summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/mm/memfd.c
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* mm/memfd: add write seals when apply SEAL_EXEC to executable memfdJeff Xu2023-01-181-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In order to avoid WX mappings, add F_SEAL_WRITE when apply F_SEAL_EXEC to an executable memfd, so W^X from start. This implys application need to fill the content of the memfd first, after F_SEAL_EXEC is applied, application can no longer modify the content of the memfd. Typically, application seals the memfd right after writing to it. For example: 1. memfd_create(MFD_EXEC). 2. write() code to the memfd. 3. fcntl(F_ADD_SEALS, F_SEAL_EXEC) to convert the memfd to W^X. 4. call exec() on the memfd. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-5-jeffxu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
* mm/memfd: add MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXECJeff Xu2023-01-181-2/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The new MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC flags allows application to set executable bit at creation time (memfd_create). When MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL is set, memfd is created without executable bit (mode:0666), and sealed with F_SEAL_EXEC, so it can't be chmod to be executable (mode: 0777) after creation. when MFD_EXEC flag is set, memfd is created with executable bit (mode:0777), this is the same as the old behavior of memfd_create. The new pid namespaced sysctl vm.memfd_noexec has 3 values: 0: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like MFD_EXEC was set. 1: memfd_create() without MFD_EXEC nor MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL acts like MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL was set. 2: memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected. The sysctl allows finer control of memfd_create for old-software that doesn't set the executable bit, for example, a container with vm.memfd_noexec=1 means the old-software will create non-executable memfd by default. Also, the value of memfd_noexec is passed to child namespace at creation time. For example, if the init namespace has vm.memfd_noexec=2, all its children namespaces will be created with 2. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: add stub functions to fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded register_pid_ns_ctl_table_vm() stub, per Jeff] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: s/pr_warn_ratelimited/pr_warn_once/, per review] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix CONFIG_SYSCTL=n warning] Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-4-jeffxu@google.com Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Co-developed-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
* mm/memfd: add F_SEAL_EXECDaniel Verkamp2023-01-181-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Patch series "mm/memfd: introduce MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL and MFD_EXEC", v8. Since Linux introduced the memfd feature, memfd have always had their execute bit set, and the memfd_create() syscall doesn't allow setting it differently. However, in a secure by default system, such as ChromeOS, (where all executables should come from the rootfs, which is protected by Verified boot), this executable nature of memfd opens a door for NoExec bypass and enables “confused deputy attack”. E.g, in VRP bug [1]: cros_vm process created a memfd to share the content with an external process, however the memfd is overwritten and used for executing arbitrary code and root escalation. [2] lists more VRP in this kind. On the other hand, executable memfd has its legit use, runc uses memfd’s seal and executable feature to copy the contents of the binary then execute them, for such system, we need a solution to differentiate runc's use of executable memfds and an attacker's [3]. To address those above, this set of patches add following: 1> Let memfd_create() set X bit at creation time. 2> Let memfd to be sealed for modifying X bit. 3> A new pid namespace sysctl: vm.memfd_noexec to control the behavior of X bit.For example, if a container has vm.memfd_noexec=2, then memfd_create() without MFD_NOEXEC_SEAL will be rejected. 4> A new security hook in memfd_create(). This make it possible to a new LSM, which rejects or allows executable memfd based on its security policy. This patch (of 5): The new F_SEAL_EXEC flag will prevent modification of the exec bits: written as traditional octal mask, 0111, or as named flags, S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH. Any chmod(2) or similar call that attempts to modify any of these bits after the seal is applied will fail with errno EPERM. This will preserve the execute bits as they are at the time of sealing, so the memfd will become either permanently executable or permanently un-executable. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-1-jeffxu@google.com Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20221215001205.51969-2-jeffxu@google.com Signed-off-by: Daniel Verkamp <dverkamp@chromium.org> Co-developed-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Xu <jeffxu@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Jorge Lucangeli Obes <jorgelo@chromium.org> Cc: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Cc: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
* memfd: fix F_SEAL_WRITE after shmem huge page allocatedHugh Dickins2022-03-051-12/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Wangyong reports: after enabling tmpfs filesystem to support transparent hugepage with the following command: echo always > /sys/kernel/mm/transparent_hugepage/shmem_enabled the docker program tries to add F_SEAL_WRITE through the following command, but it fails unexpectedly with errno EBUSY: fcntl(5, F_ADD_SEALS, F_SEAL_WRITE) = -1. That is because memfd_tag_pins() and memfd_wait_for_pins() were never updated for shmem huge pages: checking page_mapcount() against page_count() is hopeless on THP subpages - they need to check total_mapcount() against page_count() on THP heads only. Make memfd_tag_pins() (compared > 1) as strict as memfd_wait_for_pins() (compared != 1): either can be justified, but given the non-atomic total_mapcount() calculation, it is better now to be strict. Bear in mind that total_mapcount() itself scans all of the THP subpages, when choosing to take an XA_CHECK_SCHED latency break. Also fix the unlikely xa_is_value() case in memfd_wait_for_pins(): if a page has been swapped out since memfd_tag_pins(), then its refcount must have fallen, and so it can safely be untagged. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/a4f79248-df75-2c8c-3df-ba3317ccb5da@google.com Signed-off-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn> Reported-by: wangyong <wang.yong12@zte.com.cn> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org> Cc: CGEL ZTE <cgel.zte@gmail.com> Cc: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Cc: Yang Yang <yang.yang29@zte.com.cn> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm,hugetlb: remove mlock ulimit for SHM_HUGETLBzhangyiru2021-11-091-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 21a3c273f88c ("mm, hugetlb: add thread name and pid to SHM_HUGETLB mlock rlimit warning") marked this as deprecated in 2012, but it is not deleted yet. Mike says he still sees that message in log files on occasion, so maybe we should preserve this warning. Also remove hugetlbfs related user_shm_unlock in ipc/shm.c and remove the user_shm_unlock after out. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20211103105857.25041-1-zhangyiru3@huawei.com Signed-off-by: zhangyiru <zhangyiru3@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Liu Zixian <liuzixian4@huawei.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: wuxu.wu <wuxu.wu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Reimplement RLIMIT_MEMLOCK on top of ucountsAlexey Gladkov2021-04-301-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The rlimit counter is tied to uid in the user_namespace. This allows rlimit values to be specified in userns even if they are already globally exceeded by the user. However, the value of the previous user_namespaces cannot be exceeded. Changelog v11: * Fix issue found by lkp robot. v8: * Fix issues found by lkp-tests project. v7: * Keep only ucounts for RLIMIT_MEMLOCK checks instead of struct cred. v6: * Fix bug in hugetlb_file_setup() detected by trinity. Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Alexey Gladkov <legion@kernel.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/970d50c70c71bfd4496e0e8d2a0a32feebebb350.1619094428.git.legion@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
* mm: page cache: store only head pages in i_pagesMatthew Wilcox (Oracle)2019-09-241-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Transparent Huge Pages are currently stored in i_pages as pointers to consecutive subpages. This patch changes that to storing consecutive pointers to the head page in preparation for storing huge pages more efficiently in i_pages. Large parts of this are "inspired" by Kirill's patch https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20170126115819.58875-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com/ Kirill and Huang Ying contributed several fixes. [willy@infradead.org: use compound_nr, squish uninit-var warning] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190731210400.7419-1-willy@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Kirill Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Reviewed-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Tested-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Tested-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Revert "mm: page cache: store only head pages in i_pages"Linus Torvalds2019-07-051-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 5fd4ca2d84b249f0858ce28cf637cf25b61a398f. Mikhail Gavrilov reports that it causes the VM_BUG_ON_PAGE() in __delete_from_swap_cache() to trigger: page:ffffd6d34dff0000 refcount:1 mapcount:1 mapping:ffff97812323a689 index:0xfecec363 anon flags: 0x17fffe00080034(uptodate|lru|active|swapbacked) raw: 0017fffe00080034 ffffd6d34c67c508 ffffd6d3504b8d48 ffff97812323a689 raw: 00000000fecec363 0000000000000000 0000000100000000 ffff978433ace000 page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(entry != page) page->mem_cgroup:ffff978433ace000 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at mm/swap_state.c:170! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 221 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 5.2.0-0.rc2.git0.1.fc31.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/ROG STRIX X470-I GAMING, BIOS 2202 04/11/2019 RIP: 0010:__delete_from_swap_cache+0x20d/0x240 Code: 30 65 48 33 04 25 28 00 00 00 75 4a 48 83 c4 38 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 48 c7 c6 2f dc 0f 8a 48 89 c7 e8 93 1b fd ff <0f> 0b 48 c7 c6 a8 74 0f 8a e8 85 1b fd ff 0f 0b 48 c7 c6 a8 7d 0f RSP: 0018:ffffa982036e7980 EFLAGS: 00010046 RAX: 0000000000000021 RBX: 0000000000000040 RCX: 0000000000000006 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000086 RDI: ffff97843d657900 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffa982036e7835 R09: 0000000000000535 R10: ffff97845e21a46c R11: ffffa982036e7835 R12: ffff978426387120 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffd6d34dff0040 R15: ffffd6d34dff0000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff97843d640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00002cba88ef5000 CR3: 000000078a97c000 CR4: 00000000003406e0 Call Trace: delete_from_swap_cache+0x46/0xa0 try_to_free_swap+0xbc/0x110 swap_writepage+0x13/0x70 pageout.isra.0+0x13c/0x350 shrink_page_list+0xc14/0xdf0 shrink_inactive_list+0x1e5/0x3c0 shrink_node_memcg+0x202/0x760 shrink_node+0xe0/0x470 balance_pgdat+0x2d1/0x510 kswapd+0x220/0x420 kthread+0xfb/0x130 ret_from_fork+0x22/0x40 and it's not immediately obvious why it happens. It's too late in the rc cycle to do anything but revert for now. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CABXGCsN9mYmBD-4GaaeW_NrDu+FDXLzr_6x+XNxfmFV6QkYCDg@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-and-bisected-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Kirill Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Cc: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm: page cache: store only head pages in i_pagesMatthew Wilcox2019-05-141-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Transparent Huge Pages are currently stored in i_pages as pointers to consecutive subpages. This patch changes that to storing consecutive pointers to the head page in preparation for storing huge pages more efficiently in i_pages. Large parts of this are "inspired" by Kirill's patch https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20170126115819.58875-2-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com/ [willy@infradead.org: fix swapcache pages] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190324155441.GF10344@bombadil.infradead.org [kirill@shutemov.name: hugetlb stores pages in page cache differently] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190404134553.vuvhgmghlkiw2hgl@kshutemo-mobl1 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190307153051.18815-1-willy@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Kirill Shutemov <kirill@shutemov.name> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com> Tested-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: William Kucharski <william.kucharski@oracle.com> Tested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Song Liu <liu.song.a23@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* mm/memfd: add an F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal to memfdJoel Fernandes (Google)2019-03-051-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Android uses ashmem for sharing memory regions. We are looking forward to migrating all usecases of ashmem to memfd so that we can possibly remove the ashmem driver in the future from staging while also benefiting from using memfd and contributing to it. Note staging drivers are also not ABI and generally can be removed at anytime. One of the main usecases Android has is the ability to create a region and mmap it as writeable, then add protection against making any "future" writes while keeping the existing already mmap'ed writeable-region active. This allows us to implement a usecase where receivers of the shared memory buffer can get a read-only view, while the sender continues to write to the buffer. See CursorWindow documentation in Android for more details: https://developer.android.com/reference/android/database/CursorWindow This usecase cannot be implemented with the existing F_SEAL_WRITE seal. To support the usecase, this patch adds a new F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal which prevents any future mmap and write syscalls from succeeding while keeping the existing mmap active. A better way to do F_SEAL_FUTURE_WRITE seal was discussed [1] last week where we don't need to modify core VFS structures to get the same behavior of the seal. This solves several side-effects pointed by Andy. self-tests are provided in later patch to verify the expected semantics. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20181111173650.GA256781@google.com/ Thanks a lot to Andy for suggestions to improve code. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190112203816.85534-2-joel@joelfernandes.org Signed-off-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org> Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Cc: Marc-Andr Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* memfd: Convert memfd_tag_pins to XArrayMatthew Wilcox2018-10-211-26/+18
| | | | | | | | Switch to a batch-processing model like memfd_wait_for_pins() and use the xa_state previously set up by memfd_wait_for_pins(). Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
* memfd: Convert memfd_wait_for_pins to XArrayMatthew Wilcox2018-10-211-36/+25
| | | | | | | | | Simplify the locking by taking the spinlock while we walk the tree on the assumption that many acquires and releases of the lock will be worse than holding the lock while we process an entire batch of pages. Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
* alloc_file(): switch to passing O_... flags instead of FMODE_... modeAl Viro2018-07-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | ... so that it could set both ->f_flags and ->f_mode, without callers having to set ->f_flags manually. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* mm: restructure memfd codeMike Kravetz2018-06-071-0/+345
With the addition of memfd hugetlbfs support, we now have the situation where memfd depends on TMPFS -or- HUGETLBFS. Previously, memfd was only supported on tmpfs, so it made sense that the code resided in shmem.c. In the current code, memfd is only functional if TMPFS is defined. If HUGETLFS is defined and TMPFS is not defined, then memfd functionality will not be available for hugetlbfs. This does not cause BUGs, just a lack of potentially desired functionality. Code is restructured in the following way: - include/linux/memfd.h is a new file containing memfd specific definitions previously contained in shmem_fs.h. - mm/memfd.c is a new file containing memfd specific code previously contained in shmem.c. - memfd specific code is removed from shmem_fs.h and shmem.c. - A new config option MEMFD_CREATE is added that is defined if TMPFS or HUGETLBFS is defined. No functional changes are made to the code: restructuring only. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180415182119.4517-4-mike.kravetz@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Khalid Aziz <khalid.aziz@oracle.com> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> Cc: Marc-Andr Lureau <marcandre.lureau@gmail.com> Cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>