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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx
Pull SPDX updates from Greg KH:
"Here are some SPDX license marker changes.
The SPDX-labeling effort has started to pick up again, so here are
some changes for various parts of the tree that are related to this
effort.
Included in here are:
- freevxfs license updates
- spihash.c license cleanups
- spdxcheck script updates to make things easier to work with going
forward
All of the license updates came from the original authors/copyright
holders of the code involved.
All of these have been in linux-next for weeks with no reported
issues"
* tag 'spdx-5.19-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/spdx:
siphash: add SPDX tags as sole licensing authority
scripts/spdxcheck: Exclude top-level README
scripts/spdxcheck: Exclude MAINTAINERS/CREDITS
scripts/spdxcheck: Exclude config directories
scripts/spdxcheck: Put excluded files and directories into a separate file
scripts/spdxcheck: Add option to display files without SPDX
scripts/spdxcheck: Add [sub]directory statistics
scripts/spdxcheck: Add directory statistics
scripts/spdxcheck: Add percentage to statistics
freevxfs: relicense to GPLv2 only
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The text "dual BSD/GPLv2 license" is somewhat ambiguous, and moving this
over to SPDX is overdue. This commit adds SPDX tags to the relevant
files and clarifies that it's GPLv2 only and 3-clause BSD. It also
removes the old text, so that the SPDX tags are the only source of the
information.
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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The SipHash family of permutations is currently used in three places:
- siphash.c itself, used in the ordinary way it was intended.
- random32.c, in a construction from an anonymous contributor.
- random.c, as part of its fast_mix function.
Each one of these places reinvents the wheel with the same C code, same
rotation constants, and same symmetry-breaking constants.
This commit tidies things up a bit by placing macros for the
permutations and constants into siphash.h, where each of the three .c
users can access them. It also leaves a note dissuading more users of
them from emerging.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
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On ARM v6 and later, we define CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS
because the ordinary load/store instructions (ldr, ldrh, ldrb) can
tolerate any misalignment of the memory address. However, load/store
double and load/store multiple instructions (ldrd, ldm) may still only
be used on memory addresses that are 32-bit aligned, and so we have to
use the CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS macro with care, or we
may end up with a severe performance hit due to alignment traps that
require fixups by the kernel. Testing shows that this currently happens
with clang-13 but not gcc-11. In theory, any compiler version can
produce this bug or other problems, as we are dealing with undefined
behavior in C99 even on architectures that support this in hardware,
see also https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=100363.
Fortunately, the get_unaligned() accessors do the right thing: when
building for ARMv6 or later, the compiler will emit unaligned accesses
using the ordinary load/store instructions (but avoid the ones that
require 32-bit alignment). When building for older ARM, those accessors
will emit the appropriate sequence of ldrb/mov/orr instructions. And on
architectures that can truly tolerate any kind of misalignment, the
get_unaligned() accessors resolve to the leXX_to_cpup accessors that
operate on aligned addresses.
Since the compiler will in fact emit ldrd or ldm instructions when
building this code for ARM v6 or later, the solution is to use the
unaligned accessors unconditionally on architectures where this is
known to be fast. The _aligned version of the hash function is
however still needed to get the best performance on architectures
that cannot do any unaligned access in hardware.
This new version avoids the undefined behavior and should produce
the fastest hash on all architectures we support.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/20181008211554.5355-4-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/CAK8P3a2KfmmGDbVHULWevB0hv71P2oi2ZCHEAqT=8dQfa0=cqQ@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Fixes: 2c956a60778c ("siphash: add cryptographically secure PRF")
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
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This reverts commit 6a9dc5fd6170 ("lib: Revert use of fallthrough
pseudo-keyword in lib/")
Now that we can build arch/powerpc/boot/ free of -Wimplicit-fallthrough,
re-enable these fixes for lib/.
Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/236
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
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The following build error for powerpc64 was reported by Nathan Chancellor:
"$ scripts/config --file arch/powerpc/configs/powernv_defconfig -e KERNEL_XZ
$ make -skj"$(nproc)" ARCH=powerpc CROSS_COMPILE=powerpc64le-linux- distclean powernv_defconfig zImage
...
In file included from arch/powerpc/boot/../../../lib/decompress_unxz.c:234,
from arch/powerpc/boot/decompress.c:38:
arch/powerpc/boot/../../../lib/xz/xz_dec_stream.c: In function 'dec_main':
arch/powerpc/boot/../../../lib/xz/xz_dec_stream.c:586:4: error: 'fallthrough' undeclared (first use in this function)
586 | fallthrough;
| ^~~~~~~~~~~
This will end up affecting distribution configurations such as Debian
and OpenSUSE according to my testing. I am not sure what the solution
is, the PowerPC wrapper does not set -D__KERNEL__ so I am not sure
that compiler_attributes.h can be safely included."
In order to avoid these sort of problems, it seems that the best
solution is to use /* fall through */ comments instead of the
fallthrough pseudo-keyword macro in lib/, for now.
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Fixes: df561f6688fe ("treewide: Use fallthrough pseudo-keyword")
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-and-tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Replace the existing /* fall through */ comments and its variants with
the new pseudo-keyword macro fallthrough[1]. Also, remove unnecessary
fall-through markings when it is the case.
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.7/process/deprecated.html?highlight=fallthrough#implicit-switch-case-fall-through
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
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In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases
where we are expecting to fall through.
This patch aims to suppress up to 18 missing-break-in-switch false
positives on some architectures.
Cc: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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HalfSipHash, or hsiphash, is a shortened version of SipHash, which
generates 32-bit outputs using a weaker 64-bit key. It has *much* lower
security margins, and shouldn't be used for anything too sensitive, but
it could be used as a hashtable key function replacement, if the output
is never exposed, and if the security requirement is not too high.
The goal is to make this something that performance-critical jhash users
would be willing to use.
On 64-bit machines, HalfSipHash1-3 is slower than SipHash1-3, so we alias
SipHash1-3 to HalfSipHash1-3 on those systems.
64-bit x86_64:
[ 0.509409] test_siphash: SipHash2-4 cycles: 4049181
[ 0.510650] test_siphash: SipHash1-3 cycles: 2512884
[ 0.512205] test_siphash: HalfSipHash1-3 cycles: 3429920
[ 0.512904] test_siphash: JenkinsHash cycles: 978267
So, we map hsiphash() -> SipHash1-3
32-bit x86:
[ 0.509868] test_siphash: SipHash2-4 cycles: 14812892
[ 0.513601] test_siphash: SipHash1-3 cycles: 9510710
[ 0.515263] test_siphash: HalfSipHash1-3 cycles: 3856157
[ 0.515952] test_siphash: JenkinsHash cycles: 1148567
So, we map hsiphash() -> HalfSipHash1-3
hsiphash() is roughly 3 times slower than jhash(), but comes with a
considerable security improvement.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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SipHash is a 64-bit keyed hash function that is actually a
cryptographically secure PRF, like HMAC. Except SipHash is super fast,
and is meant to be used as a hashtable keyed lookup function, or as a
general PRF for short input use cases, such as sequence numbers or RNG
chaining.
For the first usage:
There are a variety of attacks known as "hashtable poisoning" in which an
attacker forms some data such that the hash of that data will be the
same, and then preceeds to fill up all entries of a hashbucket. This is
a realistic and well-known denial-of-service vector. Currently
hashtables use jhash, which is fast but not secure, and some kind of
rotating key scheme (or none at all, which isn't good). SipHash is meant
as a replacement for jhash in these cases.
There are a modicum of places in the kernel that are vulnerable to
hashtable poisoning attacks, either via userspace vectors or network
vectors, and there's not a reliable mechanism inside the kernel at the
moment to fix it. The first step toward fixing these issues is actually
getting a secure primitive into the kernel for developers to use. Then
we can, bit by bit, port things over to it as deemed appropriate.
While SipHash is extremely fast for a cryptographically secure function,
it is likely a bit slower than the insecure jhash, and so replacements
will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis based on whether or not the
difference in speed is negligible and whether or not the current jhash usage
poses a real security risk.
For the second usage:
A few places in the kernel are using MD5 or SHA1 for creating secure
sequence numbers, syn cookies, port numbers, or fast random numbers.
SipHash is a faster and more fitting, and more secure replacement for MD5
in those situations. Replacing MD5 and SHA1 with SipHash for these uses is
obvious and straight-forward, and so is submitted along with this patch
series. There shouldn't be much of a debate over its efficacy.
Dozens of languages are already using this internally for their hash
tables and PRFs. Some of the BSDs already use this in their kernels.
SipHash is a widely known high-speed solution to a widely known set of
problems, and it's time we catch-up.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Jean-Philippe Aumasson <jeanphilippe.aumasson@gmail.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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