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* KEYS: Don't write out to userspace while holding key semaphoreWaiman Long2020-03-292-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a keyutils test: [12537.027242] ====================================================== [12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected [12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE --------- - - [12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------ [12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock: [12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12537.208365] [12537.208365] but task is already holding lock: [12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 [12537.270476] [12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock. [12537.270476] [12537.307209] [12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: [12537.340754] [12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}: [12537.367434] down_write+0x4d/0x110 [12537.385202] __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280 [12537.405232] request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70 [12537.427221] request_key+0x3c/0x80 [12537.444839] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] [12537.468445] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] [12537.496731] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] [12537.519418] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] [12537.546263] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] [12537.573551] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] [12537.601045] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 [12537.617906] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [12537.636225] [12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}: [12537.664525] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 [12537.683734] request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70 [12537.705640] request_key+0x3c/0x80 [12537.723304] dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver] [12537.746773] dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs] [12537.775607] cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs] [12537.798322] cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs] [12537.823369] cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs] [12537.847262] cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs] [12537.873477] kthread+0x30c/0x3d0 [12537.890281] ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 [12537.908649] [12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}: [12537.935225] __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0 [12537.954450] cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs] [12537.977250] smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs] [12538.000659] cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs] [12538.023920] read_pages+0xf5/0x560 [12538.041583] __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0 [12538.067047] ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10 [12538.092069] filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830 [12538.111637] __do_fault+0x82/0x260 [12538.129216] do_fault+0x419/0xfb0 [12538.146390] __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0 [12538.167408] handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550 [12538.187401] __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60 [12538.207395] do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0 [12538.225777] page_fault+0x1e/0x30 [12538.243010] [12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}: [12538.267875] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 [12538.286848] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 [12538.306006] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 [12538.327936] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 [12538.352154] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 [12538.370558] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 [12538.391470] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 [12538.410511] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf [12538.435535] [12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this: [12538.435535] [12538.472829] Chain exists of: [12538.472829] &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class [12538.472829] [12538.524820] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [12538.524820] [12538.551431] CPU0 CPU1 [12538.572654] ---- ---- [12538.595865] lock(&type->lock_class); [12538.613737] lock(root_key_user.cons_lock); [12538.644234] lock(&type->lock_class); [12538.672410] lock(&mm->mmap_sem); [12538.687758] [12538.687758] *** DEADLOCK *** [12538.687758] [12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598: [12538.732097] #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220 [12538.770573] [12538.770573] stack backtrace: [12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G [12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015 [12538.881963] Call Trace: [12538.892897] dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0 [12538.907908] print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279 [12538.932891] ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250 [12538.948979] check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0 [12538.971643] ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190 [12538.992738] ? check_usage+0x550/0x550 [12539.009845] ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10 [12539.025484] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0 [12539.043555] __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0 [12539.061551] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10 [12539.080554] lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420 [12539.100330] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12539.119079] __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0 [12539.135869] ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0 [12539.153234] keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170 [12539.172787] ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110 [12539.190059] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280 [12539.211526] keyring_read+0xe9/0x110 [12539.227561] ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0 [12539.249076] keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220 [12539.266660] do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0 [12539.283091] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf One way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead, an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding the lock. That requires taking out the __user modifier from all the relevant read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace write helpers. That is, 1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy. 2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy(). 3) All the fault handling code is removed. Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch. Fixes: ^1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* Merge tag 'powerpc-5.5-1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-11-301-0/+6
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux Pull powerpc updates from Michael Ellerman: "Highlights: - Infrastructure for secure boot on some bare metal Power9 machines. The firmware support is still in development, so the code here won't actually activate secure boot on any existing systems. - A change to xmon (our crash handler / pseudo-debugger) to restrict it to read-only mode when the kernel is lockdown'ed, otherwise it's trivial to drop into xmon and modify kernel data, such as the lockdown state. - Support for KASLR on 32-bit BookE machines (Freescale / NXP). - Fixes for our flush_icache_range() and __kernel_sync_dicache() (VDSO) to work with memory ranges >4GB. - Some reworks of the pseries CMM (Cooperative Memory Management) driver to make it behave more like other balloon drivers and enable some cleanups of generic mm code. - A series of fixes to our hardware breakpoint support to properly handle unaligned watchpoint addresses. Plus a bunch of other smaller improvements, fixes and cleanups. Thanks to: Alastair D'Silva, Andrew Donnellan, Aneesh Kumar K.V, Anthony Steinhauser, Cédric Le Goater, Chris Packham, Chris Smart, Christophe Leroy, Christopher M. Riedl, Christoph Hellwig, Claudio Carvalho, Daniel Axtens, David Hildenbrand, Deb McLemore, Diana Craciun, Eric Richter, Geert Uytterhoeven, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Greg Kurz, Gustavo L. F. Walbon, Hari Bathini, Harish, Jason Yan, Krzysztof Kozlowski, Leonardo Bras, Mathieu Malaterre, Mauro S. M. Rodrigues, Michal Suchanek, Mimi Zohar, Nathan Chancellor, Nathan Lynch, Nayna Jain, Nick Desaulniers, Oliver O'Halloran, Qian Cai, Rasmus Villemoes, Ravi Bangoria, Sam Bobroff, Santosh Sivaraj, Scott Wood, Thomas Huth, Tyrel Datwyler, Vaibhav Jain, Valentin Longchamp, YueHaibing" * tag 'powerpc-5.5-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/powerpc/linux: (144 commits) powerpc/fixmap: fix crash with HIGHMEM x86/efi: remove unused variables powerpc: Define arch_is_kernel_initmem_freed() for lockdep powerpc/prom_init: Use -ffreestanding to avoid a reference to bcmp powerpc: Avoid clang warnings around setjmp and longjmp powerpc: Don't add -mabi= flags when building with Clang powerpc: Fix Kconfig indentation powerpc/fixmap: don't clear fixmap area in paging_init() selftests/powerpc: spectre_v2 test must be built 64-bit powerpc/powernv: Disable native PCIe port management powerpc/kexec: Move kexec files into a dedicated subdir. powerpc/32: Split kexec low level code out of misc_32.S powerpc/sysdev: drop simple gpio powerpc/83xx: map IMMR with a BAT. powerpc/32s: automatically allocate BAT in setbat() powerpc/ioremap: warn on early use of ioremap() powerpc: Add support for GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP powerpc/fixmap: Use __fix_to_virt() instead of fix_to_virt() powerpc/8xx: use the fixmapped IMMR in cpm_reset() powerpc/8xx: add __init to cpm1 init functions ...
| * certs: Add wrapper function to check blacklisted binary hashNayna Jain2019-11-121-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The -EKEYREJECTED error returned by existing is_hash_blacklisted() is misleading when called for checking against blacklisted hash of a binary. This patch adds a wrapper function is_binary_blacklisted() to return -EPERM error if binary is blacklisted. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1572492694-6520-7-git-send-email-zohar@linux.ibm.com
* | KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys codeSumit Garg2019-11-121-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move TPM2 trusted keys code to trusted keys subsystem. The reason being it's better to consolidate all the trusted keys code to a single location so that it can be maintained sanely. Also, utilize existing tpm_send() exported API which wraps the internal tpm_transmit_cmd() API. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
* | KEYS: trusted: Create trusted keys subsystemSumit Garg2019-11-121-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move existing code to trusted keys subsystem. Also, rename files with "tpm" as suffix which provides the underlying implementation. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
* | KEYS: Use common tpm_buf for trusted and asymmetric keysSumit Garg2019-11-121-36/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Switch to utilize common heap based tpm_buf code for TPM based trusted and asymmetric keys rather than using stack based tpm1_buf code. Also, remove tpm1_buf code. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
* | tpm: Move tpm_buf code to include/linux/Sumit Garg2019-11-121-6/+6
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move tpm_buf code to common include/linux/tpm.h header so that it can be reused via other subsystems like trusted keys etc. Also rename trusted keys and asymmetric keys usage of TPM 1.x buffer implementation to tpm1_buf to avoid any compilation errors. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
* Merge tag 'keys-request-20190626' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-07-081-0/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull request_key improvements from David Howells: "These are all request_key()-related, including a fix and some improvements: - Fix the lack of a Link permission check on a key found by request_key(), thereby enabling request_key() to link keys that don't grant this permission to the target keyring (which must still grant Write permission). Note that the key must be in the caller's keyrings already to be found. - Invalidate used request_key authentication keys rather than revoking them, so that they get cleaned up immediately rather than hanging around till the expiry time is passed. - Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so that a request_key_rcu() can be provided. This can be called in RCU mode, so it can't sleep and can't upcall - but it can be called from LOOKUP_RCU pathwalk mode. - Cache the latest positive result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct so that filesystems that make a lot of request_key() calls during pathwalk can take advantage of it to avoid having to redo the searching. This requires CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE=y. It is assumed that the key just found is likely to be used multiple times in each step in an RCU pathwalk, and is likely to be reused for the next step too. Note that the cleanup of the cache is done on TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME, just before userspace resumes, and on exit" * tag 'keys-request-20190626' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: keys: Kill off request_key_async{,_with_auxdata} keys: Cache result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct keys: Provide request_key_rcu() keys: Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions keys: Invalidate used request_key authentication keys keys: Fix request_key() lack of Link perm check on found key
| * keys: Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functionsDavid Howells2019-06-191-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so that it will become possible to provide an RCU-capable partial request_key() function in a later commit. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 441Thomas Gleixner2019-06-052-8/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation version 2 of the license extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 315 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Armijn Hemel <armijn@tjaldur.nl> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531190115.503150771@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 152Thomas Gleixner2019-05-305-25/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the license or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 3029 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190527070032.746973796@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 36Thomas Gleixner2019-05-245-25/+5
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* KEYS: trusted: fix -Wvarags warningndesaulniers@google.com2019-04-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fixes the warning reported by Clang: security/keys/trusted.c:146:17: warning: passing an object that undergoes default argument promotion to 'va_start' has undefined behavior [-Wvarargs] va_start(argp, h3); ^ security/keys/trusted.c:126:37: note: parameter of type 'unsigned char' is declared here unsigned char *h2, unsigned char h3, ...) ^ Specifically, it seems that both the C90 (4.8.1.1) and C11 (7.16.1.4) standards explicitly call this out as undefined behavior: The parameter parmN is the identifier of the rightmost parameter in the variable parameter list in the function definition (the one just before the ...). If the parameter parmN is declared with ... or with a type that is not compatible with the type that results after application of the default argument promotions, the behavior is undefined. Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/41 Link: https://www.eskimo.com/~scs/cclass/int/sx11c.html Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com> Suggested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Suggested-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-03-101-0/+8
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "Mimi Zohar says: 'Linux 5.0 introduced the platform keyring to allow verifying the IMA kexec kernel image signature using the pre-boot keys. This pull request similarly makes keys on the platform keyring accessible for verifying the PE kernel image signature. Also included in this pull request is a new IMA hook that tags tmp files, in policy, indicating the file hash needs to be calculated. The remaining patches are cleanup'" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: evm: Use defined constant for UUID representation ima: define ima_post_create_tmpfile() hook and add missing call evm: remove set but not used variable 'xattr' encrypted-keys: fix Opt_err/Opt_error = -1 kexec, KEYS: Make use of platform keyring for signature verify integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyring
| * integrity, KEYS: add a reference to platform keyringKairui Song2019-02-041-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 9dc92c45177a ("integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring") introduced a .platform keyring for storing preboot keys, used for verifying kernel image signatures. Currently only IMA-appraisal is able to use the keyring to verify kernel images that have their signature stored in xattr. This patch exposes the .platform keyring, making it accessible for verifying PE signed kernel images as well. Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Kairui Song <kasong@redhat.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> [zohar@linux.ibm.com: fixed checkpatch errors, squashed with patch fix] Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* | KEYS: user: Align the payload bufferEric Biggers2019-02-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Align the payload of "user" and "logon" keys so that users of the keyrings service can access it as a struct that requires more than 2-byte alignment. fscrypt currently does this which results in the read of fscrypt_key::size being misaligned as it needs 4-byte alignment. Align to __alignof__(u64) rather than __alignof__(long) since in the future it's conceivable that people would use structs beginning with u64, which on some platforms would require more than 'long' alignment. Reported-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi> Fixes: 2aa349f6e37c ("[PATCH] Keys: Export user-defined keyring operations") Fixes: 88bd6ccdcdd6 ("ext4 crypto: add encryption key management facilities") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Tested-by: Aaro Koskinen <aaro.koskinen@iki.fi> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* | keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth keyDavid Howells2019-02-151-0/+36
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the request_key() upcall mechanism there's a dependency loop by which if a key type driver overrides the ->request_key hook and the userspace side manages to lose the authorisation key, the auth key and the internal construction record (struct key_construction) can keep each other pinned. Fix this by the following changes: (1) Killing off the construction record and using the auth key instead. (2) Including the operation name in the auth key payload and making the payload available outside of security/keys/. (3) The ->request_key hook is given the authkey instead of the cons record and operation name. Changes (2) and (3) allow the auth key to naturally be cleaned up if the keyring it is in is destroyed or cleared or the auth key is unlinked. Fixes: 7ee02a316600 ("keys: Fix dependency loop between construction record and auth key") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* KEYS: Move trusted.h to include/keys [ver #2]Denis Kenzior2018-10-261-0/+136
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* KEYS: Provide missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops [ver #2]David Howells2018-10-261-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide the missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops. This include query, encrypt, decrypt and create signature. Verify signature already exists. Also provided are accessor functions for this: int query_asymmetric_key(const struct key *key, struct kernel_pkey_query *info); int encrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *data, void *enc); int decrypt_blob(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *enc, void *data); int create_signature(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *data, void *enc); The public_key_signature struct gains an encoding field to carry the encoding for verify_signature(). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* docs: Fix some broken referencesMauro Carvalho Chehab2018-06-152-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As we move stuff around, some doc references are broken. Fix some of them via this script: ./scripts/documentation-file-ref-check --fix Manually checked if the produced result is valid, removing a few false-positives. Acked-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> Acked-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Acked-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org> Acked-by: Charles Keepax <ckeepax@opensource.wolfsonmicro.com> Acked-by: Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Acked-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no licenseGreg Kroah-Hartman2017-11-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* net: rxrpc: Replace time_t type with time64_t typeBaolin Wang2017-08-291-0/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since the 'expiry' variable of 'struct key_preparsed_payload' has been changed to 'time64_t' type, which is year 2038 safe on 32bits system. In net/rxrpc subsystem, we need convert 'u32' type to 'time64_t' type when copying ticket expires time to 'prep->expiry', then this patch introduces two helper functions to help convert 'u32' to 'time64_t' type. This patch also uses ktime_get_real_seconds() to get current time instead of get_seconds() which is not year 2038 safe on 32bits system. Signed-off-by: Baolin Wang <baolin.wang@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* KEYS: Split role of the keyring pointer for keyring restrict functionsMat Martineau2017-04-031-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The first argument to the restrict_link_func_t functions was a keyring pointer. These functions are called by the key subsystem with this argument set to the destination keyring, but restrict_link_by_signature expects a pointer to the relevant trusted keyring. Restrict functions may need something other than a single struct key pointer to allow or reject key linkage, so the data used to make that decision (such as the trust keyring) is moved to a new, fourth argument. The first argument is now always the destination keyring. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>
* KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyringDavid Howells2017-04-031-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add the following: (1) A new system keyring that is used to store information about blacklisted certificates and signatures. (2) A new key type (called 'blacklist') that is used to store a blacklisted hash in its description as a hex string. The key accepts no payload. (3) The ability to configure a list of blacklisted hashes into the kernel at build time. This is done by setting CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST to the filename of a list of hashes that are in the form: "<hash>", "<hash>", ..., "<hash>" where each <hash> is a hex string representation of the hash and must include all necessary leading zeros to pad the hash to the right size. The above are enabled with CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING. Once the kernel is booted, the blacklist keyring can be listed: root@andromeda ~]# keyctl show %:.blacklist Keyring 723359729 ---lswrv 0 0 keyring: .blacklist 676257228 ---lswrv 0 0 \_ blacklist: 123412341234c55c1dcc601ab8e172917706aa32fb5eaf826813547fdf02dd46 The blacklist cannot currently be modified by userspace, but it will be possible to load it, for example, from the UEFI blacklist database. A later commit will make it possible to load blacklisted asymmetric keys in here too. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* KEYS: Differentiate uses of rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload()David Howells2017-03-021-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | rcu_dereference_key() and user_key_payload() are currently being used in two different, incompatible ways: (1) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference() - when only the RCU read lock used to protect the key. (2) As a wrapper to rcu_dereference_protected() - when the key semaphor is used to protect the key and the may be being modified. Fix this by splitting both of the key wrappers to produce: (1) RCU accessors for keys when caller has the key semaphore locked: dereference_key_locked() user_key_payload_locked() (2) RCU accessors for keys when caller holds the RCU read lock: dereference_key_rcu() user_key_payload_rcu() This should fix following warning in the NFS idmapper =============================== [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ] 4.10.0 #1 Tainted: G W ------------------------------- ./include/keys/user-type.h:53 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 0 1 lock held by mount.nfs/5987: #0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<d000000002527abc>] nfs_idmap_get_key+0x15c/0x420 [nfsv4] stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 5987 Comm: mount.nfs Tainted: G W 4.10.0 #1 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe8/0x154 (unreliable) lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x140/0x190 nfs_idmap_get_key+0x380/0x420 [nfsv4] nfs_map_name_to_uid+0x2a0/0x3b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_attrs+0xfac/0x16b0 [nfsv4] decode_getfattr_generic.constprop.106+0xbc/0x150 [nfsv4] nfs4_xdr_dec_lookup_root+0xac/0xb0 [nfsv4] rpcauth_unwrap_resp+0xe8/0x140 [sunrpc] call_decode+0x29c/0x910 [sunrpc] __rpc_execute+0x140/0x8f0 [sunrpc] rpc_run_task+0x170/0x200 [sunrpc] nfs4_call_sync_sequence+0x68/0xa0 [nfsv4] _nfs4_lookup_root.isra.44+0xd0/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root+0xe0/0x350 [nfsv4] nfs4_lookup_root_sec+0x70/0xa0 [nfsv4] nfs4_find_root_sec+0xc4/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs4_proc_get_rootfh+0x5c/0xf0 [nfsv4] nfs4_get_rootfh+0x6c/0x190 [nfsv4] nfs4_server_common_setup+0xc4/0x260 [nfsv4] nfs4_create_server+0x278/0x3c0 [nfsv4] nfs4_remote_mount+0x50/0xb0 [nfsv4] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 nfs_do_root_mount+0xb0/0x140 [nfsv4] nfs4_try_mount+0x60/0x100 [nfsv4] nfs_fs_mount+0x5ec/0xda0 [nfs] mount_fs+0x74/0x210 vfs_kern_mount+0x78/0x220 do_mount+0x254/0xf70 SyS_mount+0x94/0x100 system_call+0x38/0xe0 Reported-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* KEYS: Strip trailing spacesDavid Howells2016-06-141-1/+1
| | | | | | Strip some trailing spaces. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mokDavid Howells2016-04-111-11/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a config option (IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY) that, when enabled, allows keys to be added to the IMA keyrings by userspace - with the restriction that each must be signed by a key in the system trusted keyrings. EPERM will be returned if this option is disabled, ENOKEY will be returned if no authoritative key can be found and EKEYREJECTED will be returned if the signature doesn't match. Other errors such as ENOPKG may also be returned. If this new option is enabled, the builtin system keyring is searched, as is the secondary system keyring if that is also enabled. Intermediate keys between the builtin system keyring and the key being added can be added to the secondary keyring (which replaces .ima_mok) to form a trust chain - provided they are also validly signed by a key in one of the trusted keyrings. The .ima_mok keyring is then removed and the IMA blacklist keyring gets its own config option (IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING). Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamicallyDavid Howells2016-04-111-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to by root whilst the system is running - provided the key being added is vouched for by a key built into the kernel or already added to the secondary keyring. Rename .system_keyring to .builtin_trusted_keys to distinguish it more obviously from the new keyring (called .secondary_trusted_keys). The new keyring needs to be enabled with CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING. If the secondary keyring is enabled, a link is created from that to .builtin_trusted_keys so that the the latter will automatically be searched too if the secondary keyring is searched. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTEDDavid Howells2016-04-111-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED as they're no longer meaningful. Also we can drop the trusted flag from the preparse structure. Given this, we no longer need to pass the key flags through to restrict_link(). Further, we can now get rid of keyring_restrict_trusted_only() also. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link()David Howells2016-04-111-12/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the point at which a key is determined to be trustworthy to __key_link() so that we use the contents of the keyring being linked in to to determine whether the key being linked in is trusted or not. What is 'trusted' then becomes a matter of what's in the keyring. Currently, the test is done when the key is parsed, but given that at that point we can only sensibly refer to the contents of the system trusted keyring, we can only use that as the basis for working out the trustworthiness of a new key. With this change, a trusted keyring is a set of keys that once the trusted-only flag is set cannot be added to except by verification through one of the contained keys. Further, adding a key into a trusted keyring, whilst it might grant trustworthiness in the context of that keyring, does not automatically grant trustworthiness in the context of a second keyring to which it could be secondarily linked. To accomplish this, the authentication data associated with the key source must now be retained. For an X.509 cert, this means the contents of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier and the signature data. If system keyrings are disabled then restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted() resolves to restrict_link_reject(). The integrity digital signature code still works correctly with this as it was previously using KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED_ONLY, which doesn't permit anything to be added if there is no system keyring against which trust can be determined. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key()David Howells2016-04-111-4/+4
| | | | | | | | Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key(). It doesn't really have any dependencies on X.509 features as it uses generalised IDs and the public_key structs that contain data extracted from X.509. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* KEYS: Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.cDavid Howells2016-04-111-0/+5
| | | | | | | Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c so that it can be generalised. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal contentDavid Howells2016-04-062-6/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content through a callback. This allows all the PKCS#7 stuff to be hidden inside this function and removed from the PE file parser and the PKCS#7 test key. If external content is not required, NULL should be passed as data to the function. If the callback is not required, that can be set to NULL. The function is now called verify_pkcs7_signature() to contrast with verify_pefile_signature() and the definitions of both have been moved into linux/verification.h along with the key_being_used_for enum. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* KEYS: Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric keyDavid Howells2016-04-062-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | Allow authentication data to be stored in an asymmetric key in the 4th element of the key payload and provide a way for it to be destroyed. For the public key subtype, this will be a public_key_signature struct. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* tpm: fix checks for policy digest existence in tpm2_seal_trusted()Jarkko Sakkinen2016-02-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | In my original patch sealing with policy was done with dynamically allocated buffer that I changed later into an array so the checks in tpm2-cmd.c became invalid. This patch fixes the issue. Fixes: 5beb0c435bdd ("keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policy") Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
* Merge branch 'next' of ↵James Morris2015-12-261-0/+24
|\ | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next
| * IMA: create machine owner and blacklist keyringsPetko Manolov2015-12-151-0/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This option creates IMA MOK and blacklist keyrings. IMA MOK is an intermediate keyring that sits between .system and .ima keyrings, effectively forming a simple CA hierarchy. To successfully import a key into .ima_mok it must be signed by a key which CA is in .system keyring. On turn any key that needs to go in .ima keyring must be signed by CA in either .system or .ima_mok keyrings. IMA MOK is empty at kernel boot. IMA blacklist keyring contains all revoked IMA keys. It is consulted before any other keyring. If the search is successful the requested operation is rejected and error is returned to the caller. Signed-off-by: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
* | keys, trusted: seal with a TPM2 authorization policyJarkko Sakkinen2015-12-201-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | TPM2 supports authorization policies, which are essentially combinational logic statements repsenting the conditions where the data can be unsealed based on the TPM state. This patch enables to use authorization policies to seal trusted keys. Two following new options have been added for trusted keys: * 'policydigest=': provide an auth policy digest for sealing. * 'policyhandle=': provide a policy session handle for unsealing. If 'hash=' option is supplied after 'policydigest=' option, this will result an error because the state of the option would become mixed. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
* | keys, trusted: select hash algorithm for TPM2 chipsJarkko Sakkinen2015-12-201-0/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Added 'hash=' option for selecting the hash algorithm for add_key() syscall and documentation for it. Added entry for sm3-256 to the following tables in order to support TPM_ALG_SM3_256: * hash_algo_name * hash_digest_size Includes support for the following hash algorithms: * sha1 * sha256 * sha384 * sha512 * sm3-256 Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Tested-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Acked-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
* KEYS: Merge the type-specific data with the payload dataDavid Howells2015-10-213-1/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Merge the type-specific data with the payload data into one four-word chunk as it seems pointless to keep them separate. Use user_key_payload() for accessing the payloads of overloaded user-defined keys. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: ecryptfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
* tpm: seal/unseal for TPM 2.0Jarkko Sakkinen2015-10-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Added tpm_trusted_seal() and tpm_trusted_unseal() API for sealing trusted keys. This patch implements basic sealing and unsealing functionality for TPM 2.0: * Seal with a parent key using a 20 byte auth value. * Unseal with a parent key using a 20 byte auth value. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
* keys, trusted: move struct trusted_key_options to trusted-type.hJarkko Sakkinen2015-10-191-0/+12
| | | | | | | | Moved struct trusted_key_options to trustes-type.h so that the fields can be accessed from drivers/char/tpm. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de>
* PKCS#7: Appropriately restrict authenticated attributes and content typeDavid Howells2015-08-121-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A PKCS#7 or CMS message can have per-signature authenticated attributes that are digested as a lump and signed by the authorising key for that signature. If such attributes exist, the content digest isn't itself signed, but rather it is included in a special authattr which then contributes to the signature. Further, we already require the master message content type to be pkcs7_signedData - but there's also a separate content type for the data itself within the SignedData object and this must be repeated inside the authattrs for each signer [RFC2315 9.2, RFC5652 11.1]. We should really validate the authattrs if they exist or forbid them entirely as appropriate. To this end: (1) Alter the PKCS#7 parser to reject any message that has more than one signature where at least one signature has authattrs and at least one that does not. (2) Validate authattrs if they are present and strongly restrict them. Only the following authattrs are permitted and all others are rejected: (a) contentType. This is checked to be an OID that matches the content type in the SignedData object. (b) messageDigest. This must match the crypto digest of the data. (c) signingTime. If present, we check that this is a valid, parseable UTCTime or GeneralTime and that the date it encodes fits within the validity window of the matching X.509 cert. (d) S/MIME capabilities. We don't check the contents. (e) Authenticode SP Opus Info. We don't check the contents. (f) Authenticode Statement Type. We don't check the contents. The message is rejected if (a) or (b) are missing. If the message is an Authenticode type, the message is rejected if (e) is missing; if not Authenticode, the message is rejected if (d) - (f) are present. The S/MIME capabilities authattr (d) unfortunately has to be allowed to support kernels already signed by the pesign program. This only affects kexec. sign-file suppresses them (CMS_NOSMIMECAP). The message is also rejected if an authattr is given more than once or if it contains more than one element in its set of values. (3) Add a parameter to pkcs7_verify() to select one of the following restrictions and pass in the appropriate option from the callers: (*) VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and forbids authattrs. sign-file sets CMS_NOATTR. We could be more flexible and permit authattrs optionally, but only permit minimal content. (*) VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data and requires authattrs. In future, this will require an attribute holding the target firmware name in addition to the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE This requires that the SignedData content type be pkcs7-data but allows either no authattrs or only permits the minimal set. (*) VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE This only supports the Authenticode SPC_INDIRECT_DATA content type and requires at least an SpcSpOpusInfo authattr in addition to the minimal set. It also permits an SPC_STATEMENT_TYPE authattr (and an S/MIME capabilities authattr because the pesign program doesn't remove these). (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SIGNATURE (*) VERIFYING_KEY_SELF_SIGNATURE These are invalid in this context but are included for later use when limiting the use of X.509 certs. (4) The pkcs7_test key type is given a module parameter to select between the above options for testing purposes. For example: echo 1 >/sys/module/pkcs7_test_key/parameters/usage keyctl padd pkcs7_test foo @s </tmp/stuff.pkcs7 will attempt to check the signature on stuff.pkcs7 as if it contains a firmware blob (1 being VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE). Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
* MODSIGN: Extract the blob PKCS#7 signature verifier from module signingDavid Howells2015-08-071-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Extract the function that drives the PKCS#7 signature verification given a data blob and a PKCS#7 blob out from the module signing code and lump it with the system keyring code as it's generic. This makes it independent of module config options and opens it to use by the firmware loader. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@suse.com> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com> Cc: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@kernel.org>
* KEYS: Restore partial ID matching functionality for asymmetric keysDmitry Kasatkin2014-10-061-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | Bring back the functionality whereby an asymmetric key can be matched with a partial match on one of its IDs. Whilst we're at it, allow for the possibility of having an increased number of IDs. Reported-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handlingDavid Howells2014-09-161-0/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement the first step in using binary key IDs for asymmetric keys rather than hex string keys. The previously added match data preparsing will be able to convert hex criterion strings into binary which can then be compared more rapidly. Further, we actually want more then one ID string per public key. The problem is that X.509 certs refer to other X.509 certs by matching Issuer + AuthKeyId to Subject + SubjKeyId, but PKCS#7 messages match against X.509 Issuer + SerialNumber. This patch just provides facilities for a later patch to make use of. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
* KEYS: Remove key_type::match in favour of overriding default by match_preparseDavid Howells2014-09-161-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | A previous patch added a ->match_preparse() method to the key type. This is allowed to override the function called by the iteration algorithm. Therefore, we can just set a default that simply checks for an exact match of the key description with the original criterion data and allow match_preparse to override it as needed. The key_type::match op is then redundant and can be removed, as can the user_match() function. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
* KEYS: Preparse match dataDavid Howells2014-09-161-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Preparse the match data. This provides several advantages: (1) The preparser can reject invalid criteria up front. (2) The preparser can convert the criteria to binary data if necessary (the asymmetric key type really wants to do binary comparison of the key IDs). (3) The preparser can set the type of search to be performed. This means that it's not then a one-off setting in the key type. (4) The preparser can set an appropriate comparator function. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
* Merge remote-tracking branch 'integrity/next-with-keys' into keys-nextDavid Howells2014-07-221-1/+9
|\ | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
| * KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' keyMimi Zohar2014-07-171-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Only public keys, with certificates signed by an existing 'trusted' key on the system trusted keyring, should be added to a trusted keyring. This patch adds support for verifying a certificate's signature. This is derived from David Howells pkcs7_request_asymmetric_key() patch. Changelog v6: - on error free key - Dmitry - validate trust only for not already trusted keys - Dmitry - formatting cleanup Changelog: - define get_system_trusted_keyring() to fix kbuild issues Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
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