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* bpf: Disasm support for addr_space_cast instruction.Alexei Starovoitov2024-03-111-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | LLVM generates rX = addr_space_cast(rY, dst_addr_space, src_addr_space) instruction when pointers in non-zero address space are used by the bpf program. Recognize this insn in uapi and in bpf disassembler. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240308010812.89848-3-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
* bpf: Introduce bpf_arena.Alexei Starovoitov2024-03-111-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce bpf_arena, which is a sparse shared memory region between the bpf program and user space. Use cases: 1. User space mmap-s bpf_arena and uses it as a traditional mmap-ed anonymous region, like memcached or any key/value storage. The bpf program implements an in-kernel accelerator. XDP prog can search for a key in bpf_arena and return a value without going to user space. 2. The bpf program builds arbitrary data structures in bpf_arena (hash tables, rb-trees, sparse arrays), while user space consumes it. 3. bpf_arena is a "heap" of memory from the bpf program's point of view. The user space may mmap it, but bpf program will not convert pointers to user base at run-time to improve bpf program speed. Initially, the kernel vm_area and user vma are not populated. User space can fault in pages within the range. While servicing a page fault, bpf_arena logic will insert a new page into the kernel and user vmas. The bpf program can allocate pages from that region via bpf_arena_alloc_pages(). This kernel function will insert pages into the kernel vm_area. The subsequent fault-in from user space will populate that page into the user vma. The BPF_F_SEGV_ON_FAULT flag at arena creation time can be used to prevent fault-in from user space. In such a case, if a page is not allocated by the bpf program and not present in the kernel vm_area, the user process will segfault. This is useful for use cases 2 and 3 above. bpf_arena_alloc_pages() is similar to user space mmap(). It allocates pages either at a specific address within the arena or allocates a range with the maple tree. bpf_arena_free_pages() is analogous to munmap(), which frees pages and removes the range from the kernel vm_area and from user process vmas. bpf_arena can be used as a bpf program "heap" of up to 4GB. The speed of bpf program is more important than ease of sharing with user space. This is use case 3. In such a case, the BPF_F_NO_USER_CONV flag is recommended. It will tell the verifier to treat the rX = bpf_arena_cast_user(rY) instruction as a 32-bit move wX = wY, which will improve bpf prog performance. Otherwise, bpf_arena_cast_user is translated by JIT to conditionally add the upper 32 bits of user vm_start (if the pointer is not NULL) to arena pointers before they are stored into memory. This way, user space sees them as valid 64-bit pointers. Diff https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/84410 enables LLVM BPF backend generate the bpf_addr_space_cast() instruction to cast pointers between address_space(1) which is reserved for bpf_arena pointers and default address space zero. All arena pointers in a bpf program written in C language are tagged as __attribute__((address_space(1))). Hence, clang provides helpful diagnostics when pointers cross address space. Libbpf and the kernel support only address_space == 1. All other address space identifiers are reserved. rX = bpf_addr_space_cast(rY, /* dst_as */ 1, /* src_as */ 0) tells the verifier that rX->type = PTR_TO_ARENA. Any further operations on PTR_TO_ARENA register have to be in the 32-bit domain. The verifier will mark load/store through PTR_TO_ARENA with PROBE_MEM32. JIT will generate them as kern_vm_start + 32bit_addr memory accesses. The behavior is similar to copy_from_kernel_nofault() except that no address checks are necessary. The address is guaranteed to be in the 4GB range. If the page is not present, the destination register is zeroed on read, and the operation is ignored on write. rX = bpf_addr_space_cast(rY, 0, 1) tells the verifier that rX->type = unknown scalar. If arena->map_flags has BPF_F_NO_USER_CONV set, then the verifier converts such cast instructions to mov32. Otherwise, JIT will emit native code equivalent to: rX = (u32)rY; if (rY) rX |= clear_lo32_bits(arena->user_vm_start); /* replace hi32 bits in rX */ After such conversion, the pointer becomes a valid user pointer within bpf_arena range. The user process can access data structures created in bpf_arena without any additional computations. For example, a linked list built by a bpf program can be walked natively by user space. Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Barret Rhoden <brho@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240308010812.89848-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
* bpf: Introduce may_goto instructionAlexei Starovoitov2024-03-061-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Introduce may_goto instruction that from the verifier pov is similar to open coded iterators bpf_for()/bpf_repeat() and bpf_loop() helper, but it doesn't iterate any objects. In assembly 'may_goto' is a nop most of the time until bpf runtime has to terminate the program for whatever reason. In the current implementation may_goto has a hidden counter, but other mechanisms can be used. For programs written in C the later patch introduces 'cond_break' macro that combines 'may_goto' with 'break' statement and has similar semantics: cond_break is a nop until bpf runtime has to break out of this loop. It can be used in any normal "for" or "while" loop, like for (i = zero; i < cnt; cond_break, i++) { The verifier recognizes that may_goto is used in the program, reserves additional 8 bytes of stack, initializes them in subprog prologue, and replaces may_goto instruction with: aux_reg = *(u64 *)(fp - 40) if aux_reg == 0 goto pc+off aux_reg -= 1 *(u64 *)(fp - 40) = aux_reg may_goto instruction can be used by LLVM to implement __builtin_memcpy, __builtin_strcmp. may_goto is not a full substitute for bpf_for() macro. bpf_for() doesn't have induction variable that verifiers sees, so 'i' in bpf_for(i, 0, 100) is seen as imprecise and bounded. But when the code is written as: for (i = 0; i < 100; cond_break, i++) the verifier see 'i' as precise constant zero, hence cond_break (aka may_goto) doesn't help to converge the loop. A static or global variable can be used as a workaround: static int zero = 0; for (i = zero; i < 100; cond_break, i++) // works! may_goto works well with arena pointers that don't need to be bounds checked on access. Load/store from arena returns imprecise unbounded scalar and loops with may_goto pass the verifier. Reserve new opcode BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND for may_goto insn. JCOND stands for conditional pseudo jump. Since goto_or_nop insn was proposed, it may use the same opcode. may_goto vs goto_or_nop can be distinguished by src_reg: code = BPF_JMP | BPF_JCOND src_reg = 0 - may_goto src_reg = 1 - goto_or_nop Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Tested-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240306031929.42666-2-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com
* bpf: Replace bpf_lpm_trie_key 0-length array with flexible arrayKees Cook2024-02-291-1/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace deprecated 0-length array in struct bpf_lpm_trie_key with flexible array. Found with GCC 13: ../kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:207:51: warning: array subscript i is outside array bounds of 'const __u8[0]' {aka 'const unsigned char[]'} [-Warray-bounds=] 207 | *(__be16 *)&key->data[i]); | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~ ../include/uapi/linux/swab.h:102:54: note: in definition of macro '__swab16' 102 | #define __swab16(x) (__u16)__builtin_bswap16((__u16)(x)) | ^ ../include/linux/byteorder/generic.h:97:21: note: in expansion of macro '__be16_to_cpu' 97 | #define be16_to_cpu __be16_to_cpu | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~ ../kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:206:28: note: in expansion of macro 'be16_to_cpu' 206 | u16 diff = be16_to_cpu(*(__be16 *)&node->data[i] ^ | ^~~~~~~~~~~ In file included from ../include/linux/bpf.h:7: ../include/uapi/linux/bpf.h:82:17: note: while referencing 'data' 82 | __u8 data[0]; /* Arbitrary size */ | ^~~~ And found at run-time under CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:218:49 index 0 is out of range for type '__u8 [*]' Changing struct bpf_lpm_trie_key is difficult since has been used by userspace. For example, in Cilium: struct egress_gw_policy_key { struct bpf_lpm_trie_key lpm_key; __u32 saddr; __u32 daddr; }; While direct references to the "data" member haven't been found, there are static initializers what include the final member. For example, the "{}" here: struct egress_gw_policy_key in_key = { .lpm_key = { 32 + 24, {} }, .saddr = CLIENT_IP, .daddr = EXTERNAL_SVC_IP & 0Xffffff, }; To avoid the build time and run time warnings seen with a 0-sized trailing array for struct bpf_lpm_trie_key, introduce a new struct that correctly uses a flexible array for the trailing bytes, struct bpf_lpm_trie_key_u8. As part of this, include the "header" portion (which is just the "prefixlen" member), so it can be used by anything building a bpf_lpr_trie_key that has trailing members that aren't a u8 flexible array (like the self-test[1]), which is named struct bpf_lpm_trie_key_hdr. Unfortunately, C++ refuses to parse the __struct_group() helper, so it is not possible to define struct bpf_lpm_trie_key_hdr directly in struct bpf_lpm_trie_key_u8, so we must open-code the union directly. Adjust the kernel code to use struct bpf_lpm_trie_key_u8 through-out, and for the selftest to use struct bpf_lpm_trie_key_hdr. Add a comment to the UAPI header directing folks to the two new options. Reported-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org> Closes: https://paste.debian.net/hidden/ca500597/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/202206281009.4332AA33@keescook/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240222155612.it.533-kees@kernel.org
* bpf: Clarify batch lookup/lookup_and_delete semanticsMartin Kelly2024-02-221-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The batch lookup and lookup_and_delete APIs have two parameters, in_batch and out_batch, to facilitate iterative lookup/lookup_and_deletion operations for supported maps. Except NULL for in_batch at the start of these two batch operations, both parameters need to point to memory equal or larger than the respective map key size, except for various hashmaps (hash, percpu_hash, lru_hash, lru_percpu_hash) where the in_batch/out_batch memory size should be at least 4 bytes. Document these semantics to clarify the API. Signed-off-by: Martin Kelly <martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240221211838.1241578-1-martin.kelly@crowdstrike.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
* bpf: Add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD commandAndrii Nakryiko2024-01-241-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Add basic support of BPF token to BPF_PROG_LOAD. BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag should be set in prog_flags field when providing prog_token_fd. Wire through a set of allowed BPF program types and attach types, derived from BPF FS at BPF token creation time. Then make sure we perform bpf_token_capable() checks everywhere where it's relevant. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-7-andrii@kernel.org
* bpf: Add BPF token support to BPF_BTF_LOAD commandAndrii Nakryiko2024-01-241-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Accept BPF token FD in BPF_BTF_LOAD command to allow BTF data loading through delegated BPF token. BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag has to be specified when passing BPF token FD. Given BPF_BTF_LOAD command didn't have flags field before, we also add btf_flags field. BTF loading is a pretty straightforward operation, so as long as BPF token is created with allow_cmds granting BPF_BTF_LOAD command, kernel proceeds to parsing BTF data and creating BTF object. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-6-andrii@kernel.org
* bpf: Add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE commandAndrii Nakryiko2024-01-241-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow providing token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command to allow controlled BPF map creation from unprivileged process through delegated BPF token. New BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag is added to specify together with BPF token FD for BPF_MAP_CREATE command. Wire through a set of allowed BPF map types to BPF token, derived from BPF FS at BPF token creation time. This, in combination with allowed_cmds allows to create a narrowly-focused BPF token (controlled by privileged agent) with a restrictive set of BPF maps that application can attempt to create. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-5-andrii@kernel.org
* bpf: Introduce BPF token objectAndrii Nakryiko2024-01-241-0/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF program or creating a BPF map, from privileged process to a *trusted* unprivileged process, all while having a good amount of control over which privileged operations could be performed using provided BPF token. This is achieved through mounting BPF FS instance with extra delegation mount options, which determine what operations are delegatable, and also constraining it to the owning user namespace (as mentioned in the previous patch). BPF token itself is just a derivative from BPF FS and can be created through a new bpf() syscall command, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE, which accepts BPF FS FD, which can be attained through open() API by opening BPF FS mount point. Currently, BPF token "inherits" delegated command, map types, prog type, and attach type bit sets from BPF FS as is. In the future, having an BPF token as a separate object with its own FD, we can allow to further restrict BPF token's allowable set of things either at the creation time or after the fact, allowing the process to guard itself further from unintentionally trying to load undesired kind of BPF programs. But for now we keep things simple and just copy bit sets as is. When BPF token is created from BPF FS mount, we take reference to the BPF super block's owning user namespace, and then use that namespace for checking all the {CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_ADMIN} capabilities that are normally only checked against init userns (using capable()), but now we check them using ns_capable() instead (if BPF token is provided). See bpf_token_capable() for details. Such setup means that BPF token in itself is not sufficient to grant BPF functionality. User namespaced process has to *also* have necessary combination of capabilities inside that user namespace. So while previously CAP_BPF was useless when granted within user namespace, now it gains a meaning and allows container managers and sys admins to have a flexible control over which processes can and need to use BPF functionality within the user namespace (i.e., container in practice). And BPF FS delegation mount options and derived BPF tokens serve as a per-container "flag" to grant overall ability to use bpf() (plus further restrict on which parts of bpf() syscalls are treated as namespaced). Note also, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command itself requires ns_capable(CAP_BPF) within the BPF FS owning user namespace, rounding up the ns_capable() story of BPF token. Also creating BPF token in init user namespace is currently not supported, given BPF token doesn't have any effect in init user namespace anyways. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-4-andrii@kernel.org
* bpf: pass attached BTF to the bpf_struct_ops subsystemKui-Feng Lee2024-01-231-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pass the fd of a btf from the userspace to the bpf() syscall, and then convert the fd into a btf. The btf is generated from the module that defines the target BPF struct_ops type. In order to inform the kernel about the module that defines the target struct_ops type, the userspace program needs to provide a btf fd for the respective module's btf. This btf contains essential information on the types defined within the module, including the target struct_ops type. A btf fd must be provided to the kernel for struct_ops maps and for the bpf programs attached to those maps. In the case of the bpf programs, the attach_btf_obj_fd parameter is passed as part of the bpf_attr and is converted into a btf. This btf is then stored in the prog->aux->attach_btf field. Here, it just let the verifier access attach_btf directly. In the case of struct_ops maps, a btf fd is passed as value_type_btf_obj_fd of bpf_attr. The bpf_struct_ops_map_alloc() function converts the fd to a btf and stores it as st_map->btf. A flag BPF_F_VTYPE_BTF_OBJ_FD is added for map_flags to indicate that the value of value_type_btf_obj_fd is set. Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-9-thinker.li@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
* bpf: pass btf object id in bpf_map_info.Kui-Feng Lee2024-01-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Include btf object id (btf_obj_id) in bpf_map_info so that tools (ex: bpftools struct_ops dump) know the correct btf from the kernel to look up type information of struct_ops types. Since struct_ops types can be defined and registered in a module. The type information of a struct_ops type are defined in the btf of the module defining it. The userspace tools need to know which btf is for the module defining a struct_ops type. Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-7-thinker.li@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
* bpf: Store cookies in kprobe_multi bpf_link_info dataJiri Olsa2024-01-231-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Storing cookies in kprobe_multi bpf_link_info data. The cookies field is optional and if provided it needs to be an array of __u64 with kprobe_multi.count length. Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119110505.400573-3-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: Add cookie to perf_event bpf_link_info recordsJiri Olsa2024-01-231-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | At the moment we don't store cookie for perf_event probes, while we do that for the rest of the probes. Adding cookie fields to struct bpf_link_info perf event probe records: perf_event.uprobe perf_event.kprobe perf_event.tracepoint perf_event.perf_event And the code to store that in bpf_link_info struct. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119110505.400573-2-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf, docs: Fix bpf_redirect_peer header docVictor Stewart2024-01-231-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | Amend the bpf_redirect_peer() header documentation to also mention support for the netkit device type. Signed-off-by: Victor Stewart <v@nametag.social> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240116202952.241009-1-v@nametag.social Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* Revert BPF token-related functionalityAndrii Nakryiko2023-12-191-42/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | This patch includes the following revert (one conflicting BPF FS patch and three token patch sets, represented by merge commits): - revert 0f5d5454c723 "Merge branch 'bpf-fs-mount-options-parsing-follow-ups'"; - revert 750e785796bb "bpf: Support uid and gid when mounting bpffs"; - revert 733763285acf "Merge branch 'bpf-token-support-in-libbpf-s-bpf-object'"; - revert c35919dcce28 "Merge branch 'bpf-token-and-bpf-fs-based-delegation'". Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAHk-=wg7JuFYwGy=GOMbRCtOL+jwSQsdUaBsRWkDVYbxipbM5A@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
* Merge tag 'for-netdev' of ↵Jakub Kicinski2023-12-181-1/+45
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next Alexei Starovoitov says: ==================== pull-request: bpf-next 2023-12-18 This PR is larger than usual and contains changes in various parts of the kernel. The main changes are: 1) Fix kCFI bugs in BPF, from Peter Zijlstra. End result: all forms of indirect calls from BPF into kernel and from kernel into BPF work with CFI enabled. This allows BPF to work with CONFIG_FINEIBT=y. 2) Introduce BPF token object, from Andrii Nakryiko. It adds an ability to delegate a subset of BPF features from privileged daemon (e.g., systemd) through special mount options for userns-bound BPF FS to a trusted unprivileged application. The design accommodates suggestions from Christian Brauner and Paul Moore. Example: $ sudo mkdir -p /sys/fs/bpf/token $ sudo mount -t bpf bpffs /sys/fs/bpf/token \ -o delegate_cmds=prog_load:MAP_CREATE \ -o delegate_progs=kprobe \ -o delegate_attachs=xdp 3) Various verifier improvements and fixes, from Andrii Nakryiko, Andrei Matei. - Complete precision tracking support for register spills - Fix verification of possibly-zero-sized stack accesses - Fix access to uninit stack slots - Track aligned STACK_ZERO cases as imprecise spilled registers. It improves the verifier "instructions processed" metric from single digit to 50-60% for some programs. - Fix verifier retval logic 4) Support for VLAN tag in XDP hints, from Larysa Zaremba. 5) Allocate BPF trampoline via bpf_prog_pack mechanism, from Song Liu. End result: better memory utilization and lower I$ miss for calls to BPF via BPF trampoline. 6) Fix race between BPF prog accessing inner map and parallel delete, from Hou Tao. 7) Add bpf_xdp_get_xfrm_state() kfunc, from Daniel Xu. It allows BPF interact with IPSEC infra. The intent is to support software RSS (via XDP) for the upcoming ipsec pcpu work. Experiments on AWS demonstrate single tunnel pcpu ipsec reaching line rate on 100G ENA nics. 8) Expand bpf_cgrp_storage to support cgroup1 non-attach, from Yafang Shao. 9) BPF file verification via fsverity, from Song Liu. It allows BPF progs get fsverity digest. * tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (164 commits) bpf: Ensure precise is reset to false in __mark_reg_const_zero() selftests/bpf: Add more uprobe multi fail tests bpf: Fail uprobe multi link with negative offset selftests/bpf: Test the release of map btf s390/bpf: Fix indirect trampoline generation selftests/bpf: Temporarily disable dummy_struct_ops test on s390 x86/cfi,bpf: Fix bpf_exception_cb() signature bpf: Fix dtor CFI cfi: Add CFI_NOSEAL() x86/cfi,bpf: Fix bpf_struct_ops CFI x86/cfi,bpf: Fix bpf_callback_t CFI x86/cfi,bpf: Fix BPF JIT call cfi: Flip headers selftests/bpf: Add test for abnormal cnt during multi-kprobe attachment selftests/bpf: Don't use libbpf_get_error() in kprobe_multi_test selftests/bpf: Add test for abnormal cnt during multi-uprobe attachment bpf: Limit the number of kprobes when attaching program to multiple kprobes bpf: Limit the number of uprobes when attaching program to multiple uprobes bpf: xdp: Register generic_kfunc_set with XDP programs selftests/bpf: utilize string values for delegate_xxx mount options ... ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231219000520.34178-1-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
| * bpf: rename MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE into __MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE for consistencyAndrii Nakryiko2023-12-061-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | To stay consistent with the naming pattern used for similar cases in BPF UAPI (__MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE, etc), rename MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE into __MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE. Also similar to MAX_BPF_ATTACH_TYPE and MAX_BPF_REG, add: #define MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE __MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE Not all __MAX_xxx enums have such #define, so I'm not sure if we should add it or not, but I figured I'll start with a completely backwards compatible way, and we can drop that, if necessary. Also adjust a selftest that used MAX_BPF_LINK_TYPE enum. Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231206190920.1651226-1-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_PROG_LOAD commandAndrii Nakryiko2023-12-061-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add basic support of BPF token to BPF_PROG_LOAD. Wire through a set of allowed BPF program types and attach types, derived from BPF FS at BPF token creation time. Then make sure we perform bpf_token_capable() checks everywhere where it's relevant. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130185229.2688956-7-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_BTF_LOAD commandAndrii Nakryiko2023-12-061-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Accept BPF token FD in BPF_BTF_LOAD command to allow BTF data loading through delegated BPF token. BTF loading is a pretty straightforward operation, so as long as BPF token is created with allow_cmds granting BPF_BTF_LOAD command, kernel proceeds to parsing BTF data and creating BTF object. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130185229.2688956-6-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * bpf: add BPF token support to BPF_MAP_CREATE commandAndrii Nakryiko2023-12-061-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow providing token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command to allow controlled BPF map creation from unprivileged process through delegated BPF token. Wire through a set of allowed BPF map types to BPF token, derived from BPF FS at BPF token creation time. This, in combination with allowed_cmds allows to create a narrowly-focused BPF token (controlled by privileged agent) with a restrictive set of BPF maps that application can attempt to create. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130185229.2688956-5-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
| * bpf: introduce BPF token objectAndrii Nakryiko2023-12-061-0/+37
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF program or creating a BPF map, from privileged process to a *trusted* unprivileged process, all while having a good amount of control over which privileged operations could be performed using provided BPF token. This is achieved through mounting BPF FS instance with extra delegation mount options, which determine what operations are delegatable, and also constraining it to the owning user namespace (as mentioned in the previous patch). BPF token itself is just a derivative from BPF FS and can be created through a new bpf() syscall command, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE, which accepts BPF FS FD, which can be attained through open() API by opening BPF FS mount point. Currently, BPF token "inherits" delegated command, map types, prog type, and attach type bit sets from BPF FS as is. In the future, having an BPF token as a separate object with its own FD, we can allow to further restrict BPF token's allowable set of things either at the creation time or after the fact, allowing the process to guard itself further from unintentionally trying to load undesired kind of BPF programs. But for now we keep things simple and just copy bit sets as is. When BPF token is created from BPF FS mount, we take reference to the BPF super block's owning user namespace, and then use that namespace for checking all the {CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_ADMIN} capabilities that are normally only checked against init userns (using capable()), but now we check them using ns_capable() instead (if BPF token is provided). See bpf_token_capable() for details. Such setup means that BPF token in itself is not sufficient to grant BPF functionality. User namespaced process has to *also* have necessary combination of capabilities inside that user namespace. So while previously CAP_BPF was useless when granted within user namespace, now it gains a meaning and allows container managers and sys admins to have a flexible control over which processes can and need to use BPF functionality within the user namespace (i.e., container in practice). And BPF FS delegation mount options and derived BPF tokens serve as a per-container "flag" to grant overall ability to use bpf() (plus further restrict on which parts of bpf() syscalls are treated as namespaced). Note also, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command itself requires ns_capable(CAP_BPF) within the BPF FS owning user namespace, rounding up the ns_capable() story of BPF token. Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231130185229.2688956-4-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* | tcp: Dump bound-only sockets in inet_diag.Guillaume Nault2023-12-041-0/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Walk the hashinfo->bhash2 table so that inet_diag can dump TCP sockets that are bound but haven't yet called connect() or listen(). The code is inspired by the ->lhash2 loop. However there's no manual test of the source port, since this kind of filtering is already handled by inet_diag_bc_sk(). Also, a maximum of 16 sockets are dumped at a time, to avoid running with bh disabled for too long. There's no TCP state for bound but otherwise inactive sockets. Such sockets normally map to TCP_CLOSE. However, "ss -l", which is supposed to only dump listening sockets, actually requests the kernel to dump sockets in either the TCP_LISTEN or TCP_CLOSE states. To avoid dumping bound-only sockets with "ss -l", we therefore need to define a new pseudo-state (TCP_BOUND_INACTIVE) that user space will be able to set explicitly. With an IPv4, an IPv6 and an IPv6-only socket, bound respectively to 40000, 64000, 60000, an updated version of iproute2 could work as follow: $ ss -t state bound-inactive Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address:Port Peer Address:Port Process 0 0 0.0.0.0:40000 0.0.0.0:* 0 0 [::]:60000 [::]:* 0 0 *:64000 *:* Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <gnault@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b3a84ae61e19c06806eea9c602b3b66e8f0cfc81.1701362867.git.gnault@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
* bpf: Add link_info support for uprobe multi linkJiri Olsa2023-11-281-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Adding support to get uprobe_link details through bpf_link_info interface. Adding new struct uprobe_multi to struct bpf_link_info to carry the uprobe_multi link details. The uprobe_multi.count is passed from user space to denote size of array fields (offsets/ref_ctr_offsets/cookies). The actual array size is stored back to uprobe_multi.count (allowing user to find out the actual array size) and array fields are populated up to the user passed size. All the non-array fields (path/count/flags/pid) are always set. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231125193130.834322-4-jolsa@kernel.org
* bpf: rename BPF_F_TEST_SANITY_STRICT to BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTSAndrii Nakryiko2023-11-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Rename verifier internal flag BPF_F_TEST_SANITY_STRICT to more neutral BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS. This is a follow up to [0]. A few selftests and veristat need to be adjusted in the same patch as well. [0] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/20231112010609.848406-5-andrii@kernel.org/ Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231117171404.225508-1-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: add register bounds sanity checks and sanitizationAndrii Nakryiko2023-11-151-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add simple sanity checks that validate well-formed ranges (min <= max) across u64, s64, u32, and s32 ranges. Also for cases when the value is constant (either 64-bit or 32-bit), we validate that ranges and tnums are in agreement. These bounds checks are performed at the end of BPF_ALU/BPF_ALU64 operations, on conditional jumps, and for LDX instructions (where subreg zero/sign extension is probably the most important to check). This covers most of the interesting cases. Also, we validate the sanity of the return register when manually adjusting it for some special helpers. By default, sanity violation will trigger a warning in verifier log and resetting register bounds to "unbounded" ones. But to aid development and debugging, BPF_F_TEST_SANITY_STRICT flag is added, which will trigger hard failure of verification with -EFAULT on register bounds violations. This allows selftests to catch such issues. veristat will also gain a CLI option to enable this behavior. Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231112010609.848406-5-andrii@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: Add crosstask check to __bpf_get_stackJordan Rome2023-11-101-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently get_perf_callchain only supports user stack walking for the current task. Passing the correct *crosstask* param will return 0 frames if the task passed to __bpf_get_stack isn't the current one instead of a single incorrect frame/address. This change passes the correct *crosstask* param but also does a preemptive check in __bpf_get_stack if the task is current and returns -EOPNOTSUPP if it is not. This issue was found using bpf_get_task_stack inside a BPF iterator ("iter/task"), which iterates over all tasks. bpf_get_task_stack works fine for fetching kernel stacks but because get_perf_callchain relies on the caller to know if the requested *task* is the current one (via *crosstask*) it was failing in a confusing way. It might be possible to get user stacks for all tasks utilizing something like access_process_vm but that requires the bpf program calling bpf_get_task_stack to be sleepable and would therefore be a breaking change. Fixes: fa28dcb82a38 ("bpf: Introduce helper bpf_get_task_stack()") Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <jordalgo@meta.com> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231108112334.3433136-1-jordalgo@meta.com
* bpf: Use named fields for certain bpf uapi structsYonghong Song2023-11-091-16/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Martin and Vadim reported a verifier failure with bpf_dynptr usage. The issue is mentioned but Vadim workarounded the issue with source change ([1]). The below describes what is the issue and why there is a verification failure. int BPF_PROG(skb_crypto_setup) { struct bpf_dynptr algo, key; ... bpf_dynptr_from_mem(..., ..., 0, &algo); ... } The bpf program is using vmlinux.h, so we have the following definition in vmlinux.h: struct bpf_dynptr { long: 64; long: 64; }; Note that in uapi header bpf.h, we have struct bpf_dynptr { long: 64; long: 64; } __attribute__((aligned(8))); So we lost alignment information for struct bpf_dynptr by using vmlinux.h. Let us take a look at a simple program below: $ cat align.c typedef unsigned long long __u64; struct bpf_dynptr_no_align { __u64 :64; __u64 :64; }; struct bpf_dynptr_yes_align { __u64 :64; __u64 :64; } __attribute__((aligned(8))); void bar(void *, void *); int foo() { struct bpf_dynptr_no_align a; struct bpf_dynptr_yes_align b; bar(&a, &b); return 0; } $ clang --target=bpf -O2 -S -emit-llvm align.c Look at the generated IR file align.ll: ... %a = alloca %struct.bpf_dynptr_no_align, align 1 %b = alloca %struct.bpf_dynptr_yes_align, align 8 ... The compiler dictates the alignment for struct bpf_dynptr_no_align is 1 and the alignment for struct bpf_dynptr_yes_align is 8. So theoretically compiler could allocate variable %a with alignment 1 although in reallity the compiler may choose a different alignment by considering other local variables. In [1], the verification failure happens because variable 'algo' is allocated on the stack with alignment 4 (fp-28). But the verifer wants its alignment to be 8. To fix the issue, the RFC patch ([1]) tried to add '__attribute__((aligned(8)))' to struct bpf_dynptr plus other similar structs. Andrii suggested that we could directly modify uapi struct with named fields like struct 'bpf_iter_num': struct bpf_iter_num { /* opaque iterator state; having __u64 here allows to preserve correct * alignment requirements in vmlinux.h, generated from BTF */ __u64 __opaque[1]; } __attribute__((aligned(8))); Indeed, adding named fields for those affected structs in this patch can preserve alignment when bpf program references them in vmlinux.h. With this patch, the verification failure in [1] can also be resolved. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/1b100f73-7625-4c1f-3ae5-50ecf84d3ff0@linux.dev/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231103055218.2395034-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev/ Cc: Vadim Fedorenko <vadfed@meta.com> Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev> Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231104024900.1539182-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* netkit, bpf: Add bpf programmable net deviceDaniel Borkmann2023-10-241-0/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This work adds a new, minimal BPF-programmable device called "netkit" (former PoC code-name "meta") we recently presented at LSF/MM/BPF. The core idea is that BPF programs are executed within the drivers xmit routine and therefore e.g. in case of containers/Pods moving BPF processing closer to the source. One of the goals was that in case of Pod egress traffic, this allows to move BPF programs from hostns tcx ingress into the device itself, providing earlier drop or forward mechanisms, for example, if the BPF program determines that the skb must be sent out of the node, then a redirect to the physical device can take place directly without going through per-CPU backlog queue. This helps to shift processing for such traffic from softirq to process context, leading to better scheduling decisions/performance (see measurements in the slides). In this initial version, the netkit device ships as a pair, but we plan to extend this further so it can also operate in single device mode. The pair comes with a primary and a peer device. Only the primary device, typically residing in hostns, can manage BPF programs for itself and its peer. The peer device is designated for containers/Pods and cannot attach/detach BPF programs. Upon the device creation, the user can set the default policy to 'pass' or 'drop' for the case when no BPF program is attached. Additionally, the device can be operated in L3 (default) or L2 mode. The management of BPF programs is done via bpf_mprog, so that multi-attach is supported right from the beginning with similar API and dependency controls as tcx. For details on the latter see commit 053c8e1f235d ("bpf: Add generic attach/detach/query API for multi-progs"). tc BPF compatibility is provided, so that existing programs can be easily migrated. Going forward, we plan to use netkit devices in Cilium as the main device type for connecting Pods. They will be operated in L3 mode in order to simplify a Pod's neighbor management and the peer will operate in default drop mode, so that no traffic is leaving between the time when a Pod is brought up by the CNI plugin and programs attached by the agent. Additionally, the programs we attach via tcx on the physical devices are using bpf_redirect_peer() for inbound traffic into netkit device, hence the latter is also supporting the ndo_get_peer_dev callback. Similarly, we use bpf_redirect_neigh() for the way out, pushing from netkit peer to phys device directly. Also, BIG TCP is supported on netkit device. For the follow-up work in single device mode, we plan to convert Cilium's cilium_host/_net devices into a single one. An extensive test suite for checking device operations and the BPF program and link management API comes as BPF selftests in this series. Co-developed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <razor@blackwall.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Reviewed-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Link: https://github.com/borkmann/iproute2/tree/pr/netkit Link: http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2023_material/tcx_meta_netdev_borkmann.pdf (24ff.) Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231024214904.29825-2-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
* bpf: Implement cgroup sockaddr hooks for unix socketsDaan De Meyer2023-10-111-4/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These hooks allows intercepting connect(), getsockname(), getpeername(), sendmsg() and recvmsg() for unix sockets. The unix socket hooks get write access to the address length because the address length is not fixed when dealing with unix sockets and needs to be modified when a unix socket address is modified by the hook. Because abstract socket unix addresses start with a NUL byte, we cannot recalculate the socket address in kernelspace after running the hook by calculating the length of the unix socket path using strlen(). These hooks can be used when users want to multiplex syscall to a single unix socket to multiple different processes behind the scenes by redirecting the connect() and other syscalls to process specific sockets. We do not implement support for intercepting bind() because when using bind() with unix sockets with a pathname address, this creates an inode in the filesystem which must be cleaned up. If we rewrite the address, the user might try to clean up the wrong file, leaking the socket in the filesystem where it is never cleaned up. Until we figure out a solution for this (and a use case for intercepting bind()), we opt to not allow rewriting the sockaddr in bind() calls. We also implement recvmsg() support for connected streams so that after a connect() that is modified by a sockaddr hook, any corresponding recmvsg() on the connected socket can also be modified to make the connected program think it is connected to the "intended" remote. Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Daan De Meyer <daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231011185113.140426-5-daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
* bpf: Derive source IP addr via bpf_*_fib_lookup()Martynas Pumputis2023-10-091-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Extend the bpf_fib_lookup() helper by making it to return the source IPv4/IPv6 address if the BPF_FIB_LOOKUP_SRC flag is set. For example, the following snippet can be used to derive the desired source IP address: struct bpf_fib_lookup p = { .ipv4_dst = ip4->daddr }; ret = bpf_skb_fib_lookup(skb, p, sizeof(p), BPF_FIB_LOOKUP_SRC | BPF_FIB_LOOKUP_SKIP_NEIGH); if (ret != BPF_FIB_LKUP_RET_SUCCESS) return TC_ACT_SHOT; /* the p.ipv4_src now contains the source address */ The inability to derive the proper source address may cause malfunctions in BPF-based dataplanes for hosts containing netdevs with more than one routable IP address or for multi-homed hosts. For example, Cilium implements packet masquerading in BPF. If an egressing netdev to which the Cilium's BPF prog is attached has multiple IP addresses, then only one [hardcoded] IP address can be used for masquerading. This breaks connectivity if any other IP address should have been selected instead, for example, when a public and private addresses are attached to the same egress interface. The change was tested with Cilium [1]. Nikolay Aleksandrov helped to figure out the IPv6 addr selection. [1]: https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/28283 Signed-off-by: Martynas Pumputis <m@lambda.lt> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231007081415.33502-2-m@lambda.lt Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
* bpf: Add ability to pin bpf timer to calling CPUDavid Vernet2023-10-091-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | BPF supports creating high resolution timers using bpf_timer_* helper functions. Currently, only the BPF_F_TIMER_ABS flag is supported, which specifies that the timeout should be interpreted as absolute time. It would also be useful to be able to pin that timer to a core. For example, if you wanted to make a subset of cores run without timer interrupts, and only have the timer be invoked on a single core. This patch adds support for this with a new BPF_F_TIMER_CPU_PIN flag. When specified, the HRTIMER_MODE_PINNED flag is passed to hrtimer_start(). A subsequent patch will update selftests to validate. Signed-off-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Acked-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20231004162339.200702-2-void@manifault.com
* bpf: Add missed value to kprobe perf link infoJiri Olsa2023-09-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | Add missed value to kprobe attached through perf link info to hold the stats of missed kprobe handler execution. The kprobe's missed counter gets incremented when kprobe handler is not executed due to another kprobe running on the same cpu. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230920213145.1941596-4-jolsa@kernel.org
* bpf: Add missed value to kprobe_multi link infoJiri Olsa2023-09-251-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add missed value to kprobe_multi link info to hold the stats of missed kprobe_multi probe. The missed counter gets incremented when fprobe fails the recursion check or there's no rethook available for return probe. In either case the attached bpf program is not executed. Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Tested-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org> Acked-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230920213145.1941596-3-jolsa@kernel.org
* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/netPaolo Abeni2023-09-211-1/+3
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR. No conflicts. Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
| * bpf: Clarify error expectations from bpf_clone_redirectStanislav Fomichev2023-09-111-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 151e887d8ff9 ("veth: Fixing transmit return status for dropped packets") exposed the fact that bpf_clone_redirect is capable of returning raw NET_XMIT_XXX return codes. This is in the conflict with its UAPI doc which says the following: "0 on success, or a negative error in case of failure." Update the UAPI to reflect the fact that bpf_clone_redirect can return positive error numbers, but don't explicitly define their meaning. Reported-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230911194731.286342-1-sdf@google.com
* | bpf: Mark BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE deprecatedYonghong Song2023-09-081-1/+8
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | Now 'BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGRP_STORAGE + local percpu ptr' can cover all BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE functionality and more. So mark BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_CGROUP_STORAGE deprecated. Also make changes in selftests/bpf/test_bpftool_synctypes.py and selftest libbpf_str to fix otherwise test errors. Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230827152837.2003563-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: Add pid filter support for uprobe_multi linkJiri Olsa2023-08-211-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Adding support to specify pid for uprobe_multi link and the uprobes are created only for task with given pid value. Using the consumer.filter filter callback for that, so the task gets filtered during the uprobe installation. We still need to check the task during runtime in the uprobe handler, because the handler could get executed if there's another system wide consumer on the same uprobe (thanks Oleg for the insight). Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809083440.3209381-6-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: Add cookies support for uprobe_multi linkJiri Olsa2023-08-211-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Adding support to specify cookies array for uprobe_multi link. The cookies array share indexes and length with other uprobe_multi arrays (offsets/ref_ctr_offsets). The cookies[i] value defines cookie for i-the uprobe and will be returned by bpf_get_attach_cookie helper when called from ebpf program hooked to that specific uprobe. Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809083440.3209381-5-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: Add multi uprobe linkJiri Olsa2023-08-211-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Adding new multi uprobe link that allows to attach bpf program to multiple uprobes. Uprobes to attach are specified via new link_create uprobe_multi union: struct { __aligned_u64 path; __aligned_u64 offsets; __aligned_u64 ref_ctr_offsets; __u32 cnt; __u32 flags; } uprobe_multi; Uprobes are defined for single binary specified in path and multiple calling sites specified in offsets array with optional reference counters specified in ref_ctr_offsets array. All specified arrays have length of 'cnt'. The 'flags' supports single bit for now that marks the uprobe as return probe. Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809083440.3209381-4-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: Switch BPF_F_KPROBE_MULTI_RETURN macro to enumJiri Olsa2023-08-211-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Switching BPF_F_KPROBE_MULTI_RETURN macro to anonymous enum, so it'd show up in vmlinux.h. There's not functional change compared to having this as macro. Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230809083440.3209381-2-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: Add support for bpf_get_func_ip helper for uprobe programJiri Olsa2023-08-071-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Adding support for bpf_get_func_ip helper for uprobe program to return probed address for both uprobe and return uprobe. We discussed this in [1] and agreed that uprobe can have special use of bpf_get_func_ip helper that differs from kprobe. The kprobe bpf_get_func_ip returns: - address of the function if probe is attach on function entry for both kprobe and return kprobe - 0 if the probe is not attach on function entry The uprobe bpf_get_func_ip returns: - address of the probe for both uprobe and return uprobe The reason for this semantic change is that kernel can't really tell if the probe user space address is function entry. The uprobe program is actually kprobe type program attached as uprobe. One of the consequences of this design is that uprobes do not have its own set of helpers, but share them with kprobes. As we need different functionality for bpf_get_func_ip helper for uprobe, I'm adding the bool value to the bpf_trace_run_ctx, so the helper can detect that it's executed in uprobe context and call specific code. The is_uprobe bool is set as true in bpf_prog_run_array_sleepable, which is currently used only for executing bpf programs in uprobe. Renaming bpf_prog_run_array_sleepable to bpf_prog_run_array_uprobe to address that it's only used for uprobes and that it sets the run_ctx.is_uprobe as suggested by Yafang Shao. Suggested-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Tested-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzZ=xLVkG5eurEuvLU79wAMtwho7ReR+XJAgwhFF4M-7Cg@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Tested-by: Viktor Malik <vmalik@redhat.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230807085956.2344866-2-jolsa@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
* netfilter: bpf: Support BPF_F_NETFILTER_IP_DEFRAG in netfilter linkDaniel Xu2023-07-281-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This commit adds support for enabling IP defrag using pre-existing netfilter defrag support. Basically all the flag does is bump a refcnt while the link the active. Checks are also added to ensure the prog requesting defrag support is run _after_ netfilter defrag hooks. We also take care to avoid any issues w.r.t. module unloading -- while defrag is active on a link, the module is prevented from unloading. Signed-off-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/5cff26f97e55161b7d56b09ddcf5f8888a5add1d.1689970773.git.dxu@dxuuu.xyz Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: Support new sign-extension load insnsYonghong Song2023-07-271-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add interpreter/jit support for new sign-extension load insns which adds a new mode (BPF_MEMSX). Also add verifier support to recognize these insns and to do proper verification with new insns. In verifier, besides to deduce proper bounds for the dst_reg, probed memory access is also properly handled. Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230728011156.3711870-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf, net: Support SO_REUSEPORT sockets with bpf_sk_assignLorenz Bauer2023-07-251-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently the bpf_sk_assign helper in tc BPF context refuses SO_REUSEPORT sockets. This means we can't use the helper to steer traffic to Envoy, which configures SO_REUSEPORT on its sockets. In turn, we're blocked from removing TPROXY from our setup. The reason that bpf_sk_assign refuses such sockets is that the bpf_sk_lookup helpers don't execute SK_REUSEPORT programs. Instead, one of the reuseport sockets is selected by hash. This could cause dispatch to the "wrong" socket: sk = bpf_sk_lookup_tcp(...) // select SO_REUSEPORT by hash bpf_sk_assign(skb, sk) // SK_REUSEPORT wasn't executed Fixing this isn't as simple as invoking SK_REUSEPORT from the lookup helpers unfortunately. In the tc context, L2 headers are at the start of the skb, while SK_REUSEPORT expects L3 headers instead. Instead, we execute the SK_REUSEPORT program when the assigned socket is pulled out of the skb, further up the stack. This creates some trickiness with regards to refcounting as bpf_sk_assign will put both refcounted and RCU freed sockets in skb->sk. reuseport sockets are RCU freed. We can infer that the sk_assigned socket is RCU freed if the reuseport lookup succeeds, but convincing yourself of this fact isn't straight forward. Therefore we defensively check refcounting on the sk_assign sock even though it's probably not required in practice. Fixes: 8e368dc72e86 ("bpf: Fix use of sk->sk_reuseport from sk_assign") Fixes: cf7fbe660f2d ("bpf: Add socket assign support") Co-developed-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Joe Stringer <joe@cilium.io> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACAyw98+qycmpQzKupquhkxbvWK4OFyDuuLMBNROnfWMZxUWeA@mail.gmail.com/ Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com> Signed-off-by: Lorenz Bauer <lmb@isovalent.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230720-so-reuseport-v6-7-7021b683cdae@isovalent.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
* bpf: Add fd-based tcx multi-prog infra with link supportDaniel Borkmann2023-07-191-4/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This work refactors and adds a lightweight extension ("tcx") to the tc BPF ingress and egress data path side for allowing BPF program management based on fds via bpf() syscall through the newly added generic multi-prog API. The main goal behind this work which we also presented at LPC [0] last year and a recent update at LSF/MM/BPF this year [3] is to support long-awaited BPF link functionality for tc BPF programs, which allows for a model of safe ownership and program detachment. Given the rise in tc BPF users in cloud native environments, this becomes necessary to avoid hard to debug incidents either through stale leftover programs or 3rd party applications accidentally stepping on each others toes. As a recap, a BPF link represents the attachment of a BPF program to a BPF hook point. The BPF link holds a single reference to keep BPF program alive. Moreover, hook points do not reference a BPF link, only the application's fd or pinning does. A BPF link holds meta-data specific to attachment and implements operations for link creation, (atomic) BPF program update, detachment and introspection. The motivation for BPF links for tc BPF programs is multi-fold, for example: - From Meta: "It's especially important for applications that are deployed fleet-wide and that don't "control" hosts they are deployed to. If such application crashes and no one notices and does anything about that, BPF program will keep running draining resources or even just, say, dropping packets. We at FB had outages due to such permanent BPF attachment semantics. With fd-based BPF link we are getting a framework, which allows safe, auto-detachable behavior by default, unless application explicitly opts in by pinning the BPF link." [1] - From Cilium-side the tc BPF programs we attach to host-facing veth devices and phys devices build the core datapath for Kubernetes Pods, and they implement forwarding, load-balancing, policy, EDT-management, etc, within BPF. Currently there is no concept of 'safe' ownership, e.g. we've recently experienced hard-to-debug issues in a user's staging environment where another Kubernetes application using tc BPF attached to the same prio/handle of cls_bpf, accidentally wiping all Cilium-based BPF programs from underneath it. The goal is to establish a clear/safe ownership model via links which cannot accidentally be overridden. [0,2] BPF links for tc can co-exist with non-link attachments, and the semantics are in line also with XDP links: BPF links cannot replace other BPF links, BPF links cannot replace non-BPF links, non-BPF links cannot replace BPF links and lastly only non-BPF links can replace non-BPF links. In case of Cilium, this would solve mentioned issue of safe ownership model as 3rd party applications would not be able to accidentally wipe Cilium programs, even if they are not BPF link aware. Earlier attempts [4] have tried to integrate BPF links into core tc machinery to solve cls_bpf, which has been intrusive to the generic tc kernel API with extensions only specific to cls_bpf and suboptimal/complex since cls_bpf could be wiped from the qdisc also. Locking a tc BPF program in place this way, is getting into layering hacks given the two object models are vastly different. We instead implemented the tcx (tc 'express') layer which is an fd-based tc BPF attach API, so that the BPF link implementation blends in naturally similar to other link types which are fd-based and without the need for changing core tc internal APIs. BPF programs for tc can then be successively migrated from classic cls_bpf to the new tc BPF link without needing to change the program's source code, just the BPF loader mechanics for attaching is sufficient. For the current tc framework, there is no change in behavior with this change and neither does this change touch on tc core kernel APIs. The gist of this patch is that the ingress and egress hook have a lightweight, qdisc-less extension for BPF to attach its tc BPF programs, in other words, a minimal entry point for tc BPF. The name tcx has been suggested from discussion of earlier revisions of this work as a good fit, and to more easily differ between the classic cls_bpf attachment and the fd-based one. For the ingress and egress tcx points, the device holds a cache-friendly array with program pointers which is separated from control plane (slow-path) data. Earlier versions of this work used priority to determine ordering and expression of dependencies similar as with classic tc, but it was challenged that for something more future-proof a better user experience is required. Hence this resulted in the design and development of the generic attach/detach/query API for multi-progs. See prior patch with its discussion on the API design. tcx is the first user and later we plan to integrate also others, for example, one candidate is multi-prog support for XDP which would benefit and have the same 'look and feel' from API perspective. The goal with tcx is to have maximum compatibility to existing tc BPF programs, so they don't need to be rewritten specifically. Compatibility to call into classic tcf_classify() is also provided in order to allow successive migration or both to cleanly co-exist where needed given its all one logical tc layer and the tcx plus classic tc cls/act build one logical overall processing pipeline. tcx supports the simplified return codes TCX_NEXT which is non-terminating (go to next program) and terminating ones with TCX_PASS, TCX_DROP, TCX_REDIRECT. The fd-based API is behind a static key, so that when unused the code is also not entered. The struct tcx_entry's program array is currently static, but could be made dynamic if necessary at a point in future. The a/b pair swap design has been chosen so that for detachment there are no allocations which otherwise could fail. The work has been tested with tc-testing selftest suite which all passes, as well as the tc BPF tests from the BPF CI, and also with Cilium's L4LB. Thanks also to Nikolay Aleksandrov and Martin Lau for in-depth early reviews of this work. [0] https://lpc.events/event/16/contributions/1353/ [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAEf4BzbokCJN33Nw_kg82sO=xppXnKWEncGTWCTB9vGCmLB6pw@mail.gmail.com [2] https://colocatedeventseu2023.sched.com/event/1Jo6O/tales-from-an-ebpf-programs-murder-mystery-hemanth-malla-guillaume-fournier-datadog [3] http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2023_material/tcx_meta_netdev_borkmann.pdf [4] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210604063116.234316-1-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230719140858.13224-3-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: Add generic attach/detach/query API for multi-progsDaniel Borkmann2023-07-191-8/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This adds a generic layer called bpf_mprog which can be reused by different attachment layers to enable multi-program attachment and dependency resolution. In-kernel users of the bpf_mprog don't need to care about the dependency resolution internals, they can just consume it with few API calls. The initial idea of having a generic API sparked out of discussion [0] from an earlier revision of this work where tc's priority was reused and exposed via BPF uapi as a way to coordinate dependencies among tc BPF programs, similar as-is for classic tc BPF. The feedback was that priority provides a bad user experience and is hard to use [1], e.g.: I cannot help but feel that priority logic copy-paste from old tc, netfilter and friends is done because "that's how things were done in the past". [...] Priority gets exposed everywhere in uapi all the way to bpftool when it's right there for users to understand. And that's the main problem with it. The user don't want to and don't need to be aware of it, but uapi forces them to pick the priority. [...] Your cover letter [0] example proves that in real life different service pick the same priority. They simply don't know any better. Priority is an unnecessary magic that apps _have_ to pick, so they just copy-paste and everyone ends up using the same. The course of the discussion showed more and more the need for a generic, reusable API where the "same look and feel" can be applied for various other program types beyond just tc BPF, for example XDP today does not have multi- program support in kernel, but also there was interest around this API for improving management of cgroup program types. Such common multi-program management concept is useful for BPF management daemons or user space BPF applications coordinating internally about their attachments. Both from Cilium and Meta side [2], we've collected the following requirements for a generic attach/detach/query API for multi-progs which has been implemented as part of this work: - Support prog-based attach/detach and link API - Dependency directives (can also be combined): - BPF_F_{BEFORE,AFTER} with relative_{fd,id} which can be {prog,link,none} - BPF_F_ID flag as {fd,id} toggle; the rationale for id is so that user space application does not need CAP_SYS_ADMIN to retrieve foreign fds via bpf_*_get_fd_by_id() - BPF_F_LINK flag as {prog,link} toggle - If relative_{fd,id} is none, then BPF_F_BEFORE will just prepend, and BPF_F_AFTER will just append for attaching - Enforced only at attach time - BPF_F_REPLACE with replace_bpf_fd which can be prog, links have their own infra for replacing their internal prog - If no flags are set, then it's default append behavior for attaching - Internal revision counter and optionally being able to pass expected_revision - User space application can query current state with revision, and pass it along for attachment to assert current state before doing updates - Query also gets extension for link_ids array and link_attach_flags: - prog_ids are always filled with program IDs - link_ids are filled with link IDs when link was used, otherwise 0 - {prog,link}_attach_flags for holding {prog,link}-specific flags - Must be easy to integrate/reuse for in-kernel users The uapi-side changes needed for supporting bpf_mprog are rather minimal, consisting of the additions of the attachment flags, revision counter, and expanding existing union with relative_{fd,id} member. The bpf_mprog framework consists of an bpf_mprog_entry object which holds an array of bpf_mprog_fp (fast-path structure). The bpf_mprog_cp (control-path structure) is part of bpf_mprog_bundle. Both have been separated, so that fast-path gets efficient packing of bpf_prog pointers for maximum cache efficiency. Also, array has been chosen instead of linked list or other structures to remove unnecessary indirections for a fast point-to-entry in tc for BPF. The bpf_mprog_entry comes as a pair via bpf_mprog_bundle so that in case of updates the peer bpf_mprog_entry is populated and then just swapped which avoids additional allocations that could otherwise fail, for example, in detach case. bpf_mprog_{fp,cp} arrays are currently static, but they could be converted to dynamic allocation if necessary at a point in future. Locking is deferred to the in-kernel user of bpf_mprog, for example, in case of tcx which uses this API in the next patch, it piggybacks on rtnl. An extensive test suite for checking all aspects of this API for prog-based attach/detach and link API comes as BPF selftests in this series. Thanks also to Andrii Nakryiko for early API discussions wrt Meta's BPF prog management. [0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221004231143.19190-1-daniel@iogearbox.net [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CAADnVQ+gEY3FjCR=+DmjDR4gp5bOYZUFJQXj4agKFHT9CQPZBw@mail.gmail.com [2] http://vger.kernel.org/bpfconf2023_material/tcx_meta_netdev_borkmann.pdf Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230719140858.13224-2-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: Add 'owner' field to bpf_{list,rb}_nodeDave Marchevsky2023-07-181-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As described by Kumar in [0], in shared ownership scenarios it is necessary to do runtime tracking of {rb,list} node ownership - and synchronize updates using this ownership information - in order to prevent races. This patch adds an 'owner' field to struct bpf_list_node and bpf_rb_node to implement such runtime tracking. The owner field is a void * that describes the ownership state of a node. It can have the following values: NULL - the node is not owned by any data structure BPF_PTR_POISON - the node is in the process of being added to a data structure ptr_to_root - the pointee is a data structure 'root' (bpf_rb_root / bpf_list_head) which owns this node The field is initially NULL (set by bpf_obj_init_field default behavior) and transitions states in the following sequence: Insertion: NULL -> BPF_PTR_POISON -> ptr_to_root Removal: ptr_to_root -> NULL Before a node has been successfully inserted, it is not protected by any root's lock, and therefore two programs can attempt to add the same node to different roots simultaneously. For this reason the intermediate BPF_PTR_POISON state is necessary. For removal, the node is protected by some root's lock so this intermediate hop isn't necessary. Note that bpf_list_pop_{front,back} helpers don't need to check owner before removing as the node-to-be-removed is not passed in as input and is instead taken directly from the list. Do the check anyways and WARN_ON_ONCE in this unexpected scenario. Selftest changes in this patch are entirely mechanical: some BTF tests have hardcoded struct sizes for structs that contain bpf_{list,rb}_node fields, those were adjusted to account for the new sizes. Selftest additions to validate the owner field are added in a further patch in the series. [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/d7hyspcow5wtjcmw4fugdgyp3fwhljwuscp3xyut5qnwivyeru@ysdq543otzv2 Signed-off-by: Dave Marchevsky <davemarchevsky@fb.com> Suggested-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230718083813.3416104-4-davemarchevsky@fb.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: Support ->fill_link_info for perf_eventYafang Shao2023-07-111-0/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | By introducing support for ->fill_link_info to the perf_event link, users gain the ability to inspect it using `bpftool link show`. While the current approach involves accessing this information via `bpftool perf show`, consolidating link information for all link types in one place offers greater convenience. Additionally, this patch extends support to the generic perf event, which is not currently accommodated by `bpftool perf show`. While only the perf type and config are exposed to userspace, other attributes such as sample_period and sample_freq are ignored. It's important to note that if kptr_restrict is not permitted, the probed address will not be exposed, maintaining security measures. A new enum bpf_perf_event_type is introduced to help the user understand which struct is relevant. Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230709025630.3735-9-laoar.shao@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* bpf: Support ->fill_link_info for kprobe_multiYafang Shao2023-07-111-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the addition of support for fill_link_info to the kprobe_multi link, users will gain the ability to inspect it conveniently using the `bpftool link show`. This enhancement provides valuable information to the user, including the count of probed functions and their respective addresses. It's important to note that if the kptr_restrict setting is not permitted, the probed address will not be exposed, ensuring security. Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230709025630.3735-2-laoar.shao@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
* Merge tag 'for-netdev' of ↵Jakub Kicinski2023-06-241-3/+18
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== pull-request: bpf-next 2023-06-23 We've added 49 non-merge commits during the last 24 day(s) which contain a total of 70 files changed, 1935 insertions(+), 442 deletions(-). The main changes are: 1) Extend bpf_fib_lookup helper to allow passing the route table ID, from Louis DeLosSantos. 2) Fix regsafe() in verifier to call check_ids() for scalar registers, from Eduard Zingerman. 3) Extend the set of cpumask kfuncs with bpf_cpumask_first_and() and a rework of bpf_cpumask_any*() kfuncs. Additionally, add selftests, from David Vernet. 4) Fix socket lookup BPF helpers for tc/XDP to respect VRF bindings, from Gilad Sever. 5) Change bpf_link_put() to use workqueue unconditionally to fix it under PREEMPT_RT, from Sebastian Andrzej Siewior. 6) Follow-ups to address issues in the bpf_refcount shared ownership implementation, from Dave Marchevsky. 7) A few general refactorings to BPF map and program creation permissions checks which were part of the BPF token series, from Andrii Nakryiko. 8) Various fixes for benchmark framework and add a new benchmark for BPF memory allocator to BPF selftests, from Hou Tao. 9) Documentation improvements around iterators and trusted pointers, from Anton Protopopov. 10) Small cleanup in verifier to improve allocated object check, from Daniel T. Lee. 11) Improve performance of bpf_xdp_pointer() by avoiding access to shared_info when XDP packet does not have frags, from Jesper Dangaard Brouer. 12) Silence a harmless syzbot-reported warning in btf_type_id_size(), from Yonghong Song. 13) Remove duplicate bpfilter_umh_cleanup in favor of umd_cleanup_helper, from Jarkko Sakkinen. 14) Fix BPF selftests build for resolve_btfids under custom HOSTCFLAGS, from Viktor Malik. * tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (49 commits) bpf, docs: Document existing macros instead of deprecated bpf, docs: BPF Iterator Document selftests/bpf: Fix compilation failure for prog vrf_socket_lookup selftests/bpf: Add vrf_socket_lookup tests bpf: Fix bpf socket lookup from tc/xdp to respect socket VRF bindings bpf: Call __bpf_sk_lookup()/__bpf_skc_lookup() directly via TC hookpoint bpf: Factor out socket lookup functions for the TC hookpoint. selftests/bpf: Set the default value of consumer_cnt as 0 selftests/bpf: Ensure that next_cpu() returns a valid CPU number selftests/bpf: Output the correct error code for pthread APIs selftests/bpf: Use producer_cnt to allocate local counter array xsk: Remove unused inline function xsk_buff_discard() bpf: Keep BPF_PROG_LOAD permission checks clear of validations bpf: Centralize permissions checks for all BPF map types bpf: Inline map creation logic in map_create() function bpf: Move unprivileged checks into map_create() and bpf_prog_load() bpf: Remove in_atomic() from bpf_link_put(). selftests/bpf: Verify that check_ids() is used for scalars in regsafe() bpf: Verify scalar ids mapping in regsafe() using check_ids() selftests/bpf: Check if mark_chain_precision() follows scalar ids ... ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230623211256.8409-1-daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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