| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|---|
| |\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 shadow stack support from Dave Hansen:
"This is the long awaited x86 shadow stack support, part of Intel's
Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET).
CET consists of two related security features: shadow stacks and
indirect branch tracking. This series implements just the shadow stack
part of this feature, and just for userspace.
The main use case for shadow stack is providing protection against
return oriented programming attacks. It works by maintaining a
secondary (shadow) stack using a special memory type that has
protections against modification. When executing a CALL instruction,
the processor pushes the return address to both the normal stack and
to the special permission shadow stack. Upon RET, the processor pops
the shadow stack copy and compares it to the normal stack copy.
For more information, refer to the links below for the earlier
versions of this patch set"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220130211838.8382-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230613001108.3040476-1-rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com/
* tag 'x86_shstk_for_6.6-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (47 commits)
x86/shstk: Change order of __user in type
x86/ibt: Convert IBT selftest to asm
x86/shstk: Don't retry vm_munmap() on -EINTR
x86/kbuild: Fix Documentation/ reference
x86/shstk: Move arch detail comment out of core mm
x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_STATUS
x86/shstk: Add ARCH_SHSTK_UNLOCK
x86: Add PTRACE interface for shadow stack
selftests/x86: Add shadow stack test
x86/cpufeatures: Enable CET CR4 bit for shadow stack
x86/shstk: Wire in shadow stack interface
x86: Expose thread features in /proc/$PID/status
x86/shstk: Support WRSS for userspace
x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall
x86/shstk: Check that signal frame is shadow stack mem
x86/shstk: Check that SSP is aligned on sigreturn
x86/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack
x86/shstk: Introduce routines modifying shstk
x86/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack
x86/shstk: Add user-mode shadow stack support
...
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
When operating with shadow stacks enabled, the kernel will automatically
allocate shadow stacks for new threads, however in some cases userspace
will need additional shadow stacks. The main example of this is the
ucontext family of functions, which require userspace allocating and
pivoting to userspace managed stacks.
Unlike most other user memory permissions, shadow stacks need to be
provisioned with special data in order to be useful. They need to be setup
with a restore token so that userspace can pivot to them via the RSTORSSP
instruction. But, the security design of shadow stacks is that they
should not be written to except in limited circumstances. This presents a
problem for userspace, as to how userspace can provision this special
data, without allowing for the shadow stack to be generally writable.
Previously, a new PROT_SHADOW_STACK was attempted, which could be
mprotect()ed from RW permissions after the data was provisioned. This was
found to not be secure enough, as other threads could write to the
shadow stack during the writable window.
The kernel can use a special instruction, WRUSS, to write directly to
userspace shadow stacks. So the solution can be that memory can be mapped
as shadow stack permissions from the beginning (never generally writable
in userspace), and the kernel itself can write the restore token.
First, a new madvise() flag was explored, which could operate on the
PROT_SHADOW_STACK memory. This had a couple of downsides:
1. Extra checks were needed in mprotect() to prevent writable memory from
ever becoming PROT_SHADOW_STACK.
2. Extra checks/vma state were needed in the new madvise() to prevent
restore tokens being written into the middle of pre-used shadow stacks.
It is ideal to prevent restore tokens being added at arbitrary
locations, so the check was to make sure the shadow stack had never been
written to.
3. It stood out from the rest of the madvise flags, as more of direct
action than a hint at future desired behavior.
So rather than repurpose two existing syscalls (mmap, madvise) that don't
quite fit, just implement a new map_shadow_stack syscall to allow
userspace to map and setup new shadow stacks in one step. While ucontext
is the primary motivator, userspace may have other unforeseen reasons to
setup its own shadow stacks using the WRSS instruction. Towards this
provide a flag so that stacks can be optionally setup securely for the
common case of ucontext without enabling WRSS. Or potentially have the
kernel set up the shadow stack in some new way.
The following example demonstrates how to create a new shadow stack with
map_shadow_stack:
void *shstk = map_shadow_stack(addr, stack_size, SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN);
Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com>
Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-35-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com
|
| |\ \
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull core entry code update from Thomas Gleixner:
"A single update to the core entry code, which removes the empty user
address limit check which is a leftover of the removed TIF_FSCHECK"
* tag 'core-entry-2023-08-28' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
entry: Remove empty addr_limit_user_check()
|
| | |/
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Back when set_fs() was a generic API for altering the address limit,
addr_limit_user_check() was a safety measure to prevent userspace being
able to issue syscalls with an unbound limit.
With the the removal of set_fs() as a generic API, the last user of
addr_limit_user_check() was removed in commit:
b5a5a01d8e9a44ec ("arm64: uaccess: remove addr_limit_user_check()")
... as since that commit, no architecture defines TIF_FSCHECK, and hence
addr_limit_user_check() always expands to nothing.
Remove addr_limit_user_check(), updating the comment in
exit_to_user_mode_prepare() to no longer refer to it. At the same time,
the comment is reworded to be a little more generic so as to cover
kmap_assert_nomap() in addition to lockdep_sys_exit().
No functional change.
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230821163526.2319443-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
On the userspace side fchmodat(3) is implemented as a wrapper
function which implements the POSIX-specified interface. This
interface differs from the underlying kernel system call, which does not
have a flags argument. Most implementations require procfs [1][2].
There doesn't appear to be a good userspace workaround for this issue
but the implementation in the kernel is pretty straight-forward.
The new fchmodat2() syscall allows to pass the AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flag,
unlike existing fchmodat.
[1] https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=blob;f=sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/fchmodat.c;h=17eca54051ee28ba1ec3f9aed170a62630959143;hb=a492b1e5ef7ab50c6fdd4e4e9879ea5569ab0a6c#l35
[2] https://git.musl-libc.org/cgit/musl/tree/src/stat/fchmodat.c?id=718f363bc2067b6487900eddc9180c84e7739f80#n28
Co-developed-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Message-Id: <f2a846ef495943c5d101011eebcf01179d0c7b61.1689092120.git.legion@kernel.org>
[brauner: pre reviews, do flag conversion in do_fchmodat() directly]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
| |/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The next patch defines a very similar interface, which I copied from
this definition. Since I'm touching it anyway I don't see any reason
not to just go fix this one up.
Signed-off-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@sifive.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Message-Id: <ef644540cfd8717f30bcc5e4c32f06c80b6c156e.1689092120.git.legion@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
|
| |\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic
Pull asm-generic updates from Arnd Bergmann:
"These are cleanups for architecture specific header files:
- the comments in include/linux/syscalls.h have gone out of sync and
are really pointless, so these get removed
- The asm/bitsperlong.h header no longer needs to be architecture
specific on modern compilers, so use a generic version for newer
architectures that use new enough userspace compilers
- A cleanup for virt_to_pfn/virt_to_bus to have proper type checking,
forcing the use of pointers"
* tag 'asm-generic-6.5' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic:
syscalls: Remove file path comments from headers
tools arch: Remove uapi bitsperlong.h of hexagon and microblaze
asm-generic: Unify uapi bitsperlong.h for arm64, riscv and loongarch
m68k/mm: Make pfn accessors static inlines
arm64: memory: Make virt_to_pfn() a static inline
ARM: mm: Make virt_to_pfn() a static inline
asm-generic/page.h: Make pfn accessors static inlines
xen/netback: Pass (void *) to virt_to_page()
netfs: Pass a pointer to virt_to_page()
cifs: Pass a pointer to virt_to_page() in cifsglob
cifs: Pass a pointer to virt_to_page()
riscv: mm: init: Pass a pointer to virt_to_page()
ARC: init: Pass a pointer to virt_to_pfn() in init
m68k: Pass a pointer to virt_to_pfn() virt_to_page()
fs/proc/kcore.c: Pass a pointer to virt_addr_valid()
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Source file locations for syscall definitions can change over a period
of time. File paths in comments get stale and are hard to maintain long
term. Also, their usefulness is questionable since it would be easier to
locate a syscall definition using the SYSCALL_DEFINEx() macro.
Remove all source file path comments from the syscall headers. Also,
equalize the uneven line spacing (some of which is introduced due to the
deletions).
Signed-off-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
|
| |\ \
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull mm updates from Andrew Morton:
- Yosry Ahmed brought back some cgroup v1 stats in OOM logs
- Yosry has also eliminated cgroup's atomic rstat flushing
- Nhat Pham adds the new cachestat() syscall. It provides userspace
with the ability to query pagecache status - a similar concept to
mincore() but more powerful and with improved usability
- Mel Gorman provides more optimizations for compaction, reducing the
prevalence of page rescanning
- Lorenzo Stoakes has done some maintanance work on the
get_user_pages() interface
- Liam Howlett continues with cleanups and maintenance work to the
maple tree code. Peng Zhang also does some work on maple tree
- Johannes Weiner has done some cleanup work on the compaction code
- David Hildenbrand has contributed additional selftests for
get_user_pages()
- Thomas Gleixner has contributed some maintenance and optimization
work for the vmalloc code
- Baolin Wang has provided some compaction cleanups,
- SeongJae Park continues maintenance work on the DAMON code
- Huang Ying has done some maintenance on the swap code's usage of
device refcounting
- Christoph Hellwig has some cleanups for the filemap/directio code
- Ryan Roberts provides two patch series which yield some
rationalization of the kernel's access to pte entries - use the
provided APIs rather than open-coding accesses
- Lorenzo Stoakes has some fixes to the interaction between pagecache
and directio access to file mappings
- John Hubbard has a series of fixes to the MM selftesting code
- ZhangPeng continues the folio conversion campaign
- Hugh Dickins has been working on the pagetable handling code, mainly
with a view to reducing the load on the mmap_lock
- Catalin Marinas has reduced the arm64 kmalloc() minimum alignment
from 128 to 8
- Domenico Cerasuolo has improved the zswap reclaim mechanism by
reorganizing the LRU management
- Matthew Wilcox provides some fixups to make gfs2 work better with the
buffer_head code
- Vishal Moola also has done some folio conversion work
- Matthew Wilcox has removed the remnants of the pagevec code - their
functionality is migrated over to struct folio_batch
* tag 'mm-stable-2023-06-24-19-15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (380 commits)
mm/hugetlb: remove hugetlb_set_page_subpool()
mm: nommu: correct the range of mmap_sem_read_lock in task_mem()
hugetlb: revert use of page_cache_next_miss()
Revert "page cache: fix page_cache_next/prev_miss off by one"
mm/vmscan: fix root proactive reclaim unthrottling unbalanced node
mm: memcg: rename and document global_reclaim()
mm: kill [add|del]_page_to_lru_list()
mm: compaction: convert to use a folio in isolate_migratepages_block()
mm: zswap: fix double invalidate with exclusive loads
mm: remove unnecessary pagevec includes
mm: remove references to pagevec
mm: rename invalidate_mapping_pagevec to mapping_try_invalidate
mm: remove struct pagevec
net: convert sunrpc from pagevec to folio_batch
i915: convert i915_gpu_error to use a folio_batch
pagevec: rename fbatch_count()
mm: remove check_move_unevictable_pages()
drm: convert drm_gem_put_pages() to use a folio_batch
i915: convert shmem_sg_free_table() to use a folio_batch
scatterlist: add sg_set_folio()
...
|
| | |/
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
There is currently no good way to query the page cache state of large file
sets and directory trees. There is mincore(), but it scales poorly: the
kernel writes out a lot of bitmap data that userspace has to aggregate,
when the user really doesn not care about per-page information in that
case. The user also needs to mmap and unmap each file as it goes along,
which can be quite slow as well.
Some use cases where this information could come in handy:
* Allowing database to decide whether to perform an index scan or
direct table queries based on the in-memory cache state of the
index.
* Visibility into the writeback algorithm, for performance issues
diagnostic.
* Workload-aware writeback pacing: estimating IO fulfilled by page
cache (and IO to be done) within a range of a file, allowing for
more frequent syncing when and where there is IO capacity, and
batching when there is not.
* Computing memory usage of large files/directory trees, analogous to
the du tool for disk usage.
More information about these use cases could be found in the following
thread:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20230315170934.GA97793@cmpxchg.org/
This patch implements a new syscall that queries cache state of a file and
summarizes the number of cached pages, number of dirty pages, number of
pages marked for writeback, number of (recently) evicted pages, etc. in a
given range. Currently, the syscall is only wired in for x86
architecture.
NAME
cachestat - query the page cache statistics of a file.
SYNOPSIS
#include <sys/mman.h>
struct cachestat_range {
__u64 off;
__u64 len;
};
struct cachestat {
__u64 nr_cache;
__u64 nr_dirty;
__u64 nr_writeback;
__u64 nr_evicted;
__u64 nr_recently_evicted;
};
int cachestat(unsigned int fd, struct cachestat_range *cstat_range,
struct cachestat *cstat, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
cachestat() queries the number of cached pages, number of dirty
pages, number of pages marked for writeback, number of evicted
pages, number of recently evicted pages, in the bytes range given by
`off` and `len`.
An evicted page is a page that is previously in the page cache but
has been evicted since. A page is recently evicted if its last
eviction was recent enough that its reentry to the cache would
indicate that it is actively being used by the system, and that
there is memory pressure on the system.
These values are returned in a cachestat struct, whose address is
given by the `cstat` argument.
The `off` and `len` arguments must be non-negative integers. If
`len` > 0, the queried range is [`off`, `off` + `len`]. If `len` ==
0, we will query in the range from `off` to the end of the file.
The `flags` argument is unused for now, but is included for future
extensibility. User should pass 0 (i.e no flag specified).
Currently, hugetlbfs is not supported.
Because the status of a page can change after cachestat() checks it
but before it returns to the application, the returned values may
contain stale information.
RETURN VALUE
On success, cachestat returns 0. On error, -1 is returned, and errno
is set to indicate the error.
ERRORS
EFAULT cstat or cstat_args points to an invalid address.
EINVAL invalid flags.
EBADF invalid file descriptor.
EOPNOTSUPP file descriptor is of a hugetlbfs file
[nphamcs@gmail.com: replace rounddown logic with the existing helper]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230504022044.3675469-1-nphamcs@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20230503013608.2431726-3-nphamcs@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Nhat Pham <nphamcs@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Brian Foster <bfoster@redhat.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
|
| |/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The sys_ni_posix_timers() definition causes a warning when the declaration
is missing, so this needs to be added along with the normal syscalls,
outside of the #ifdef.
kernel/time/posix-stubs.c:26:17: error: no previous prototype for 'sys_ni_posix_timers' [-Werror=missing-prototypes]
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230607142925.3126422-1-arnd@kernel.org
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
There are significant differences between signal handling on 32-bit vs.
64-bit, like different structure layouts and legacy syscalls. Instead
of duplicating that code for native and compat, merge both versions
into one file.
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220606203802.158958-8-brgerst@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
There are no remaining callers of set_fs(), so CONFIG_SET_FS
can be removed globally, along with the thread_info field and
any references to it.
This turns access_ok() into a cheaper check against TASK_SIZE_MAX.
As CONFIG_SET_FS is now gone, drop all remaining references to
set_fs()/get_fs(), mm_segment_t, user_addr_max() and uaccess_kernel().
Acked-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org> # for sparc32 changes
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Tested-by: Sergey Matyukevich <sergey.matyukevich@synopsys.com> # for arc changes
Acked-by: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> # [openrisc, asm-generic]
Acked-by: Dinh Nguyen <dinguyen@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211202123810.267175-4-aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com
Signed-off-by: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Huang Ying <ying.huang@intel.com>
Cc: <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Add support to wait on multiple futexes. This is the interface
implemented by this syscall:
futex_waitv(struct futex_waitv *waiters, unsigned int nr_futexes,
unsigned int flags, struct timespec *timeout, clockid_t clockid)
struct futex_waitv {
__u64 val;
__u64 uaddr;
__u32 flags;
__u32 __reserved;
};
Given an array of struct futex_waitv, wait on each uaddr. The thread
wakes if a futex_wake() is performed at any uaddr. The syscall returns
immediately if any waiter has *uaddr != val. *timeout is an optional
absolute timeout value for the operation. This syscall supports only
64bit sized timeout structs. The flags argument of the syscall should be
empty, but it can be used for future extensions. Flags for shared
futexes, sizes, etc. should be used on the individual flags of each
waiter.
__reserved is used for explicit padding and should be 0, but it might be
used for future extensions. If the userspace uses 32-bit pointers, it
should make sure to explicitly cast it when assigning to waitv::uaddr.
Returns the array index of one of the woken futexes. There’s no given
information of how many were woken, or any particular attribute of it
(if it’s the first woken, if it is of the smaller index...).
Signed-off-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210923171111.300673-17-andrealmeid@collabora.com
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Put the syscalls in their own little file.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@collabora.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210923171111.300673-3-andrealmeid@collabora.com
|
| |\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Pull ARM development updates from Russell King:
- Rename "mod_init" and "mod_exit" so that initcall debug output is
actually useful (Randy Dunlap)
- Update maintainers entries for linux-arm-kernel to indicate it is
moderated for non-subscribers (Randy Dunlap)
- Move install rules to arch/arm/Makefile (Masahiro Yamada)
- Drop unnecessary ARCH_NR_GPIOS definition (Linus Walleij)
- Don't warn about atags_to_fdt() stack size (David Heidelberg)
- Speed up unaligned copy_{from,to}_kernel_nofault (Arnd Bergmann)
- Get rid of set_fs() usage (Arnd Bergmann)
- Remove checks for GCC prior to v4.6 (Geert Uytterhoeven)
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.armlinux.org.uk/~rmk/linux-arm:
ARM: 9118/1: div64: Remove always-true __div64_const32_is_OK() duplicate
ARM: 9117/1: asm-generic: div64: Remove always-true __div64_const32_is_OK()
ARM: 9116/1: unified: Remove check for gcc < 4
ARM: 9110/1: oabi-compat: fix oabi epoll sparse warning
ARM: 9113/1: uaccess: remove set_fs() implementation
ARM: 9112/1: uaccess: add __{get,put}_kernel_nofault
ARM: 9111/1: oabi-compat: rework fcntl64() emulation
ARM: 9114/1: oabi-compat: rework sys_semtimedop emulation
ARM: 9108/1: oabi-compat: rework epoll_wait/epoll_pwait emulation
ARM: 9107/1: syscall: always store thread_info->abi_syscall
ARM: 9109/1: oabi-compat: add epoll_pwait handler
ARM: 9106/1: traps: use get_kernel_nofault instead of set_fs()
ARM: 9115/1: mm/maccess: fix unaligned copy_{from,to}_kernel_nofault
ARM: 9105/1: atags_to_fdt: don't warn about stack size
ARM: 9103/1: Drop ARCH_NR_GPIOS definition
ARM: 9102/1: move theinstall rules to arch/arm/Makefile
ARM: 9100/1: MAINTAINERS: mark all linux-arm-kernel@infradead list as moderated
ARM: 9099/1: crypto: rename 'mod_init' & 'mod_exit' functions to be module-specific
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
sys_oabi_semtimedop() is one of the last users of set_fs() on Arm. To
remove this one, expose the internal code of the actual implementation
that operates on a kernel pointer and call it directly after copying.
There should be no measurable impact on the normal execution of this
function, and it makes the overly long function a little shorter, which
may help readability.
While reworking the oabi version, make it behave a little more like
the native one, using kvmalloc_array() and restructure the code
flow in a similar way.
The naming of __do_semtimedop() is not very good, I hope someone can
come up with a better name.
One regression was spotted by kernel test robot <rong.a.chen@intel.com>
and fixed before the first mailing list submission.
Acked-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
|
| |\ \
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | | |
Merge misc updates from Andrew Morton:
"173 patches.
Subsystems affected by this series: ia64, ocfs2, block, and mm (debug,
pagecache, gup, swap, shmem, memcg, selftests, pagemap, mremap,
bootmem, sparsemem, vmalloc, kasan, pagealloc, memory-failure,
hugetlb, userfaultfd, vmscan, compaction, mempolicy, memblock,
oom-kill, migration, ksm, percpu, vmstat, and madvise)"
* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (173 commits)
mm/madvise: add MADV_WILLNEED to process_madvise()
mm/vmstat: remove unneeded return value
mm/vmstat: simplify the array size calculation
mm/vmstat: correct some wrong comments
mm/percpu,c: remove obsolete comments of pcpu_chunk_populated()
selftests: vm: add COW time test for KSM pages
selftests: vm: add KSM merging time test
mm: KSM: fix data type
selftests: vm: add KSM merging across nodes test
selftests: vm: add KSM zero page merging test
selftests: vm: add KSM unmerge test
selftests: vm: add KSM merge test
mm/migrate: correct kernel-doc notation
mm: wire up syscall process_mrelease
mm: introduce process_mrelease system call
memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method private
mm/mempolicy.c: use in_task() in mempolicy_slab_node()
mm/mempolicy: unify the create() func for bind/interleave/prefer-many policies
mm/mempolicy: advertise new MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
mm/hugetlb: add support for mempolicy MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY
...
|
| | |/
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Split off from prev patch in the series that implements the syscall.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210809185259.405936-2-surenb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Engelhardt <jengelh@inai.de>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
| |/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The bdflush system call has been deprecated for a very long time.
Recently Michael Schmitz tested[1] and found that the last known
caller of of the bdflush system call is unaffected by it's removal.
Since the code is not needed delete it.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/36123b5d-daa0-6c2b-f2d4-a942f069fd54@gmail.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87sg10quue.fsf_-_@disp2133
Tested-by: Michael Schmitz <schmitzmic@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Cyril Hrubis <chrubis@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Wire up memfd_secret system call on architectures that define
ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP, namely arm64, risc-v and x86.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210518072034.31572-7-rppt@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Some users have pointed out that path-based syscalls are problematic in
some environments and at least directory fd argument and possibly also
resolve flags are desirable for such syscalls. Rather than
reimplementing all details of pathname lookup and following where it may
eventually evolve, let's go for full file descriptor based syscall
similar to how ioctl(2) works since the beginning. Managing of quotas
isn't performance sensitive so the extra overhead of open does not
matter and we are able to consume O_PATH descriptors as well which makes
open cheap anyway. Also for frequent operations (such as retrieving
usage information for all users) we can reuse single fd and in fact get
even better performance as well as avoiding races with possible remounts
etc.
Tested-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
|
| |\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris:
"Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün.
Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing.
From Mickaël's cover letter:
"The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g.
global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security
sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing
system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to
help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious
behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any
process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict
themselves.
Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering
syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the
use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the
kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS
sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD
Pledge/Unveil.
In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features.
This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This
series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the
combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing,
init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]"
The cover letter and v34 posting is here:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/
See also:
https://landlock.io/
This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several
years"
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2]
* tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features
landlock: Add user and kernel documentation
samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example
selftests/landlock: Add user space tests
landlock: Add syscall implementations
arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls
fs,security: Add sb_delete hook
landlock: Support filesystem access-control
LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock
landlock: Add ptrace restrictions
landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials
landlock: Add ruleset and domain management
landlock: Add object management
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
These 3 system calls are designed to be used by unprivileged processes
to sandbox themselves:
* landlock_create_ruleset(2): Creates a ruleset and returns its file
descriptor.
* landlock_add_rule(2): Adds a rule (e.g. file hierarchy access) to a
ruleset, identified by the dedicated file descriptor.
* landlock_restrict_self(2): Enforces a ruleset on the calling thread
and its future children (similar to seccomp). This syscall has the
same usage restrictions as seccomp(2): the caller must have the
no_new_privs attribute set or have CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the current user
namespace.
All these syscalls have a "flags" argument (not currently used) to
enable extensibility.
Here are the motivations for these new syscalls:
* A sandboxed process may not have access to file systems, including
/dev, /sys or /proc, but it should still be able to add more
restrictions to itself.
* Neither prctl(2) nor seccomp(2) (which was used in a previous version)
fit well with the current definition of a Landlock security policy.
All passed structs (attributes) are checked at build time to ensure that
they don't contain holes and that they are aligned the same way for each
architecture.
See the user and kernel documentation for more details (provided by a
following commit):
* Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
* Documentation/security/landlock.rst
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-9-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
|
| |/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Wire up the quotactl_path syscall added in the previous patch.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210304123541.30749-3-s.hauer@pengutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
|
| |\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux
Pull idmapped mounts from Christian Brauner:
"This introduces idmapped mounts which has been in the making for some
time. Simply put, different mounts can expose the same file or
directory with different ownership. This initial implementation comes
with ports for fat, ext4 and with Christoph's port for xfs with more
filesystems being actively worked on by independent people and
maintainers.
Idmapping mounts handle a wide range of long standing use-cases. Here
are just a few:
- Idmapped mounts make it possible to easily share files between
multiple users or multiple machines especially in complex
scenarios. For example, idmapped mounts will be used in the
implementation of portable home directories in
systemd-homed.service(8) where they allow users to move their home
directory to an external storage device and use it on multiple
computers where they are assigned different uids and gids. This
effectively makes it possible to assign random uids and gids at
login time.
- It is possible to share files from the host with unprivileged
containers without having to change ownership permanently through
chown(2).
- It is possible to idmap a container's rootfs and without having to
mangle every file. For example, Chromebooks use it to share the
user's Download folder with their unprivileged containers in their
Linux subsystem.
- It is possible to share files between containers with
non-overlapping idmappings.
- Filesystem that lack a proper concept of ownership such as fat can
use idmapped mounts to implement discretionary access (DAC)
permission checking.
- They allow users to efficiently changing ownership on a per-mount
basis without having to (recursively) chown(2) all files. In
contrast to chown (2) changing ownership of large sets of files is
instantenous with idmapped mounts. This is especially useful when
ownership of a whole root filesystem of a virtual machine or
container is changed. With idmapped mounts a single syscall
mount_setattr syscall will be sufficient to change the ownership of
all files.
- Idmapped mounts always take the current ownership into account as
idmappings specify what a given uid or gid is supposed to be mapped
to. This contrasts with the chown(2) syscall which cannot by itself
take the current ownership of the files it changes into account. It
simply changes the ownership to the specified uid and gid. This is
especially problematic when recursively chown(2)ing a large set of
files which is commong with the aforementioned portable home
directory and container and vm scenario.
- Idmapped mounts allow to change ownership locally, restricting it
to specific mounts, and temporarily as the ownership changes only
apply as long as the mount exists.
Several userspace projects have either already put up patches and
pull-requests for this feature or will do so should you decide to pull
this:
- systemd: In a wide variety of scenarios but especially right away
in their implementation of portable home directories.
https://systemd.io/HOME_DIRECTORY/
- container runtimes: containerd, runC, LXD:To share data between
host and unprivileged containers, unprivileged and privileged
containers, etc. The pull request for idmapped mounts support in
containerd, the default Kubernetes runtime is already up for quite
a while now: https://github.com/containerd/containerd/pull/4734
- The virtio-fs developers and several users have expressed interest
in using this feature with virtual machines once virtio-fs is
ported.
- ChromeOS: Sharing host-directories with unprivileged containers.
I've tightly synced with all those projects and all of those listed
here have also expressed their need/desire for this feature on the
mailing list. For more info on how people use this there's a bunch of
talks about this too. Here's just two recent ones:
https://www.cncf.io/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Rootless-Containers-in-Gitpod.pdf
https://fosdem.org/2021/schedule/event/containers_idmap/
This comes with an extensive xfstests suite covering both ext4 and
xfs:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/xfstests-dev/h/idmapped_mounts
It covers truncation, creation, opening, xattrs, vfscaps, setid
execution, setgid inheritance and more both with idmapped and
non-idmapped mounts. It already helped to discover an unrelated xfs
setgid inheritance bug which has since been fixed in mainline. It will
be sent for inclusion with the xfstests project should you decide to
merge this.
In order to support per-mount idmappings vfsmounts are marked with
user namespaces. The idmapping of the user namespace will be used to
map the ids of vfs objects when they are accessed through that mount.
By default all vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace.
The initial user namespace is used to indicate that a mount is not
idmapped. All operations behave as before and this is verified in the
testsuite.
Based on prior discussions we want to attach the whole user namespace
and not just a dedicated idmapping struct. This allows us to reuse all
the helpers that already exist for dealing with idmappings instead of
introducing a whole new range of helpers. In addition, if we decide in
the future that we are confident enough to enable unprivileged users
to setup idmapped mounts the permission checking can take into account
whether the caller is privileged in the user namespace the mount is
currently marked with.
The user namespace the mount will be marked with can be specified by
passing a file descriptor refering to the user namespace as an
argument to the new mount_setattr() syscall together with the new
MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP flag. The system call follows the openat2() pattern
of extensibility.
The following conditions must be met in order to create an idmapped
mount:
- The caller must currently have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in the
user namespace the underlying filesystem has been mounted in.
- The underlying filesystem must support idmapped mounts.
- The mount must not already be idmapped. This also implies that the
idmapping of a mount cannot be altered once it has been idmapped.
- The mount must be a detached/anonymous mount, i.e. it must have
been created by calling open_tree() with the OPEN_TREE_CLONE flag
and it must not already have been visible in the filesystem.
The last two points guarantee easier semantics for userspace and the
kernel and make the implementation significantly simpler.
By default vfsmounts are marked with the initial user namespace and no
behavioral or performance changes are observed.
The manpage with a detailed description can be found here:
https://git.kernel.org/brauner/man-pages/c/1d7b902e2875a1ff342e036a9f866a995640aea8
In order to support idmapped mounts, filesystems need to be changed
and mark themselves with the FS_ALLOW_IDMAP flag in fs_flags. The
patches to convert individual filesystem are not very large or
complicated overall as can be seen from the included fat, ext4, and
xfs ports. Patches for other filesystems are actively worked on and
will be sent out separately. The xfstestsuite can be used to verify
that port has been done correctly.
The mount_setattr() syscall is motivated independent of the idmapped
mounts patches and it's been around since July 2019. One of the most
valuable features of the new mount api is the ability to perform
mounts based on file descriptors only.
Together with the lookup restrictions available in the openat2()
RESOLVE_* flag namespace which we added in v5.6 this is the first time
we are close to hardened and race-free (e.g. symlinks) mounting and
path resolution.
While userspace has started porting to the new mount api to mount
proper filesystems and create new bind-mounts it is currently not
possible to change mount options of an already existing bind mount in
the new mount api since the mount_setattr() syscall is missing.
With the addition of the mount_setattr() syscall we remove this last
restriction and userspace can now fully port to the new mount api,
covering every use-case the old mount api could. We also add the
crucial ability to recursively change mount options for a whole mount
tree, both removing and adding mount options at the same time. This
syscall has been requested multiple times by various people and
projects.
There is a simple tool available at
https://github.com/brauner/mount-idmapped
that allows to create idmapped mounts so people can play with this
patch series. I'll add support for the regular mount binary should you
decide to pull this in the following weeks:
Here's an example to a simple idmapped mount of another user's home
directory:
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo ./mount --idmap both:1000:1001:1 /home/ubuntu/ /mnt
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 ubuntu ubuntu 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 4 root root 4096 Oct 28 04:00 ..
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 ubuntu ubuntu 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/
total 28
drwxr-xr-x 2 u1001 u1001 4096 Oct 28 22:07 .
drwxr-xr-x 29 root root 4096 Oct 28 22:01 ..
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 3154 Oct 28 22:12 .bash_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 220 Feb 25 2020 .bash_logout
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 3771 Feb 25 2020 .bashrc
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 807 Feb 25 2020 .profile
-rw-r--r-- 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 16 16:11 .sudo_as_admin_successful
-rw------- 1 u1001 u1001 1144 Oct 28 00:43 .viminfo
u1001@f2-vm:/$ touch /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ setfacl -m u:1001:rwx /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ sudo setcap -n 1001 cap_net_raw+ep /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /mnt/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 u1001 u1001 0 Oct 28 22:14 /mnt/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ ls -al /home/ubuntu/my-file
-rw-rwxr--+ 1 ubuntu ubuntu 0 Oct 28 22:14 /home/ubuntu/my-file
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /mnt/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: mnt/my-file
# owner: u1001
# group: u1001
user::rw-
user:u1001:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--
u1001@f2-vm:/$ getfacl /home/ubuntu/my-file
getfacl: Removing leading '/' from absolute path names
# file: home/ubuntu/my-file
# owner: ubuntu
# group: ubuntu
user::rw-
user:ubuntu:rwx
group::rw-
mask::rwx
other::r--"
* tag 'idmapped-mounts-v5.12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/brauner/linux: (41 commits)
xfs: remove the possibly unused mp variable in xfs_file_compat_ioctl
xfs: support idmapped mounts
ext4: support idmapped mounts
fat: handle idmapped mounts
tests: add mount_setattr() selftests
fs: introduce MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP
fs: add mount_setattr()
fs: add attr_flags_to_mnt_flags helper
fs: split out functions to hold writers
namespace: only take read lock in do_reconfigure_mnt()
mount: make {lock,unlock}_mount_hash() static
namespace: take lock_mount_hash() directly when changing flags
nfs: do not export idmapped mounts
overlayfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ecryptfs: do not mount on top of idmapped mounts
ima: handle idmapped mounts
apparmor: handle idmapped mounts
fs: make helpers idmap mount aware
exec: handle idmapped mounts
would_dump: handle idmapped mounts
...
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
This implements the missing mount_setattr() syscall. While the new mount
api allows to change the properties of a superblock there is currently
no way to change the properties of a mount or a mount tree using file
descriptors which the new mount api is based on. In addition the old
mount api has the restriction that mount options cannot be applied
recursively. This hasn't changed since changing mount options on a
per-mount basis was implemented in [1] and has been a frequent request
not just for convenience but also for security reasons. The legacy
mount syscall is unable to accommodate this behavior without introducing
a whole new set of flags because MS_REC | MS_REMOUNT | MS_BIND |
MS_RDONLY | MS_NOEXEC | [...] only apply the mount option to the topmost
mount. Changing MS_REC to apply to the whole mount tree would mean
introducing a significant uapi change and would likely cause significant
regressions.
The new mount_setattr() syscall allows to recursively clear and set
mount options in one shot. Multiple calls to change mount options
requesting the same changes are idempotent:
int mount_setattr(int dfd, const char *path, unsigned flags,
struct mount_attr *uattr, size_t usize);
Flags to modify path resolution behavior are specified in the @flags
argument. Currently, AT_EMPTY_PATH, AT_RECURSIVE, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW,
and AT_NO_AUTOMOUNT are supported. If useful, additional lookup flags to
restrict path resolution as introduced with openat2() might be supported
in the future.
The mount_setattr() syscall can be expected to grow over time and is
designed with extensibility in mind. It follows the extensible syscall
pattern we have used with other syscalls such as openat2(), clone3(),
sched_{set,get}attr(), and others.
The set of mount options is passed in the uapi struct mount_attr which
currently has the following layout:
struct mount_attr {
__u64 attr_set;
__u64 attr_clr;
__u64 propagation;
__u64 userns_fd;
};
The @attr_set and @attr_clr members are used to clear and set mount
options. This way a user can e.g. request that a set of flags is to be
raised such as turning mounts readonly by raising MOUNT_ATTR_RDONLY in
@attr_set while at the same time requesting that another set of flags is
to be lowered such as removing noexec from a mount tree by specifying
MOUNT_ATTR_NOEXEC in @attr_clr.
Note, since the MOUNT_ATTR_<atime> values are an enum starting from 0,
not a bitmap, users wanting to transition to a different atime setting
cannot simply specify the atime setting in @attr_set, but must also
specify MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME in the @attr_clr field. So we ensure that
MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME can't be partially set in @attr_clr and that @attr_set
can't have any atime bits set if MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME isn't set in
@attr_clr.
The @propagation field lets callers specify the propagation type of a
mount tree. Propagation is a single property that has four different
settings and as such is not really a flag argument but an enum.
Specifically, it would be unclear what setting and clearing propagation
settings in combination would amount to. The legacy mount() syscall thus
forbids the combination of multiple propagation settings too. The goal
is to keep the semantics of mount propagation somewhat simple as they
are overly complex as it is.
The @userns_fd field lets user specify a user namespace whose idmapping
becomes the idmapping of the mount. This is implemented and explained in
detail in the next patch.
[1]: commit 2e4b7fcd9260 ("[PATCH] r/o bind mounts: honor mount writer counts at remount")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210121131959.646623-35-christian.brauner@ubuntu.com
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-api@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
|
| |\|
| |
| |
| | |
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Commit
121b32a58a3a ("x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments")
converted native x86-32 which take 64-bit arguments to use the
compat handlers to allow conversion to passing args via pt_regs.
sys_fanotify_mark() was however missed, as it has a general compat
handler. Add a config option that will use the syscall wrapper that
takes the split args for native 32-bit.
[ bp: Fix typo in Kconfig help text. ]
Fixes: 121b32a58a3a ("x86/entry/32: Use IA32-specific wrappers for syscalls taking 64-bit arguments")
Reported-by: Paweł Jasiak <pawel@jasiak.xyz>
Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201130223059.101286-1-brgerst@gmail.com
|
| |/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
futex(2) says that 'utime' is a pointer to 'const'. The implementation
doesn't use 'const'; however, it _never_ modifies the contents of utime.
- futex() either uses 'utime' as a pointer to struct or as a 'u32'.
- In case it's used as a 'u32', it makes a copy of it, and of course it is
not dereferenced.
- In case it's used as a 'struct __kernel_timespec __user *', the pointer
is not dereferenced inside the futex() definition, and it is only passed
to a function: get_timespec64(), which accepts a 'const struct
__kernel_timespec __user *'.
[ tglx: Make the same change to the compat syscall and fixup the prototypes. ]
Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201128123945.4592-1-alx.manpages@gmail.com
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Split off from prev patch in the series that implements the syscall.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201121144401.3727659-4-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
| |\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Pull io_uring updates from Jens Axboe:
"Fairly light set of changes this time around, and mostly some bits
that were pushed out to 5.11 instead of 5.10, fixes/cleanups, and a
few features. In particular:
- Cleanups around iovec import (David Laight, Pavel)
- Add timeout support for io_uring_enter(2), which enables us to
clean up liburing and avoid a timeout sqe submission in the
completion path.
The big win here is that it allows setups that split SQ and CQ
handling into separate threads to avoid locking, as the CQ side
will no longer submit when timeouts are needed when waiting for
events (Hao Xu)
- Add support for socket shutdown, and renameat/unlinkat.
- SQPOLL cleanups and improvements (Xiaoguang Wang)
- Allow SQPOLL setups for CAP_SYS_NICE, and enable regular
(non-fixed) files to be used.
- Cancelation improvements (Pavel)
- Fixed file reference improvements (Pavel)
- IOPOLL related race fixes (Pavel)
- Lots of other little fixes and cleanups (mostly Pavel)"
* tag 'for-5.11/io_uring-2020-12-14' of git://git.kernel.dk/linux-block: (43 commits)
io_uring: fix io_cqring_events()'s noflush
io_uring: fix racy IOPOLL flush overflow
io_uring: fix racy IOPOLL completions
io_uring: always let io_iopoll_complete() complete polled io
io_uring: add timeout update
io_uring: restructure io_timeout_cancel()
io_uring: fix files cancellation
io_uring: use bottom half safe lock for fixed file data
io_uring: fix miscounting ios_left
io_uring: change submit file state invariant
io_uring: check kthread stopped flag when sq thread is unparked
io_uring: share fixed_file_refs b/w multiple rsrcs
io_uring: replace inflight_wait with tctx->wait
io_uring: don't take fs for recvmsg/sendmsg
io_uring: only wake up sq thread while current task is in io worker context
io_uring: don't acquire uring_lock twice
io_uring: initialize 'timeout' properly in io_sq_thread()
io_uring: refactor io_sq_thread() handling
io_uring: always batch cancel in *cancel_files()
io_uring: pass files into kill timeouts/poll
...
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Now users who want to get woken when waiting for events should submit a
timeout command first. It is not safe for applications that split SQ and
CQ handling between two threads, such as mysql. Users should synchronize
the two threads explicitly to protect SQ and that will impact the
performance.
This patch adds support for timeout to existing io_uring_enter(). To
avoid overloading arguments, it introduces a new parameter structure
which contains sigmask and timeout.
I have tested the workloads with one thread submiting nop requests
while the other reaping the cqe with timeout. It shows 1.8~2x faster
when the iodepth is 16.
Signed-off-by: Jiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Hao Xu <haoxu@linux.alibaba.com>
[axboe: various cleanups/fixes, and name change to SIG_IS_DATA]
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
|
| |\ \
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | |
| | | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic
Pull asm-generic cleanups from Arnd Bergmann:
"These are a couple of compiler warning fixes to make 'make W=2' less
noisy, as well as some fixes to code comments in asm-generic"
* tag 'asm-generic-cleanup-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arnd/asm-generic:
syscalls: Fix file comments for syscalls implemented in kernel/sys.c
ctype.h: remove duplicate isdigit() helper
qspinlock: use signed temporaries for cmpxchg
asm-generic: fix ffs -Wshadow warning
asm-generic: percpu: avoid Wshadow warning
asm-generic/sembuf: Update architecture related information in comment
|
| | |/
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
The relevant syscalls were previously moved from kernel/timer.c to kernel/sys.c,
but the comments weren't updated to reflect this change.
Fixing these comments messes up the alphabetical ordering of syscalls by
filename. This could be fixed by merging the two groups of kernel/sys.c syscalls,
but that would require reordering the syscalls and renumbering them to maintain
the numerical order in unistd.h.
Signed-off-by: Tal Zussman <tz2294@columbia.edu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20201112215657.GA4539@charmander'
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Now that ksys_close is exactly identical to close_fd replace
the one caller of ksys_close with close_fd.
[1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200818112020.GA17080@infradead.org
Suggested-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201120231441.29911-22-ebiederm@xmission.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
| |/
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The function __close_fd was added to support binder[1]. Now that
binder has been fixed to no longer need __close_fd[2] all calls
to __close_fd pass current->files.
Therefore transform the files parameter into a local variable
initialized to current->files, and rename __close_fd to close_fd to
reflect this change, and keep it in sync with the similar changes to
__alloc_fd, and __fd_install.
This removes the need for callers to care about the extra care that
needs to be take if anything except current->files is passed, by
limiting the callers to only operation on current->files.
[1] 483ce1d4b8c3 ("take descriptor-related part of close() to file.c")
[2] 44d8047f1d87 ("binder: use standard functions to allocate fds")
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
v1: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200817220425.9389-17-ebiederm@xmission.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201120231441.29911-21-ebiederm@xmission.com
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Use a more generic form for __section that requires quotes to avoid
complications with clang and gcc differences.
Remove the quote operator # from compiler_attributes.h __section macro.
Convert all unquoted __section(foo) uses to quoted __section("foo").
Also convert __attribute__((section("foo"))) uses to __section("foo")
even if the __attribute__ has multiple list entry forms.
Conversion done using the script at:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/75393e5ddc272dc7403de74d645e6c6e0f4e70eb.camel@perches.com/2-convert_section.pl
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@gooogle.com>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
There is usecase that System Management Software(SMS) want to give a
memory hint like MADV_[COLD|PAGEEOUT] to other processes and in the
case of Android, it is the ActivityManagerService.
The information required to make the reclaim decision is not known to the
app. Instead, it is known to the centralized userspace
daemon(ActivityManagerService), and that daemon must be able to initiate
reclaim on its own without any app involvement.
To solve the issue, this patch introduces a new syscall
process_madvise(2). It uses pidfd of an external process to give the
hint. It also supports vector address range because Android app has
thousands of vmas due to zygote so it's totally waste of CPU and power if
we should call the syscall one by one for each vma.(With testing 2000-vma
syscall vs 1-vector syscall, it showed 15% performance improvement. I
think it would be bigger in real practice because the testing ran very
cache friendly environment).
Another potential use case for the vector range is to amortize the cost
ofTLB shootdowns for multiple ranges when using MADV_DONTNEED; this could
benefit users like TCP receive zerocopy and malloc implementations. In
future, we could find more usecases for other advises so let's make it
happens as API since we introduce a new syscall at this moment. With
that, existing madvise(2) user could replace it with process_madvise(2)
with their own pid if they want to have batch address ranges support
feature.
ince it could affect other process's address range, only privileged
process(PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS) or something else(e.g., being the same
UID) gives it the right to ptrace the process could use it successfully.
The flag argument is reserved for future use if we need to extend the API.
I think supporting all hints madvise has/will supported/support to
process_madvise is rather risky. Because we are not sure all hints make
sense from external process and implementation for the hint may rely on
the caller being in the current context so it could be error-prone. Thus,
I just limited hints as MADV_[COLD|PAGEOUT] in this patch.
If someone want to add other hints, we could hear the usecase and review
it for each hint. It's safer for maintenance rather than introducing a
buggy syscall but hard to fix it later.
So finally, the API is as follows,
ssize_t process_madvise(int pidfd, const struct iovec *iovec,
unsigned long vlen, int advice, unsigned int flags);
DESCRIPTION
The process_madvise() system call is used to give advice or directions
to the kernel about the address ranges from external process as well as
local process. It provides the advice to address ranges of process
described by iovec and vlen. The goal of such advice is to improve
system or application performance.
The pidfd selects the process referred to by the PID file descriptor
specified in pidfd. (See pidofd_open(2) for further information)
The pointer iovec points to an array of iovec structures, defined in
<sys/uio.h> as:
struct iovec {
void *iov_base; /* starting address */
size_t iov_len; /* number of bytes to be advised */
};
The iovec describes address ranges beginning at address(iov_base)
and with size length of bytes(iov_len).
The vlen represents the number of elements in iovec.
The advice is indicated in the advice argument, which is one of the
following at this moment if the target process specified by pidfd is
external.
MADV_COLD
MADV_PAGEOUT
Permission to provide a hint to external process is governed by a
ptrace access mode PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_FSCREDS check; see ptrace(2).
The process_madvise supports every advice madvise(2) has if target
process is in same thread group with calling process so user could
use process_madvise(2) to extend existing madvise(2) to support
vector address ranges.
RETURN VALUE
On success, process_madvise() returns the number of bytes advised.
This return value may be less than the total number of requested
bytes, if an error occurred. The caller should check return value
to determine whether a partial advice occurred.
FAQ:
Q.1 - Why does any external entity have better knowledge?
Quote from Sandeep
"For Android, every application (including the special SystemServer)
are forked from Zygote. The reason of course is to share as many
libraries and classes between the two as possible to benefit from the
preloading during boot.
After applications start, (almost) all of the APIs end up calling into
this SystemServer process over IPC (binder) and back to the
application.
In a fully running system, the SystemServer monitors every single
process periodically to calculate their PSS / RSS and also decides
which process is "important" to the user for interactivity.
So, because of how these processes start _and_ the fact that the
SystemServer is looping to monitor each process, it does tend to *know*
which address range of the application is not used / useful.
Besides, we can never rely on applications to clean things up
themselves. We've had the "hey app1, the system is low on memory,
please trim your memory usage down" notifications for a long time[1].
They rely on applications honoring the broadcasts and very few do.
So, if we want to avoid the inevitable killing of the application and
restarting it, some way to be able to tell the OS about unimportant
memory in these applications will be useful.
- ssp
Q.2 - How to guarantee the race(i.e., object validation) between when
giving a hint from an external process and get the hint from the target
process?
process_madvise operates on the target process's address space as it
exists at the instant that process_madvise is called. If the space
target process can run between the time the process_madvise process
inspects the target process address space and the time that
process_madvise is actually called, process_madvise may operate on
memory regions that the calling process does not expect. It's the
responsibility of the process calling process_madvise to close this
race condition. For example, the calling process can suspend the
target process with ptrace, SIGSTOP, or the freezer cgroup so that it
doesn't have an opportunity to change its own address space before
process_madvise is called. Another option is to operate on memory
regions that the caller knows a priori will be unchanged in the target
process. Yet another option is to accept the race for certain
process_madvise calls after reasoning that mistargeting will do no
harm. The suggested API itself does not provide synchronization. It
also apply other APIs like move_pages, process_vm_write.
The race isn't really a problem though. Why is it so wrong to require
that callers do their own synchronization in some manner? Nobody
objects to write(2) merely because it's possible for two processes to
open the same file and clobber each other's writes --- instead, we tell
people to use flock or something. Think about mmap. It never
guarantees newly allocated address space is still valid when the user
tries to access it because other threads could unmap the memory right
before. That's where we need synchronization by using other API or
design from userside. It shouldn't be part of API itself. If someone
needs more fine-grained synchronization rather than process level,
there were two ideas suggested - cookie[2] and anon-fd[3]. Both are
applicable via using last reserved argument of the API but I don't
think it's necessary right now since we have already ways to prevent
the race so don't want to add additional complexity with more
fine-grained optimization model.
To make the API extend, it reserved an unsigned long as last argument
so we could support it in future if someone really needs it.
Q.3 - Why doesn't ptrace work?
Injecting an madvise in the target process using ptrace would not work
for us because such injected madvise would have to be executed by the
target process, which means that process would have to be runnable and
that creates the risk of the abovementioned race and hinting a wrong
VMA. Furthermore, we want to act the hint in caller's context, not the
callee's, because the callee is usually limited in cpuset/cgroups or
even freezed state so they can't act by themselves quick enough, which
causes more thrashing/kill. It doesn't work if the target process are
ptraced(e.g., strace, debugger, minidump) because a process can have at
most one ptracer.
[1] https://developer.android.com/topic/performance/memory"
[2] process_getinfo for getting the cookie which is updated whenever
vma of process address layout are changed - Daniel Colascione -
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190520035254.57579-1-minchan@kernel.org/T/#m7694416fd179b2066a2c62b5b139b14e3894e224
[3] anonymous fd which is used for the object(i.e., address range)
validation - Michal Hocko -
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200120112722.GY18451@dhcp22.suse.cz/
[minchan@kernel.org: fix process_madvise build break for arm64]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200303145756.GA219683@google.com
[minchan@kernel.org: fix build error for mips of process_madvise]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508052517.GA197378@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix patch ordering issue]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix arm64 whoops]
[minchan@kernel.org: make process_madvise() vlen arg have type size_t, per Florian]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix i386 build]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix syscall numbering]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200905142639.49fc3f1a@canb.auug.org.au
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: madvise.c needs compat.h]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200908204547.285646b4@canb.auug.org.au
[minchan@kernel.org: fix mips build]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200909173655.GC2435453@google.com
[yuehaibing@huawei.com: remove duplicate header which is included twice]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200915121550.30584-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
[minchan@kernel.org: do not use helper functions for process_madvise]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200921175539.GB387368@google.com
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: pidfd_get_pid() gained an argument]
[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: fix up for "iov_iter: transparently handle compat iovecs in import_iovec"]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200928212542.468e1fef@canb.auug.org.au
Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Brian Geffon <bgeffon@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Cc: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Oleksandr Natalenko <oleksandr@redhat.com>
Cc: Sandeep Patil <sspatil@google.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sj38.park@gmail.com>
Cc: SeongJae Park <sjpark@amazon.de>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Cc: Sonny Rao <sonnyrao@google.com>
Cc: Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
Cc: <linux-man@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200302193630.68771-3-minchan@kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200508183320.GA125527@google.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200622192900.22757-4-minchan@kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200901000633.1920247-4-minchan@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This patchset is based on Google-internal RSEQ work done by Paul
Turner and Andrew Hunter.
When working with per-CPU RSEQ-based memory allocations, it is
sometimes important to make sure that a global memory location is no
longer accessed from RSEQ critical sections. For example, there can be
two per-CPU lists, one is "active" and accessed per-CPU, while another
one is inactive and worked on asynchronously "off CPU" (e.g. garbage
collection is performed). Then at some point the two lists are
swapped, and a fast RCU-like mechanism is required to make sure that
the previously active list is no longer accessed.
This patch introduces such a mechanism: in short, membarrier() syscall
issues an IPI to a CPU, restarting a potentially active RSEQ critical
section on the CPU.
Signed-off-by: Peter Oskolkov <posk@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200923233618.2572849-1-posk@google.com
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Since commit 61a47c1ad3a4dc ("sysctl: Remove the sysctl system call"),
sys_sysctl is actually unavailable: any input can only return an error.
We have been warning about people using the sysctl system call for years
and believe there are no more users. Even if there are users of this
interface if they have not complained or fixed their code by now they
probably are not going to, so there is no point in warning them any
longer.
So completely remove sys_sysctl on all architectures.
[nixiaoming@huawei.com: s390: fix build error for sys_call_table_emu]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200618141426.16884-1-nixiaoming@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Xiaoming Ni <nixiaoming@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org> [arm/arm64]
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Bin Meng <bin.meng@windriver.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: chenzefeng <chenzefeng2@huawei.com>
Cc: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <christian@brauner.io>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Diego Elio Pettenò <flameeyes@flameeyes.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net>
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Iurii Zaikin <yzaikin@google.com>
Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru>
Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kars de Jong <jongk@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzk@kernel.org>
Cc: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Cc: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com>
Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Naveen N. Rao <naveen.n.rao@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Olof Johansson <olof@lixom.net>
Cc: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: Ravi Bangoria <ravi.bangoria@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>
Cc: Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>
Cc: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Cc: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com>
Cc: Sven Schnelle <svens@stackframe.org>
Cc: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Thomas Bogendoerfer <tsbogend@alpha.franken.de>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp>
Cc: Zhou Yanjie <zhouyanjie@wanyeetech.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200616030734.87257-1-nixiaoming@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Patch series "clean up address limit helpers", v2.
In preparation for eventually phasing out direct use of set_fs(), this
series removes the segment_eq() arch helper that is only used to implement
or duplicate the uaccess_kernel() API, and then adds descriptive helpers
to force the kernel address limit.
This patch (of 6):
Use the uaccess_kernel helper instead of duplicating it.
[hch@lst.de: arm: don't call addr_limit_user_check for nommu]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200721045834.GA9613@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Hu <nickhu@andestech.com>
Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com>
Cc: Vincent Chen <deanbo422@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>
Cc: Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200714105505.935079-1-hch@lst.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710135706.537715-1-hch@lst.de
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200710135706.537715-2-hch@lst.de
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
| |\
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull init and set_fs() cleanups from Al Viro:
"Christoph's 'getting rid of ksys_...() uses under KERNEL_DS' series"
* 'hch.init_path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (50 commits)
init: add an init_dup helper
init: add an init_utimes helper
init: add an init_stat helper
init: add an init_mknod helper
init: add an init_mkdir helper
init: add an init_symlink helper
init: add an init_link helper
init: add an init_eaccess helper
init: add an init_chmod helper
init: add an init_chown helper
init: add an init_chroot helper
init: add an init_chdir helper
init: add an init_rmdir helper
init: add an init_unlink helper
init: add an init_umount helper
init: add an init_mount helper
init: mark create_dev as __init
init: mark console_on_rootfs as __init
init: initialize ramdisk_execute_command at compile time
devtmpfs: refactor devtmpfsd()
...
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Add a simple helper to mknod with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_mknod.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Add a simple helper to mkdir with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_mkdir.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Add a simple helper to symlink with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_symlink.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Add a simple helper to link with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it. Remove the now unused ksys_link.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Add a simple helper to check if a file exists based on kernel space file
name and switch the early init code over to it. Note that this
theoretically changes behavior as it always is based on the effective
permissions. But during early init that doesn't make a difference.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
| | |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| |
| | |
Add a simple helper to chmod with a kernel space file name and switch
the early init code over to it.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
|
