| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Allow transferring an imbalanced RCU lock state between subprog calls
during verification. This allows patterns where a subprog call returns
with an RCU lock held, or a subprog call releases an RCU lock held by
the caller. Currently, the verifier would end up complaining if the RCU
lock is not released when processing an exit from a subprog, which is
non-ideal if its execution is supposed to be enclosed in an RCU read
section of the caller.
Instead, simply only check whether we are processing exit for frame#0
and do not complain on an active RCU lock otherwise. We only need to
update the check when processing BPF_EXIT insn, as copy_verifier_state
is already set up to do the right thing.
Suggested-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Tested-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240205055646.1112186-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Currently, calling any helpers, kfuncs, or subprogs except the graph
data structure (lists, rbtrees) API kfuncs while holding a bpf_spin_lock
is not allowed. One of the original motivations of this decision was to
force the BPF programmer's hand into keeping the bpf_spin_lock critical
section small, and to ensure the execution time of the program does not
increase due to lock waiting times. In addition to this, some of the
helpers and kfuncs may be unsafe to call while holding a bpf_spin_lock.
However, when it comes to subprog calls, atleast for static subprogs,
the verifier is able to explore their instructions during verification.
Therefore, it is similar in effect to having the same code inlined into
the critical section. Hence, not allowing static subprog calls in the
bpf_spin_lock critical section is mostly an annoyance that needs to be
worked around, without providing any tangible benefit.
Unlike static subprog calls, global subprog calls are not safe to permit
within the critical section, as the verifier does not explore them
during verification, therefore whether the same lock will be taken
again, or unlocked, cannot be ascertained.
Therefore, allow calling static subprogs within a bpf_spin_lock critical
section, and only reject it in case the subprog linkage is global.
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240204222349.938118-2-memxor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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The "i" here is always equal to "btf_type_vlen(t)" since
the "for_each_member()" loop never breaks.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240203055119.2235598-1-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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When btf_prepare_func_args() was generalized to handle both static and
global subprogs, a few warnings/errors that are meant only for global
subprog cases started to be emitted for static subprogs, where they are
sort of expected and irrelavant.
Stop polutting verifier logs with irrelevant scary-looking messages.
Fixes: e26080d0da87 ("bpf: prepare btf_prepare_func_args() for handling static subprogs")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202190529.2374377-4-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Add PTR_TRUSTED | PTR_MAYBE_NULL modifiers for PTR_TO_BTF_ID to
check_reg_type() to support passing trusted nullable PTR_TO_BTF_ID
registers into global functions accepting `__arg_trusted __arg_nullable`
arguments. This hasn't been caught earlier because tests were either
passing known non-NULL PTR_TO_BTF_ID registers or known NULL (SCALAR)
registers.
When utilizing this functionality in complicated real-world BPF
application that passes around PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL, it became apparent
that verifier rejects valid case because check_reg_type() doesn't handle
this case explicitly. Existing check_reg_type() logic is already
anticipating this combination, so we just need to explicitly list this
combo in the switch statement.
Fixes: e2b3c4ff5d18 ("bpf: add __arg_trusted global func arg tag")
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240202190529.2374377-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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When check_stack_read_fixed_off() reads value from an spi
all stack slots of which are set to STACK_{MISC,INVALID},
the destination register is set to unbound SCALAR_VALUE.
Exploit this fact by allowing stacksafe() to use a fake
unbound scalar register to compare 'mmmm mmmm' stack value
in old state vs spilled 64-bit scalar in current state
and vice versa.
Veristat results after this patch show some gains:
./veristat -C -e file,prog,states -f 'states_pct>10' not-opt after
File Program States (DIFF)
----------------------- --------------------- ---------------
bpf_overlay.o tail_rev_nodeport_lb4 -45 (-15.85%)
bpf_xdp.o tail_lb_ipv4 -541 (-19.57%)
pyperf100.bpf.o on_event -680 (-10.42%)
pyperf180.bpf.o on_event -2164 (-19.62%)
pyperf600.bpf.o on_event -9799 (-24.84%)
strobemeta.bpf.o on_event -9157 (-65.28%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_tc -54 (-19.29%)
xdp_synproxy_kern.bpf.o syncookie_xdp -74 (-24.50%)
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240127175237.526726-6-maxtram95@gmail.com
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When the width of a fill is smaller than the width of the preceding
spill, the information about scalar boundaries can still be preserved,
as long as it's coerced to the right width (done by coerce_reg_to_size).
Even further, if the actual value fits into the fill width, the ID can
be preserved as well for further tracking of equal scalars.
Implement the above improvements, which makes narrowing fills behave the
same as narrowing spills and MOVs between registers.
Two tests are adjusted to accommodate for endianness differences and to
take into account that it's now allowed to do a narrowing fill from the
least significant bits.
reg_bounds_sync is added to coerce_reg_to_size to correctly adjust
umin/umax boundaries after the var_off truncation, for example, a 64-bit
value 0xXXXXXXXX00000000, when read as a 32-bit, gets umin = 0, umax =
0xFFFFFFFF, var_off = (0x0; 0xffffffff00000000), which needs to be
synced down to umax = 0, otherwise reg_bounds_sanity_check doesn't pass.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxim@isovalent.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240127175237.526726-4-maxtram95@gmail.com
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Support the pattern where an unbounded scalar is spilled to the stack,
then boundary checks are performed on the src register, after which the
stack frame slot is refilled into a register.
Before this commit, the verifier didn't treat the src register and the
stack slot as related if the src register was an unbounded scalar. The
register state wasn't copied, the id wasn't preserved, and the stack
slot was marked as STACK_MISC. Subsequent boundary checks on the src
register wouldn't result in updating the boundaries of the spilled
variable on the stack.
After this commit, the verifier will preserve the bond between src and
dst even if src is unbounded, which permits to do boundary checks on src
and refill dst later, still remembering its boundaries. Such a pattern
is sometimes generated by clang when compiling complex long functions.
One test is adjusted to reflect that now unbounded scalars are tracked.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maxim@isovalent.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240127175237.526726-2-maxtram95@gmail.com
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There's already one main CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK ifdef block within
the sleepable_lsm_hooks BTF set. Consolidate this duplicated ifdef
block as there's no need for it and all things guarded by it should
remain in one place in this specific context.
Signed-off-by: Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/Zbt1smz43GDMbVU3@google.com
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This commit marks kfuncs as such inside the .BTF_ids section. The upshot
of these annotations is that we'll be able to automatically generate
kfunc prototypes for downstream users. The process is as follows:
1. In source, use BTF_KFUNCS_START/END macro pair to mark kfuncs
2. During build, pahole injects into BTF a "bpf_kfunc" BTF_DECL_TAG for
each function inside BTF_KFUNCS sets
3. At runtime, vmlinux or module BTF is made available in sysfs
4. At runtime, bpftool (or similar) can look at provided BTF and
generate appropriate prototypes for functions with "bpf_kfunc" tag
To ensure future kfunc are similarly tagged, we now also return error
inside kfunc registration for untagged kfuncs. For vmlinux kfuncs,
we also WARN(), as initcall machinery does not handle errors.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Xu <dxu@dxuuu.xyz>
Acked-by: Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/e55150ceecbf0a5d961e608941165c0bee7bc943.1706491398.git.dxu@dxuuu.xyz
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Add ability to mark arg:trusted arguments with optional arg:nullable
tag to mark it as PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL variant, which will allow
callers to pass NULL, and subsequently will force global subprog's code
to do NULL check. This allows to have "optional" PTR_TO_BTF_ID values
passed into global subprogs.
For now arg:nullable cannot be combined with anything else.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240130000648.2144827-3-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Add support for passing PTR_TO_BTF_ID registers to global subprogs.
Currently only PTR_TRUSTED flavor of PTR_TO_BTF_ID is supported.
Non-NULL semantics is assumed, so caller will be forced to prove
PTR_TO_BTF_ID can't be NULL.
Note, we disallow global subprogs to destroy passed in PTR_TO_BTF_ID
arguments, even the trusted one. We achieve that by not setting
ref_obj_id when validating subprog code. This basically enforces (in
Rust terms) borrowing semantics vs move semantics. Borrowing semantics
seems to be a better fit for isolated global subprog validation
approach.
Implementation-wise, we utilize existing logic for matching
user-provided BTF type to kernel-side BTF type, used by BPF CO-RE logic
and following same matching rules. We enforce a unique match for types.
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240130000648.2144827-2-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Replace the '(1ULL << *)' with the macro BIT_ULL(nr).
Signed-off-by: Haiyue Wang <haiyue.wang@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240127134901.3698613-1-haiyue.wang@intel.com
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Remove the duplicate check on type and unify result.
Signed-off-by: Florian Lehner <dev@der-flo.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240120150920.3370-1-dev@der-flo.net
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Now that bpf and bpf-next trees converged and we don't run the risk of
merge conflicts, move btf_validate_prog_ctx_type() into its most logical
place inside the main logic loop.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240125205510.3642094-4-andrii@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.
Conflicts:
net/ipv4/udp.c
f796feabb9f5 ("udp: add local "peek offset enabled" flag")
56667da7399e ("net: implement lockless setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF)")
Adjacent changes:
net/unix/garbage.c
aa82ac51d633 ("af_unix: Drop oob_skb ref before purging queue in GC.")
11498715f266 ("af_unix: Remove io_uring code for GC.")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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The debug.config file is really great to easily enable a bunch of
general debugging features on a CI-like setup. But it would be great to
also include core networking debugging config.
A few CI's validating features from the Net tree also enable a few other
debugging options on top of debug.config. A small selection is quite
generic for the whole net tree. They validate some assumptions in
different parts of the core net tree. As suggested by Jakub Kicinski in
[1], having them added to this debug.config file would help other CIs
using network features to find bugs in this area.
Note that the two REFCNT configs also select REF_TRACKER, which doesn't
seem to be an issue.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240202093148.33bd2b14@kernel.org/T/ [1]
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240212-kconfig-debug-enable-net-v1-1-fb026de8174c@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.
No conflicts.
Adjacent changes:
net/core/dev.c
9f30831390ed ("net: add rcu safety to rtnl_prop_list_size()")
723de3ebef03 ("net: free altname using an RCU callback")
net/unix/garbage.c
11498715f266 ("af_unix: Remove io_uring code for GC.")
25236c91b5ab ("af_unix: Fix task hung while purging oob_skb in GC.")
drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c
ed4adc07207d ("net: ravb: Count packets instead of descriptors in GbEth RX path"
)
c2da9408579d ("ravb: Add Rx checksum offload support for GbEth")
net/mptcp/protocol.c
bdd70eb68913 ("mptcp: drop the push_pending field")
28e5c1380506 ("mptcp: annotate lockless accesses around read-mostly fields")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.
No conflicts.
Adjacent changes:
drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/common.h
38cc3c6dcc09 ("net: stmmac: protect updates of 64-bit statistics counters")
fd5a6a71313e ("net: stmmac: est: Per Tx-queue error count for HLBF")
c5c3e1bfc9e0 ("net: stmmac: Offload queueMaxSDU from tc-taprio")
drivers/net/wireless/microchip/wilc1000/netdev.c
c9013880284d ("wifi: fill in MODULE_DESCRIPTION()s for wilc1000")
328efda22af8 ("wifi: wilc1000: do not realloc workqueue everytime an interface is added")
net/unix/garbage.c
11498715f266 ("af_unix: Remove io_uring code for GC.")
1279f9d9dec2 ("af_unix: Call kfree_skb() for dead unix_(sk)->oob_skb in GC.")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.
No conflicts or adjacent changes.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next
Daniel Borkmann says:
====================
pull-request: bpf-next 2024-01-26
We've added 107 non-merge commits during the last 4 day(s) which contain
a total of 101 files changed, 6009 insertions(+), 1260 deletions(-).
The main changes are:
1) Add BPF token support to delegate a subset of BPF subsystem
functionality from privileged system-wide daemons such as systemd
through special mount options for userns-bound BPF fs to a trusted
& unprivileged application. With addressed changes from Christian
and Linus' reviews, from Andrii Nakryiko.
2) Support registration of struct_ops types from modules which helps
projects like fuse-bpf that seeks to implement a new struct_ops type,
from Kui-Feng Lee.
3) Add support for retrieval of cookies for perf/kprobe multi links,
from Jiri Olsa.
4) Bigger batch of prep-work for the BPF verifier to eventually support
preserving boundaries and tracking scalars on narrowing fills,
from Maxim Mikityanskiy.
5) Extend the tc BPF flavor to support arbitrary TCP SYN cookies to help
with the scenario of SYN floods, from Kuniyuki Iwashima.
6) Add code generation to inline the bpf_kptr_xchg() helper which
improves performance when stashing/popping the allocated BPF objects,
from Hou Tao.
7) Extend BPF verifier to track aligned ST stores as imprecise spilled
registers, from Yonghong Song.
8) Several fixes to BPF selftests around inline asm constraints and
unsupported VLA code generation, from Jose E. Marchesi.
9) Various updates to the BPF IETF instruction set draft document such
as the introduction of conformance groups for instructions,
from Dave Thaler.
10) Fix BPF verifier to make infinite loop detection in is_state_visited()
exact to catch some too lax spill/fill corner cases,
from Eduard Zingerman.
11) Refactor the BPF verifier pointer ALU check to allow ALU explicitly
instead of implicitly for various register types, from Hao Sun.
12) Fix the flaky tc_redirect_dtime BPF selftest due to slowness
in neighbor advertisement at setup time, from Martin KaFai Lau.
13) Change BPF selftests to skip callback tests for the case when the
JIT is disabled, from Tiezhu Yang.
14) Add a small extension to libbpf which allows to auto create
a map-in-map's inner map, from Andrey Grafin.
* tag 'for-netdev' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf-next: (107 commits)
selftests/bpf: Add missing line break in test_verifier
bpf, docs: Clarify definitions of various instructions
bpf: Fix error checks against bpf_get_btf_vmlinux().
bpf: One more maintainer for libbpf and BPF selftests
selftests/bpf: Incorporate LSM policy to token-based tests
selftests/bpf: Add tests for LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar
libbpf: Support BPF token path setting through LIBBPF_BPF_TOKEN_PATH envvar
selftests/bpf: Add tests for BPF object load with implicit token
selftests/bpf: Add BPF object loading tests with explicit token passing
libbpf: Wire up BPF token support at BPF object level
libbpf: Wire up token_fd into feature probing logic
libbpf: Move feature detection code into its own file
libbpf: Further decouple feature checking logic from bpf_object
libbpf: Split feature detectors definitions from cached results
selftests/bpf: Utilize string values for delegate_xxx mount options
bpf: Support symbolic BPF FS delegation mount options
bpf: Fail BPF_TOKEN_CREATE if no delegation option was set on BPF FS
bpf,selinux: Allocate bpf_security_struct per BPF token
selftests/bpf: Add BPF token-enabled tests
libbpf: Add BPF token support to bpf_prog_load() API
...
====================
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126215710.19855-1-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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In bpf_struct_ops_map_alloc, it needs to check for NULL in the returned
pointer of bpf_get_btf_vmlinux() when CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF is not set.
ENOTSUPP is used to preserve the same behavior before the
struct_ops kmod support.
In the function check_struct_ops_btf_id(), instead of redoing the
bpf_get_btf_vmlinux() that has already been done in syscall.c, the fix
here is to check for prog->aux->attach_btf_id.
BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS must require attach_btf_id and syscall.c
guarantees a valid attach_btf as long as attach_btf_id is set.
When attach_btf_id is not set, this patch returns -ENOTSUPP
because it is what the selftest in test_libbpf_probe_prog_types()
and libbpf_probes.c are expecting for feature probing purpose.
Changes from v1:
- Remove an unnecessary NULL check in check_struct_ops_btf_id()
Reported-by: syzbot+88f0aafe5f950d7489d7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/00000000000040d68a060fc8db8c@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+1336f3d4b10bcda75b89@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/00000000000026353b060fc21c07@google.com/
Fixes: fcc2c1fb0651 ("bpf: pass attached BTF to the bpf_struct_ops subsystem")
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240126023113.1379504-1-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Besides already supported special "any" value and hex bit mask, support
string-based parsing of delegation masks based on exact enumerator
names. Utilize BTF information of `enum bpf_cmd`, `enum bpf_map_type`,
`enum bpf_prog_type`, and `enum bpf_attach_type` types to find supported
symbolic names (ignoring __MAX_xxx guard values and stripping repetitive
prefixes like BPF_ for cmd and attach types, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ for maps, and
BPF_PROG_TYPE_ for prog types). The case doesn't matter, but it is
normalized to lower case in mount option output. So "PROG_LOAD",
"prog_load", and "MAP_create" are all valid values to specify for
delegate_cmds options, "array" is among supported for map types, etc.
Besides supporting string values, we also support multiple values
specified at the same time, using colon (':') separator.
There are corresponding changes on bpf_show_options side to use known
values to print them in human-readable format, falling back to hex mask
printing, if there are any unrecognized bits. This shouldn't be
necessary when enum BTF information is present, but in general we should
always be able to fall back to this even if kernel was built without BTF.
As mentioned, emitted symbolic names are normalized to be all lower case.
Example below shows various ways to specify delegate_cmds options
through mount command and how mount options are printed back:
12/14 14:39:07.604
vmuser@archvm:~/local/linux/tools/testing/selftests/bpf
$ mount | rg token
$ sudo mkdir -p /sys/fs/bpf/token
$ sudo mount -t bpf bpffs /sys/fs/bpf/token \
-o delegate_cmds=prog_load:MAP_CREATE \
-o delegate_progs=kprobe \
-o delegate_attachs=xdp
$ mount | grep token
bpffs on /sys/fs/bpf/token type bpf (rw,relatime,delegate_cmds=map_create:prog_load,delegate_progs=kprobe,delegate_attachs=xdp)
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-20-andrii@kernel.org
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It's quite confusing in practice when it's possible to successfully
create a BPF token from BPF FS that didn't have any of delegate_xxx
mount options set up. While it's not wrong, it's actually more
meaningful to reject BPF_TOKEN_CREATE with specific error code (-ENOENT)
to let user-space know that no token delegation is setup up.
So, instead of creating empty BPF token that will be always ignored
because it doesn't have any of the allow_xxx bits set, reject it with
-ENOENT. If we ever need empty BPF token to be possible, we can support
that with extra flag passed into BPF_TOKEN_CREATE.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Acked-by: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-19-andrii@kernel.org
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Wire up bpf_token_create and bpf_token_free LSM hooks, which allow to
allocate LSM security blob (we add `void *security` field to struct
bpf_token for that), but also control who can instantiate BPF token.
This follows existing pattern for BPF map and BPF prog.
Also add security_bpf_token_allow_cmd() and security_bpf_token_capable()
LSM hooks that allow LSM implementation to control and negate (if
necessary) BPF token's delegation of a specific bpf_cmd and capability,
respectively.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-12-andrii@kernel.org
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Similarly to bpf_prog_alloc LSM hook, rename and extend bpf_map_alloc
hook into bpf_map_create, taking not just struct bpf_map, but also
bpf_attr and bpf_token, to give a fuller context to LSMs.
Unlike bpf_prog_alloc, there is no need to move the hook around, as it
currently is firing right before allocating BPF map ID and FD, which
seems to be a sweet spot.
But like bpf_prog_alloc/bpf_prog_free combo, make sure that bpf_map_free
LSM hook is called even if bpf_map_create hook returned error, as if few
LSMs are combined together it could be that one LSM successfully
allocated security blob for its needs, while subsequent LSM rejected BPF
map creation. The former LSM would still need to free up LSM blob, so we
need to ensure security_bpf_map_free() is called regardless of the
outcome.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-11-andrii@kernel.org
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Based on upstream discussion ([0]), rework existing
bpf_prog_alloc_security LSM hook. Rename it to bpf_prog_load and instead
of passing bpf_prog_aux, pass proper bpf_prog pointer for a full BPF
program struct. Also, we pass bpf_attr union with all the user-provided
arguments for BPF_PROG_LOAD command. This will give LSMs as much
information as we can basically provide.
The hook is also BPF token-aware now, and optional bpf_token struct is
passed as a third argument. bpf_prog_load LSM hook is called after
a bunch of sanity checks were performed, bpf_prog and bpf_prog_aux were
allocated and filled out, but right before performing full-fledged BPF
verification step.
bpf_prog_free LSM hook is now accepting struct bpf_prog argument, for
consistency. SELinux code is adjusted to all new names, types, and
signatures.
Note, given that bpf_prog_load (previously bpf_prog_alloc) hook can be
used by some LSMs to allocate extra security blob, but also by other
LSMs to reject BPF program loading, we need to make sure that
bpf_prog_free LSM hook is called after bpf_prog_load/bpf_prog_alloc one
*even* if the hook itself returned error. If we don't do that, we run
the risk of leaking memory. This seems to be possible today when
combining SELinux and BPF LSM, as one example, depending on their
relative ordering.
Also, for BPF LSM setup, add bpf_prog_load and bpf_prog_free to
sleepable LSM hooks list, as they are both executed in sleepable
context. Also drop bpf_prog_load hook from untrusted, as there is no
issue with refcount or anything else anymore, that originally forced us
to add it to untrusted list in c0c852dd1876 ("bpf: Do not mark certain LSM
hook arguments as trusted"). We now trigger this hook much later and it
should not be an issue anymore.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/9fe88aef7deabbe87d3fc38c4aea3c69.paul@paul-moore.com/
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-10-andrii@kernel.org
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Remove remaining direct queries to perfmon_capable() and bpf_capable()
in BPF verifier logic and instead use BPF token (if available) to make
decisions about privileges.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-9-andrii@kernel.org
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Instead of performing unconditional system-wide bpf_capable() and
perfmon_capable() calls inside bpf_base_func_proto() function (and other
similar ones) to determine eligibility of a given BPF helper for a given
program, use previously recorded BPF token during BPF_PROG_LOAD command
handling to inform the decision.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-8-andrii@kernel.org
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Add basic support of BPF token to BPF_PROG_LOAD. BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag
should be set in prog_flags field when providing prog_token_fd.
Wire through a set of allowed BPF program types and attach types,
derived from BPF FS at BPF token creation time. Then make sure we
perform bpf_token_capable() checks everywhere where it's relevant.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-7-andrii@kernel.org
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Accept BPF token FD in BPF_BTF_LOAD command to allow BTF data loading
through delegated BPF token. BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag has to be specified
when passing BPF token FD. Given BPF_BTF_LOAD command didn't have flags
field before, we also add btf_flags field.
BTF loading is a pretty straightforward operation, so as long as BPF
token is created with allow_cmds granting BPF_BTF_LOAD command, kernel
proceeds to parsing BTF data and creating BTF object.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-6-andrii@kernel.org
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Allow providing token_fd for BPF_MAP_CREATE command to allow controlled
BPF map creation from unprivileged process through delegated BPF token.
New BPF_F_TOKEN_FD flag is added to specify together with BPF token FD
for BPF_MAP_CREATE command.
Wire through a set of allowed BPF map types to BPF token, derived from
BPF FS at BPF token creation time. This, in combination with allowed_cmds
allows to create a narrowly-focused BPF token (controlled by privileged
agent) with a restrictive set of BPF maps that application can attempt
to create.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-5-andrii@kernel.org
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Add new kind of BPF kernel object, BPF token. BPF token is meant to
allow delegating privileged BPF functionality, like loading a BPF
program or creating a BPF map, from privileged process to a *trusted*
unprivileged process, all while having a good amount of control over which
privileged operations could be performed using provided BPF token.
This is achieved through mounting BPF FS instance with extra delegation
mount options, which determine what operations are delegatable, and also
constraining it to the owning user namespace (as mentioned in the
previous patch).
BPF token itself is just a derivative from BPF FS and can be created
through a new bpf() syscall command, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE, which accepts BPF
FS FD, which can be attained through open() API by opening BPF FS mount
point. Currently, BPF token "inherits" delegated command, map types,
prog type, and attach type bit sets from BPF FS as is. In the future,
having an BPF token as a separate object with its own FD, we can allow
to further restrict BPF token's allowable set of things either at the
creation time or after the fact, allowing the process to guard itself
further from unintentionally trying to load undesired kind of BPF
programs. But for now we keep things simple and just copy bit sets as is.
When BPF token is created from BPF FS mount, we take reference to the
BPF super block's owning user namespace, and then use that namespace for
checking all the {CAP_BPF, CAP_PERFMON, CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_SYS_ADMIN}
capabilities that are normally only checked against init userns (using
capable()), but now we check them using ns_capable() instead (if BPF
token is provided). See bpf_token_capable() for details.
Such setup means that BPF token in itself is not sufficient to grant BPF
functionality. User namespaced process has to *also* have necessary
combination of capabilities inside that user namespace. So while
previously CAP_BPF was useless when granted within user namespace, now
it gains a meaning and allows container managers and sys admins to have
a flexible control over which processes can and need to use BPF
functionality within the user namespace (i.e., container in practice).
And BPF FS delegation mount options and derived BPF tokens serve as
a per-container "flag" to grant overall ability to use bpf() (plus further
restrict on which parts of bpf() syscalls are treated as namespaced).
Note also, BPF_TOKEN_CREATE command itself requires ns_capable(CAP_BPF)
within the BPF FS owning user namespace, rounding up the ns_capable()
story of BPF token. Also creating BPF token in init user namespace is
currently not supported, given BPF token doesn't have any effect in init
user namespace anyways.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-4-andrii@kernel.org
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Add few new mount options to BPF FS that allow to specify that a given
BPF FS instance allows creation of BPF token (added in the next patch),
and what sort of operations are allowed under BPF token. As such, we get
4 new mount options, each is a bit mask
- `delegate_cmds` allow to specify which bpf() syscall commands are
allowed with BPF token derived from this BPF FS instance;
- if BPF_MAP_CREATE command is allowed, `delegate_maps` specifies
a set of allowable BPF map types that could be created with BPF token;
- if BPF_PROG_LOAD command is allowed, `delegate_progs` specifies
a set of allowable BPF program types that could be loaded with BPF token;
- if BPF_PROG_LOAD command is allowed, `delegate_attachs` specifies
a set of allowable BPF program attach types that could be loaded with
BPF token; delegate_progs and delegate_attachs are meant to be used
together, as full BPF program type is, in general, determined
through both program type and program attach type.
Currently, these mount options accept the following forms of values:
- a special value "any", that enables all possible values of a given
bit set;
- numeric value (decimal or hexadecimal, determined by kernel
automatically) that specifies a bit mask value directly;
- all the values for a given mount option are combined, if specified
multiple times. E.g., `mount -t bpf nodev /path/to/mount -o
delegate_maps=0x1 -o delegate_maps=0x2` will result in a combined 0x3
mask.
Ideally, more convenient (for humans) symbolic form derived from
corresponding UAPI enums would be accepted (e.g., `-o
delegate_progs=kprobe|tracepoint`) and I intend to implement this, but
it requires a bunch of UAPI header churn, so I postponed it until this
feature lands upstream or at least there is a definite consensus that
this feature is acceptable and is going to make it, just to minimize
amount of wasted effort and not increase amount of non-essential code to
be reviewed.
Attentive reader will notice that BPF FS is now marked as
FS_USERNS_MOUNT, which theoretically makes it mountable inside non-init
user namespace as long as the process has sufficient *namespaced*
capabilities within that user namespace. But in reality we still
restrict BPF FS to be mountable only by processes with CAP_SYS_ADMIN *in
init userns* (extra check in bpf_fill_super()). FS_USERNS_MOUNT is added
to allow creating BPF FS context object (i.e., fsopen("bpf")) from
inside unprivileged process inside non-init userns, to capture that
userns as the owning userns. It will still be required to pass this
context object back to privileged process to instantiate and mount it.
This manipulation is important, because capturing non-init userns as the
owning userns of BPF FS instance (super block) allows to use that userns
to constraint BPF token to that userns later on (see next patch). So
creating BPF FS with delegation inside unprivileged userns will restrict
derived BPF token objects to only "work" inside that intended userns,
making it scoped to a intended "container". Also, setting these
delegation options requires capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN), so unprivileged
process cannot set this up without involvement of a privileged process.
There is a set of selftests at the end of the patch set that simulates
this sequence of steps and validates that everything works as intended.
But careful review is requested to make sure there are no missed gaps in
the implementation and testing.
This somewhat subtle set of aspects is the result of previous
discussions ([0]) about various user namespace implications and
interactions with BPF token functionality and is necessary to contain
BPF token inside intended user namespace.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20230704-hochverdient-lehne-eeb9eeef785e@brauner/
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-3-andrii@kernel.org
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Within BPF syscall handling code CAP_NET_ADMIN checks stand out a bit
compared to CAP_BPF and CAP_PERFMON checks. For the latter, CAP_BPF or
CAP_PERFMON are checked first, but if they are not set, CAP_SYS_ADMIN
takes over and grants whatever part of BPF syscall is required.
Similar kind of checks that involve CAP_NET_ADMIN are not so consistent.
One out of four uses does follow CAP_BPF/CAP_PERFMON model: during
BPF_PROG_LOAD, if the type of BPF program is "network-related" either
CAP_NET_ADMIN or CAP_SYS_ADMIN is required to proceed.
But in three other cases CAP_NET_ADMIN is required even if CAP_SYS_ADMIN
is set:
- when creating DEVMAP/XDKMAP/CPU_MAP maps;
- when attaching CGROUP_SKB programs;
- when handling BPF_PROG_QUERY command.
This patch is changing the latter three cases to follow BPF_PROG_LOAD
model, that is allowing to proceed under either CAP_NET_ADMIN or
CAP_SYS_ADMIN.
This also makes it cleaner in subsequent BPF token patches to switch
wholesomely to a generic bpf_token_capable(int cap) check, that always
falls back to CAP_SYS_ADMIN if requested capability is missing.
Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240124022127.2379740-2-andrii@kernel.org
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The module requires the use of btf_ctx_access() to invoke
bpf_tracing_btf_ctx_access() from a module. This function is valuable for
implementing validation functions that ensure proper access to ctx.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-14-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Replace the static list of struct_ops types with per-btf struct_ops_tab to
enable dynamic registration.
Both bpf_dummy_ops and bpf_tcp_ca now utilize the registration function
instead of being listed in bpf_struct_ops_types.h.
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-12-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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A value_type should consist of three components: refcnt, state, and data.
refcnt and state has been move to struct bpf_struct_ops_common_value to
make it easier to check the value type.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-11-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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To ensure that a module remains accessible whenever a struct_ops object of
a struct_ops type provided by the module is still in use.
struct bpf_struct_ops_map doesn't hold a refcnt to btf anymore since a
module will hold a refcnt to it's btf already. But, struct_ops programs are
different. They hold their associated btf, not the module since they need
only btf to assure their types (signatures).
However, verifier holds the refcnt of the associated module of a struct_ops
type temporarily when verify a struct_ops prog. Verifier needs the help
from the verifier operators (struct bpf_verifier_ops) provided by the owner
module to verify data access of a prog, provide information, and generate
code.
This patch also add a count of links (links_cnt) to bpf_struct_ops_map. It
avoids bpf_struct_ops_map_put_progs() from accessing btf after calling
module_put() in bpf_struct_ops_map_free().
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-10-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Pass the fd of a btf from the userspace to the bpf() syscall, and then
convert the fd into a btf. The btf is generated from the module that
defines the target BPF struct_ops type.
In order to inform the kernel about the module that defines the target
struct_ops type, the userspace program needs to provide a btf fd for the
respective module's btf. This btf contains essential information on the
types defined within the module, including the target struct_ops type.
A btf fd must be provided to the kernel for struct_ops maps and for the bpf
programs attached to those maps.
In the case of the bpf programs, the attach_btf_obj_fd parameter is passed
as part of the bpf_attr and is converted into a btf. This btf is then
stored in the prog->aux->attach_btf field. Here, it just let the verifier
access attach_btf directly.
In the case of struct_ops maps, a btf fd is passed as value_type_btf_obj_fd
of bpf_attr. The bpf_struct_ops_map_alloc() function converts the fd to a
btf and stores it as st_map->btf. A flag BPF_F_VTYPE_BTF_OBJ_FD is added
for map_flags to indicate that the value of value_type_btf_obj_fd is set.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-9-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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This is a preparation for searching for struct_ops types from a specified
module. BTF is always btf_vmlinux now. This patch passes a pointer of BTF
to bpf_struct_ops_find_value() and bpf_struct_ops_find(). Once the new
registration API of struct_ops types is used, other BTFs besides
btf_vmlinux can also be passed to them.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-8-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Include btf object id (btf_obj_id) in bpf_map_info so that tools (ex:
bpftools struct_ops dump) know the correct btf from the kernel to look up
type information of struct_ops types.
Since struct_ops types can be defined and registered in a module. The
type information of a struct_ops type are defined in the btf of the
module defining it. The userspace tools need to know which btf is for
the module defining a struct_ops type.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-7-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Once new struct_ops can be registered from modules, btf_vmlinux is no
longer the only btf that struct_ops_map would face. st_map should remember
what btf it should use to get type information.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-6-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Maintain a registry of registered struct_ops types in the per-btf (module)
struct_ops_tab. This registry allows for easy lookup of struct_ops types
that are registered by a specific module.
It is a preparation work for supporting kernel module struct_ops in a
latter patch. Each struct_ops will be registered under its own kernel
module btf and will be stored in the newly added btf->struct_ops_tab. The
bpf verifier and bpf syscall (e.g. prog and map cmd) can find the
struct_ops and its btf type/size/id... information from
btf->struct_ops_tab.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-5-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Move some of members of bpf_struct_ops to bpf_struct_ops_desc. type_id is
unavailabe in bpf_struct_ops anymore. Modules should get it from the btf
received by kmod's init function.
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-4-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Get ready to remove bpf_struct_ops_init() in the future. By using
BTF_ID_LIST, it is possible to gather type information while building
instead of runtime.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-3-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Move the majority of the code to bpf_struct_ops_init_one(), which can then
be utilized for the initialization of newly registered dynamically
allocated struct_ops types in the following patches.
Signed-off-by: Kui-Feng Lee <thinker.li@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119225005.668602-2-thinker.li@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
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Storing cookies in kprobe_multi bpf_link_info data. The cookies
field is optional and if provided it needs to be an array of
__u64 with kprobe_multi.count length.
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119110505.400573-3-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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At the moment we don't store cookie for perf_event probes,
while we do that for the rest of the probes.
Adding cookie fields to struct bpf_link_info perf event
probe records:
perf_event.uprobe
perf_event.kprobe
perf_event.tracepoint
perf_event.perf_event
And the code to store that in bpf_link_info struct.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240119110505.400573-2-jolsa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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Current checking rules are structured to disallow alu on particular ptr
types explicitly, so default cases are allowed implicitly. This may lead
to newly added ptr types being allowed unexpectedly. So restruture it to
allow alu explicitly. The tradeoff is mainly a bit more cases added in
the switch. The following table from Eduard summarizes the rules:
| Pointer type | Arithmetics allowed |
|---------------------+---------------------|
| PTR_TO_CTX | yes |
| CONST_PTR_TO_MAP | conditionally |
| PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | yes |
| PTR_TO_MAP_KEY | yes |
| PTR_TO_STACK | yes |
| PTR_TO_PACKET_META | yes |
| PTR_TO_PACKET | yes |
| PTR_TO_PACKET_END | no |
| PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS | conditionally |
| PTR_TO_SOCKET | no |
| PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON | no |
| PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK | no |
| PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER | yes |
| PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK | no |
| PTR_TO_BTF_ID | yes |
| PTR_TO_MEM | yes |
| PTR_TO_BUF | yes |
| PTR_TO_FUNC | yes |
| CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | yes |
The refactored rules are equivalent to the original one. Note that
PTR_TO_FUNC and CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR are not reject here because: (1)
check_mem_access() rejects load/store on those ptrs, and those ptrs
with offset passing to calls are rejected check_func_arg_reg_off();
(2) someone may rely on the verifier not rejecting programs earily.
Signed-off-by: Hao Sun <sunhao.th@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240117094012.36798-1-sunhao.th@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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