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* [LSM-IPsec]: SELinux AuthorizeCatherine Zhang2006-06-171-6/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch contains a fix for the previous patch that adds security contexts to IPsec policies and security associations. In the previous patch, no authorization (besides the check for write permissions to SAD and SPD) is required to delete IPsec policies and security assocations with security contexts. Thus a user authorized to change SAD and SPD can bypass the IPsec policy authorization by simply deleteing policies with security contexts. To fix this security hole, an additional authorization check is added for removing security policies and security associations with security contexts. Note that if no security context is supplied on add or present on policy to be deleted, the SELinux module allows the change unconditionally. The hook is called on deletion when no context is present, which we may want to change. At present, I left it up to the module. LSM changes: The patch adds two new LSM hooks: xfrm_policy_delete and xfrm_state_delete. The new hooks are necessary to authorize deletion of IPsec policies that have security contexts. The existing hooks xfrm_policy_free and xfrm_state_free lack the context to do the authorization, so I decided to split authorization of deletion and memory management of security data, as is typical in the LSM interface. Use: The new delete hooks are checked when xfrm_policy or xfrm_state are deleted by either the xfrm_user interface (xfrm_get_policy, xfrm_del_sa) or the pfkey interface (pfkey_spddelete, pfkey_delete). SELinux changes: The new policy_delete and state_delete functions are added. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NET] sem2mutex: net/Arjan van de Ven2006-03-201-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | Semaphore to mutex conversion. The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated automatically via a script as well. Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Sync series - userJamal Hadi Salim2006-03-201-0/+2
| | | | | | | Add xfrm as the user of the core changes Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [XFRM]: Eliminate refcounting confusion by creating __xfrm_state_put().Herbert Xu2006-02-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | We often just do an atomic_dec(&x->refcnt) on an xfrm_state object because we know there is more than 1 reference remaining and thus we can elide the heavier xfrm_state_put() call. Do this behind an inline function called __xfrm_state_put() so that is more obvious and also to allow us to more cleanly add refcount debugging later. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [AF_KEY]: no message type setJerome Borsboom2006-01-241-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | When returning a message to userspace in reply to a SADB_FLUSH or SADB_X_SPDFLUSH message, the type was not set for the returned PFKEY message. The patch below corrects this problem. Signed-off-by: Jerome Borsboom <j.borsboom@erasmusmc.nl> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] capable/capability.h (net/)Randy Dunlap2006-01-111-0/+1
| | | | | | | | net: Use <linux/capability.h> where capable() is used. Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [NET]: Change some "if (x) BUG();" to "BUG_ON(x);"Kris Katterjohn2006-01-091-2/+1
| | | | | | | This changes some simple "if (x) BUG();" statements to "BUG_ON(x);" Signed-off-by: Kris Katterjohn <kjak@users.sourceforge.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [NET]: move struct proto_ops to constEric Dumazet2006-01-031-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I noticed that some of 'struct proto_ops' used in the kernel may share a cache line used by locks or other heavily modified data. (default linker alignement is 32 bytes, and L1_CACHE_LINE is 64 or 128 at least) This patch makes sure a 'struct proto_ops' can be declared as const, so that all cpus can share all parts of it without false sharing. This is not mandatory : a driver can still use a read/write structure if it needs to (and eventually a __read_mostly) I made a global stubstitute to change all existing occurences to make them const. This should reduce the possibility of false sharing on SMP, and speedup some socket system calls. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.Trent Jaeger2006-01-031-8/+189
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch series implements per packet access control via the extension of the Linux Security Modules (LSM) interface by hooks in the XFRM and pfkey subsystems that leverage IPSec security associations to label packets. Extensions to the SELinux LSM are included that leverage the patch for this purpose. This patch implements the changes necessary to the XFRM subsystem, pfkey interface, ipv4/ipv6, and xfrm_user interface to restrict a socket to use only authorized security associations (or no security association) to send/receive network packets. Patch purpose: The patch is designed to enable access control per packets based on the strongly authenticated IPSec security association. Such access controls augment the existing ones based on network interface and IP address. The former are very coarse-grained, and the latter can be spoofed. By using IPSec, the system can control access to remote hosts based on cryptographic keys generated using the IPSec mechanism. This enables access control on a per-machine basis or per-application if the remote machine is running the same mechanism and trusted to enforce the access control policy. Patch design approach: The overall approach is that policy (xfrm_policy) entries set by user-level programs (e.g., setkey for ipsec-tools) are extended with a security context that is used at policy selection time in the XFRM subsystem to restrict the sockets that can send/receive packets via security associations (xfrm_states) that are built from those policies. A presentation available at www.selinux-symposium.org/2005/presentations/session2/2-3-jaeger.pdf from the SELinux symposium describes the overall approach. Patch implementation details: On output, the policy retrieved (via xfrm_policy_lookup or xfrm_sk_policy_lookup) must be authorized for the security context of the socket and the same security context is required for resultant security association (retrieved or negotiated via racoon in ipsec-tools). This is enforced in xfrm_state_find. On input, the policy retrieved must also be authorized for the socket (at __xfrm_policy_check), and the security context of the policy must also match the security association being used. The patch has virtually no impact on packets that do not use IPSec. The existing Netfilter (outgoing) and LSM rcv_skb hooks are used as before. Also, if IPSec is used without security contexts, the impact is minimal. The LSM must allow such policies to be selected for the combination of socket and remote machine, but subsequent IPSec processing proceeds as in the original case. Testing: The pfkey interface is tested using the ipsec-tools. ipsec-tools have been modified (a separate ipsec-tools patch is available for version 0.5) that supports assignment of xfrm_policy entries and security associations with security contexts via setkey and the negotiation using the security contexts via racoon. The xfrm_user interface is tested via ad hoc programs that set security contexts. These programs are also available from me, and contain programs for setting, getting, and deleting policy for testing this interface. Testing of sa functions was done by tracing kernel behavior. Signed-off-by: Trent Jaeger <tjaeger@cse.psu.edu> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [PATCH] gfp flags annotations - part 1Al Viro2005-10-081-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | - added typedef unsigned int __nocast gfp_t; - replaced __nocast uses for gfp flags with gfp_t - it gives exactly the same warnings as far as sparse is concerned, doesn't change generated code (from gcc point of view we replaced unsigned int with typedef) and documents what's going on far better. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
* [IPSEC]: Document that policy direction is derived from the index.Herbert Xu2005-10-051-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | Here is a patch that adds a helper called xfrm_policy_id2dir to document the fact that the policy direction can be and is derived from the index. This is based on a patch by YOSHIFUJI Hideaki and 210313105@suda.edu.cn. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [AF_KEY]: fix sparse gfp nocast warningsRandy Dunlap2005-10-041-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | Fix implicit nocast warnings in net/key code: net/key/af_key.c:195:27: warning: implicit cast to nocast type net/key/af_key.c:1439:28: warning: implicit cast to nocast type Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Add XFRM_STATE_NOPMTUDISC flagHerbert Xu2005-06-201-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds the flag XFRM_STATE_NOPMTUDISC for xfrm states. It is similar to the nopmtudisc on IPIP/GRE tunnels. It only has an effect on IPv4 tunnel mode states. For these states, it will ensure that the DF flag is always cleared. This is primarily useful to work around ICMP blackholes. In future this flag could also allow a larger MTU to be set within the tunnel just like IPIP/GRE tunnels. This could be useful for short haul tunnels where temporary fragmentation outside the tunnel is desired over smaller fragments inside the tunnel. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC]: Add xfrm_init_stateHerbert Xu2005-06-201-9/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds xfrm_init_state which is simply a wrapper that calls xfrm_get_type and subsequently x->type->init_state. It also gets rid of the unused args argument. Abstracting it out allows us to add common initialisation code, e.g., to set family-specific flags. The add_time setting in xfrm_user.c was deleted because it's already set by xfrm_state_alloc. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC] Fix xfrm_state leaks in error pathPatrick McHardy2005-06-181-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Herbert Xu wrote: > @@ -1254,6 +1326,7 @@ static int pfkey_add(struct sock *sk, st > if (IS_ERR(x)) > return PTR_ERR(x); > > + xfrm_state_hold(x); This introduces a leak when xfrm_state_add()/xfrm_state_update() fail. We hold two references (one from xfrm_state_alloc(), one from xfrm_state_hold()), but only drop one. We need to take the reference because the reference from xfrm_state_alloc() can be dropped by __xfrm_state_delete(), so the fix is to drop both references on error. Same problem in xfrm_user.c. Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* [IPSEC] Use XFRM_MSG_* instead of XFRM_SAP_*Herbert Xu2005-06-181-30/+30
| | | | | | | | | | This patch removes XFRM_SAP_* and converts them over to XFRM_MSG_*. The netlink interface is meant to map directly onto the underlying xfrm subsystem. Therefore rather than using a new independent representation for the events we can simply use the existing ones from xfrm_user. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [IPSEC] Turn km_event.data into a unionHerbert Xu2005-06-181-12/+5
| | | | | | | This patch turns km_event.data into a union. This makes code that uses it clearer. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [IPSEC] Fix xfrm to pfkey SA state conversionHerbert Xu2005-06-181-5/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adjusts the SA state conversion in af_key such that XFRM_STATE_ERROR/XFRM_STATE_DEAD will be converted to SADB_STATE_DEAD instead of SADB_STATE_DYING. According to RFC 2367, SADB_STATE_DYING SAs can be turned into mature ones through updating their lifetime settings. Since SAs which are in the states XFRM_STATE_ERROR/XFRM_STATE_DEAD cannot be resurrected, this value is unsuitable. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* [IPSEC] Add complete xfrm event notificationJamal Hadi Salim2005-06-181-90/+267
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Heres the final patch. What this patch provides - netlink xfrm events - ability to have events generated by netlink propagated to pfkey and vice versa. - fixes the acquire lets-be-happy-with-one-success issue Signed-off-by: Jamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
* Linux-2.6.12-rc2v2.6.12-rc2Linus Torvalds2005-04-162-0/+2908
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!