_io dio_bio_end_aio dio_complete ocfs2_dio_end_io ocfs2_dio_end_io_write ocfs2_inode_lock __ocfs2_cluster_lock ocfs2_wait_for_mask -->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag to be cleared, that is waiting for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock inode_dio_end -->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never be called, so a deadlock happened. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com> Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ocfs2: fix cluster hang after a node diesChangwei Ge2017-11-241-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 1c01967116a678fed8e2c68a6ab82abc8effeddc upstream. When a node dies, other live nodes have to choose a new master for an existed lock resource mastered by the dead node. As for ocfs2/dlm implementation, this is done by function - dlm_move_lockres_to_recovery_list which marks those lock rsources as DLM_LOCK_RES_RECOVERING and manages them via a list from which DLM changes lock resource's master later. So without invoking dlm_move_lockres_to_recovery_list, no master will be choosed after dlm recovery accomplishment since no lock resource can be found through ::resource list. What's worse is that if DLM_LOCK_RES_RECOVERING is not marked for lock resources mastered a dead node, it will break up synchronization among nodes. So invoke dlm_move_lockres_to_recovery_list again. Fixs: 'commit ee8f7fcbe638 ("ocfs2/dlm: continue to purge recovery lockres when recovery master goes down")' Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/63ADC13FD55D6546B7DECE290D39E373CED6E0F9@H3CMLB14-EX.srv.huawei-3com.com Signed-off-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com> Reported-by: Vitaly Mayatskih <v.mayatskih@gmail.com> Tested-by: Vitaly Mayatskikh <v.mayatskih@gmail.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown idsSeth Forshee2017-11-081-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 1328c727004d432bbdfba0ffa02a166df04c7305 ] may_create() rejects creation of inodes with ids which lack a mapping into s_user_ns. However for O_CREAT may_o_create() is is used instead. Add a similar check there. Fixes: 036d523641c6 ("vfs: Don't create inodes with a uid or gid unknown to the vfs") Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ext4: do not use stripe_width if it is not setJan Kara2017-11-081-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 5469d7c3087ecaf760f54b447f11af6061b7c897 ] Avoid using stripe_width for sbi->s_stripe value if it is not actually set. It prevents using the stride for sbi->s_stripe. Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ext4: fix stripe-unaligned allocationsJan Kara2017-11-081-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit d9b22cf9f5466a057f2a4f1e642b469fa9d73117 ] When a filesystem is created using: mkfs.ext4 -b 4096 -E stride=512 <dev> and we try to allocate 64MB extent, we will end up directly in ext4_mb_complex_scan_group(). This is because the request is detected as power-of-two allocation (so we start in ext4_mb_regular_allocator() with ac_criteria == 0) however the check before ext4_mb_simple_scan_group() refuses the direct buddy scan because the allocation request is too large. Since cr == 0, the check whether we should use ext4_mb_scan_aligned() fails as well and we fall back to ext4_mb_complex_scan_group(). Fix the problem by checking for upper limit on power-of-two requests directly when detecting them. Reported-by: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ocfs2: fstrim: Fix start offset of first cluster group during fstrimAshish Samant2017-11-081-6/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 105ddc93f06ebe3e553f58563d11ed63dbcd59f0 upstream. The first cluster group descriptor is not stored at the start of the group but at an offset from the start. We need to take this into account while doing fstrim on the first cluster group. Otherwise we will wrongly start fstrim a few blocks after the desired start block and the range can cross over into the next cluster group and zero out the group descriptor there. This can cause filesytem corruption that cannot be fixed by fsck. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507835579-7308-1-git-send-email-ashish.samant@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Ashish Samant <ashish.samant@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* cifs: check MaxPathNameComponentLength != 0 before using itRonnie Sahlberg2017-11-081-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | commit f74bc7c6679200a4a83156bb89cbf6c229fe8ec0 upstream. And fix tcon leak in error path. Signed-off-by: Ronnie Sahlberg <lsahlber@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <ddiss@samba.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ecryptfs: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payloadEric Biggers2017-11-022-8/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f66665c09ab489a11ca490d6a82df57cfc1bea3e upstream. In eCryptfs, we failed to verify that the authentication token keys are not revoked before dereferencing their payloads, which is problematic because the payload of a revoked key is NULL. request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a window where the key can be revoked before we acquire the key semaphore. Fix it by updating ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data() to return -EKEYREVOKED if the key payload is NULL. For completeness we check this for "encrypted" keys as well as "user" keys, although encrypted keys cannot be revoked currently. Alternatively we could use key_validate(), but since we'll also need to fix ecryptfs_get_key_payload_data() to validate the payload length, it seems appropriate to just check the payload pointer. Fixes: 237fead61998 ("[PATCH] ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig") Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* fuse: fix READDIRPLUS skipping an entryMiklos Szeredi2017-11-021-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c6cdd51404b7ac12dd95173ddfc548c59ecf037f upstream. Marios Titas running a Haskell program noticed a problem with fuse's readdirplus: when it is interrupted by a signal, it skips one directory entry. The reason is that fuse erronously updates ctx->pos after a failed dir_emit(). The issue originates from the patch adding readdirplus support. Reported-by: Jakob Unterwurzacher <jakobunt@gmail.com> Tested-by: Marios Titas <redneb@gmx.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com> Fixes: 0b05b18381ee ("fuse: implement NFS-like readdirplus support") Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ceph: unlock dangling spinlock in try_flush_caps()Jeff Layton2017-11-021-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 6c2838fbdedb9b72a81c931d49e56b229b6cdbca upstream. sparse warns: fs/ceph/caps.c:2042:9: warning: context imbalance in 'try_flush_caps' - wrong count at exit We need to exit this function with the lock unlocked, but a couple of cases leave it locked. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: "Yan, Zheng" <zyan@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* FS-Cache: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payloadEric Biggers2017-10-271-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d124b2c53c7bee6569d2a2d0b18b4a1afde00134 upstream. When the file /proc/fs/fscache/objects (available with CONFIG_FSCACHE_OBJECT_LIST=y) is opened, we request a user key with description "fscache:objlist", then access its payload. However, a revoked key has a NULL payload, and we failed to check for this. request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a window where the key can be revoked before we access its payload. Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was already revoked at the time it was requested. Fixes: 4fbf4291aa15 ("FS-Cache: Allow the current state of all objects to be dumped") Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* fscrypt: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payloadEric Biggers2017-10-271-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d60b5b7854c3d135b869f74fb93eaf63cbb1991a upstream. When an fscrypt-encrypted file is opened, we request the file's master key from the keyrings service as a logon key, then access its payload. However, a revoked key has a NULL payload, and we failed to check for this. request_key() *does* skip revoked keys, but there is still a window where the key can be revoked before we acquire its semaphore. Fix it by checking for a NULL payload, treating it like a key which was already revoked at the time it was requested. Fixes: 88bd6ccdcdd6 ("ext4 crypto: add encryption key management facilities") Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfs: trim writepage mapping to within eofBrian Foster2017-10-273-0/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 40214d128e07dd21bb07a8ed6a7fe2f911281ab2 upstream. The writeback rework in commit fbcc02561359 ("xfs: Introduce writeback context for writepages") introduced a subtle change in behavior with regard to the block mapping used across the ->writepages() sequence. The previous xfs_cluster_write() code would only flush pages up to EOF at the time of the writepage, thus ensuring that any pages due to file-extending writes would be handled on a separate cycle and with a new, updated block mapping. The updated code establishes a block mapping in xfs_writepage_map() that could extend beyond EOF if the file has post-eof preallocation. Because we now use the generic writeback infrastructure and pass the cached mapping to each writepage call, there is no implicit EOF limit in place. If eofblocks trimming occurs during ->writepages(), any post-eof portion of the cached mapping becomes invalid. The eofblocks code has no means to serialize against writeback because there are no pages associated with post-eof blocks. Therefore if an eofblocks trim occurs and is followed by a file-extending buffered write, not only has the mapping become invalid, but we could end up writing a page to disk based on the invalid mapping. Consider the following sequence of events: - A buffered write creates a delalloc extent and post-eof speculative preallocation. - Writeback starts and on the first writepage cycle, the delalloc extent is converted to real blocks (including the post-eof blocks) and the mapping is cached. - The file is closed and xfs_release() trims post-eof blocks. The cached writeback mapping is now invalid. - Another buffered write appends the file with a delalloc extent. - The concurrent writeback cycle picks up the just written page because the writeback range end is LLONG_MAX. xfs_writepage_map() attributes it to the (now invalid) cached mapping and writes the data to an incorrect location on disk (and where the file offset is still backed by a delalloc extent). This problem is reproduced by xfstests test generic/464, which triggers racing writes, appends, open/closes and writeback requests. To address this problem, trim the mapping used during writeback to within EOF when the mapping is validated. This ensures the mapping is revalidated for any pages encountered beyond EOF as of the time the current mapping was cached or last validated. Reported-by: Eryu Guan <eguan@redhat.com> Diagnosed-by: Eryu Guan <eguan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfs: cancel dirty pages on invalidationDave Chinner2017-10-271-12/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 793d7dbe6d82a50b9d14bf992b9eaacb70a11ce6 upstream. Recently we've had warnings arise from the vm handing us pages without bufferheads attached to them. This should not ever occur in XFS, but we don't defend against it properly if it does. The only place where we remove bufferheads from a page is in xfs_vm_releasepage(), but we can't tell the difference here between "page is dirty so don't release" and "page is dirty but is being invalidated so release it". In some places that are invalidating pages ask for pages to be released and follow up afterward calling ->releasepage by checking whether the page was dirty and then aborting the invalidation. This is a possible vector for releasing buffers from a page but then leaving it in the mapping, so we really do need to avoid dirty pages in xfs_vm_releasepage(). To differentiate between invalidated pages and normal pages, we need to clear the page dirty flag when invalidating the pages. This can be done through xfs_vm_invalidatepage(), and will result xfs_vm_releasepage() seeing the page as clean which matches the bufferhead state on the page after calling block_invalidatepage(). Hence we can re-add the page dirty check in xfs_vm_releasepage to catch the case where we might be releasing a page that is actually dirty and so should not have the bufferheads on it removed. This will remove one possible vector of "dirty page with no bufferheads" and so help narrow down the search for the root cause of that problem. Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfs: handle error if xfs_btree_get_bufs failsEric Sandeen2017-10-271-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 93e8befc17f6d6ea92b0aee3741ceac8bca4590f upstream. Jason reported that a corrupted filesystem failed to replay the log with a metadata block out of bounds warning: XFS (dm-2): _xfs_buf_find: Block out of range: block 0x80270fff8, EOFS 0x9c40000 _xfs_buf_find() and xfs_btree_get_bufs() return NULL if that happens, and then when xfs_alloc_fix_freelist() calls xfs_trans_binval() on that NULL bp, we oops with: BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000000f8 We don't handle _xfs_buf_find errors very well, every caller higher up the stack gets to guess at why it failed. But we should at least handle it somehow, so return EFSCORRUPTED here. Reported-by: Jason L Tibbitts III <tibbs@math.uh.edu> Signed-off-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfs: reinit btree pointer on attr tree inactivation walkBrian Foster2017-10-271-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f35c5e10c6ed6ba52a8dd8573924a80b6a02f03f upstream. xfs_attr3_root_inactive() walks the attr fork tree to invalidate the associated blocks. xfs_attr3_node_inactive() recursively descends from internal blocks to leaf blocks, caching block address values along the way to revisit parent blocks, locate the next entry and descend down that branch of the tree. The code that attempts to reread the parent block is unsafe because it assumes that the local xfs_da_node_entry pointer remains valid after an xfs_trans_brelse() and re-read of the parent buffer. Under heavy memory pressure, it is possible that the buffer has been reclaimed and reallocated by the time the parent block is reread. This means that 'btree' can point to an invalid memory address, lead to a random/garbage value for child_fsb and cause the subsequent read of the attr fork to go off the rails and return a NULL buffer for an attr fork offset that is most likely not allocated. Note that this problem can be manufactured by setting XFS_ATTR_BTREE_REF to 0 to prevent LRU caching of attr buffers, creating a file with a multi-level attr fork and removing it to trigger inactivation. To address this problem, reinit the node/btree pointers to the parent buffer after it has been re-read. This ensures btree points to a valid record and allows the walk to proceed. Signed-off-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfs: don't change inode mode if ACL update failsDave Chinner2017-10-271-6/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 67f2ffe31d1a683170c2ba0ecc643e42a5fdd397 upstream. If we get ENOSPC half way through setting the ACL, the inode mode can still be changed even though the ACL does not exist. Reorder the operation to only change the mode of the inode if the ACL is set correctly. Whilst this does not fix the problem with crash consistency (that requires attribute addition to be a deferred op) it does prevent ENOSPC and other non-fatal errors setting an xattr to be handled sanely. This fixes xfstests generic/449. Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfs: move more RT specific code under CONFIG_XFS_RTDave Chinner2017-10-272-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit bb9c2e5433250f5b477035dc478314f8e6dd5e36 upstream. Various utility functions and interfaces that iterate internal devices try to reference the realtime device even when RT support is not compiled into the kernel. Make sure this code is excluded from the CONFIG_XFS_RT=n build, and where appropriate stub functions to return fatal errors if they ever get called when RT support is not present. Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfs: Don't log uninitialised fields in inode structuresDave Chinner2017-10-273-62/+51
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 20413e37d71befd02b5846acdaf5e2564dd1c38e upstream. Prevent kmemcheck from throwing warnings about reading uninitialised memory when formatting inodes into the incore log buffer. There are several issues here - we don't always log all the fields in the inode log format item, and we never log the inode the di_next_unlinked field. In the case of the inode log format item, this is exacerbated by the old xfs_inode_log_format structure padding issue. Hence make the padded, 64 bit aligned version of the structure the one we always use for formatting the log and get rid of the 64 bit variant. This means we'll always log the 64-bit version and so recovery only needs to convert from the unpadded 32 bit version from older 32 bit kernels. Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Tested-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfs: handle racy AIO in xfs_reflink_end_cowChristoph Hellwig2017-10-271-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e12199f85d0ad1b04ce6c425ad93cd847fe930bb upstream. If we got two AIO writes into a COW area the second one might not have any COW extents left to convert. Handle that case gracefully instead of triggering an assert or accessing beyond the bounds of the extent list. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfs: always swap the cow forks when swapping extentsDarrick J. Wong2017-10-271-2/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 52bfcdd7adbc26639bc7b2356ab9a3f5dad68ad6 upstream. Since the CoW fork exists as a secondary data structure to the data fork, we must always swap cow forks during swapext. We also need to swap the extent counts and reset the cowblocks tags. Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfs: Capture state of the right inode in xfs_iflush_doneCarlos Maiolino2017-10-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 842f6e9f786226c58fcbd5ef80eadca72fdfe652 upstream. My previous patch: d3a304b6292168b83b45d624784f973fdc1ca674 check for XFS_LI_FAILED flag xfs_iflush done, so the failed item can be properly resubmitted. In the loop scanning other inodes being completed, it should check the current item for the XFS_LI_FAILED, and not the initial one. The state of the initial inode is checked after the loop ends Kudos to Eric for catching this. Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfs: perag initialization should only touch m_ag_max_usable for AG 0Darrick J. Wong2017-10-271-2/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 9789dd9e1d939232e8ff4c50ef8e75aa6781b3fb upstream. We call __xfs_ag_resv_init to make a per-AG reservation for each AG. This makes the reservation per-AG, not per-filesystem. Therefore, it is incorrect to adjust m_ag_max_usable for each AG. Adjust it only when we're reserving AG 0's blocks so that we only do it once per fs. Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfs: update i_size after unwritten conversion in dio completionEryu Guan2017-10-274-12/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit ee70daaba82d70766d0723b743d9fdeb3b06102a upstream. Since commit d531d91d6990 ("xfs: always use unwritten extents for direct I/O writes"), we start allocating unwritten extents for all direct writes to allow appending aio in XFS. But for dio writes that could extend file size we update the in-core inode size first, then convert the unwritten extents to real allocations at dio completion time in xfs_dio_write_end_io(). Thus a racing direct read could see the new i_size and find the unwritten extents first and read zeros instead of actual data, if the direct writer also takes a shared iolock. Fix it by updating the in-core inode size after the unwritten extent conversion. To do this, introduce a new boolean argument to xfs_iomap_write_unwritten() to tell if we want to update in-core i_size or not. Suggested-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <eguan@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> [hch: backported to the old direct I/O code before Linux 4.10] Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfs: report zeroed or not correctly in xfs_zero_range()Eryu Guan2017-10-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d20a5e3851969fa685f118a80e4df670255a4e8d upstream. The 'did_zero' param of xfs_zero_range() was not passed to iomap_zero_range() correctly. This was introduced by commit 7bb41db3ea16 ("xfs: handle 64-bit length in xfs_iozero"), and found by code inspection. Signed-off-by: Eryu Guan <eguan@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* fs/xfs: Use %pS printk format for direct addressesHelge Deller2017-10-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e150dcd459e1b441eaf08f341a986f04e61bf3b8 upstream. Use the %pS instead of the %pF printk format specifier for printing symbols from direct addresses. This is needed for the ia64, ppc64 and parisc64 architectures. Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfs: evict CoW fork extents when performing finsert/fcollapseDarrick J. Wong2017-10-271-1/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3af423b03435c81036fa710623d3ae92fbe346a3 upstream. When we perform an finsert/fcollapse operation, cancel all the CoW extents for the affected file offset range so that they don't end up pointing to the wrong blocks. Reported-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfs: don't unconditionally clear the reflink flag on zero-block filesDarrick J. Wong2017-10-271-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit cc6f77710a6de6210f9feda7cd53e2f5ee7a7e69 upstream. If we have speculative cow preallocations hanging around in the cow fork, don't let a truncate operation clear the reflink flag because if we do then there's a chance we'll forget to free those extents when we destroy the incore inode. Reported-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* nfsd/callback: Cleanup callback cred on shutdownKinglong Mee2017-10-213-4/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit f7d1ddbe7648af7460d23688c8c131342eb43b3a ] The rpccred gotten from rpc_lookup_machine_cred() should be put when state is shutdown. Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ceph: clean up unsafe d_parent accesses in build_dentry_pathJeff Layton2017-10-211-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit c6b0b656ca24ede6657abb4a2cd910fa9c1879ba ] While we hold a reference to the dentry when build_dentry_path is called, we could end up racing with a rename that changes d_parent. Handle that situation correctly, by using the rcu_read_lock to ensure that the parent dentry and inode stick around long enough to safely check ceph_snap and ceph_ino. Link: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/18148 Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ceph: fix bogus endianness change in ceph_ioctl_set_layoutJeff Layton2017-10-211-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 24c149ad6914d349d8b64749f20f3f8ea5031fe0 ] sparse says: fs/ceph/ioctl.c:100:28: warning: cast to restricted __le64 preferred_osd is a __s64 so we don't need to do any conversion. Also, just remove the cast in ceph_ioctl_get_layout as it's not needed. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ceph: don't update_dentry_lease unless we actually got oneJeff Layton2017-10-211-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 80d025ffede88969f6adf7266fbdedfd5641148a ] This if block updates the dentry lease even in the case where the MDS didn't grant one. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Yan, Zheng <zyan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ocfs2/dlmglue: prepare tracking logic to avoid recursive cluster lockEric Ren2017-10-213-3/+121
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 439a36b8ef38657f765b80b775e2885338d72451 ] We are in the situation that we have to avoid recursive cluster locking, but there is no way to check if a cluster lock has been taken by a precess already. Mostly, we can avoid recursive locking by writing code carefully. However, we found that it's very hard to handle the routines that are invoked directly by vfs code. For instance: const struct inode_operations ocfs2_file_iops = { .permission = ocfs2_permission, .get_acl = ocfs2_iop_get_acl, .set_acl = ocfs2_iop_set_acl, }; Both ocfs2_permission() and ocfs2_iop_get_acl() call ocfs2_inode_lock(PR): do_sys_open may_open inode_permission ocfs2_permission ocfs2_inode_lock() <=== first time generic_permission get_acl ocfs2_iop_get_acl ocfs2_inode_lock() <=== recursive one A deadlock will occur if a remote EX request comes in between two of ocfs2_inode_lock(). Briefly describe how the deadlock is formed: On one hand, OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag of this lockres is set in BAST(ocfs2_generic_handle_bast) when downconvert is started on behalf of the remote EX lock request. Another hand, the recursive cluster lock (the second one) will be blocked in in __ocfs2_cluster_lock() because of OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED. But, the downconvert never complete, why? because there is no chance for the first cluster lock on this node to be unlocked - we block ourselves in the code path. The idea to fix this issue is mostly taken from gfs2 code. 1. introduce a new field: struct ocfs2_lock_res.l_holders, to keep track of the processes' pid who has taken the cluster lock of this lock resource; 2. introduce a new flag for ocfs2_inode_lock_full: OCFS2_META_LOCK_GETBH; it means just getting back disk inode bh for us if we've got cluster lock. 3. export a helper: ocfs2_is_locked_by_me() is used to check if we have got the cluster lock in the upper code path. The tracking logic should be used by some of the ocfs2 vfs's callbacks, to solve the recursive locking issue cuased by the fact that vfs routines can call into each other. The performance penalty of processing the holder list should only be seen at a few cases where the tracking logic is used, such as get/set acl. You may ask what if the first time we got a PR lock, and the second time we want a EX lock? fortunately, this case never happens in the real world, as far as I can see, including permission check, (get|set)_(acl|attr), and the gfs2 code also do so. [sfr@canb.auug.org.au remove some inlines] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117100948.11657-2-zren@suse.com Signed-off-by: Eric Ren <zren@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com> Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au> Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com> Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* f2fs: do not wait for writeback in write_beginJaegeuk Kim2017-10-211-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 86d54795c94532075d862aa0a79f0c981dab4bdd ] Otherwise we can get livelock like below. [79880.428136] dbench D 0 18405 18404 0x00000000 [79880.428139] Call Trace: [79880.428142] __schedule+0x219/0x6b0 [79880.428144] schedule+0x36/0x80 [79880.428147] schedule_timeout+0x243/0x2e0 [79880.428152] ? update_sd_lb_stats+0x16b/0x5f0 [79880.428155] ? ktime_get+0x3c/0xb0 [79880.428157] io_schedule_timeout+0xa6/0x110 [79880.428161] __lock_page+0xf7/0x130 [79880.428164] ? unlock_page+0x30/0x30 [79880.428167] pagecache_get_page+0x16b/0x250 [79880.428171] grab_cache_page_write_begin+0x20/0x40 [79880.428182] f2fs_write_begin+0xa2/0xdb0 [f2fs] [79880.428192] ? f2fs_mark_inode_dirty_sync+0x16/0x30 [f2fs] [79880.428197] ? kmem_cache_free+0x79/0x200 [79880.428203] ? __mark_inode_dirty+0x17f/0x360 [79880.428206] generic_perform_write+0xbb/0x190 [79880.428213] ? file_update_time+0xa4/0xf0 [79880.428217] __generic_file_write_iter+0x19b/0x1e0 [79880.428226] f2fs_file_write_iter+0x9c/0x180 [f2fs] [79880.428231] __vfs_write+0xc5/0x140 [79880.428235] vfs_write+0xb2/0x1b0 [79880.428238] SyS_write+0x46/0xa0 [79880.428242] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad Fixes: cae96a5c8ab6 ("f2fs: check io submission more precisely") Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Btrfs: send, fix failure to rename top level inode due to name collisionRobbie Ko2017-10-211-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 4dd9920d991745c4a16f53a8f615f706fbe4b3f7 ] Under certain situations, an incremental send operation can fail due to a premature attempt to create a new top level inode (a direct child of the subvolume/snapshot root) whose name collides with another inode that was removed from the send snapshot. Consider the following example scenario. Parent snapshot: . (ino 256, gen 8) |---- a1/ (ino 257, gen 9) |---- a2/ (ino 258, gen 9) Send snapshot: . (ino 256, gen 3) |---- a2/ (ino 257, gen 7) In this scenario, when receiving the incremental send stream, the btrfs receive command fails like this (ran in verbose mode, -vv argument): rmdir a1 mkfile o257-7-0 rename o257-7-0 -> a2 ERROR: rename o257-7-0 -> a2 failed: Is a directory What happens when computing the incremental send stream is: 1) An operation to remove the directory with inode number 257 and generation 9 is issued. 2) An operation to create the inode with number 257 and generation 7 is issued. This creates the inode with an orphanized name of "o257-7-0". 3) An operation rename the new inode 257 to its final name, "a2", is issued. This is incorrect because inode 258, which has the same name and it's a child of the same parent (root inode 256), was not yet processed and therefore no rmdir operation for it was yet issued. The rename operation is issued because we fail to detect that the name of the new inode 257 collides with inode 258, because their parent, a subvolume/snapshot root (inode 256) has a different generation in both snapshots. So fix this by ignoring the generation value of a parent directory that matches a root inode (number 256) when we are checking if the name of the inode currently being processed collides with the name of some other inode that was not yet processed. We can achieve this scenario of different inodes with the same number but different generation values either by mounting a filesystem with the inode cache option (-o inode_cache) or by creating and sending snapshots across different filesystems, like in the following example: $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdb $ mount /dev/sdb /mnt $ mkdir /mnt/a1 $ mkdir /mnt/a2 $ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt /mnt/snap1 $ btrfs send /mnt/snap1 -f /tmp/1.snap $ umount /mnt $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdc $ mount /dev/sdc /mnt $ touch /mnt/a2 $ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /mnt /mnt/snap2 $ btrfs receive /mnt -f /tmp/1.snap # Take note that once the filesystem is created, its current # generation has value 7 so the inode from the second snapshot has # a generation value of 7. And after receiving the first snapshot # the filesystem is at a generation value of 10, because the call to # create the second snapshot bumps the generation to 8 (the snapshot # creation ioctl does a transaction commit), the receive command calls # the snapshot creation ioctl to create the first snapshot, which bumps # the filesystem's generation to 9, and finally when the receive # operation finishes it calls an ioctl to transition the first snapshot # (snap1) from RW mode to RO mode, which does another transaction commit # and bumps the filesystem's generation to 10. $ rm -f /tmp/1.snap $ btrfs send /mnt/snap1 -f /tmp/1.snap $ btrfs send -p /mnt/snap1 /mnt/snap2 -f /tmp/2.snap $ umount /mnt $ mkfs.btrfs -f /dev/sdd $ mount /dev/sdd /mnt $ btrfs receive /mnt /tmp/1.snap # Receive of snapshot snap2 used to fail. $ btrfs receive /mnt /tmp/2.snap Signed-off-by: Robbie Ko <robbieko@synology.com> Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> [Rewrote changelog to be more precise and clear] Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* f2fs: do SSR for data when there is enough free spaceYunlong Song2017-10-211-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 035e97adab26c1121cedaeb9bd04cf48a8e8cf51 ] In allocate_segment_by_default(), need_SSR() already detected it's time to do SSR. So, let's try to find victims for data segments more aggressively in time. Signed-off-by: Yunlong Song <yunlong.song@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* direct-io: Prevent NULL pointer access in submit_page_sectionAndreas Gruenbacher2017-10-181-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 899f0429c7d3eed886406cd72182bee3b96aa1f9 upstream. In the code added to function submit_page_section by commit b1058b981, sdio->bio can currently be NULL when calling dio_bio_submit. This then leads to a NULL pointer access in dio_bio_submit, so check for a NULL bio in submit_page_section before trying to submit it instead. Fixes xfstest generic/250 on gfs2. Signed-off-by: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruenba@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* fs/mpage.c: fix mpage_writepage() for pages with buffersMatthew Wilcox2017-10-182-5/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f892760aa66a2d657deaf59538fb69433036767c upstream. When using FAT on a block device which supports rw_page, we can hit BUG_ON(!PageLocked(page)) in try_to_free_buffers(). This is because we call clean_buffers() after unlocking the page we've written. Introduce a new clean_page_buffers() which cleans all buffers associated with a page and call it from within bdev_write_page(). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/PAGE_SIZE/~0U/ per Linus and Matthew] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171006211541.GA7409@bombadil.infradead.org Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Reported-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Reported-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp> Tested-by: Toshi Kani <toshi.kani@hpe.com> Acked-by: Johannes Thumshirn <jthumshirn@suse.de> Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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