summaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/net/ipv6
Commit message (Collapse)AuthorAgeFilesLines
* ip6_gre: update dst pmtu if dev mtu has been updated by toobig in __gre6_xmitXin Long2017-11-181-2/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 8aec4959d832bae0889a8e2f348973b5e4abffef ] When receiving a Toobig icmpv6 packet, ip6gre_err would just set tunnel dev's mtu, that's not enough. For skb_dst(skb)'s pmtu may still be using the old value, it has no chance to be updated with tunnel dev's mtu. Jianlin found this issue by reducing route's mtu while running netperf, the performance went to 0. ip6ip6 and ip4ip6 tunnel can work well with this, as they lookup the upper dst and update_pmtu it's pmtu or icmpv6_send a Toobig to upper socket after setting tunnel dev's mtu. We couldn't do that for ip6_gre, as gre's inner packet could be any protocol, it's difficult to handle them (like lookup upper dst) in a good way. So this patch is to fix it by updating skb_dst(skb)'s pmtu when dev->mtu < skb_dst(skb)'s pmtu in tx path. It's safe to do this update there, as usually dev->mtu <= skb_dst(skb)'s pmtu and no performance regression can be caused by this. Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6") Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ip6_gre: only increase err_count for some certain type icmpv6 in ip6gre_errXin Long2017-11-181-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit f8d20b46ce55cf40afb30dcef6d9288f7ef46d9b ] The similar fix in patch 'ipip: only increase err_count for some certain type icmp in ipip_err' is needed for ip6gre_err. In Jianlin's case, udp netperf broke even when receiving a TooBig icmpv6 packet. Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6") Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: flowlabel: do not leave opt->tot_len with garbageEric Dumazet2017-11-182-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 864e2a1f8aac05effac6063ce316b480facb46ff ] When syzkaller team brought us a C repro for the crash [1] that had been reported many times in the past, I finally could find the root cause. If FlowLabel info is merged by fl6_merge_options(), we leave part of the opt_space storage provided by udp/raw/l2tp with random value in opt_space.tot_len, unless a control message was provided at sendmsg() time. Then ip6_setup_cork() would use this random value to perform a kzalloc() call. Undefined behavior and crashes. Fix is to properly set tot_len in fl6_merge_options() At the same time, we can also avoid consuming memory and cpu cycles to clear it, if every option is copied via a kmemdup(). This is the change in ip6_setup_cork(). [1] kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 6613 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.14.0-rc4+ #127 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 task: ffff8801cb64a100 task.stack: ffff8801cc350000 RIP: 0010:ip6_setup_cork+0x274/0x15c0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1168 RSP: 0018:ffff8801cc357550 EFLAGS: 00010203 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff8801cc357748 RCX: 0000000000000010 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: ffffffff842bd1d9 RDI: 0000000000000014 RBP: ffff8801cc357620 R08: ffff8801cb17f380 R09: ffff8801cc357b10 R10: ffff8801cb64a100 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8801cc357ab0 R13: ffff8801cc357b10 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8801c3bbf0c0 FS: 00007f9c5c459700(0000) GS:ffff8801db200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020324000 CR3: 00000001d1cf2000 CR4: 00000000001406f0 DR0: 0000000020001010 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 Call Trace: ip6_make_skb+0x282/0x530 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1729 udpv6_sendmsg+0x2769/0x3380 net/ipv6/udp.c:1340 inet_sendmsg+0x11f/0x5e0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:762 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 SYSC_sendto+0x358/0x5a0 net/socket.c:1750 SyS_sendto+0x40/0x50 net/socket.c:1718 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x4520a9 RSP: 002b:00007f9c5c458c08 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000718000 RCX: 00000000004520a9 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020fd1000 RDI: 0000000000000016 RBP: 0000000000000086 R08: 0000000020e0afe4 R09: 000000000000001c R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00000000004bb1ee R13: 00000000ffffffff R14: 0000000000000016 R15: 0000000000000029 Code: e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 ea 0f 00 00 48 8d 79 04 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 45 8b 74 24 04 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 RIP: ip6_setup_cork+0x274/0x15c0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1168 RSP: ffff8801cc357550 Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: addrconf: increment ifp refcount before ipv6_del_addr()Eric Dumazet2017-11-181-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit e669b86945478b3d90d2d87e3793a6eed06d332f ] In the (unlikely) event fixup_permanent_addr() returns a failure, addrconf_permanent_addr() calls ipv6_del_addr() without the mandatory call to in6_ifa_hold(), leading to a refcount error, spotted by syzkaller : WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3142 at lib/refcount.c:227 refcount_dec+0x4c/0x50 lib/refcount.c:227 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 3142 Comm: ip Not tainted 4.14.0-rc4-next-20171009+ #33 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:52 panic+0x1e4/0x41c kernel/panic.c:181 __warn+0x1c4/0x1e0 kernel/panic.c:544 report_bug+0x211/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:183 fixup_bug+0x40/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 do_trap_no_signal arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:212 [inline] do_trap+0x260/0x390 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:261 do_error_trap+0x120/0x390 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:298 do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:311 invalid_op+0x18/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:905 RIP: 0010:refcount_dec+0x4c/0x50 lib/refcount.c:227 RSP: 0018:ffff8801ca49e680 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 000000000000002c RBX: ffff8801d07cfcdc RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 000000000000002c RSI: 1ffff10039493c90 RDI: ffffed0039493cc4 RBP: ffff8801ca49e688 R08: ffff8801ca49dd70 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffff8801ca49df58 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 1ffff10039493cd9 R13: ffff8801ca49e6e8 R14: ffff8801ca49e7e8 R15: ffff8801d07cfcdc __in6_ifa_put include/net/addrconf.h:369 [inline] ipv6_del_addr+0x42b/0xb60 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:1208 addrconf_permanent_addr net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3327 [inline] addrconf_notify+0x1c66/0x2190 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:3393 notifier_call_chain+0x136/0x2c0 kernel/notifier.c:93 __raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:394 [inline] raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2d/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:401 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x32/0x60 net/core/dev.c:1697 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1715 [inline] __dev_notify_flags+0x15d/0x430 net/core/dev.c:6843 dev_change_flags+0xf5/0x140 net/core/dev.c:6879 do_setlink+0xa1b/0x38e0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2113 rtnl_newlink+0xf0d/0x1a40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2661 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x733/0x1090 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4301 netlink_rcv_skb+0x216/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2408 rtnetlink_rcv+0x1c/0x20 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4313 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1273 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1299 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe70 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1862 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 ___sys_sendmsg+0x75b/0x8a0 net/socket.c:2049 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x210 net/socket.c:2083 SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2094 [inline] SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2090 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x7fa9174d3320 RSP: 002b:00007ffe302ae9e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffe302b2ae0 RCX: 00007fa9174d3320 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffe302aea20 RDI: 0000000000000016 RBP: 0000000000000082 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 000000000000000f R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe302b32a0 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffe302b2ab8 R15: 00007ffe302b32b8 Fixes: f1705ec197e7 ("net: ipv6: Make address flushing on ifdown optional") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* gso: fix payload length when gso_size is zeroAlexey Kodanev2017-11-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 3d0241d57c7b25bb75ac9d7a62753642264fdbce ] When gso_size reset to zero for the tail segment in skb_segment(), later in ipv6_gso_segment(), __skb_udp_tunnel_segment() and gre_gso_segment() we will get incorrect results (payload length, pcsum) for that segment. inet_gso_segment() already has a check for gso_size before calculating payload. The issue was found with LTP vxlan & gre tests over ixgbe NIC. Fixes: 07b26c9454a2 ("gso: Support partial splitting at the frag_list pointer") Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com> Acked-by: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ip6_tunnel: update mtu properly for ARPHRD_ETHER tunnel device in tx pathXin Long2017-10-121-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit d41bb33ba33b8f8debe54ed36be6925eb496e354 ] Now when updating mtu in tx path, it doesn't consider ARPHRD_ETHER tunnel device, like ip6gre_tap tunnel, for which it should also subtract ether header to get the correct mtu. Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ip6_gre: ip6gre_tap device should keep dstXin Long2017-10-121-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 2d40557cc702ed8e5edd9bd422233f86652d932e ] The patch 'ip_gre: ipgre_tap device should keep dst' fixed a issue that ipgre_tap mtu couldn't be updated in tx path. The same fix is needed for ip6gre_tap as well. Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* vti: fix use after free in vti_tunnel_xmit/vti6_tnl_xmitAlexey Kodanev2017-10-121-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 36f6ee22d2d66046e369757ec6bbe1c482957ba6 ] When running LTP IPsec tests, KASan might report: BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vti_tunnel_xmit+0xeee/0xff0 [ip_vti] Read of size 4 at addr ffff880dc6ad1980 by task swapper/0/0 ... Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack+0x63/0x89 print_address_description+0x7c/0x290 kasan_report+0x28d/0x370 ? vti_tunnel_xmit+0xeee/0xff0 [ip_vti] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x19/0x20 vti_tunnel_xmit+0xeee/0xff0 [ip_vti] ? vti_init_net+0x190/0x190 [ip_vti] ? save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 ? save_stack+0x46/0xd0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x147/0x510 ? icmp_echo.part.24+0x1f0/0x210 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1394/0x1c60 ... Freed by task 0: save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 save_stack+0x46/0xd0 kasan_slab_free+0x70/0xc0 kmem_cache_free+0x81/0x1e0 kfree_skbmem+0xb1/0xe0 kfree_skb+0x75/0x170 kfree_skb_list+0x3e/0x60 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1298/0x1c60 dev_queue_xmit+0x10/0x20 neigh_resolve_output+0x3a8/0x740 ip_finish_output2+0x5c0/0xe70 ip_finish_output+0x4ba/0x680 ip_output+0x1c1/0x3a0 xfrm_output_resume+0xc65/0x13d0 xfrm_output+0x1e4/0x380 xfrm4_output_finish+0x5c/0x70 Can be fixed if we get skb->len before dst_output(). Fixes: b9959fd3b0fa ("vti: switch to new ip tunnel code") Fixes: 22e1b23dafa8 ("vti6: Support inter address family tunneling.") Signed-off-by: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ip6_tunnel: do not allow loading ip6_tunnel if ipv6 is disabled in cmdlineXin Long2017-10-121-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 8c22dab03ad072e45060c299c70d02a4f6fc4aab ] If ipv6 has been disabled from cmdline since kernel started, it makes no sense to allow users to create any ip6 tunnel. Otherwise, it could some potential problem. Jianlin found a kernel crash caused by this in ip6_gre when he set ipv6.disable=1 in grub: [ 209.588865] Unable to handle kernel paging request for data at address 0x00000080 [ 209.588872] Faulting instruction address: 0xc000000000a3aa6c [ 209.588879] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1] [ 209.589062] NIP [c000000000a3aa6c] fib_rules_lookup+0x4c/0x260 [ 209.589071] LR [c000000000b9ad90] fib6_rule_lookup+0x50/0xb0 [ 209.589076] Call Trace: [ 209.589097] fib6_rule_lookup+0x50/0xb0 [ 209.589106] rt6_lookup+0xc4/0x110 [ 209.589116] ip6gre_tnl_link_config+0x214/0x2f0 [ip6_gre] [ 209.589125] ip6gre_newlink+0x138/0x3a0 [ip6_gre] [ 209.589134] rtnl_newlink+0x798/0xb80 [ 209.589142] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xec/0x390 [ 209.589151] netlink_rcv_skb+0x138/0x150 [ 209.589159] rtnetlink_rcv+0x48/0x70 [ 209.589169] netlink_unicast+0x538/0x640 [ 209.589175] netlink_sendmsg+0x40c/0x480 [ 209.589184] ___sys_sendmsg+0x384/0x4e0 [ 209.589194] SyS_sendmsg+0xd4/0x140 [ 209.589201] SyS_socketcall+0x3e0/0x4f0 [ 209.589209] system_call+0x38/0xe0 This patch is to return -EOPNOTSUPP in ip6_tunnel_init if ipv6 has been disabled from cmdline. Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ip6_gre: skb_push ipv6hdr before packing the header in ip6gre_headerXin Long2017-10-121-10/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 76cc0d3282d4b933fa144fa41fbc5318e0fdca24 ] Now in ip6gre_header before packing the ipv6 header, it skb_push t->hlen which only includes encap_hlen + tun_hlen. It means greh and inner header would be over written by ipv6 stuff and ipv6h might have no chance to set up. Jianlin found this issue when using remote any on ip6_gre, the packets he captured on gre dev are truncated: 22:50:26.210866 Out ethertype IPv6 (0x86dd), length 120: truncated-ip6 -\ 8128 bytes missing!(flowlabel 0x92f40, hlim 0, next-header Options (0) \ payload length: 8192) ::1:2000:0 > ::1:0:86dd: HBH [trunc] ip-proto-128 \ 8184 It should also skb_push ipv6hdr so that ipv6h points to the right position to set ipv6 stuff up. This patch is to skb_push hlen + sizeof(*ipv6h) and also fix some indents in ip6gre_header. Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6") Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* udpv6: Fix the checksum computation when HW checksum does not applySubash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan2017-10-121-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 63ecc3d9436f8012e49dc846d6cb0a85a3433517 ] While trying an ESP transport mode encryption for UDPv6 packets of datagram size 1436 with MTU 1500, checksum error was observed in the secondary fragment. This error occurs due to the UDP payload checksum being missed out when computing the full checksum for these packets in udp6_hwcsum_outgoing(). Fixes: d39d938c8228 ("ipv6: Introduce udpv6_send_skb()") Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: Fix may be used uninitialized warning in rt6_checkSteffen Klassert2017-09-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3614364527daa870264f6dde77f02853cdecd02c upstream. rt_cookie might be used uninitialized, fix this by initializing it. Fixes: c5cff8561d2d ("ipv6: add rcu grace period before freeing fib6_node") Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: fix typo in fib6_net_exit()Eric Dumazet2017-09-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 32a805baf0fb70b6dbedefcd7249ac7f580f9e3b ] IPv6 FIB should use FIB6_TABLE_HASHSZ, not FIB_TABLE_HASHSZ. Fixes: ba1cc08d9488 ("ipv6: fix memory leak with multiple tables during netns destruction") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: fix memory leak with multiple tables during netns destructionSabrina Dubroca2017-09-201-6/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ba1cc08d9488c94cb8d94f545305688b72a2a300 ] fib6_net_exit only frees the main and local tables. If another table was created with fib6_alloc_table, we leak it when the netns is destroyed. Fix this in the same way ip_fib_net_exit cleans up tables, by walking through the whole hashtable of fib6_table's. We can get rid of the special cases for local and main, since they're also part of the hashtable. Reproducer: ip netns add x ip -net x -6 rule add from 6003:1::/64 table 100 ip netns del x Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Fixes: 58f09b78b730 ("[NETNS][IPV6] ip6_fib - make it per network namespace") Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ip6_gre: update mtu properly in ip6gre_errXin Long2017-09-201-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 5c25f30c93fdc5bf25e62101aeaae7a4f9b421b3 ] Now when probessing ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG, ip6gre_err only subtracts the offset of gre header from mtu info. The expected mtu of gre device should also subtract gre header. Otherwise, the next packets still can't be sent out. Jianlin found this issue when using the topo: client(ip6gre)<---->(nic1)route(nic2)<----->(ip6gre)server and reducing nic2's mtu, then both tcp and sctp's performance with big size data became 0. This patch is to fix it by also subtracting grehdr (tun->tun_hlen) from mtu info when updating gre device's mtu in ip6gre_err(). It also needs to subtract ETH_HLEN if gre dev'type is ARPHRD_ETHER. Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Revert "net: fix percpu memory leaks"Jesper Dangaard Brouer2017-09-202-18/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 5a63643e583b6a9789d7a225ae076fb4e603991c ] This reverts commit 1d6119baf0610f813eb9d9580eb4fd16de5b4ceb. After reverting commit 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting") then here is no need for this fix-up patch. As percpu_counter is no longer used, it cannot memory leak it any-longer. Fixes: 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting") Fixes: 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks") Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: fix sparse warning on rt6i_nodeWei Wang2017-09-203-6/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 4e587ea71bf924f7dac621f1351653bd41e446cb ] Commit c5cff8561d2d adds rcu grace period before freeing fib6_node. This generates a new sparse warning on rt->rt6i_node related code: net/ipv6/route.c:1394:30: error: incompatible types in comparison expression (different address spaces) ./include/net/ip6_fib.h:187:14: error: incompatible types in comparison expression (different address spaces) This commit adds "__rcu" tag for rt6i_node and makes sure corresponding rcu API is used for it. After this fix, sparse no longer generates the above warning. Fixes: c5cff8561d2d ("ipv6: add rcu grace period before freeing fib6_node") Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: add rcu grace period before freeing fib6_nodeWei Wang2017-09-202-7/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit c5cff8561d2d0006e972bd114afd51f082fee77c ] We currently keep rt->rt6i_node pointing to the fib6_node for the route. And some functions make use of this pointer to dereference the fib6_node from rt structure, e.g. rt6_check(). However, as there is neither refcount nor rcu taken when dereferencing rt->rt6i_node, it could potentially cause crashes as rt->rt6i_node could be set to NULL by other CPUs when doing a route deletion. This patch introduces an rcu grace period before freeing fib6_node and makes sure the functions that dereference it takes rcu_read_lock(). Note: there is no "Fixes" tag because this bug was there in a very early stage. Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: accept 64k - 1 packet length in ip6_find_1stfragopt()Stefano Brivio2017-09-201-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 3de33e1ba0506723ab25734e098cf280ecc34756 ] A packet length of exactly IPV6_MAXPLEN is allowed, we should refuse parsing options only if the size is 64KiB or more. While at it, remove one extra variable and one assignment which were also introduced by the commit that introduced the size check. Checking the sum 'offset + len' and only later adding 'len' to 'offset' doesn't provide any advantage over directly summing to 'offset' and checking it. Fixes: 6399f1fae4ec ("ipv6: avoid overflow of offset in ip6_find_1stfragopt") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: repair fib6 tree in failure caseWei Wang2017-08-301-11/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 348a4002729ccab8b888b38cbc099efa2f2a2036 ] In fib6_add(), it is possible that fib6_add_1() picks an intermediate node and sets the node's fn->leaf to NULL in order to add this new route. However, if fib6_add_rt2node() fails to add the new route for some reason, fn->leaf will be left as NULL and could potentially cause crash when fn->leaf is accessed in fib6_locate(). This patch makes sure fib6_repair_tree() is called to properly repair fn->leaf in the above failure case. Here is the syzkaller reported general protection fault in fib6_locate: kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 40937 Comm: syz-executor3 Not tainted Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 task: ffff8801d7d64100 ti: ffff8801d01a0000 task.ti: ffff8801d01a0000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82a3e0e1>] [<ffffffff82a3e0e1>] __ipv6_prefix_equal64_half include/net/ipv6.h:475 [inline] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82a3e0e1>] [<ffffffff82a3e0e1>] ipv6_prefix_equal include/net/ipv6.h:492 [inline] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82a3e0e1>] [<ffffffff82a3e0e1>] fib6_locate_1 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1210 [inline] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82a3e0e1>] [<ffffffff82a3e0e1>] fib6_locate+0x281/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1233 RSP: 0018:ffff8801d01a36a8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000020 RBX: ffff8801bc790e00 RCX: ffffc90002983000 RDX: 0000000000001219 RSI: ffff8801d01a37a0 RDI: 0000000000000100 RBP: ffff8801d01a36f0 R08: 00000000000000ff R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8801d01a37a0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f6afd68c700(0000) GS:ffff8801db400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004c6340 CR3: 00000000ba41f000 CR4: 00000000001426f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Stack: ffff8801d01a37a8 ffff8801d01a3780 ffffed003a0346f5 0000000c82a23ea0 ffff8800b7bd7700 ffff8801d01a3780 ffff8800b6a1c940 ffffffff82a23ea0 ffff8801d01a3920 ffff8801d01a3748 ffffffff82a223d6 ffff8801d7d64988 Call Trace: [<ffffffff82a223d6>] ip6_route_del+0x106/0x570 net/ipv6/route.c:2109 [<ffffffff82a23f9d>] inet6_rtm_delroute+0xfd/0x100 net/ipv6/route.c:3075 [<ffffffff82621359>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x549/0x7a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3450 [<ffffffff8274c1d1>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x141/0x370 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2281 [<ffffffff82613ddf>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x2f/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3456 [<ffffffff8274ad38>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1206 [inline] [<ffffffff8274ad38>] netlink_unicast+0x518/0x750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1232 [<ffffffff8274b83e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x8ce/0xc30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1778 [<ffffffff82564aff>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:609 [inline] [<ffffffff82564aff>] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x110 net/socket.c:619 [<ffffffff82564d62>] sock_write_iter+0x222/0x3a0 net/socket.c:834 [<ffffffff8178523d>] new_sync_write+0x1dd/0x2b0 fs/read_write.c:478 [<ffffffff817853f4>] __vfs_write+0xe4/0x110 fs/read_write.c:491 [<ffffffff81786c38>] vfs_write+0x178/0x4b0 fs/read_write.c:538 [<ffffffff817892a9>] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:585 [inline] [<ffffffff817892a9>] SyS_write+0xd9/0x1b0 fs/read_write.c:577 [<ffffffff82c71e32>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Note: there is no "Fixes" tag as this seems to be a bug introduced very early. Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: reset fn->rr_ptr when replacing routeWei Wang2017-08-301-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 383143f31d7d3525a1dbff733d52fff917f82f15 ] syzcaller reported the following use-after-free issue in rt6_select(): BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rt6_select net/ipv6/route.c:755 [inline] at addr ffff8800bc6994e8 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip6_pol_route.isra.46+0x1429/0x1470 net/ipv6/route.c:1084 at addr ffff8800bc6994e8 Read of size 4 by task syz-executor1/439628 CPU: 0 PID: 439628 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.3.5+ #8 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 0000000000000000 ffff88018fe435b0 ffffffff81ca384d ffff8801d3588c00 ffff8800bc699380 ffff8800bc699500 dffffc0000000000 ffff8801d40a47c0 ffff88018fe435d8 ffffffff81735751 ffff88018fe43660 ffff8800bc699380 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81ca384d>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] [<ffffffff81ca384d>] dump_stack+0xc1/0x124 lib/dump_stack.c:51 sctp: [Deprecated]: syz-executor0 (pid 439615) Use of struct sctp_assoc_value in delayed_ack socket option. Use struct sctp_sack_info instead [<ffffffff81735751>] kasan_object_err+0x21/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:158 [<ffffffff817359c4>] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:196 [inline] [<ffffffff817359c4>] kasan_report_error+0x1b4/0x4a0 mm/kasan/report.c:285 [<ffffffff81735d93>] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:305 [inline] [<ffffffff81735d93>] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x43/0x50 mm/kasan/report.c:325 [<ffffffff82a28e39>] rt6_select net/ipv6/route.c:755 [inline] [<ffffffff82a28e39>] ip6_pol_route.isra.46+0x1429/0x1470 net/ipv6/route.c:1084 [<ffffffff82a28fb1>] ip6_pol_route_output+0x81/0xb0 net/ipv6/route.c:1203 [<ffffffff82ab0a50>] fib6_rule_action+0x1f0/0x680 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:95 [<ffffffff8265cbb6>] fib_rules_lookup+0x2a6/0x7a0 net/core/fib_rules.c:223 [<ffffffff82ab1430>] fib6_rule_lookup+0xd0/0x250 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:41 [<ffffffff82a22006>] ip6_route_output+0x1d6/0x2c0 net/ipv6/route.c:1224 [<ffffffff829e83d2>] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x4d2/0x890 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:943 [<ffffffff829e889a>] ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x9a/0x250 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1079 [<ffffffff82a9f7d8>] ip6_datagram_dst_update+0x538/0xd40 net/ipv6/datagram.c:91 [<ffffffff82aa0978>] __ip6_datagram_connect net/ipv6/datagram.c:251 [inline] [<ffffffff82aa0978>] ip6_datagram_connect+0x518/0xe50 net/ipv6/datagram.c:272 [<ffffffff82aa1313>] ip6_datagram_connect_v6_only+0x63/0x90 net/ipv6/datagram.c:284 [<ffffffff8292f790>] inet_dgram_connect+0x170/0x1f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:564 [<ffffffff82565547>] SYSC_connect+0x1a7/0x2f0 net/socket.c:1582 [<ffffffff8256a649>] SyS_connect+0x29/0x30 net/socket.c:1563 [<ffffffff82c72032>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Object at ffff8800bc699380, in cache ip6_dst_cache size: 384 The root cause of it is that in fib6_add_rt2node(), when it replaces an existing route with the new one, it does not update fn->rr_ptr. This commit resets fn->rr_ptr to NULL when it points to a route which is replaced in fib6_add_rt2node(). Fixes: 27596472473a ("ipv6: fix ECMP route replacement") Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* udp: consistently apply ufo or fragmentationWillem de Bruijn2017-08-121-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 85f1bd9a7b5a79d5baa8bf44af19658f7bf77bfa ] When iteratively building a UDP datagram with MSG_MORE and that datagram exceeds MTU, consistently choose UFO or fragmentation. Once skb_is_gso, always apply ufo. Conversely, once a datagram is split across multiple skbs, do not consider ufo. Sendpage already maintains the first invariant, only add the second. IPv6 does not have a sendpage implementation to modify. A gso skb must have a partial checksum, do not follow sk_no_check_tx in udp_send_skb. Found by syzkaller. Fixes: e89e9cf539a2 ("[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach") Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* revert "net: account for current skb length when deciding about UFO"Greg Kroah-Hartman2017-08-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit ef09c9ff343122a0b245416066992d096416ff19 which is commit a5cb659bbc1c8644efa0c3138a757a1e432a4880 upstream as it causes merge issues with later patches that are much more important... Cc: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* net: avoid skb_warn_bad_offload false positives on UFOWillem de Bruijn2017-08-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 8d63bee643f1fb53e472f0e135cae4eb99d62d19 ] skb_warn_bad_offload triggers a warning when an skb enters the GSO stack at __skb_gso_segment that does not have CHECKSUM_PARTIAL checksum offload set. Commit b2504a5dbef3 ("net: reduce skb_warn_bad_offload() noise") observed that SKB_GSO_DODGY producers can trigger the check and that passing those packets through the GSO handlers will fix it up. But, the software UFO handler will set ip_summed to CHECKSUM_NONE. When __skb_gso_segment is called from the receive path, this triggers the warning again. Make UFO set CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY instead of CHECKSUM_NONE. On Tx these two are equivalent. On Rx, this better matches the skb state (checksum computed), as CHECKSUM_NONE here means no checksum computed. See also this thread for context: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/799015/ Fixes: b2504a5dbef3 ("net: reduce skb_warn_bad_offload() noise") Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* net: account for current skb length when deciding about UFOMichal Kubeček2017-08-111-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit a5cb659bbc1c8644efa0c3138a757a1e432a4880 ] Our customer encountered stuck NFS writes for blocks starting at specific offsets w.r.t. page boundary caused by networking stack sending packets via UFO enabled device with wrong checksum. The problem can be reproduced by composing a long UDP datagram from multiple parts using MSG_MORE flag: sendto(sd, buff, 1000, MSG_MORE, ...); sendto(sd, buff, 1000, MSG_MORE, ...); sendto(sd, buff, 3000, 0, ...); Assume this packet is to be routed via a device with MTU 1500 and NETIF_F_UFO enabled. When second sendto() gets into __ip_append_data(), this condition is tested (among others) to decide whether to call ip_ufo_append_data(): ((length + fragheaderlen) > mtu) || (skb && skb_is_gso(skb)) At the moment, we already have skb with 1028 bytes of data which is not marked for GSO so that the test is false (fragheaderlen is usually 20). Thus we append second 1000 bytes to this skb without invoking UFO. Third sendto(), however, has sufficient length to trigger the UFO path so that we end up with non-UFO skb followed by a UFO one. Later on, udp_send_skb() uses udp_csum() to calculate the checksum but that assumes all fragments have correct checksum in skb->csum which is not true for UFO fragments. When checking against MTU, we need to add skb->len to length of new segment if we already have a partially filled skb and fragheaderlen only if there isn't one. In the IPv6 case, skb can only be null if this is the first segment so that we have to use headersize (length of the first IPv6 header) rather than fragheaderlen (length of IPv6 header of further fragments) for skb == NULL. Fixes: e89e9cf539a2 ("[IPv4/IPv6]: UFO Scatter-gather approach") Fixes: e4c5e13aa45c ("ipv6: Should use consistent conditional judgement for ip6 fragment between __ip6_append_data and ip6_finish_output") Signed-off-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: use fwmark_reflect in nf_send_resetPau Espin Pedrol2017-08-111-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit cc31d43b4154ad5a7d8aa5543255a93b7e89edc2 ] Otherwise, RST packets generated by ipt_REJECT always have mark 0 when the routing is checked later in the same code path. Fixes: e110861f8609 ("net: add a sysctl to reflect the fwmark on replies") Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Signed-off-by: Pau Espin Pedrol <pau.espin@tessares.net> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: Don't increase IPSTATS_MIB_FRAGFAILS twice in ip6_fragment()Stefano Brivio2017-08-111-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit afce615aaabfbaad02550e75c0bec106dafa1adf ] RFC 2465 defines ipv6IfStatsOutFragFails as: "The number of IPv6 datagrams that have been discarded because they needed to be fragmented at this output interface but could not be." The existing implementation, instead, would increase the counter twice in case we fail to allocate room for single fragments: once for the fragment, once for the datagram. This didn't look intentional though. In one of the two affected affected failure paths, the double increase was simply a result of a new 'goto fail' statement, introduced to avoid a skb leak. The other path appears to be affected since at least 2.6.12-rc2. Reported-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sdubroca@redhat.com> Fixes: 1d325d217c7f ("ipv6: ip6_fragment: fix headroom tests and skb leak") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: avoid overflow of offset in ip6_find_1stfragoptSabrina Dubroca2017-08-111-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 6399f1fae4ec29fab5ec76070435555e256ca3a6 ] In some cases, offset can overflow and can cause an infinite loop in ip6_find_1stfragopt(). Make it unsigned int to prevent the overflow, and cap it at IPV6_MAXPLEN, since packets larger than that should be invalid. This problem has been here since before the beginning of git history. Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv4: ipv6: initialize treq->txhash in cookie_v[46]_check()Alexander Potapenko2017-08-111-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 18bcf2907df935981266532e1e0d052aff2e6fae ] KMSAN reported use of uninitialized memory in skb_set_hash_from_sk(), which originated from the TCP request socket created in cookie_v6_check(): ================================================================== BUG: KMSAN: use of uninitialized memory in tcp_transmit_skb+0xf77/0x3ec0 CPU: 1 PID: 2949 Comm: syz-execprog Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2931 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 TCP: request_sock_TCPv6: Possible SYN flooding on port 20028. Sending cookies. Check SNMP counters. Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 dump_stack+0x172/0x1c0 lib/dump_stack.c:52 kmsan_report+0x12a/0x180 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:927 __msan_warning_32+0x61/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:469 skb_set_hash_from_sk ./include/net/sock.h:2011 tcp_transmit_skb+0xf77/0x3ec0 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:983 tcp_send_ack+0x75b/0x830 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:3493 tcp_delack_timer_handler+0x9a6/0xb90 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:284 tcp_delack_timer+0x1b0/0x310 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:309 call_timer_fn+0x240/0x520 kernel/time/timer.c:1268 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1307 __run_timers+0xc13/0xf10 kernel/time/timer.c:1601 run_timer_softirq+0x36/0xa0 kernel/time/timer.c:1614 __do_softirq+0x485/0x942 kernel/softirq.c:284 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:364 irq_exit+0x1fa/0x230 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq+0xe/0x10 ./arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:657 smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x5a/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:966 apic_timer_interrupt+0x86/0x90 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:489 RIP: 0010:native_restore_fl ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:36 RIP: 0010:arch_local_irq_restore ./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:77 RIP: 0010:__msan_poison_alloca+0xed/0x120 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:440 RSP: 0018:ffff880024917cd8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff10 RAX: 0000000000000246 RBX: ffff8800224c0000 RCX: 0000000000000005 RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: ffff880000000000 RDI: ffffea0000b6d770 RBP: ffff880024917d58 R08: 0000000000000dd8 R09: 0000000000000004 R10: 0000160000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff85abf810 R13: ffff880024917dd8 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: ffffffff81cabde4 </IRQ> poll_select_copy_remaining+0xac/0x6b0 fs/select.c:293 SYSC_select+0x4b4/0x4e0 fs/select.c:653 SyS_select+0x76/0xa0 fs/select.c:634 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x13/0x94 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:204 RIP: 0033:0x4597e7 RSP: 002b:000000c420037ee0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000017 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00000000004597e7 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 000000c420037ef0 R08: 000000c420037ee0 R09: 0000000000000059 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000042dc20 R13: 00000000000000f3 R14: 0000000000000030 R15: 0000000000000003 chained origin: save_stack_trace+0x37/0x40 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:302 kmsan_save_stack mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:317 kmsan_internal_chain_origin+0x12a/0x1f0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:547 __msan_store_shadow_origin_4+0xac/0x110 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:259 tcp_create_openreq_child+0x709/0x1ae0 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:472 tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock+0x7eb/0x2a30 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1103 tcp_get_cookie_sock+0x136/0x5f0 net/ipv4/syncookies.c:212 cookie_v6_check+0x17a9/0x1b50 net/ipv6/syncookies.c:245 tcp_v6_cookie_check net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:989 tcp_v6_do_rcv+0xdd8/0x1c60 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1298 tcp_v6_rcv+0x41a3/0x4f00 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1487 ip6_input_finish+0x82f/0x1ee0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279 NF_HOOK ./include/linux/netfilter.h:257 ip6_input+0x239/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322 dst_input ./include/net/dst.h:492 ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69 NF_HOOK ./include/linux/netfilter.h:257 ipv6_rcv+0x1dbd/0x22e0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x2f6f/0x3a20 net/core/dev.c:4208 __netif_receive_skb net/core/dev.c:4246 process_backlog+0x667/0xba0 net/core/dev.c:4866 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5268 net_rx_action+0xc95/0x1590 net/core/dev.c:5333 __do_softirq+0x485/0x942 kernel/softirq.c:284 origin: save_stack_trace+0x37/0x40 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59 kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:302 kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xb1/0x1a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:198 kmsan_kmalloc+0x7f/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:337 kmem_cache_alloc+0x1c2/0x1e0 mm/slub.c:2766 reqsk_alloc ./include/net/request_sock.h:87 inet_reqsk_alloc+0xa4/0x5b0 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6200 cookie_v6_check+0x4f4/0x1b50 net/ipv6/syncookies.c:169 tcp_v6_cookie_check net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:989 tcp_v6_do_rcv+0xdd8/0x1c60 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1298 tcp_v6_rcv+0x41a3/0x4f00 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1487 ip6_input_finish+0x82f/0x1ee0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:279 NF_HOOK ./include/linux/netfilter.h:257 ip6_input+0x239/0x290 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:322 dst_input ./include/net/dst.h:492 ip6_rcv_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:69 NF_HOOK ./include/linux/netfilter.h:257 ipv6_rcv+0x1dbd/0x22e0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:203 __netif_receive_skb_core+0x2f6f/0x3a20 net/core/dev.c:4208 __netif_receive_skb net/core/dev.c:4246 process_backlog+0x667/0xba0 net/core/dev.c:4866 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:5268 net_rx_action+0xc95/0x1590 net/core/dev.c:5333 __do_softirq+0x485/0x942 kernel/softirq.c:284 ================================================================== Similar error is reported for cookie_v4_check(). Fixes: 58d607d3e52f ("tcp: provide skb->hash to synack packets") Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: Should use consistent conditional judgement for ip6 fragment between ↵Zheng Li2017-08-061-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | __ip6_append_data and ip6_finish_output [ Upstream commit e4c5e13aa45c23692e4acf56f0b3533f328199b2 ] There is an inconsistent conditional judgement between __ip6_append_data and ip6_finish_output functions, the variable length in __ip6_append_data just include the length of application's payload and udp6 header, don't include the length of ipv6 header, but in ip6_finish_output use (skb->len > ip6_skb_dst_mtu(skb)) as judgement, and skb->len include the length of ipv6 header. That causes some particular application's udp6 payloads whose length are between (MTU - IPv6 Header) and MTU were fragmented by ip6_fragment even though the rst->dev support UFO feature. Add the length of ipv6 header to length in __ip6_append_data to keep consistent conditional judgement as ip6_finish_output for ip6 fragment. Signed-off-by: Zheng Li <james.z.li@ericsson.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* net: ipv6: Compare lwstate in detecting duplicate nexthopsDavid Ahern2017-07-212-11/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f06b7549b79e29a672336d4e134524373fb7a232 upstream. Lennert reported a failure to add different mpls encaps in a multipath route: $ ip -6 route add 1234::/16 \ nexthop encap mpls 10 via fe80::1 dev ens3 \ nexthop encap mpls 20 via fe80::1 dev ens3 RTNETLINK answers: File exists The problem is that the duplicate nexthop detection does not compare lwtunnel configuration. Add it. Fixes: 19e42e451506 ("ipv6: support for fib route lwtunnel encap attributes") Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Reported-by: João Taveira Araújo <joao.taveira@gmail.com> Reported-by: Lennert Buytenhek <buytenh@wantstofly.org> Acked-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com> Tested-by: Lennert Buytenhek <buytenh@wantstofly.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: dad: don't remove dynamic addresses if link is downSabrina Dubroca2017-07-211-9/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit ec8add2a4c9df723c94a863b8fcd6d93c472deed upstream. Currently, when the link for $DEV is down, this command succeeds but the address is removed immediately by DAD (1): ip addr add 1111::12/64 dev $DEV valid_lft 3600 preferred_lft 1800 In the same situation, this will succeed and not remove the address (2): ip addr add 1111::12/64 dev $DEV ip addr change 1111::12/64 dev $DEV valid_lft 3600 preferred_lft 1800 The comment in addrconf_dad_begin() when !IF_READY makes it look like this is the intended behavior, but doesn't explain why: * If the device is not ready: * - keep it tentative if it is a permanent address. * - otherwise, kill it. We clearly cannot prevent userspace from doing (2), but we can make (1) work consistently with (2). addrconf_dad_stop() is only called in two cases: if DAD failed, or to skip DAD when the link is down. In that second case, the fix is to avoid deleting the address, like we already do for permanent addresses. Fixes: 3c21edbd1137 ("[IPV6]: Defer IPv6 device initialization until the link becomes ready.") Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: avoid unregistering inet6_dev for loopbackWANG Cong2017-07-211-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 60abc0be96e00ca71bac083215ac91ad2e575096 upstream. The per netns loopback_dev->ip6_ptr is unregistered and set to NULL when its mtu is set to smaller than IPV6_MIN_MTU, this leads to that we could set rt->rt6i_idev NULL after a rt6_uncached_list_flush_dev() and then crash after another call. In this case we should just bring its inet6_dev down, rather than unregistering it, at least prior to commit 176c39af29bc ("netns: fix addrconf_ifdown kernel panic") we always override the case for loopback. Thanks a lot to Andrey for finding a reliable reproducer. Fixes: 176c39af29bc ("netns: fix addrconf_ifdown kernel panic") Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Cc: Daniel Lezcano <dlezcano@fr.ibm.com> Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ip6_tunnel, ip6_gre: fix setting of DSCP on encapsulated packetsPeter Dawson2017-07-052-14/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 0e9a709560dbcfbace8bf4019dc5298619235891 ] This fix addresses two problems in the way the DSCP field is formulated on the encapsulating header of IPv6 tunnels. Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=195661 1) The IPv6 tunneling code was manipulating the DSCP field of the encapsulating packet using the 32b flowlabel. Since the flowlabel is only the lower 20b it was incorrect to assume that the upper 12b containing the DSCP and ECN fields would remain intact when formulating the encapsulating header. This fix handles the 'inherit' and 'fixed-value' DSCP cases explicitly using the extant dsfield u8 variable. 2) The use of INET_ECN_encapsulate(0, dsfield) in ip6_tnl_xmit was incorrect and resulted in the DSCP value always being set to 0. Commit 90427ef5d2a4 ("ipv6: fix flow labels when the traffic class is non-0") caused the regression by masking out the flowlabel which exposed the incorrect handling of the DSCP portion of the flowlabel in ip6_tunnel and ip6_gre. Fixes: 90427ef5d2a4 ("ipv6: fix flow labels when the traffic class is non-0") Signed-off-by: Peter Dawson <peter.a.dawson@boeing.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ip6_tunnel: must reload ipv6h in ip6ip6_tnl_xmit()Eric Dumazet2017-07-052-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 21b995a9cb093fff33ec91d7cb3822b882a90a1e ] Since ip6_tnl_parse_tlv_enc_lim() can call pskb_may_pull(), we must reload any pointer that was related to skb->head (or skb->data), or risk use after free. Fixes: c12b395a4664 ("gre: Support GRE over IPv6") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Kozlov <xeb@mail.ru> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: Do not leak throw route referencesSerhey Popovych2017-07-052-18/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 07f615574f8ac499875b21c1142f26308234a92c ] While commit 73ba57bfae4a ("ipv6: fix backtracking for throw routes") does good job on error propagation to the fib_rules_lookup() in fib rules core framework that also corrects throw routes handling, it does not solve route reference leakage problem happened when we return -EAGAIN to the fib_rules_lookup() and leave routing table entry referenced in arg->result. If rule with matched throw route isn't last matched in the list we overwrite arg->result losing reference on throw route stored previously forever. We also partially revert commit ab997ad40839 ("ipv6: fix the incorrect return value of throw route") since we never return routing table entry with dst.error == -EAGAIN when CONFIG_IPV6_MULTIPLE_TABLES is on. Also there is no point to check for RTF_REJECT flag since it is always set throw route. Fixes: 73ba57bfae4a ("ipv6: fix backtracking for throw routes") Signed-off-by: Serhey Popovych <serhe.popovych@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: fix calling in6_ifa_hold incorrectly for dad workXin Long2017-07-051-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit f8a894b218138888542a5058d0e902378fd0d4ec ] Now when starting the dad work in addrconf_mod_dad_work, if the dad work is idle and queued, it needs to hold ifa. The problem is there's one gap in [1], during which if the pending dad work is removed elsewhere. It will miss to hold ifa, but the dad word is still idea and queue. if (!delayed_work_pending(&ifp->dad_work)) in6_ifa_hold(ifp); <--------------[1] mod_delayed_work(addrconf_wq, &ifp->dad_work, delay); An use-after-free issue can be caused by this. Chen Wei found this issue when WARN_ON(!hlist_unhashed(&ifp->addr_lst)) in net6_ifa_finish_destroy was hit because of it. As Hannes' suggestion, this patch is to fix it by holding ifa first in addrconf_mod_dad_work, then calling mod_delayed_work and putting ifa if the dad_work is already in queue. Note that this patch did not choose to fix it with: if (!mod_delayed_work(delay)) in6_ifa_hold(ifp); As with it, when delay == 0, dad_work would be scheduled immediately, all addrconf_mod_dad_work(0) callings had to be moved under ifp->lock. Reported-by: Wei Chen <weichen@redhat.com> Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* proc: snmp6: Use correct type in memsetChristian Perle2017-07-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 3500cd73dff48f28f4ba80c171c4c80034d40f76 ] Reading /proc/net/snmp6 yields bogus values on 32 bit kernels. Use "u64" instead of "unsigned long" in sizeof(). Fixes: 4a4857b1c81e ("proc: Reduce cache miss in snmp6_seq_show") Signed-off-by: Christian Perle <christian.perle@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: release dst on error in ip6_dst_lookup_tailWillem de Bruijn2017-07-051-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 00ea1ceebe0d9f2dc1cc2b7bd575a00100c27869 upstream. If ip6_dst_lookup_tail has acquired a dst and fails the IPv4-mapped check, release the dst before returning an error. Fixes: ec5e3b0a1d41 ("ipv6: Inhibit IPv4-mapped src address on the wire.") Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ila_xlat: add missing hash secret initializationArnd Bergmann2017-06-241-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 0db47e3d323411beeb6ea97f2c4d19395c91fd8b upstream. While discussing the possible merits of clang warning about unused initialized functions, I found one function that was clearly meant to be called but never actually is. __ila_hash_secret_init() initializes the hash value for the ila locator, apparently this is intended to prevent hash collision attacks, but this ends up being a read-only zero constant since there is no caller. I could find no indication of why it was never called, the earliest patch submission for the module already was like this. If my interpretation is right, we certainly want to backport the patch to stable kernels as well. I considered adding it to the ila_xlat_init callback, but for best effect the random data is read as late as possible, just before it is first used. The underlying net_get_random_once() is already highly optimized to avoid overhead when called frequently. Fixes: 7f00feaf1076 ("ila: Add generic ILA translation facility") Link: https://www.spinics.net/lists/kernel/msg2527243.html Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: Fix IPv6 packet loss in scenarios involving roaming + snooping switchesLinus Lüssing2017-06-171-2/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit a088d1d73a4bcfd7bc482f8d08375b9b665dc3e5 ] When for instance a mobile Linux device roams from one access point to another with both APs sharing the same broadcast domain and a multicast snooping switch in between: 1) (c) <~~~> (AP1) <--[SSW]--> (AP2) 2) (AP1) <--[SSW]--> (AP2) <~~~> (c) Then currently IPv6 multicast packets will get lost for (c) until an MLD Querier sends its next query message. The packet loss occurs because upon roaming the Linux host so far stayed silent regarding MLD and the snooping switch will therefore be unaware of the multicast topology change for a while. This patch fixes this by always resending MLD reports when an interface change happens, for instance from NO-CARRIER to CARRIER state. Signed-off-by: Linus Lüssing <linus.luessing@c0d3.blue> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: addrconf: fix generation of new temporary addressesMarcus Huewe2017-06-171-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit a11a7f71cac209c7c9cca66eb506e1ebb033a3b3 ] Under some circumstances it is possible that no new temporary addresses will be generated. For instance, addrconf_prefix_rcv_add_addr() indirectly calls ipv6_create_tempaddr(), which creates a tentative temporary address and starts dad. Next, addrconf_prefix_rcv_add_addr() indirectly calls addrconf_verify_rtnl(). Now, assume that the previously created temporary address has the least preferred lifetime among all existing addresses and is still tentative (that is, dad is still running). Hence, the next run of addrconf_verify_rtnl() is performed when the preferred lifetime of the temporary address ends. If dad succeeds before the next run, the temporary address becomes deprecated during the next run, but no new temporary address is generated. In order to fix this, schedule the next addrconf_verify_rtnl() run slightly before the temporary address becomes deprecated, if dad succeeded. Signed-off-by: Marcus Huewe <suse-tux@gmx.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: Inhibit IPv4-mapped src address on the wire.Jonathan T. Leighton2017-06-171-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ec5e3b0a1d41fbda0cc33a45bc9e54e91d9d12c7 ] This patch adds a check for the problematic case of an IPv4-mapped IPv6 source address and a destination address that is neither an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address nor in6addr_any, and returns an appropriate error. The check in done before returning from looking up the route. Signed-off-by: Jonathan T. Leighton <jtleight@udel.edu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: Handle IPv4-mapped src to in6addr_any dst.Jonathan T. Leighton2017-06-173-8/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 052d2369d1b479cdbbe020fdd6d057d3c342db74 ] This patch adds a check on the type of the source address for the case where the destination address is in6addr_any. If the source is an IPv4-mapped IPv6 source address, the destination is changed to ::ffff:127.0.0.1, and otherwise the destination is changed to ::1. This is done in three locations to handle UDP calls to either connect() or sendmsg() and TCP calls to connect(). Note that udpv6_sendmsg() delays handling an in6addr_any destination until very late, so the patch only needs to handle the case where the source is an IPv4-mapped IPv6 address. Signed-off-by: Jonathan T. Leighton <jtleight@udel.edu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* net/ipv6: Fix CALIPSO causing GPF with datagram supportRichard Haines2017-06-141-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit e3ebdb20fddacded2740a333ff66781e0d28b05c ] When using CALIPSO with IPPROTO_UDP it is possible to trigger a GPF as the IP header may have moved. Also update the payload length after adding the CALIPSO option. Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Huw Davies <huw@codeweavers.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* net: ping: do not abuse udp_poll()Eric Dumazet2017-06-142-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 77d4b1d36926a9b8387c6b53eeba42bcaaffcea3 ] Alexander reported various KASAN messages triggered in recent kernels The problem is that ping sockets should not use udp_poll() in the first place, and recent changes in UDP stack finally exposed this old bug. Fixes: c319b4d76b9e ("net: ipv4: add IPPROTO_ICMP socket kind") Fixes: 6d0bfe226116 ("net: ipv6: Add IPv6 support to the ping socket.") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Cc: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Acked-By: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Tested-By: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: Fix leak in ipv6_gso_segment().David S. Miller2017-06-141-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit e3e86b5119f81e5e2499bea7ea1ebe8ac6aab789 ] If ip6_find_1stfragopt() fails and we return an error we have to free up 'segs' because nobody else is going to. Fixes: 2423496af35d ("ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options") Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: xfrm: Handle errors reported by xfrm6_find_1stfragopt()Ben Hutchings2017-06-142-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 6e80ac5cc992ab6256c3dae87f7e57db15e1a58c ] xfrm6_find_1stfragopt() may now return an error code and we must not treat it as a length. Fixes: 2423496af35d ("ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options") Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> Acked-by: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: fix out of bound writes in __ip6_append_data()Eric Dumazet2017-06-071-7/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 232cd35d0804cc241eb887bb8d4d9b3b9881c64a ] Andrey Konovalov and idaifish@gmail.com reported crashes caused by one skb shared_info being overwritten from __ip6_append_data() Andrey program lead to following state : copy -4200 datalen 2000 fraglen 2040 maxfraglen 2040 alloclen 2048 transhdrlen 0 offset 0 fraggap 6200 The skb_copy_and_csum_bits(skb_prev, maxfraglen, data + transhdrlen, fraggap, 0); is overwriting skb->head and skb_shared_info Since we apparently detect this rare condition too late, move the code earlier to even avoid allocating skb and risking crashes. Once again, many thanks to Andrey and syzkaller team. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Reported-by: <idaifish@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: Check ip6_find_1stfragopt() return value properly.David S. Miller2017-06-073-12/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 7dd7eb9513bd02184d45f000ab69d78cb1fa1531 ] Do not use unsigned variables to see if it returns a negative error or not. Fixes: 2423496af35d ("ipv6: Prevent overrun when parsing v6 header options") Reported-by: Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@lip6.fr> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.46.0) at 2025-04-25 01:25:39 +0000