summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/include/linux
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* Merge tag 'x86_cache_for_v6.1_rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-10-041-4/+60
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 cache resource control updates from Borislav Petkov: - More work by James Morse to disentangle the resctrl filesystem generic code from the architectural one with the endgoal of plugging ARM's MPAM implementation into it too so that the user interface remains the same - Properly restore the MSR_MISC_FEATURE_CONTROL value instead of blindly overwriting it to 0 * tag 'x86_cache_for_v6.1_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (22 commits) x86/resctrl: Make resctrl_arch_rmid_read() return values in bytes x86/resctrl: Add resctrl_rmid_realloc_limit to abstract x86's boot_cpu_data x86/resctrl: Rename and change the units of resctrl_cqm_threshold x86/resctrl: Move get_corrected_mbm_count() into resctrl_arch_rmid_read() x86/resctrl: Move mbm_overflow_count() into resctrl_arch_rmid_read() x86/resctrl: Pass the required parameters into resctrl_arch_rmid_read() x86/resctrl: Abstract __rmid_read() x86/resctrl: Allow per-rmid arch private storage to be reset x86/resctrl: Add per-rmid arch private storage for overflow and chunks x86/resctrl: Calculate bandwidth from the previous __mon_event_count() chunks x86/resctrl: Allow update_mba_bw() to update controls directly x86/resctrl: Remove architecture copy of mbps_val x86/resctrl: Switch over to the resctrl mbps_val list x86/resctrl: Create mba_sc configuration in the rdt_domain x86/resctrl: Abstract and use supports_mba_mbps() x86/resctrl: Remove set_mba_sc()s control array re-initialisation x86/resctrl: Add domain offline callback for resctrl work x86/resctrl: Group struct rdt_hw_domain cleanup x86/resctrl: Add domain online callback for resctrl work x86/resctrl: Merge mon_capable and mon_enabled ...
| * x86/resctrl: Make resctrl_arch_rmid_read() return values in bytesJames Morse2022-09-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | resctrl_arch_rmid_read() returns a value in chunks, as read from the hardware. This needs scaling to bytes by mon_scale, as provided by the architecture code. Now that resctrl_arch_rmid_read() performs the overflow and corrections itself, it may as well return a value in bytes directly. This allows the accesses to the architecture specific 'hw' structure to be removed. Move the mon_scale conversion into resctrl_arch_rmid_read(). mbm_bw_count() is updated to calculate bandwidth from bytes. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jamie Iles <quic_jiles@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Tested-by: Xin Hao <xhao@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902154829.30399-22-james.morse@arm.com
| * x86/resctrl: Add resctrl_rmid_realloc_limit to abstract x86's boot_cpu_dataJames Morse2022-09-231-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | resctrl_rmid_realloc_threshold can be set by user-space. The maximum value is specified by the architecture. Currently max_threshold_occ_write() reads the maximum value from boot_cpu_data.x86_cache_size, which is not portable to another architecture. Add resctrl_rmid_realloc_limit to describe the maximum size in bytes that user-space can set the threshold to. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jamie Iles <quic_jiles@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Tested-by: Xin Hao <xhao@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902154829.30399-21-james.morse@arm.com
| * x86/resctrl: Rename and change the units of resctrl_cqm_thresholdJames Morse2022-09-231-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | resctrl_cqm_threshold is stored in a hardware specific chunk size, but exposed to user-space as bytes. This means the filesystem parts of resctrl need to know how the hardware counts, to convert the user provided byte value to chunks. The interface between the architecture's resctrl code and the filesystem ought to treat everything as bytes. Change the unit of resctrl_cqm_threshold to bytes. resctrl_arch_rmid_read() still returns its value in chunks, so this needs converting to bytes. As all the users have been touched, rename the variable to resctrl_rmid_realloc_threshold, which describes what the value is for. Neither r->num_rmid nor hw_res->mon_scale are guaranteed to be a power of 2, so the existing code introduces a rounding error from resctrl's theoretical fraction of the cache usage. This behaviour is kept as it ensures the user visible value matches the value read from hardware when the rmid will be reallocated. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jamie Iles <quic_jiles@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Tested-by: Xin Hao <xhao@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902154829.30399-20-james.morse@arm.com
| * x86/resctrl: Pass the required parameters into resctrl_arch_rmid_read()James Morse2022-09-231-1/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | resctrl_arch_rmid_read() is intended as the function that an architecture agnostic resctrl filesystem driver can use to read a value in bytes from a hardware register. Currently the function returns the MBM values in chunks directly from hardware. To convert this to bytes, some correction and overflow calculations are needed. These depend on the resource and domain structures. Overflow detection requires the old chunks value. None of this is available to resctrl_arch_rmid_read(). MPAM requires the resource and domain structures to find the MMIO device that holds the registers. Pass the resource and domain to resctrl_arch_rmid_read(). This makes rmid_dirty() too big. Instead merge it with its only caller, and the name is kept as a local variable. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jamie Iles <quic_jiles@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Tested-by: Xin Hao <xhao@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902154829.30399-17-james.morse@arm.com
| * x86/resctrl: Abstract __rmid_read()James Morse2022-09-231-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | __rmid_read() selects the specified eventid and returns the counter value from the MSR. The error handling is architecture specific, and handled by the callers, rdtgroup_mondata_show() and __mon_event_count(). Error handling should be handled by architecture specific code, as a different architecture may have different requirements. MPAM's counters can report that they are 'not ready', requiring a second read after a short delay. This should be hidden from resctrl. Make __rmid_read() the architecture specific function for reading a counter. Rename it resctrl_arch_rmid_read() and move the error handling into it. A read from a counter that hardware supports but resctrl does not now returns -EINVAL instead of -EIO from the default case in __mon_event_count(). It isn't possible for user-space to see this change as resctrl doesn't expose counters it doesn't support. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jamie Iles <quic_jiles@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Tested-by: Xin Hao <xhao@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902154829.30399-16-james.morse@arm.com
| * x86/resctrl: Allow per-rmid arch private storage to be resetJames Morse2022-09-231-0/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To abstract the rmid counters into a helper that returns the number of bytes counted, architecture specific per-rmid state is needed. It needs to be possible to reset this hidden state, as the values may outlive the life of an rmid, or the mount time of the filesystem. mon_event_read() is called with first = true when an rmid is first allocated in mkdir_mondata_subdir(). Add resctrl_arch_reset_rmid() and call it from __mon_event_count()'s rr->first check. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jamie Iles <quic_jiles@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Tested-by: Xin Hao <xhao@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902154829.30399-15-james.morse@arm.com
| * x86/resctrl: Allow update_mba_bw() to update controls directlyJames Morse2022-09-221-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | update_mba_bw() calculates a new control value for the MBA resource based on the user provided mbps_val and the current measured bandwidth. Some control values need remapping by delay_bw_map(). It does this by calling wrmsrl() directly. This needs splitting up to be done by an architecture specific helper, so that the remainder can eventually be moved to /fs/. Add resctrl_arch_update_one() to apply one configuration value to the provided resource and domain. This avoids the staging and cross-calling that is only needed with changes made by user-space. delay_bw_map() moves to be part of the arch code, to maintain the 'percentage control' view of MBA resources in resctrl. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jamie Iles <quic_jiles@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Tested-by: Xin Hao <xhao@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902154829.30399-12-james.morse@arm.com
| * x86/resctrl: Create mba_sc configuration in the rdt_domainJames Morse2022-09-221-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To support resctrl's MBA software controller, the architecture must provide a second configuration array to hold the mbps_val[] from user-space. This complicates the interface between the architecture specific code and the filesystem portions of resctrl that will move to /fs/, to allow multiple architectures to support resctrl. Make the filesystem parts of resctrl create an array for the mba_sc values. The software controller can be changed to use this, allowing the architecture code to only consider the values configured in hardware. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jamie Iles <quic_jiles@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Tested-by: Xin Hao <xhao@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902154829.30399-9-james.morse@arm.com
| * x86/resctrl: Add domain offline callback for resctrl workJames Morse2022-09-221-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Because domains are exposed to user-space via resctrl, the filesystem must update its state when CPU hotplug callbacks are triggered. Some of this work is common to any architecture that would support resctrl, but the work is tied up with the architecture code to free the memory. Move the monitor subdir removal and the cancelling of the mbm/limbo works into a new resctrl_offline_domain() call. These bits are not specific to the architecture. Grouping them in one function allows that code to be moved to /fs/ and re-used by another architecture. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jamie Iles <quic_jiles@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Tested-by: Xin Hao <xhao@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902154829.30399-6-james.morse@arm.com
| * x86/resctrl: Add domain online callback for resctrl workJames Morse2022-09-221-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Because domains are exposed to user-space via resctrl, the filesystem must update its state when CPU hotplug callbacks are triggered. Some of this work is common to any architecture that would support resctrl, but the work is tied up with the architecture code to allocate the memory. Move domain_setup_mon_state(), the monitor subdir creation call and the mbm/limbo workers into a new resctrl_online_domain() call. These bits are not specific to the architecture. Grouping them in one function allows that code to be moved to /fs/ and re-used by another architecture. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jamie Iles <quic_jiles@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Tested-by: Xin Hao <xhao@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902154829.30399-4-james.morse@arm.com
| * x86/resctrl: Merge mon_capable and mon_enabledJames Morse2022-09-221-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | mon_enabled and mon_capable are always set as a pair by rdt_get_mon_l3_config(). There is no point having two values. Merge them together. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jamie Iles <quic_jiles@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Tested-by: Xin Hao <xhao@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902154829.30399-3-james.morse@arm.com
| * x86/resctrl: Kill off alloc_enabledJames Morse2022-09-221-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | rdt_resources_all[] used to have extra entries for L2CODE/L2DATA. These were hidden from resctrl by the alloc_enabled value. Now that the L2/L2CODE/L2DATA resources have been merged together, alloc_enabled doesn't mean anything, it always has the same value as alloc_capable which indicates allocation is supported by this resource. Remove alloc_enabled and its helpers. Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jamie Iles <quic_jiles@quicinc.com> Reviewed-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com> Tested-by: Xin Hao <xhao@linux.alibaba.com> Tested-by: Shaopeng Tan <tan.shaopeng@fujitsu.com> Tested-by: Cristian Marussi <cristian.marussi@arm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220902154829.30399-2-james.morse@arm.com
* | Merge tag 'x86_core_for_v6.1_rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-10-041-0/+3
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip Pull x86 core fixes from Borislav Petkov: - Make sure an INT3 is slapped after every unconditional retpoline JMP as both vendors suggest - Clean up pciserial a bit * tag 'x86_core_for_v6.1_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86,retpoline: Be sure to emit INT3 after JMP *%\reg x86/earlyprintk: Clean up pciserial
| * | x86/earlyprintk: Clean up pciserialPeter Zijlstra2022-08-291-0/+3
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While working on a GRUB patch to support PCI-serial, a number of cleanups were suggested that apply to the code I took inspiration from. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> # pci_ids.h Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YwdeyCEtW+wa+QhH@worktop.programming.kicks-ass.net
* | Merge tag 'edac_updates_for_v6.1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-10-041-15/+15
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ras/ras Pull EDAC updates from Borislav Petkov: - Add support for Skylake-S CPUs to ie31200_edac - Improve error decoding speed of the Intel drivers by avoiding the ACPI facilities but doing decoding in the driver itself - Other misc improvements to the Intel drivers - The usual cleanups and fixlets all over EDAC land * tag 'edac_updates_for_v6.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ras/ras: EDAC/i7300: Correct the i7300_exit() function name in comment x86/sb_edac: Add row column translation for Broadwell EDAC/i10nm: Print an extra register set of retry_rd_err_log EDAC/i10nm: Retrieve and print retry_rd_err_log registers for HBM EDAC/skx_common: Add ChipSelect ADXL component EDAC/ppc_4xx: Reorder symbols to get rid of a few forward declarations EDAC: Remove obsolete declarations in edac_module.h EDAC/i10nm: Add driver decoder for Ice Lake and Tremont CPUs EDAC/skx_common: Make output format similar EDAC/skx_common: Use driver decoder first EDAC/mc: Drop duplicated dimm->nr_pages debug printout EDAC/mc: Replace spaces with tabs in memtype flags definition EDAC/wq: Remove unneeded flush_workqueue() EDAC/ie31200: Add Skylake-S support
| * | EDAC/mc: Replace spaces with tabs in memtype flags definitionSerge Semin2022-09-011-15/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, the memory type macros are partly defined with multiple spaces between the macro name and its definition. Replace the spaces with tabs as the kernel coding style requires. Signed-off-by: Serge Semin <Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220822190730.27277-13-Sergey.Semin@baikalelectronics.ru
* | | Merge tag 'statx-dioalign-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-10-033-5/+8
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux Pull STATX_DIOALIGN support from Eric Biggers: "Make statx() support reporting direct I/O (DIO) alignment information. This provides a generic interface for userspace programs to determine whether a file supports DIO, and if so with what alignment restrictions. Specifically, STATX_DIOALIGN works on block devices, and on regular files when their containing filesystem has implemented support. An interface like this has been requested for years, since the conditions for when DIO is supported in Linux have gotten increasingly complex over time. Today, DIO support and alignment requirements can be affected by various filesystem features such as multi-device support, data journalling, inline data, encryption, verity, compression, checkpoint disabling, log-structured mode, etc. Further complicating things, Linux v6.0 relaxed the traditional rule of DIO needing to be aligned to the block device's logical block size; now user buffers (but not file offsets) only need to be aligned to the DMA alignment. The approach of uplifting the XFS specific ioctl XFS_IOC_DIOINFO was discarded in favor of creating a clean new interface with statx(). For more information, see the individual commits and the man page update[1]" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220722074229.148925-1-ebiggers@kernel.org [1] * tag 'statx-dioalign-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiggers/linux: xfs: support STATX_DIOALIGN f2fs: support STATX_DIOALIGN f2fs: simplify f2fs_force_buffered_io() f2fs: move f2fs_force_buffered_io() into file.c ext4: support STATX_DIOALIGN fscrypt: change fscrypt_dio_supported() to prepare for STATX_DIOALIGN vfs: support STATX_DIOALIGN on block devices statx: add direct I/O alignment information
| * | | fscrypt: change fscrypt_dio_supported() to prepare for STATX_DIOALIGNEric Biggers2022-09-111-5/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To prepare for STATX_DIOALIGN support, make two changes to fscrypt_dio_supported(). First, remove the filesystem-block-alignment check and make the filesystems handle it instead. It previously made sense to have it in fs/crypto/; however, to support STATX_DIOALIGN the alignment restriction would have to be returned to filesystems. It ends up being simpler if filesystems handle this part themselves, especially for f2fs which only allows fs-block-aligned DIO in the first place. Second, make fscrypt_dio_supported() work on inodes whose encryption key hasn't been set up yet, by making it set up the key if needed. This is required for statx(), since statx() doesn't require a file descriptor. Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220827065851.135710-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
| * | | vfs: support STATX_DIOALIGN on block devicesEric Biggers2022-09-111-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for STATX_DIOALIGN to block devices, so that direct I/O alignment restrictions are exposed to userspace in a generic way. Note that this breaks the tradition of stat operating only on the block device node, not the block device itself. However, it was felt that doing this is preferable, in order to make the interface useful and avoid needing separate interfaces for regular files and block devices. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220827065851.135710-3-ebiggers@kernel.org
| * | | statx: add direct I/O alignment informationEric Biggers2022-09-111-0/+2
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Traditionally, the conditions for when DIO (direct I/O) is supported were fairly simple. For both block devices and regular files, DIO had to be aligned to the logical block size of the block device. However, due to filesystem features that have been added over time (e.g. multi-device support, data journalling, inline data, encryption, verity, compression, checkpoint disabling, log-structured mode), the conditions for when DIO is allowed on a regular file have gotten increasingly complex. Whether a particular regular file supports DIO, and with what alignment, can depend on various file attributes and filesystem mount options, as well as which block device(s) the file's data is located on. Moreover, the general rule of DIO needing to be aligned to the block device's logical block size was recently relaxed to allow user buffers (but not file offsets) aligned to the DMA alignment instead. See commit bf8d08532bc1 ("iomap: add support for dma aligned direct-io"). XFS has an ioctl XFS_IOC_DIOINFO that exposes DIO alignment information. Uplifting this to the VFS is one possibility. However, as discussed (https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20220120071215.123274-1-ebiggers@kernel.org/T/#u), this ioctl is rarely used and not known to be used outside of XFS-specific code. It was also never intended to indicate when a file doesn't support DIO at all, nor was it intended for block devices. Therefore, let's expose this information via statx(). Add the STATX_DIOALIGN flag and two new statx fields associated with it: * stx_dio_mem_align: the alignment (in bytes) required for user memory buffers for DIO, or 0 if DIO is not supported on the file. * stx_dio_offset_align: the alignment (in bytes) required for file offsets and I/O segment lengths for DIO, or 0 if DIO is not supported on the file. This will only be nonzero if stx_dio_mem_align is nonzero, and vice versa. Note that as with other statx() extensions, if STATX_DIOALIGN isn't set in the returned statx struct, then these new fields won't be filled in. This will happen if the file is neither a regular file nor a block device, or if the file is a regular file and the filesystem doesn't support STATX_DIOALIGN. It might also happen if the caller didn't include STATX_DIOALIGN in the request mask, since statx() isn't required to return unrequested information. This commit only adds the VFS-level plumbing for STATX_DIOALIGN. For regular files, individual filesystems will still need to add code to support it. For block devices, a separate commit will wire it up too. Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220827065851.135710-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
* | | Merge tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscryptLinus Torvalds2022-10-032-19/+15
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull fscrypt updates from Eric Biggers: "This release contains some implementation changes, but no new features: - Rework the implementation of the fscrypt filesystem-level keyring to not be as tightly coupled to the keyrings subsystem. This resolves several issues. - Eliminate most direct uses of struct request_queue from fs/crypto/, since struct request_queue is considered to be a block layer implementation detail. - Stop using the PG_error flag to track decryption failures. This is a prerequisite for freeing up PG_error for other uses" * tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/fscrypt/fscrypt: fscrypt: work on block_devices instead of request_queues fscrypt: stop holding extra request_queue references fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_key fscrypt: stop using PG_error to track error status fscrypt: remove fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption()
| * | | fscrypt: work on block_devices instead of request_queuesChristoph Hellwig2022-09-211-12/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | request_queues are a block layer implementation detail that should not leak into file systems. Change the fscrypt inline crypto code to retrieve block devices instead of request_queues from the file system. As part of that, clean up the interaction with multi-device file systems by returning both the number of devices and the actual device array in a single method call. Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> [ebiggers: bug fixes and minor tweaks] Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901193208.138056-4-ebiggers@kernel.org
| * | | fscrypt: stop using keyrings subsystem for fscrypt_master_keyEric Biggers2022-09-212-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The approach of fs/crypto/ internally managing the fscrypt_master_key structs as the payloads of "struct key" objects contained in a "struct key" keyring has outlived its usefulness. The original idea was to simplify the code by reusing code from the keyrings subsystem. However, several issues have arisen that can't easily be resolved: - When a master key struct is destroyed, blk_crypto_evict_key() must be called on any per-mode keys embedded in it. (This started being the case when inline encryption support was added.) Yet, the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys, even past the time the filesystem was unmounted. Therefore, currently there is no easy way to call blk_crypto_evict_key() when a master key is destroyed. Currently, this is worked around by holding an extra reference to the filesystem's request_queue(s). But it was overlooked that the request_queue reference is *not* guaranteed to pin the corresponding blk_crypto_profile too; for device-mapper devices that support inline crypto, it doesn't. This can cause a use-after-free. - When the last inode that was using an incompletely-removed master key is evicted, the master key removal is completed by removing the key struct from the keyring. Currently this is done via key_invalidate(). Yet, key_invalidate() takes the key semaphore. This can deadlock when called from the shrinker, since in fscrypt_ioctl_add_key(), memory is allocated with GFP_KERNEL under the same semaphore. - More generally, the fact that the keyrings subsystem can arbitrarily delay the destruction of keys (via garbage collection delay, or via random processes getting temporary key references) is undesirable, as it means we can't strictly guarantee that all secrets are ever wiped. - Doing the master key lookups via the keyrings subsystem results in the key_permission LSM hook being called. fscrypt doesn't want this, as all access control for encrypted files is designed to happen via the files themselves, like any other files. The workaround which SELinux users are using is to change their SELinux policy to grant key search access to all domains. This works, but it is an odd extra step that shouldn't really have to be done. The fix for all these issues is to change the implementation to what I should have done originally: don't use the keyrings subsystem to keep track of the filesystem's fscrypt_master_key structs. Instead, just store them in a regular kernel data structure, and rework the reference counting, locking, and lifetime accordingly. Retain support for RCU-mode key lookups by using a hash table. Replace fscrypt_sb_free() with fscrypt_sb_delete(), which releases the keys synchronously and runs a bit earlier during unmount, so that block devices are still available. A side effect of this patch is that neither the master keys themselves nor the filesystem keyrings will be listed in /proc/keys anymore. ("Master key users" and the master key users keyrings will still be listed.) However, this was mostly an implementation detail, and it was intended just for debugging purposes. I don't know of anyone using it. This patch does *not* change how "master key users" (->mk_users) works; that still uses the keyrings subsystem. That is still needed for key quotas, and changing that isn't necessary to solve the issues listed above. If we decide to change that too, it would be a separate patch. I've marked this as fixing the original commit that added the fscrypt keyring, but as noted above the most important issue that this patch fixes wasn't introduced until the addition of inline encryption support. Fixes: 22d94f493bfb ("fscrypt: add FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY ioctl") Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220901193208.138056-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
| * | | fscrypt: stop using PG_error to track error statusEric Biggers2022-09-061-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As a step towards freeing the PG_error flag for other uses, change ext4 and f2fs to stop using PG_error to track decryption errors. Instead, if a decryption error occurs, just mark the whole bio as failed. The coarser granularity isn't really a problem since it isn't any worse than what the block layer provides, and errors from a multi-page readahead aren't reported to applications unless a single-page read fails too. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Yu <chao@kernel.org> # for f2fs part Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220815235052.86545-2-ebiggers@kernel.org
| * | | fscrypt: remove fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption()Eric Biggers2022-08-221-2/+0
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that all its callers have been converted to fscrypt_parse_test_dummy_encryption() and fscrypt_add_test_dummy_key() instead, fscrypt_set_test_dummy_encryption() can be removed. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220513231605.175121-6-ebiggers@kernel.org
* | | Merge tag 'dlm-6.1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-10-031-4/+1
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/teigland/linux-dlm Pull dlm updates from David Teigland: - Fix a couple races found with a new torture test - Improve errors when api functions are used incorrectly - Improve tracing for lock requests from user space - Fix use after free in recently added tracing cod. - Small internal code cleanups * tag 'dlm-6.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/teigland/linux-dlm: fs: dlm: fix possible use after free if tracing fs: dlm: const void resource name parameter fs: dlm: LSFL_CB_DELAY only for kernel lockspaces fs: dlm: remove DLM_LSFL_FS from uapi fs: dlm: trace user space callbacks fs: dlm: change ls_clear_proc_locks to spinlock fs: dlm: remove dlm_del_ast prototype fs: dlm: handle rcom in else if branch fs: dlm: allow lockspaces have zero lvblen fs: dlm: fix invalid derefence of sb_lvbptr fs: dlm: handle -EINVAL as log_error() fs: dlm: use __func__ for function name fs: dlm: handle -EBUSY first in unlock validation fs: dlm: handle -EBUSY first in lock arg validation fs: dlm: fix race between test_bit() and queue_work() fs: dlm: fix race in lowcomms
| * | | fs: dlm: const void resource name parameterAlexander Aring2022-08-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The resource name parameter should never be changed by DLM so we declare it as const. At some point it is handled as a char pointer, a resource name can be a non printable ascii string as well. This patch change it to handle it as void pointer as it is offered by DLM API. Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
| * | | fs: dlm: remove DLM_LSFL_FS from uapiAlexander Aring2022-08-231-3/+0
| |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The DLM_LSFL_FS flag is set in lockspaces created directly for a kernel user, as opposed to those lockspaces created for user space applications. The user space libdlm allowed this flag to be set for lockspaces created from user space, but then used by a kernel user. No kernel user has ever used this method, so remove the ability to do it. Signed-off-by: Alexander Aring <aahringo@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Teigland <teigland@redhat.com>
* | | Merge tag 'nfsd-6.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linuxLinus Torvalds2022-10-032-4/+18
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull nfsd updates from Chuck Lever: "This release is mostly bug fixes, clean-ups, and optimizations. One notable set of fixes addresses a subtle buffer overflow issue that occurs if a small RPC Call message arrives in an oversized RPC record. This is only possible on a framed RPC transport such as TCP. Because NFSD shares the receive and send buffers in one set of pages, an oversized RPC record steals pages from the send buffer that will be used to construct the RPC Reply message. NFSD must not assume that a full-sized buffer is always available to it; otherwise, it will walk off the end of the send buffer while constructing its reply. In this release, we also introduce the ability for the server to wait a moment for clients to return delegations before it responds with NFS4ERR_DELAY. This saves a retransmit and a network round- trip when a delegation recall is needed. This work will be built upon in future releases. The NFS server adds another shrinker to its collection. Because courtesy clients can linger for quite some time, they might be freeable when the server host comes under memory pressure. A new shrinker has been added that releases courtesy client resources during low memory scenarios. Lastly, of note: the maximum number of operations per NFSv4 COMPOUND that NFSD can handle is increased from 16 to 50. There are NFSv4 client implementations that need more than 16 to successfully perform a mount operation that uses a pathname with many components" * tag 'nfsd-6.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/cel/linux: (53 commits) nfsd: extra checks when freeing delegation stateids nfsd: make nfsd4_run_cb a bool return function nfsd: fix comments about spinlock handling with delegations nfsd: only fill out return pointer on success in nfsd4_lookup_stateid NFSD: fix use-after-free on source server when doing inter-server copy NFSD: Cap rsize_bop result based on send buffer size NFSD: Rename the fields in copy_stateid_t nfsd: use DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE to define nfsd_file_cache_stats_fops nfsd: use DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE to define nfsd_reply_cache_stats_fops nfsd: use DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE to define client_info_fops nfsd: use DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE to define export_features_fops and supported_enctypes_fops nfsd: use DEFINE_PROC_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE to define nfsd_proc_ops NFSD: Pack struct nfsd4_compoundres NFSD: Remove unused nfsd4_compoundargs::cachetype field NFSD: Remove "inline" directives on op_rsize_bop helpers NFSD: Clean up nfs4svc_encode_compoundres() SUNRPC: Fix typo in xdr_buf_subsegment's kdoc comment NFSD: Clean up WRITE arg decoders NFSD: Use xdr_inline_decode() to decode NFSv3 symlinks NFSD: Refactor common code out of dirlist helpers ...
| * | | NFSD: Refactor common code out of dirlist helpersChuck Lever2022-09-261-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The dust has settled a bit and it's become obvious what code is totally common between nfsd_init_dirlist_pages() and nfsd3_init_dirlist_pages(). Move that common code to SUNRPC. The new helper brackets the existing xdr_init_decode_pages() API. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
| * | | SUNRPC: Parametrize how much of argsize should be zeroedChuck Lever2022-09-261-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, SUNRPC clears the whole of .pc_argsize before processing each incoming RPC transaction. Add an extra parameter to struct svc_procedure to enable upper layers to reduce the amount of each operation's argument structure that is zeroed by SUNRPC. The size of struct nfsd4_compoundargs, in particular, is a lot to clear on each incoming RPC Call. A subsequent patch will cut this down to something closer to what NFSv2 and NFSv3 uses. This patch should cause no behavior changes. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
| * | | SUNRPC: Fix svcxdr_init_encode's buflen calculationChuck Lever2022-09-261-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 2825a7f90753 ("nfsd4: allow encoding across page boundaries") added an explicit computation of the remaining length in the rq_res XDR buffer. The computation appears to suffer from an "off-by-one" bug. Because buflen is too large by one page, XDR encoding can run off the end of the send buffer by eventually trying to use the struct page address in rq_page_end, which always contains NULL. Fixes: bddfdbcddbe2 ("NFSD: Extract the svcxdr_init_encode() helper") Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
| * | | SUNRPC: Fix svcxdr_init_decode's end-of-buffer calculationChuck Lever2022-09-261-3/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Ensure that stream-based argument decoding can't go past the actual end of the receive buffer. xdr_init_decode's calculation of the value of xdr->end over-estimates the end of the buffer because the Linux kernel RPC server code does not remove the size of the RPC header from rqstp->rq_arg before calling the upper layer's dispatcher. The server-side still uses the svc_getnl() macros to decode the RPC call header. These macros reduce the length of the head iov but do not update the total length of the message in the buffer (buf->len). A proper fix for this would be to replace the use of svc_getnl() and friends in the RPC header decoder, but that would be a large and invasive change that would be difficult to backport. Fixes: 5191955d6fc6 ("SUNRPC: Prepare for xdr_stream-style decoding on the server-side") Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
* | | | Merge tag 'fs.acl.rework.prep.v6.1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-10-032-10/+4
|\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping Pull vfs acl updates from Christian Brauner: "These are general fixes and preparatory changes related to the ongoing posix acl rework. The actual rework where we build a type safe posix acl api wasn't ready for this merge window but we're hopeful for the next merge window. General fixes: - Some filesystems like 9p and cifs have to implement custom posix acl handlers because they require access to the dentry in order to set and get posix acls while the set and get inode operations currently don't. But the ntfs3 filesystem has no such requirement and thus implemented custom posix acl xattr handlers when it really didn't have to. So this pr contains patch that just implements set and get inode operations for ntfs3 and switches it to rely on the generic posix acl xattr handlers. (We would've appreciated reviews from the ntfs3 maintainers but we didn't get any. But hey, if we really broke it we'll fix it. But fstests for ntfs3 said it's fine.) - The posix_acl_fix_xattr_common() helper has been adapted so it can be used by a few more callers and avoiding open-coding the same checks over and over. Other than the two general fixes this series introduces a new helper vfs_set_acl_prepare(). The reason for this helper is so that we can mitigate one of the source that change {g,u}id values directly in the uapi struct. With the vfs_set_acl_prepare() helper we can move the idmapped mount fixup into the generic posix acl set handler. The advantage of this is that it allows us to remove the posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() helper which so far we had to call in vfs_setxattr() to account for idmapped mounts. While semantically correct the problem with this approach was that we had to keep the value parameter of the generic vfs_setxattr() call as non-const. This is rectified in this series. Ultimately, we will get rid of all the extreme kludges and type unsafety once we have merged the posix api - hopefully during the next merge window - built solely around get and set inode operations. Which incidentally will also improve handling of posix acls in security and especially in integrity modesl. While this will come with temporarily having two inode operation for posix acls that is nothing compared to the problems we have right now and so well worth it. We'll end up with something that we can actually reason about instead of needing to write novels to explain what's going on" * tag 'fs.acl.rework.prep.v6.1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/idmapping: xattr: always us is_posix_acl_xattr() helper acl: fix the comments of posix_acl_xattr_set xattr: constify value argument in vfs_setxattr() ovl: use vfs_set_acl_prepare() acl: move idmapping handling into posix_acl_xattr_set() acl: add vfs_set_acl_prepare() acl: return EOPNOTSUPP in posix_acl_fix_xattr_common() ntfs3: rework xattr handlers and switch to POSIX ACL VFS helpers
| * | | | xattr: constify value argument in vfs_setxattr()Christian Brauner2022-08-311-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Now that we don't perform translations directly in vfs_setxattr() anymore we can constify the @value argument in vfs_setxattr(). This also allows us to remove the hack to cast from a const in ovl_do_setxattr(). Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
| * | | | acl: move idmapping handling into posix_acl_xattr_set()Christian Brauner2022-08-311-9/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The uapi POSIX ACL struct passed through the value argument during setxattr() contains {g,u}id values encoded via ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries that should actually be stored in the form of k{g,u}id_t (See [1] for a long explanation of the issue.). In 0c5fd887d2bb ("acl: move idmapped mount fixup into vfs_{g,s}etxattr()") we took the mount's idmapping into account in order to let overlayfs handle POSIX ACLs on idmapped layers correctly. The fixup is currently performed directly in vfs_setxattr() which piles on top of the earlier hackiness by handling the mount's idmapping and stuff the vfs{g,u}id_t values into the uapi struct as well. While that is all correct and works fine it's just ugly. Now that we have introduced vfs_make_posix_acl() earlier move handling idmapped mounts out of vfs_setxattr() and into the POSIX ACL handler where it belongs. Note that we also need to call vfs_make_posix_acl() for EVM which interpretes POSIX ACLs during security_inode_setxattr(). Leave them a longer comment for future reference. All filesystems that support idmapped mounts via FS_ALLOW_IDMAP use the standard POSIX ACL xattr handlers and are covered by this change. This includes overlayfs which simply calls vfs_{g,s}etxattr(). The following filesystems use custom POSIX ACL xattr handlers: 9p, cifs, ecryptfs, and ntfs3 (and overlayfs but we've covered that in the paragraph above) and none of them support idmapped mounts yet. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org/ [1] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
| * | | | acl: add vfs_set_acl_prepare()Christian Brauner2022-08-311-0/+3
| | |_|/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Various filesystems store POSIX ACLs on the backing store in their uapi format. Such filesystems need to translate from the uapi POSIX ACL format into the VFS format during i_op->get_acl(). The VFS provides the posix_acl_from_xattr() helper for this task. But the usage of posix_acl_from_xattr() is currently ambiguous. It is intended to transform from a uapi POSIX ACL to the VFS represenation. For example, when retrieving POSIX ACLs for permission checking during lookup or when calling getxattr() to retrieve system.posix_acl_{access,default}. Calling posix_acl_from_xattr() during i_op->get_acl() will map the raw {g,u}id values stored as ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries in the uapi POSIX ACL format into k{g,u}id_t in the filesystem's idmapping and return a struct posix_acl ready to be returned to the VFS for caching and to perform permission checks on. However, posix_acl_from_xattr() is also called during setxattr() for all filesystems that rely on VFS provides posix_acl_{access,default}_xattr_handler. The posix_acl_xattr_set() handler which is used for the ->set() method of posix_acl_{access,default}_xattr_handler uses posix_acl_from_xattr() to translate from the uapi POSIX ACL format to the VFS format so that it can be passed to the i_op->set_acl() handler of the filesystem or for direct caching in case no i_op->set_acl() handler is defined. During setxattr() the {g,u}id values stored as ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries in the uapi POSIX ACL format aren't raw {g,u}id values that need to be mapped according to the filesystem's idmapping. Instead they are {g,u}id values in the caller's idmapping which have been generated during posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(). In other words, they are k{g,u}id_t which are passed as raw {g,u}id values abusing the uapi POSIX ACL format (Please note that this type safety violation has existed since the introduction of k{g,u}id_t. Please see [1] for more details.). So when posix_acl_from_xattr() is called in posix_acl_xattr_set() the filesystem idmapping is completely irrelevant. Instead, we abuse the initial idmapping to recover the k{g,u}id_t base on the value stored in raw {g,u}id as ACL_{GROUP,USER} in the uapi POSIX ACL format. We need to clearly distinguish betweeen these two operations as it is really easy to confuse for filesystems as can be seen in ntfs3. In order to do this we factor out make_posix_acl() which takes callbacks allowing callers to pass dedicated methods to generate the correct k{g,u}id_t. This is just an internal static helper which is not exposed to any filesystems but it neatly encapsulates the basic logic of walking through a uapi POSIX ACL and returning an allocated VFS POSIX ACL with the correct k{g,u}id_t values. The posix_acl_from_xattr() helper can then be implemented as a simple call to make_posix_acl() with callbacks that generate the correct k{g,u}id_t from the raw {g,u}id values in ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries in the uapi POSIX ACL format as read from the backing store. For setxattr() we add a new helper vfs_set_acl_prepare() which has callbacks to map the POSIX ACLs from the uapi format with the k{g,u}id_t values stored in raw {g,u}id format in ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries into the correct k{g,u}id_t values in the filesystem idmapping. In contrast to posix_acl_from_xattr() the vfs_set_acl_prepare() helper needs to take the mount idmapping into account. The differences are explained in more detail in the kernel doc for the new functions. In follow up patches we will remove all abuses of posix_acl_from_xattr() for setxattr() operations and replace it with calls to vfs_set_acl_prepare(). The new vfs_set_acl_prepare() helper allows us to deal with the ambiguity in how the POSI ACL uapi struct stores {g,u}id values depending on whether this is a getxattr() or setxattr() operation. This also allows us to remove the posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() helper reducing the abuse of the POSIX ACL uapi format to pass values that should be distinct types in {g,u}id values stored as ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries. The removal of posix_acl_setxattr_idmapped_mnt() in turn allows us to re-constify the value parameter of vfs_setxattr() which in turn allows us to avoid the nasty cast from a const void pointer to a non-const void pointer on ovl_do_setxattr(). Ultimately, the plan is to get rid of the type violations completely and never pass the values from k{g,u}id_t as raw {g,u}id in ACL_{GROUP,USER} entries in uapi POSIX ACL format. But that's a longer way to go and this is a preparatory step. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Co-Developed-by: Seth Forshee <sforshee@digitalocean.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
* | | | Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20221003' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-10-033-0/+11
|\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore: "Seven patches for the LSM layer and we've got a mix of trivial and significant patches. Highlights below, starting with the smaller bits first so they don't get lost in the discussion of the larger items: - Remove some redundant NULL pointer checks in the common LSM audit code. - Ratelimit the lockdown LSM's access denial messages. With this change there is a chance that the last visible lockdown message on the console is outdated/old, but it does help preserve the initial series of lockdown denials that started the denial message flood and my gut feeling is that these might be the more valuable messages. - Open userfaultfds as readonly instead of read/write. While this code obviously lives outside the LSM, it does have a noticeable impact on the LSMs with Ondrej explaining the situation in the commit description. It is worth noting that this patch languished on the VFS list for over a year without any comments (objections or otherwise) so I took the liberty of pulling it into the LSM tree after giving fair notice. It has been in linux-next since the end of August without any noticeable problems. - Add a LSM hook for user namespace creation, with implementations for both the BPF LSM and SELinux. Even though the changes are fairly small, this is the bulk of the diffstat as we are also including BPF LSM selftests for the new hook. It's also the most contentious of the changes in this pull request with Eric Biederman NACK'ing the LSM hook multiple times during its development and discussion upstream. While I've never taken NACK's lightly, I'm sending these patches to you because it is my belief that they are of good quality, satisfy a long-standing need of users and distros, and are in keeping with the existing nature of the LSM layer and the Linux Kernel as a whole. The patches in implement a LSM hook for user namespace creation that allows for a granular approach, configurable at runtime, which enables both monitoring and control of user namespaces. The general consensus has been that this is far preferable to the other solutions that have been adopted downstream including outright removal from the kernel, disabling via system wide sysctls, or various other out-of-tree mechanisms that users have been forced to adopt since we haven't been able to provide them an upstream solution for their requests. Eric has been steadfast in his objections to this LSM hook, explaining that any restrictions on the user namespace could have significant impact on userspace. While there is the possibility of impacting userspace, it is important to note that this solution only impacts userspace when it is requested based on the runtime configuration supplied by the distro/admin/user. Frederick (the pathset author), the LSM/security community, and myself have tried to work with Eric during development of this patchset to find a mutually acceptable solution, but Eric's approach and unwillingness to engage in a meaningful way have made this impossible. I have CC'd Eric directly on this pull request so he has a chance to provide his side of the story; there have been no objections outside of Eric's" * tag 'lsm-pr-20221003' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: lockdown: ratelimit denial messages userfaultfd: open userfaultfds with O_RDONLY selinux: Implement userns_create hook selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm userns_create hook bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_userns_create() sleepable security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns() lsm: clean up redundant NULL pointer check
| * | | | security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns()Frederick Lawler2022-08-163-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | User namespaces are an effective tool to allow programs to run with permission without requiring the need for a program to run as root. User namespaces may also be used as a sandboxing technique. However, attackers sometimes leverage user namespaces as an initial attack vector to perform some exploit. [1,2,3] While it is not the unprivileged user namespace functionality, which causes the kernel to be exploitable, users/administrators might want to more granularly limit or at least monitor how various processes use this functionality, while vulnerable kernel subsystems are being patched. Preventing user namespace already creation comes in a few of forms in order of granularity: 1. /proc/sys/user/max_user_namespaces sysctl 2. Distro specific patch(es) 3. CONFIG_USER_NS To block a task based on its attributes, the LSM hook cred_prepare is a decent candidate for use because it provides more granular control, and it is called before create_user_ns(): cred = prepare_creds() security_prepare_creds() call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ... if (cred) create_user_ns(cred) Since security_prepare_creds() is meant for LSMs to copy and prepare credentials, access control is an unintended use of the hook. [4] Further, security_prepare_creds() will always return a ENOMEM if the hook returns any non-zero error code. This hook also does not handle the clone3 case which requires us to access a user space pointer to know if we're in the CLONE_NEW_USER call path which may be subject to a TOCTTOU attack. Lastly, cred_prepare is called in many call paths, and a targeted hook further limits the frequency of calls which is a beneficial outcome. Therefore introduce a new function security_create_user_ns() with an accompanying userns_create LSM hook. With the new userns_create hook, users will have more control over the observability and access control over user namespace creation. Users should expect that normal operation of user namespaces will behave as usual, and only be impacted when controls are implemented by users or administrators. This hook takes the prepared creds for LSM authors to write policy against. On success, the new namespace is applied to credentials, otherwise an error is returned. Links: 1. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0492 2. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25636 3. https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34918 4. https://lore.kernel.org/all/1c4b1c0d-12f6-6e9e-a6a3-cdce7418110c@schaufler-ca.com/ Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | | | | Merge tag 'hardening-v6.1-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-10-033-98/+262
|\ \ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull kernel hardening updates from Kees Cook: "Most of the collected changes here are fixes across the tree for various hardening features (details noted below). The most notable new feature here is the addition of the memcpy() overflow warning (under CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE), which is the next step on the path to killing the common class of "trivially detectable" buffer overflow conditions (i.e. on arrays with sizes known at compile time) that have resulted in many exploitable vulnerabilities over the years (e.g. BleedingTooth). This feature is expected to still have some undiscovered false positives. It's been in -next for a full development cycle and all the reported false positives have been fixed in their respective trees. All the known-bad code patterns we could find with Coccinelle are also either fixed in their respective trees or in flight. The commit message in commit 54d9469bc515 ("fortify: Add run-time WARN for cross-field memcpy()") for the feature has extensive details, but I'll repeat here that this is a warning _only_, and is not intended to actually block overflows (yet). The many patches fixing array sizes and struct members have been landing for several years now, and we're finally able to turn this on to find any remaining stragglers. Summary: Various fixes across several hardening areas: - loadpin: Fix verity target enforcement (Matthias Kaehlcke). - zero-call-used-regs: Add missing clobbers in paravirt (Bill Wendling). - CFI: clean up sparc function pointer type mismatches (Bart Van Assche). - Clang: Adjust compiler flag detection for various Clang changes (Sami Tolvanen, Kees Cook). - fortify: Fix warnings in arch-specific code in sh, ARM, and xen. Improvements to existing features: - testing: improve overflow KUnit test, introduce fortify KUnit test, add more coverage to LKDTM tests (Bart Van Assche, Kees Cook). - overflow: Relax overflow type checking for wider utility. New features: - string: Introduce strtomem() and strtomem_pad() to fill a gap in strncpy() replacement needs. - um: Enable FORTIFY_SOURCE support. - fortify: Enable run-time struct member memcpy() overflow warning" * tag 'hardening-v6.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (27 commits) Makefile.extrawarn: Move -Wcast-function-type-strict to W=1 hardening: Remove Clang's enable flag for -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero sparc: Unbreak the build x86/paravirt: add extra clobbers with ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS enabled x86/paravirt: clean up typos and grammaros fortify: Convert to struct vs member helpers fortify: Explicitly check bounds are compile-time constants x86/entry: Work around Clang __bdos() bug ARM: decompressor: Include .data.rel.ro.local fortify: Adjust KUnit test for modular build sh: machvec: Use char[] for section boundaries kunit/memcpy: Avoid pathological compile-time string size lib: Improve the is_signed_type() kunit test LoadPin: Require file with verity root digests to have a header dm: verity-loadpin: Only trust verity targets with enforcement LoadPin: Fix Kconfig doc about format of file with verity digests um: Enable FORTIFY_SOURCE lkdtm: Update tests for memcpy() run-time warnings fortify: Add run-time WARN for cross-field memcpy() fortify: Use SIZE_MAX instead of (size_t)-1 ...
| * | | | | fortify: Convert to struct vs member helpersKees Cook2022-09-261-33/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In preparation for adding support for __builtin_dynamic_object_size(), wrap each instance of __builtin_object_size(p, N) with either the new __struct_size(p) as __bos(p, 0), or __member_size(p) as __bos(p, 1). This will allow us to replace the definitions with __bdos() next. There are no binary differences from this change. Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220920192202.190793-4-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | | | | fortify: Explicitly check bounds are compile-time constantsKees Cook2022-09-261-19/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In preparation for replacing __builtin_object_size() with __builtin_dynamic_object_size(), all the compile-time size checks need to check that the bounds comparisons are, in fact, known at compile-time. Enforce what was guaranteed with __bos(). In other words, since all uses of __bos() were constant expressions, it was not required to test for this. When these change to __bdos(), they _may_ be constant expressions, and the checks are only valid when the prior condition holds. This results in no binary differences. Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220920192202.190793-3-keescook@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | | | | fortify: Add run-time WARN for cross-field memcpy()Kees Cook2022-09-071-3/+67
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Enable run-time checking of dynamic memcpy() and memmove() lengths, issuing a WARN when a write would exceed the size of the target struct member, when built with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y. This would have caught all of the memcpy()-based buffer overflows in the last 3 years, specifically covering all the cases where the destination buffer size is known at compile time. This change ONLY adds a run-time warning. As false positives are currently still expected, this will not block the overflow. The new warnings will look like this: memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size N) of single field "var->dest" (size M) WARNING: CPU: n PID: pppp at source/file/path.c:nr function+0xXX/0xXX [module] There may be false positives in the kernel where intentional field-spanning writes are happening. These need to be addressed similarly to how the compile-time cases were addressed: add a struct_group(), split the memcpy(), or some other refactoring. In order to make counting/investigating instances of added runtime checks easier, each instance includes the destination variable name as a WARN argument, prefixed with 'field "'. Therefore, on an x86_64 defconfig build, it is trivial to inspect the build artifacts to find instances. For example on an x86_64 defconfig build, there are 78 new run-time memcpy() bounds checks added: $ for i in vmlinux $(find . -name '*.ko'); do \ strings "$i" | grep '^field "'; done | wc -l 78 Simple cases where a destination buffer is known to be a dynamic size do not generate a WARN. For example: struct normal_flex_array { void *a; int b; u32 c; size_t array_size; u8 flex_array[]; }; struct normal_flex_array *instance; ... /* These will be ignored for run-time bounds checking. */ memcpy(instance, src, len); memcpy(instance->flex_array, src, len); However, one of the dynamic-sized destination cases is irritatingly unable to be detected by the compiler: when using memcpy() to target a composite struct member which contains a trailing flexible array struct. For example: struct wrapper { int foo; char bar; struct normal_flex_array embedded; }; struct wrapper *instance; ... /* This will incorrectly WARN when len > sizeof(instance->embedded) */ memcpy(&instance->embedded, src, len); These cases end up appearing to the compiler to be sized as if the flexible array had 0 elements. :( For more details see: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=101832 https://godbolt.org/z/vW6x8vh4P These "composite flexible array structure destination" cases will be need to be flushed out and addressed on a case-by-case basis. Regardless, for the general case of using memcpy() on flexible array destinations, future APIs will be created to handle common cases. Those can be used to migrate away from open-coded memcpy() so that proper error handling (instead of trapping) can be used. As mentioned, none of these bounds checks block any overflows currently. For users that have tested their workloads, do not encounter any warnings, and wish to make these checks stop any overflows, they can use a big hammer and set the sysctl panic_on_warn=1. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | | | | fortify: Use SIZE_MAX instead of (size_t)-1Kees Cook2022-09-071-14/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Clean up uses of "(size_t)-1" in favor of SIZE_MAX. Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | | | | fortify: Fix __compiletime_strlen() under UBSAN_BOUNDS_LOCALKees Cook2022-09-071-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With CONFIG_FORTIFY=y and CONFIG_UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS=y enabled, we observe a runtime panic while running Android's Compatibility Test Suite's (CTS) android.hardware.input.cts.tests. This is stemming from a strlen() call in hidinput_allocate(). __compiletime_strlen() is implemented in terms of __builtin_object_size(), then does an array access to check for NUL-termination. A quirk of __builtin_object_size() is that for strings whose values are runtime dependent, __builtin_object_size(str, 1 or 0) returns the maximum size of possible values when those sizes are determinable at compile time. Example: static const char *v = "FOO BAR"; static const char *y = "FOO BA"; unsigned long x (int z) { // Returns 8, which is: // max(__builtin_object_size(v, 1), __builtin_object_size(y, 1)) return __builtin_object_size(z ? v : y, 1); } So when FORTIFY_SOURCE is enabled, the current implementation of __compiletime_strlen() will try to access beyond the end of y at runtime using the size of v. Mixed with UBSAN_LOCAL_BOUNDS we get a fault. hidinput_allocate() has a local C string whose value is control flow dependent on a switch statement, so __builtin_object_size(str, 1) evaluates to the maximum string length, making all other cases fault on the last character check. hidinput_allocate() could be cleaned up to avoid runtime calls to strlen() since the local variable can only have literal values, so there's no benefit to trying to fortify the strlen call site there. Perform a __builtin_constant_p() check against index 0 earlier in the macro to filter out the control-flow-dependant case. Add a KUnit test for checking the expected behavioral characteristics of FORTIFY_SOURCE internals. Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Tom Rix <trix@redhat.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: "Steven Rostedt (Google)" <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: David Gow <davidgow@google.com> Cc: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Sander Vanheule <sander@svanheule.net> Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Cc: llvm@lists.linux.dev Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Tested-by: Android Treehugger Robot Link: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/kernel/common/+/2206839 Co-developed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | | | | string: Introduce strtomem() and strtomem_pad()Kees Cook2022-09-072-0/+75
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | One of the "legitimate" uses of strncpy() is copying a NUL-terminated string into a fixed-size non-NUL-terminated character array. To avoid the weaknesses and ambiguity of intent when using strncpy(), provide replacement functions that explicitly distinguish between trailing padding and not, and require the destination buffer size be discoverable by the compiler. For example: struct obj { int foo; char small[4] __nonstring; char big[8] __nonstring; int bar; }; struct obj p; /* This will truncate to 4 chars with no trailing NUL */ strncpy(p.small, "hello", sizeof(p.small)); /* p.small contains 'h', 'e', 'l', 'l' */ /* This will NUL pad to 8 chars. */ strncpy(p.big, "hello", sizeof(p.big)); /* p.big contains 'h', 'e', 'l', 'l', 'o', '\0', '\0', '\0' */ When the "__nonstring" attributes are missing, the intent of the programmer becomes ambiguous for whether the lack of a trailing NUL in the p.small copy is a bug. Additionally, it's not clear whether the trailing padding in the p.big copy is _needed_. Both cases become unambiguous with: strtomem(p.small, "hello"); strtomem_pad(p.big, "hello", 0); See also https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/90 Expand the memcpy KUnit tests to include these functions. Cc: Wolfram Sang <wsa+renesas@sang-engineering.com> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | | | | overflow: Allow mixed type argumentsKees Cook2022-09-071-31/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the check_[op]_overflow() helpers were introduced, all arguments were required to be the same type to make the fallback macros simpler. However, now that the fallback macros have been removed[1], it is fine to allow mixed types, which makes using the helpers much more useful, as they can be used to test for type-based overflows (e.g. adding two large ints but storing into a u8), as would be handy in the drm core[2]. Remove the restriction, and add additional self-tests that exercise some of the mixed-type overflow cases, and double-check for accidental macro side-effects. [1] https://git.kernel.org/linus/4eb6bd55cfb22ffc20652732340c4962f3ac9a91 [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220824084514.2261614-2-gwan-gyeong.mun@intel.com Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Gwan-gyeong Mun <gwan-gyeong.mun@intel.com> Cc: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" <gustavoars@kernel.org> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Andrzej Hajda <andrzej.hajda@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Gwan-gyeong Mun <gwan-gyeong.mun@intel.com> Tested-by: Gwan-gyeong Mun <gwan-gyeong.mun@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
| * | | | | overflow, tracing: Define the is_signed_type() macro onceBart Van Assche2022-08-313-3/+6
| | |_|_|/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There are two definitions of the is_signed_type() macro: one in <linux/overflow.h> and a second definition in <linux/trace_events.h>. As suggested by Linus Torvalds, move the definition of the is_signed_type() macro into the <linux/compiler.h> header file. Change the definition of the is_signed_type() macro to make sure that it does not trigger any sparse warnings with future versions of sparse for bitwise types. See also: https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=whjH6p+qzwUdx5SOVVHjS3WvzJQr6mDUwhEyTf6pJWzaQ@mail.gmail.com/ https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAHk-=wjQGnVfb4jehFR0XyZikdQvCZouE96xR_nnf5kqaM5qqQ@mail.gmail.com/ Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Isabella Basso <isabbasso@riseup.net> Cc: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> Cc: Luc Van Oostenryck <luc.vanoostenryck@gmail.com> Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Cc: Sander Vanheule <sander@svanheule.net> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220826162116.1050972-3-bvanassche@acm.org
* | | | | Merge tag 'kcfi-v6.1-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-10-038-72/+86
|\ \ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull kcfi updates from Kees Cook: "This replaces the prior support for Clang's standard Control Flow Integrity (CFI) instrumentation, which has required a lot of special conditions (e.g. LTO) and work-arounds. The new implementation ("Kernel CFI") is specific to C, directly designed for the Linux kernel, and takes advantage of architectural features like x86's IBT. This series retains arm64 support and adds x86 support. GCC support is expected in the future[1], and additional "generic" architectural support is expected soon[2]. Summary: - treewide: Remove old CFI support details - arm64: Replace Clang CFI support with Clang KCFI support - x86: Introduce Clang KCFI support" Link: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=107048 [1] Link: https://github.com/samitolvanen/llvm-project/commits/kcfi_generic [2] * tag 'kcfi-v6.1-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (22 commits) x86: Add support for CONFIG_CFI_CLANG x86/purgatory: Disable CFI x86: Add types to indirectly called assembly functions x86/tools/relocs: Ignore __kcfi_typeid_ relocations kallsyms: Drop CONFIG_CFI_CLANG workarounds objtool: Disable CFI warnings objtool: Preserve special st_shndx indexes in elf_update_symbol treewide: Drop __cficanonical treewide: Drop WARN_ON_FUNCTION_MISMATCH treewide: Drop function_nocfi init: Drop __nocfi from __init arm64: Drop unneeded __nocfi attributes arm64: Add CFI error handling arm64: Add types to indirect called assembly functions psci: Fix the function type for psci_initcall_t lkdtm: Emit an indirect call for CFI tests cfi: Add type helper macros cfi: Switch to -fsanitize=kcfi cfi: Drop __CFI_ADDRESSABLE cfi: Remove CONFIG_CFI_CLANG_SHADOW ...