summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/kernel/cred.c
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* x86: Mark __invalid_creds() __noreturnPeter Zijlstra2022-03-151-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | vmlinux.o: warning: objtool: ksys_unshare()+0x36c: unreachable instruction 0000 0000000000067040 <ksys_unshare>: ... 0364 673a4: 4c 89 ef mov %r13,%rdi 0367 673a7: e8 00 00 00 00 call 673ac <ksys_unshare+0x36c> 673a8: R_X86_64_PLT32 __invalid_creds-0x4 036c 673ac: e9 28 ff ff ff jmp 672d9 <ksys_unshare+0x299> 0371 673b1: 41 bc f4 ff ff ff mov $0xfffffff4,%r12d 0377 673b7: e9 80 fd ff ff jmp 6713c <ksys_unshare+0xfc> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/Yi9gOW9f1GGwwUD6@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
* ucounts: Base set_cred_ucounts changes on the real userEric W. Biederman2022-02-171-7/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com> wrote: > Tasks are associated to multiple users at once. Historically and as per > setrlimit(2) RLIMIT_NPROC is enforce based on real user ID. > > The commit 21d1c5e386bc ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts") > made the accounting structure "indexed" by euid and hence potentially > account tasks differently. > > The effective user ID may be different e.g. for setuid programs but > those are exec'd into already existing task (i.e. below limit), so > different accounting is moot. > > Some special setresuid(2) users may notice the difference, justifying > this fix. I looked at cred->ucount and it is only used for rlimit operations that were previously stored in cred->user. Making the fact cred->ucount can refer to a different user from cred->user a bug, affecting all uses of cred->ulimit not just RLIMIT_NPROC. Fix set_cred_ucounts to always use the real uid not the effective uid. Further simplify set_cred_ucounts by noticing that set_cred_ucounts somehow retained a draft version of the check to see if alloc_ucounts was needed that checks the new->user and new->user_ns against the current_real_cred(). Remove that draft version of the check. All that matters for setting the cred->ucounts are the user_ns and uid fields in the cred. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220207121800.5079-4-mkoutny@suse.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220216155832.680775-3-ebiederm@xmission.com Reported-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com> Fixes: 21d1c5e386bc ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts") Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* ucounts: In set_cred_ucounts assume new->ucounts is non-NULLEric W. Biederman2021-10-201-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Any cred that is destined for use by commit_creds must have a non-NULL cred->ucounts field. Only curing credential construction is a NULL cred->ucounts valid. Only abort_creds, put_cred, and put_cred_rcu needs to deal with a cred with a NULL ucount. As set_cred_ucounts is non of those case don't confuse people by handling something that can not happen. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/871r4irzds.fsf_-_@disp2133 Tested-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* ucounts: Move get_ucounts from cred_alloc_blank to key_change_session_keyringEric W. Biederman2021-10-201-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Setting cred->ucounts in cred_alloc_blank does not make sense. The uid and user_ns are deliberately not set in cred_alloc_blank but instead the setting is delayed until key_change_session_keyring. So move dealing with ucounts into key_change_session_keyring as well. Unfortunately that movement of get_ucounts adds a new failure mode to key_change_session_keyring. I do not see anything stopping the parent process from calling setuid and changing the relevant part of it's cred while keyctl_session_to_parent is running making it fundamentally necessary to call get_ucounts in key_change_session_keyring. Which means that the new failure mode cannot be avoided. A failure of key_change_session_keyring results in a single threaded parent keeping it's existing credentials. Which results in the parent process not being able to access the session keyring and whichever keys are in the new keyring. Further get_ucounts is only expected to fail if the number of bits in the refernece count for the structure is too few. Since the code has no other way to report the failure of get_ucounts and because such failures are not expected to be common add a WARN_ONCE to report this problem to userspace. Between the WARN_ONCE and the parent process not having access to the keys in the new session keyring I expect any failure of get_ucounts will be noticed and reported and we can find another way to handle this condition. (Possibly by just making ucounts->count an atomic_long_t). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 905ae01c4ae2 ("Add a reference to ucounts for each cred") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7k0ias0uf.fsf_-_@disp2133 Tested-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* ucounts: Proper error handling in set_cred_ucountsEric W. Biederman2021-10-191-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Instead of leaking the ucounts in new if alloc_ucounts fails, store the result of alloc_ucounts into a temporary variable, which is later assigned to new->ucounts. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 905ae01c4ae2 ("Add a reference to ucounts for each cred") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87pms2s0v8.fsf_-_@disp2133 Tested-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* ucounts: Pair inc_rlimit_ucounts with dec_rlimit_ucoutns in commit_credsEric W. Biederman2021-10-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The purpose of inc_rlimit_ucounts and dec_rlimit_ucounts in commit_creds is to change which rlimit counter is used to track a process when the credentials changes. Use the same test for both to guarantee the tracking is correct. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 21d1c5e386bc ("Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts") Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/87v91us0w4.fsf_-_@disp2133 Tested-by: Yu Zhao <yuzhao@google.com> Reviewed-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* ucounts: Increase ucounts reference counter before the security hookAlexey Gladkov2021-08-231-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | We need to increment the ucounts reference counter befor security_prepare_creds() because this function may fail and abort_creds() will try to decrement this reference. [ 96.465056][ T8641] FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. [ 96.465056][ T8641] name fail_page_alloc, interval 1, probability 0, space 0, times 0 [ 96.478453][ T8641] CPU: 1 PID: 8641 Comm: syz-executor668 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc6-syzkaller #0 [ 96.487215][ T8641] Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 [ 96.497254][ T8641] Call Trace: [ 96.500517][ T8641] dump_stack_lvl+0x1d3/0x29f [ 96.505758][ T8641] ? show_regs_print_info+0x12/0x12 [ 96.510944][ T8641] ? log_buf_vmcoreinfo_setup+0x498/0x498 [ 96.516652][ T8641] should_fail+0x384/0x4b0 [ 96.521141][ T8641] prepare_alloc_pages+0x1d1/0x5a0 [ 96.526236][ T8641] __alloc_pages+0x14d/0x5f0 [ 96.530808][ T8641] ? __rmqueue_pcplist+0x2030/0x2030 [ 96.536073][ T8641] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x3e2/0x750 [ 96.542056][ T8641] ? alloc_pages+0x3f3/0x500 [ 96.546635][ T8641] allocate_slab+0xf1/0x540 [ 96.551120][ T8641] ___slab_alloc+0x1cf/0x350 [ 96.555689][ T8641] ? kzalloc+0x1d/0x30 [ 96.559740][ T8641] __kmalloc+0x2e7/0x390 [ 96.563980][ T8641] ? kzalloc+0x1d/0x30 [ 96.568029][ T8641] kzalloc+0x1d/0x30 [ 96.571903][ T8641] security_prepare_creds+0x46/0x220 [ 96.577174][ T8641] prepare_creds+0x411/0x640 [ 96.581747][ T8641] __sys_setfsuid+0xe2/0x3a0 [ 96.586333][ T8641] do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 [ 96.590739][ T8641] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae [ 96.596611][ T8641] RIP: 0033:0x445a69 [ 96.600483][ T8641] Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 11 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [ 96.620152][ T8641] RSP: 002b:00007f1054173318 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000007a [ 96.628543][ T8641] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004ca4c8 RCX: 0000000000445a69 [ 96.636600][ T8641] RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 00007f10541732f0 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 96.644550][ T8641] RBP: 00000000004ca4c0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 96.652500][ T8641] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000004ca4cc [ 96.660631][ T8641] R13: 00007fffffe0b62f R14: 00007f1054173400 R15: 0000000000022000 Fixes: 905ae01c4ae2 ("Add a reference to ucounts for each cred") Reported-by: syzbot+01985d7909f9468f013c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/97433b1742c3331f02ad92de5a4f07d673c90613.1629735352.git.legion@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2021-06-281-5/+46
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace rlimit handling update from Eric Biederman: "This is the work mainly by Alexey Gladkov to limit rlimits to the rlimits of the user that created a user namespace, and to allow users to have stricter limits on the resources created within a user namespace." * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: cred: add missing return error code when set_cred_ucounts() failed ucounts: Silence warning in dec_rlimit_ucounts ucounts: Set ucount_max to the largest positive value the type can hold kselftests: Add test to check for rlimit changes in different user namespaces Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucounts Reimplement RLIMIT_SIGPENDING on top of ucounts Reimplement RLIMIT_MSGQUEUE on top of ucounts Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucounts Use atomic_t for ucounts reference counting Add a reference to ucounts for each cred Increase size of ucounts to atomic_long_t
| * cred: add missing return error code when set_cred_ucounts() failedYang Yingliang2021-05-281-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If set_cred_ucounts() failed, we need return the error code. Fixes: 905ae01c4ae2 ("Add a reference to ucounts for each cred") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210526143805.2549649-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com Reviewed-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * Reimplement RLIMIT_NPROC on top of ucountsAlexey Gladkov2021-04-301-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous user_namespaces cannot be exceeded. To illustrate the impact of rlimits, let's say there is a program that does not fork. Some service-A wants to run this program as user X in multiple containers. Since the program never fork the service wants to set RLIMIT_NPROC=1. service-A \- program (uid=1000, container1, rlimit_nproc=1) \- program (uid=1000, container2, rlimit_nproc=1) The service-A sets RLIMIT_NPROC=1 and runs the program in container1. When the service-A tries to run a program with RLIMIT_NPROC=1 in container2 it fails since user X already has one running process. We cannot use existing inc_ucounts / dec_ucounts because they do not allow us to exceed the maximum for the counter. Some rlimits can be overlimited by root or if the user has the appropriate capability. Changelog v11: * Change inc_rlimit_ucounts() which now returns top value of ucounts. * Drop inc_rlimit_ucounts_and_test() because the return code of inc_rlimit_ucounts() can be checked. Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/c5286a8aa16d2d698c222f7532f3d735c82bc6bc.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * Add a reference to ucounts for each credAlexey Gladkov2021-04-301-0/+40
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For RLIMIT_NPROC and some other rlimits the user_struct that holds the global limit is kept alive for the lifetime of a process by keeping it in struct cred. Adding a pointer to ucounts in the struct cred will allow to track RLIMIT_NPROC not only for user in the system, but for user in the user_namespace. Updating ucounts may require memory allocation which may fail. So, we cannot change cred.ucounts in the commit_creds() because this function cannot fail and it should always return 0. For this reason, we modify cred.ucounts before calling the commit_creds(). Changelog v6: * Fix null-ptr-deref in is_ucounts_overlimit() detected by trinity. This error was caused by the fact that cred_alloc_blank() left the ucounts pointer empty. Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/b37aaef28d8b9b0d757e07ba6dd27281bbe39259.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | kernel/cred.c: make init_groups staticRasmus Villemoes2021-05-061-1/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | init_groups is declared in both cred.h and init_task.h, but it is not actually referenced anywhere outside of cred.c where it is defined. So make it static and remove the declarations. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210310220102.2484201-1-linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* exec: Teach prepare_exec_creds how exec treats uids & gidsEric W. Biederman2020-05-201-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It is almost possible to use the result of prepare_exec_creds with no modifications during exec. Update prepare_exec_creds to initialize the suid and the fsuid to the euid, and the sgid and the fsgid to the egid. This is all that is needed to handle the common case of exec when nothing special like a setuid exec is happening. That this preserves the existing behavior of exec can be verified by examing bprm_fill_uid and cap_bprm_set_creds. This change makes it clear that the later parts of exec that update bprm->cred are just need to handle special cases such as setuid exec and change of domains. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/871rng22dm.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* kernel: doc: remove outdated comment cred.cBernd Edlinger2020-03-251-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | This removes an outdated comment in prepare_kernel_cred. There is no "cred_replace_mutex" any more, so the comment must go away. Signed-off-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* Merge branch 'dhowells' (patches from DavidH)Linus Torvalds2020-01-141-2/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Merge misc fixes from David Howells. Two afs fixes and a key refcounting fix. * dhowells: afs: Fix afs_lookup() to not clobber the version on a new dentry afs: Fix use-after-loss-of-ref keys: Fix request_key() cache
| * keys: Fix request_key() cacheDavid Howells2020-01-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the key cached by request_key() and co. is cleaned up on exit(), the code looks in the wrong task_struct, and so clears the wrong cache. This leads to anomalies in key refcounting when doing, say, a kernel build on an afs volume, that then trigger kasan to report a use-after-free when the key is viewed in /proc/keys. Fix this by making exit_creds() look in the passed-in task_struct rather than in current (the task_struct cleanup code is deferred by RCU and potentially run in another task). Fixes: 7743c48e54ee ("keys: Cache result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct") Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | memcg: account security cred as well to kmemcgShakeel Butt2020-01-041-3/+3
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The cred_jar kmem_cache is already memcg accounted in the current kernel but cred->security is not. Account cred->security to kmemcg. Recently we saw high root slab usage on our production and on further inspection, we found a buggy application leaking processes. Though that buggy application was contained within its memcg but we observe much more system memory overhead, couple of GiBs, during that period. This overhead can adversely impact the isolation on the system. One source of high overhead we found was cred->security objects, which have a lifetime of at least the life of the process which allocated them. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191205223721.40034-1-shakeelb@google.com Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Acked-by: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name> Reviewed-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'access-creds'Linus Torvalds2019-07-251-2/+19
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The access() (and faccessat()) credentials change can cause an unnecessary load on the RCU machinery because every access() call ends up freeing the temporary access credential using RCU. This isn't really noticeable on small machines, but if you have hundreds of cores you can cause huge slowdowns due to RCU storms. It's easy to avoid: the temporary access crededntials aren't actually normally accessed using RCU at all, so we can avoid the whole issue by just marking them as such. * access-creds: access: avoid the RCU grace period for the temporary subjective credentials
| * access: avoid the RCU grace period for the temporary subjective credentialsLinus Torvalds2019-07-241-2/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It turns out that 'access()' (and 'faccessat()') can cause a lot of RCU work because it installs a temporary credential that gets allocated and freed for each system call. The allocation and freeing overhead is mostly benign, but because credentials can be accessed under the RCU read lock, the freeing involves a RCU grace period. Which is not a huge deal normally, but if you have a lot of access() calls, this causes a fair amount of seconday damage: instead of having a nice alloc/free patterns that hits in hot per-CPU slab caches, you have all those delayed free's, and on big machines with hundreds of cores, the RCU overhead can end up being enormous. But it turns out that all of this is entirely unnecessary. Exactly because access() only installs the credential as the thread-local subjective credential, the temporary cred pointer doesn't actually need to be RCU free'd at all. Once we're done using it, we can just free it synchronously and avoid all the RCU overhead. So add a 'non_rcu' flag to 'struct cred', which can be set by users that know they only use it in non-RCU context (there are other potential users for this). We can make it a union with the rcu freeing list head that we need for the RCU case, so this doesn't need any extra storage. Note that this also makes 'get_current_cred()' clear the new non_rcu flag, in case we have filesystems that take a long-term reference to the cred and then expect the RCU delayed freeing afterwards. It's not entirely clear that this is required, but it makes for clear semantics: the subjective cred remains non-RCU as long as you only access it synchronously using the thread-local accessors, but you _can_ use it as a generic cred if you want to. It is possible that we should just remove the whole RCU markings for ->cred entirely. Only ->real_cred is really supposed to be accessed through RCU, and the long-term cred copies that nfs uses might want to explicitly re-enable RCU freeing if required, rather than have get_current_cred() do it implicitly. But this is a "minimal semantic changes" change for the immediate problem. Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Glauber <jglauber@marvell.com> Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org> Cc: Jayachandran Chandrasekharan Nair <jnair@marvell.com> Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | Merge tag 'keys-request-20190626' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-07-081-0/+9
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull request_key improvements from David Howells: "These are all request_key()-related, including a fix and some improvements: - Fix the lack of a Link permission check on a key found by request_key(), thereby enabling request_key() to link keys that don't grant this permission to the target keyring (which must still grant Write permission). Note that the key must be in the caller's keyrings already to be found. - Invalidate used request_key authentication keys rather than revoking them, so that they get cleaned up immediately rather than hanging around till the expiry time is passed. - Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so that a request_key_rcu() can be provided. This can be called in RCU mode, so it can't sleep and can't upcall - but it can be called from LOOKUP_RCU pathwalk mode. - Cache the latest positive result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct so that filesystems that make a lot of request_key() calls during pathwalk can take advantage of it to avoid having to redo the searching. This requires CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE=y. It is assumed that the key just found is likely to be used multiple times in each step in an RCU pathwalk, and is likely to be reused for the next step too. Note that the cleanup of the cache is done on TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME, just before userspace resumes, and on exit" * tag 'keys-request-20190626' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: keys: Kill off request_key_async{,_with_auxdata} keys: Cache result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct keys: Provide request_key_rcu() keys: Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions keys: Invalidate used request_key authentication keys keys: Fix request_key() lack of Link perm check on found key
| * | keys: Cache result of request_key*() temporarily in task_structDavid Howells2019-06-191-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If a filesystem uses keys to hold authentication tokens, then it needs a token for each VFS operation that might perform an authentication check - either by passing it to the server, or using to perform a check based on authentication data cached locally. For open files this isn't a problem, since the key should be cached in the file struct since it represents the subject performing operations on that file descriptor. During pathwalk, however, there isn't anywhere to cache the key, except perhaps in the nameidata struct - but that isn't exposed to the filesystems. Further, a pathwalk can incur a lot of operations, calling one or more of the following, for instance: ->lookup() ->permission() ->d_revalidate() ->d_automount() ->get_acl() ->getxattr() on each dentry/inode it encounters - and each one may need to call request_key(). And then, at the end of pathwalk, it will call the actual operation: ->mkdir() ->mknod() ->getattr() ->open() ... which may need to go and get the token again. However, it is very likely that all of the operations on a single dentry/inode - and quite possibly a sequence of them - will all want to use the same authentication token, which suggests that caching it would be a good idea. To this end: (1) Make it so that a positive result of request_key() and co. that didn't require upcalling to userspace is cached temporarily in task_struct. (2) The cache is 1 deep, so a new result displaces the old one. (3) The key is released by exit and by notify-resume. (4) The cache is cleared in a newly forked process. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | | Merge tag 'keys-misc-20190619' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-07-081-2/+2
|\| | | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull misc keyring updates from David Howells: "These are some miscellaneous keyrings fixes and improvements: - Fix a bunch of warnings from sparse, including missing RCU bits and kdoc-function argument mismatches - Implement a keyctl to allow a key to be moved from one keyring to another, with the option of prohibiting key replacement in the destination keyring. - Grant Link permission to possessors of request_key_auth tokens so that upcall servicing daemons can more easily arrange things such that only the necessary auth key is passed to the actual service program, and not all the auth keys a daemon might possesss. - Improvement in lookup_user_key(). - Implement a keyctl to allow keyrings subsystem capabilities to be queried. The keyutils next branch has commits to make available, document and test the move-key and capabilities code: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log They're currently on the 'next' branch" * tag 'keys-misc-20190619' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: keys: Add capability-checking keyctl function keys: Reuse keyring_index_key::desc_len in lookup_user_key() keys: Grant Link permission to possessers of request_key auth keys keys: Add a keyctl to move a key between keyrings keys: Hoist locking out of __key_link_begin() keys: Break bits out of key_unlink() keys: Change keyring_serialise_link_sem to a mutex keys: sparse: Fix kdoc mismatches keys: sparse: Fix incorrect RCU accesses keys: sparse: Fix key_fs[ug]id_changed()
| * keys: sparse: Fix key_fs[ug]id_changed()David Howells2019-05-221-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Sparse warnings are incurred by key_fs[ug]id_changed() due to unprotected accesses of tsk->cred, which is marked __rcu. Fix this by passing the new cred struct to these functions from commit_creds() rather than the task pointer. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-06-111-0/+9
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull ptrace fixes from Eric Biederman: "This is just two very minor fixes: - prevent ptrace from reading unitialized kernel memory found twice by syzkaller - restore a missing smp_rmb in ptrace_may_access and add comment tp it so it is not removed by accident again. Apologies for being a little slow about getting this to you, I am still figuring out how to develop with a little baby in the house" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: ptrace: restore smp_rmb() in __ptrace_may_access() signal/ptrace: Don't leak unitialized kernel memory with PTRACE_PEEK_SIGINFO
| * | ptrace: restore smp_rmb() in __ptrace_may_access()Jann Horn2019-06-111-0/+9
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Restore the read memory barrier in __ptrace_may_access() that was deleted a couple years ago. Also add comments on this barrier and the one it pairs with to explain why they're there (as far as I understand). Fixes: bfedb589252c ("mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* / treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 36Thomas Gleixner2019-05-241-5/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at your option any later version extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-or-later has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* SELinux: Remove cred security blob poisoningCasey Schaufler2019-01-081-13/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The SELinux specific credential poisioning only makes sense if SELinux is managing the credentials. As the intent of this patch set is to move the blob management out of the modules and into the infrastructure, the SELinux specific code has to go. The poisioning could be introduced into the infrastructure at some later date. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* cred: export get_task_cred().NeilBrown2018-12-191-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | There is no reason that modules should not be able to use this, and NFS will need it when converted to use 'struct cred'. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
* cred: add get_cred_rcu()NeilBrown2018-12-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Sometimes we want to opportunistically get a ref to a cred in an rcu_read_lock protected section. get_task_cred() does this, and NFS does as similar thing with its own credential structures. To prepare for NFS converting to use 'struct cred' more uniformly, define get_cred_rcu(), and use it in get_task_cred(). Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
* cred: add cred_fscmp() for comparing creds.NeilBrown2018-12-191-0/+55
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | NFS needs to compare to credentials, to see if they can be treated the same w.r.t. filesystem access. Sometimes an ordering is needed when credentials are used as a key to an rbtree. NFS currently has its own private credential management from before 'struct cred' existed. To move it over to more consistent use of 'struct cred' we need a comparison function. This patch adds that function. Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
* doc: ReSTify credentials.txtKees Cook2017-05-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to ↵Ingo Molnar2017-03-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | <linux/sched/coredump.h> We are going to split <linux/sched/coredump.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/coredump.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
* cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as()Seth Forshee2016-06-301-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Using INVALID_[UG]ID for the LSM file creation context doesn't make sense, so return an error if the inode passed to set_create_file_as() has an invalid id. Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* kmemcg: account certain kmem allocations to memcgVladimir Davydov2016-01-141-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Mark those kmem allocations that are known to be easily triggered from userspace as __GFP_ACCOUNT/SLAB_ACCOUNT, which makes them accounted to memcg. For the list, see below: - threadinfo - task_struct - task_delay_info - pid - cred - mm_struct - vm_area_struct and vm_region (nommu) - anon_vma and anon_vma_chain - signal_struct - sighand_struct - fs_struct - files_struct - fdtable and fdtable->full_fds_bits - dentry and external_name - inode for all filesystems. This is the most tedious part, because most filesystems overwrite the alloc_inode method. The list is far from complete, so feel free to add more objects. Nevertheless, it should be close to "account everything" approach and keep most workloads within bounds. Malevolent users will be able to breach the limit, but this was possible even with the former "account everything" approach (simply because it did not account everything in fact). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* kernel/cred.c: remove unnecessary kdebug atomic readsJoe Perches2015-09-101-4/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit e0e817392b9a ("CRED: Add some configurable debugging [try #6]") added the kdebug mechanism to this file back in 2009. The kdebug macro calls no_printk which always evaluates arguments. Most of the kdebug uses have an unnecessary call of atomic_read(&cred->usage) Make the kdebug macro do nothing by defining it with do { if (0) no_printk(...); } while (0) when not enabled. $ size kernel/cred.o* (defconfig x86-64) text data bss dec hex filename 2748 336 8 3092 c14 kernel/cred.o.new 2788 336 8 3132 c3c kernel/cred.o.old Miscellanea: o Neaten the #define kdebug macros while there Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* kernel: conditionally support non-root users, groups and capabilitiesIulia Manda2015-04-151-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems, supporting multiple users is not necessary. This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled under CONFIG_EXPERT menu. When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case and processes always have all capabilities. The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid, setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups, getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset. Also, groups.c is compiled out completely. In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid adding two ifdef blocks. This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much. The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work. Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS. Bloat-o-meter output: add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-12-181-1/+26
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull (again) user namespace infrastructure changes from Eric Biederman: "Those bugs, those darn embarrasing bugs just want don't want to get fixed. Linus I just updated my mirror of your kernel.org tree and it appears you successfully pulled everything except the last 4 commits that fix those embarrasing bugs. When you get a chance can you please repull my branch" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: userns: Fix typo in description of the limitation of userns_install userns: Add a more complete capability subset test to commit_creds userns: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for most uses of setns. Fix cap_capable to only allow owners in the parent user namespace to have caps.
| * userns: Add a more complete capability subset test to commit_credsEric W. Biederman2012-12-141-1/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When unsharing a user namespace we reduce our credentials to just what can be done in that user namespace. This is a subset of the credentials we previously had. Teach commit_creds to recognize this is a subset of the credentials we have had before and don't clear the dumpability flag. This allows an unprivileged program to do: unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER); fd = open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_RDWR); Where previously opening the uid_map writable would fail because the the task had been made non-dumpable. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-12-161-112/+15
|\ \ | |/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris: "A quiet cycle for the security subsystem with just a few maintenance updates." * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: Smack: create a sysfs mount point for smackfs Smack: use select not depends in Kconfig Yama: remove locking from delete path Yama: add RCU to drop read locking drivers/char/tpm: remove tasklet and cleanup KEYS: Use keyring_alloc() to create special keyrings KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-thread seccomp: Make syscall skipping and nr changes more consistent key: Fix resource leak keys: Fix unreachable code KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or update
| * KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-threadDavid Howells2012-10-021-112/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process, but still inherited from the parent thread to solve a problem with PAM and gdm. The problem is that join_session_keyring() will reject attempts to change the session keyring of a multithreaded program but gdm is now multithreaded before it gets to the point of starting PAM and running pam_keyinit to create the session keyring. See: https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=49211 The reason that join_session_keyring() will only change the session keyring under a single-threaded environment is that it's hard to alter the other thread's credentials to effect the change in a multi-threaded program. The problems are such as: (1) How to prevent two threads both running join_session_keyring() from racing. (2) Another thread's credentials may not be modified directly by this process. (3) The number of threads is uncertain whilst we're not holding the appropriate spinlock, making preallocation slightly tricky. (4) We could use TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and key_replace_session_keyring() to get another thread to replace its keyring, but that means preallocating for each thread. A reasonable way around this is to make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process and just document that if you want a common session keyring, you must get it before you spawn any threads - which is the current situation anyway. Whilst we're at it, we can the process keyring behave in the same way. This means we can clean up some of the ickyness in the creds code. Basically, after this patch, the session, process and thread keyrings are about inheritance rules only and not about sharing changes of keyring. Reported-by: Mantas M. <grawity@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
* | userns: Make credential debugging user namespace safe.Eric W. Biederman2012-08-231-2/+8
|/ | | | | | Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* keys: kill task_struct->replacement_session_keyringOleg Nesterov2012-05-231-9/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Kill the no longer used task_struct->replacement_session_keyring, update copy_creds() and exit_creds(). Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@redhat.com> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com> Cc: "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@redhat.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2012-05-231-19/+25
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman: "This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete implementation. Highlights: - Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe. - Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe. - All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial user namespace before they are processed. Removing the need to add an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared uids remains the same. - With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or better than it is today. - For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or operationally with the user namespace enabled. - The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1 billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code enabled. This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to 164ns per stat operation). - (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value. Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause entertaining failures in userspace. - If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails. I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and handle the case where setuid fails. - If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid. The LFS experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we can't map. - Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities. My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1." Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits) userns: Silence silly gcc warning. cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids. userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate. userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces. userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace. userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs ...
| * userns: Store uid and gid values in struct cred with kuid_t and kgid_t typesEric W. Biederman2012-05-031-14/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | cred.h and a few trivial users of struct cred are changed. The rest of the users of struct cred are left for other patches as there are too many changes to make in one go and leave the change reviewable. If the user namespace is disabled and CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS are disabled the code will contiue to compile and behave correctly. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
| * cred: Refcount the user_ns pointed to by the cred.Eric W. Biederman2012-04-071-5/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | struct user_struct will shortly loose it's user_ns reference so make the cred user_ns reference a proper reference complete with reference counting. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* | cred: copy_process() should clear child->replacement_session_keyringOleg Nesterov2012-04-111-0/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | keyctl_session_to_parent(task) sets ->replacement_session_keyring, it should be processed and cleared by key_replace_session_keyring(). However, this task can fork before it notices TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and the new child gets the bogus ->replacement_session_keyring copied by dup_task_struct(). This is obviously wrong and, if nothing else, this leads to put_cred(already_freed_cred). change copy_creds() to clear this member. If copy_process() fails before this point the wrong ->replacement_session_keyring doesn't matter, exit_creds() won't be called. Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* security: trim security.hAl Viro2012-02-141-0/+1
| | | | | | | Trim security.h Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* kernel: Map most files to use export.h instead of module.hPaul Gortmaker2011-10-311-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The changed files were only including linux/module.h for the EXPORT_SYMBOL infrastructure, and nothing else. Revector them onto the isolated export header for faster compile times. Nothing to see here but a whole lot of instances of: -#include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/export.h> This commit is only changing the kernel dir; next targets will probably be mm, fs, the arch dirs, etc. Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
* Merge branch 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-securityLinus Torvalds2011-10-251-2/+16
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (95 commits) TOMOYO: Fix incomplete read after seek. Smack: allow to access /smack/access as normal user TOMOYO: Fix unused kernel config option. Smack: fix: invalid length set for the result of /smack/access Smack: compilation fix Smack: fix for /smack/access output, use string instead of byte Smack: domain transition protections (v3) Smack: Provide information for UDS getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED) Smack: Clean up comments Smack: Repair processing of fcntl Smack: Rule list lookup performance Smack: check permissions from user space (v2) TOMOYO: Fix quota and garbage collector. TOMOYO: Remove redundant tasklist_lock. TOMOYO: Fix domain transition failure warning. TOMOYO: Remove tomoyo_policy_memory_lock spinlock. TOMOYO: Simplify garbage collector. TOMOYO: Fix make namespacecheck warnings. target: check hex2bin result encrypted-keys: check hex2bin result ...
| * CRED: fix build error due to 'tgcred' undeclaredAxel Lin2011-08-231-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds CONFIG_KEYS guard for tgcred to fix below build error if CONFIG_KEYS is not configured. CC kernel/cred.o kernel/cred.c: In function 'prepare_kernel_cred': kernel/cred.c:657: error: 'tgcred' undeclared (first use in this function) kernel/cred.c:657: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once kernel/cred.c:657: error: for each function it appears in.) make[1]: *** [kernel/cred.o] Error 1 make: *** [kernel] Error 2 Signed-off-by: Axel Lin <axel.lin@gmail.com> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-27 01:11:40 +0000