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* netfilter: ctnetlink: fix incorrect nf_ct_put during hash resizeLiping Zhang2018-04-131-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit fefa92679dbe0c613e62b6c27235dcfbe9640ad1 ] If nf_conntrack_htable_size was adjusted by the user during the ct dump operation, we may invoke nf_ct_put twice for the same ct, i.e. the "last" ct. This will cause the ct will be freed but still linked in hash buckets. It's very easy to reproduce the problem by the following commands: # while : ; do echo $RANDOM > /proc/sys/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_buckets done # while : ; do conntrack -L done # iperf -s 127.0.0.1 & # iperf -c 127.0.0.1 -P 60 -t 36000 After a while, the system will hang like this: NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 22s! [bash:20184] NMI watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [iperf:20382] ... So at last if we find cb->args[1] is equal to "last", this means hash resize happened, then we can set cb->args[1] to 0 to fix the above issue. Fixes: d205dc40798d ("[NETFILTER]: ctnetlink: fix deadlock in table dumping") Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: x_tables: add and use xt_check_proc_nameFlorian Westphal2018-04-083-5/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit b1d0a5d0cba4597c0394997b2d5fced3e3841b4e upstream. recent and hashlimit both create /proc files, but only check that name is 0 terminated. This can trigger WARN() from procfs when name is "" or "/". Add helper for this and then use it for both. Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Reported-by: <syzbot+0502b00edac2a0680b61@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: IDLETIMER: be syzkaller friendlyEric Dumazet2018-03-181-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit cfc2c740533368b96e2be5e0a4e8c3cace7d9814 upstream. We had one report from syzkaller [1] First issue is that INIT_WORK() should be done before mod_timer() or we risk timer being fired too soon, even with a 1 second timer. Second issue is that we need to reject too big info->timeout to avoid overflows in msecs_to_jiffies(info->timeout * 1000), or risk looping, if result after overflow is 0. [1] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5129 at kernel/workqueue.c:1444 __queue_work+0xdf4/0x1230 kernel/workqueue.c:1444 Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 5129 Comm: syzkaller159866 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1+ #230 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <IRQ> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 panic+0x1e4/0x41c kernel/panic.c:183 __warn+0x1dc/0x200 kernel/panic.c:547 report_bug+0x211/0x2d0 lib/bug.c:184 fixup_bug.part.11+0x37/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:178 fixup_bug arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:247 [inline] do_error_trap+0x2d7/0x3e0 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:296 do_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:315 invalid_op+0x22/0x40 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:988 RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0xdf4/0x1230 kernel/workqueue.c:1444 RSP: 0018:ffff8801db507538 EFLAGS: 00010006 RAX: ffff8801aeb46080 RBX: ffff8801db530200 RCX: ffffffff81481404 RDX: 0000000000000100 RSI: ffffffff86b42640 RDI: 0000000000000082 RBP: ffff8801db507758 R08: 1ffff1003b6a0de5 R09: 000000000000000c R10: ffff8801db5073f0 R11: 0000000000000020 R12: 1ffff1003b6a0eb6 R13: ffff8801b1067ae0 R14: 00000000000001f8 R15: dffffc0000000000 queue_work_on+0x16a/0x1c0 kernel/workqueue.c:1488 queue_work include/linux/workqueue.h:488 [inline] schedule_work include/linux/workqueue.h:546 [inline] idletimer_tg_expired+0x44/0x60 net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c:116 call_timer_fn+0x228/0x820 kernel/time/timer.c:1326 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1363 [inline] __run_timers+0x7ee/0xb70 kernel/time/timer.c:1666 run_timer_softirq+0x4c/0x70 kernel/time/timer.c:1692 __do_softirq+0x2d7/0xb85 kernel/softirq.c:285 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:365 [inline] irq_exit+0x1cc/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:405 exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:541 [inline] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16b/0x700 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1052 apic_timer_interrupt+0xa9/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:829 </IRQ> RIP: 0010:arch_local_irq_restore arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:777 [inline] RIP: 0010:__raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:160 [inline] RIP: 0010:_raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x5e/0xba kernel/locking/spinlock.c:184 RSP: 0018:ffff8801c20173c8 EFLAGS: 00000282 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff12 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000282 RCX: 0000000000000006 RDX: 1ffffffff0d592cd RSI: 1ffff10035d68d23 RDI: 0000000000000282 RBP: ffff8801c20173d8 R08: 1ffff10038402e47 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff8820e5c8 R13: ffff8801b1067ad8 R14: ffff8801aea7c268 R15: ffff8801aea7c278 __debug_object_init+0x235/0x1040 lib/debugobjects.c:378 debug_object_init+0x17/0x20 lib/debugobjects.c:391 __init_work+0x2b/0x60 kernel/workqueue.c:506 idletimer_tg_create net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c:152 [inline] idletimer_tg_checkentry+0x691/0xb00 net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c:213 xt_check_target+0x22c/0x7d0 net/netfilter/x_tables.c:850 check_target net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:533 [inline] find_check_entry.isra.7+0x935/0xcf0 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:575 translate_table+0xf52/0x1690 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:744 do_replace net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1160 [inline] do_ip6t_set_ctl+0x370/0x5f0 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1686 nf_sockopt net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:106 [inline] nf_setsockopt+0x67/0xc0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:115 ipv6_setsockopt+0x10b/0x130 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:927 udpv6_setsockopt+0x45/0x80 net/ipv6/udp.c:1422 sock_common_setsockopt+0x95/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2976 SYSC_setsockopt net/socket.c:1850 [inline] SyS_setsockopt+0x189/0x360 net/socket.c:1829 do_syscall_64+0x282/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 Fixes: 0902b469bd25 ("netfilter: xtables: idletimer target implementation") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: nat: cope with negative port rangePaolo Abeni2018-03-181-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit db57ccf0f2f4624b4c4758379f8165277504fbd7 upstream. syzbot reported a division by 0 bug in the netfilter nat code: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 4168 Comm: syzkaller034710 Not tainted 4.16.0-rc1+ #309 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:nf_nat_l4proto_unique_tuple+0x291/0x530 net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c:88 RSP: 0018:ffff8801b2466778 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 000000000000f153 RBX: ffff8801b2466dd8 RCX: ffff8801b2466c7c RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff8801b2466c58 RDI: ffff8801db5293ac RBP: ffff8801b24667d8 R08: ffff8801b8ba6dc0 R09: ffffffff88af5900 R10: ffff8801b24666f0 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000002990f153 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8801b2466c7c FS: 00000000017e3880(0000) GS:ffff8801db500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000208fdfe4 CR3: 00000001b5340002 CR4: 00000000001606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: dccp_unique_tuple+0x40/0x50 net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_dccp.c:30 get_unique_tuple+0xc28/0x1c10 net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c:362 nf_nat_setup_info+0x1c2/0xe00 net/netfilter/nf_nat_core.c:406 nf_nat_redirect_ipv6+0x306/0x730 net/netfilter/nf_nat_redirect.c:124 redirect_tg6+0x7f/0xb0 net/netfilter/xt_REDIRECT.c:34 ip6t_do_table+0xc2a/0x1a30 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:365 ip6table_nat_do_chain+0x65/0x80 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_nat.c:41 nf_nat_ipv6_fn+0x594/0xa80 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c:302 nf_nat_ipv6_local_fn+0x33/0x5d0 net/ipv6/netfilter/nf_nat_l3proto_ipv6.c:407 ip6table_nat_local_fn+0x2c/0x40 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_nat.c:69 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:120 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0xba/0x1a0 net/netfilter/core.c:483 nf_hook include/linux/netfilter.h:243 [inline] NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:286 [inline] ip6_xmit+0x10ec/0x2260 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:277 inet6_csk_xmit+0x2fc/0x580 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:139 dccp_transmit_skb+0x9ac/0x10f0 net/dccp/output.c:142 dccp_connect+0x369/0x670 net/dccp/output.c:564 dccp_v6_connect+0xe17/0x1bf0 net/dccp/ipv6.c:946 __inet_stream_connect+0x2d4/0xf00 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:620 inet_stream_connect+0x58/0xa0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:684 SYSC_connect+0x213/0x4a0 net/socket.c:1639 SyS_connect+0x24/0x30 net/socket.c:1620 do_syscall_64+0x282/0x940 arch/x86/entry/common.c:287 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x26/0x9b RIP: 0033:0x441c69 RSP: 002b:00007ffe50cc0be8 EFLAGS: 00000217 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: ffffffffffffffff RCX: 0000000000441c69 RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 00000000208fdfe4 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006cc018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000538 R11: 0000000000000217 R12: 0000000000403590 R13: 0000000000403620 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Code: 48 89 f0 83 e0 07 83 c0 01 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 46 02 00 00 48 8b 45 c8 44 0f b7 20 e8 88 97 04 fd 31 d2 41 0f b7 c4 4c 89 f9 <41> f7 f6 48 c1 e9 03 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 0f b6 0c 01 RIP: nf_nat_l4proto_unique_tuple+0x291/0x530 net/netfilter/nf_nat_proto_common.c:88 RSP: ffff8801b2466778 The problem is that currently we don't have any check on the configured port range. A port range == -1 triggers the bug, while other negative values may require a very long time to complete the following loop. This commit addresses the issue swapping the two ends on negative ranges. The check is performed in nf_nat_l4proto_unique_tuple() since the nft nat loads the port values from nft registers at runtime. v1 -> v2: use the correct 'Fixes' tag v2 -> v3: update commit message, drop unneeded READ_ONCE() Fixes: 5b1158e909ec ("[NETFILTER]: Add NAT support for nf_conntrack") Reported-by: syzbot+8012e198bd037f4871e5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: x_tables: fix missing timer initialization in xt_LEDPaolo Abeni2018-03-181-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 10414014bc085aac9f787a5890b33b5605fbcfc4 upstream. syzbot reported that xt_LED may try to use the ledinternal->timer without previously initializing it: ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at kernel/time/timer.c:958! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Dumping ftrace buffer: (ftrace buffer empty) Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 1826 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 4.15.0+ #306 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Workqueue: ipv6_addrconf addrconf_dad_work RIP: 0010:__mod_timer kernel/time/timer.c:958 [inline] RIP: 0010:mod_timer+0x7d6/0x13c0 kernel/time/timer.c:1102 RSP: 0018:ffff8801d24fe9f8 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffff8801d25246c0 RBX: ffff8801aec6cb50 RCX: ffffffff816052c6 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000fffbd14b RDI: ffff8801aec6cb68 RBP: ffff8801d24fec98 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 1ffff1003a49fd6c R10: ffff8801d24feb28 R11: 0000000000000005 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff8801d24fec70 R14: 00000000fffbd14b R15: ffff8801af608f90 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8801db500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000206d6fd0 CR3: 0000000006a22001 CR4: 00000000001606e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: led_tg+0x1db/0x2e0 net/netfilter/xt_LED.c:75 ip6t_do_table+0xc2a/0x1a30 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:365 ip6table_raw_hook+0x65/0x80 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6table_raw.c:42 nf_hook_entry_hookfn include/linux/netfilter.h:120 [inline] nf_hook_slow+0xba/0x1a0 net/netfilter/core.c:483 nf_hook.constprop.27+0x3f6/0x830 include/linux/netfilter.h:243 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:286 [inline] ndisc_send_skb+0xa51/0x1370 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:491 ndisc_send_ns+0x38a/0x870 net/ipv6/ndisc.c:633 addrconf_dad_work+0xb9e/0x1320 net/ipv6/addrconf.c:4008 process_one_work+0xbbf/0x1af0 kernel/workqueue.c:2113 worker_thread+0x223/0x1990 kernel/workqueue.c:2247 kthread+0x33c/0x400 kernel/kthread.c:238 ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:429 Code: 85 2a 0b 00 00 4d 8b 3c 24 4d 85 ff 75 9f 4c 8b bd 60 fd ff ff e8 bb 57 10 00 65 ff 0d 94 9a a1 7e e9 d9 fc ff ff e8 aa 57 10 00 <0f> 0b e8 a3 57 10 00 e9 14 fb ff ff e8 99 57 10 00 4c 89 bd 70 RIP: __mod_timer kernel/time/timer.c:958 [inline] RSP: ffff8801d24fe9f8 RIP: mod_timer+0x7d6/0x13c0 kernel/time/timer.c:1102 RSP: ffff8801d24fe9f8 ---[ end trace f661ab06f5dd8b3d ]--- The ledinternal struct can be shared between several different xt_LED targets, but the related timer is currently initialized only if the first target requires it. Fix it by unconditionally initializing the timer struct. v1 -> v2: call del_timer_sync() unconditionally, too. Fixes: 268cb38e1802 ("netfilter: x_tables: add LED trigger target") Reported-by: syzbot+10c98dc5725c6c8fc7fb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: xt_RATEEST: acquire xt_rateest_mutex for hash insertCong Wang2018-02-251-5/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 7dc68e98757a8eccf8ca7a53a29b896f1eef1f76 upstream. rateest_hash is supposed to be protected by xt_rateest_mutex, and, as suggested by Eric, lookup and insert should be atomic, so we should acquire the xt_rateest_mutex once for both. So introduce a non-locking helper for internal use and keep the locking one for external. Reported-by: <syzbot+5cb189720978275e4c75@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Fixes: 5859034d7eb8 ("[NETFILTER]: x_tables: add RATEEST target") Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: x_tables: avoid out-of-bounds reads in xt_request_find_{match|target}Eric Dumazet2018-02-251-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit da17c73b6eb74aad3c3c0654394635675b623b3e upstream. It looks like syzbot found its way into netfilter territory. Issue here is that @name comes from user space and might not be null terminated. Out-of-bound reads happen, KASAN is not happy. v2 added similar fix for xt_request_find_target(), as Florian advised. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: x_tables: fix int overflow in xt_alloc_table_info()Dmitry Vyukov2018-02-251-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 889c604fd0b5f6d3b8694ade229ee44124de1127 upstream. syzkaller triggered OOM kills by passing ipt_replace.size = -1 to IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE. The root cause is that SMP_ALIGN() in xt_alloc_table_info() causes int overflow and the size check passes when it should not. SMP_ALIGN() is no longer needed leftover. Remove SMP_ALIGN() call in xt_alloc_table_info(). Reported-by: syzbot+4396883fa8c4f64e0175@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: xt_osf: Add missing permission checksKevin Cernekee2018-01-311-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 916a27901de01446bcf57ecca4783f6cff493309 upstream. The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket. However, xt_osf_fingers is shared by all net namespaces on the system. An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable() check: vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os vpnns -- nfnl_osf -f /tmp/pf.os -d These non-root operations successfully modify the systemwide OS fingerprint list. Add new capable() checks so that they can't. Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: nfnetlink_cthelper: Add missing permission checksKevin Cernekee2018-01-311-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 4b380c42f7d00a395feede754f0bc2292eebe6e5 upstream. The capability check in nfnetlink_rcv() verifies that the caller has CAP_NET_ADMIN in the namespace that "owns" the netlink socket. However, nfnl_cthelper_list is shared by all net namespaces on the system. An unprivileged user can create user and net namespaces in which he holds CAP_NET_ADMIN to bypass the netlink_net_capable() check: $ nfct helper list nfct v1.4.4: netlink error: Operation not permitted $ vpnns -- nfct helper list { .name = ftp, .queuenum = 0, .l3protonum = 2, .l4protonum = 6, .priv_data_len = 24, .status = enabled, }; Add capable() checks in nfnetlink_cthelper, as this is cleaner than trying to generalize the solution. Signed-off-by: Kevin Cernekee <cernekee@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: nf_conntrack_sip: extend request line validationUlrich Weber2018-01-311-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 444f901742d054a4cd5ff045871eac5131646cfb upstream. on SIP requests, so a fragmented TCP SIP packet from an allow header starting with INVITE,NOTIFY,OPTIONS,REFER,REGISTER,UPDATE,SUBSCRIBE Content-Length: 0 will not bet interpreted as an INVITE request. Also Request-URI must start with an alphabetic character. Confirm with RFC 3261 Request-Line = Method SP Request-URI SP SIP-Version CRLF Fixes: 30f33e6dee80 ("[NETFILTER]: nf_conntrack_sip: support method specific request/response handling") Signed-off-by: Ulrich Weber <ulrich.weber@riverbed.com> Acked-by: Marco Angaroni <marcoangaroni@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: restart search if moved to other chainFlorian Westphal2018-01-311-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 95a8d19f28e6b29377a880c6264391a62e07fccc upstream. In case nf_conntrack_tuple_taken did not find a conflicting entry check that all entries in this hash slot were tested and restart in case an entry was moved to another chain. Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Fixes: ea781f197d6a ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: use SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU and get rid of call_rcu()") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: nf_ct_expect: remove the redundant slash when policy name is emptyLiping Zhang2018-01-311-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit b173a28f62cf929324a8a6adcc45adadce311d16 upstream. The 'name' filed in struct nf_conntrack_expect_policy{} is not a pointer, so check it is NULL or not will always return true. Even if the name is empty, slash will always be displayed like follows: # cat /proc/net/nf_conntrack_expect 297 l3proto = 2 proto=6 src=1.1.1.1 dst=2.2.2.2 sport=1 dport=1025 ftp/ ^ Fixes: 3a8fc53a45c4 ("netfilter: nf_ct_helper: allocate 16 bytes for the helper and policy names") Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <liping.zhang@spreadtrum.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Acked-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: nfnl_cthelper: fix a race when walk the nf_ct_helper_hash tableLiping Zhang2017-12-251-96/+81
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 83d90219a5df8d950855ce73229a97b63605c317 ] The nf_ct_helper_hash table is protected by nf_ct_helper_mutex, while nfct_helper operation is protected by nfnl_lock(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTHELPER). So it's possible that one CPU is walking the nf_ct_helper_hash for cthelper add/get/del, another cpu is doing nf_conntrack_helpers_unregister at the same time. This is dangrous, and may cause use after free error. Note, delete operation will flush all cthelpers added via nfnetlink, so using rcu to do protect is not easy. Now introduce a dummy list to record all the cthelpers added via nfnetlink, then we can walk the dummy list instead of walking the nf_ct_helper_hash. Also, keep nfnl_cthelper_dump_table unchanged, it may be invoked without nfnl_lock(NFNL_SUBSYS_CTHELPER) held. Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: nfnl_cthelper: Fix memory leakJeffy Chen2017-12-251-3/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit f83bf8da1135ca635aac8f062cad3f001fcf3a26 ] We have memory leaks of nf_conntrack_helper & expect_policy. Signed-off-by: Jeffy Chen <jeffy.chen@rock-chips.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: nfnl_cthelper: fix runtime expectation policy updatesPablo Neira Ayuso2017-12-251-2/+84
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 2c422257550f123049552b39f7af6e3428a60f43 ] We only allow runtime updates of expectation policies for timeout and maximum number of expectations, otherwise reject the update. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Acked-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: nf_tables: fix oob accessFlorian Westphal2017-11-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 3e38df136e453aa69eb4472108ebce2fb00b1ba6 ] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in nf_tables_rule_destroy+0xf1/0x130 at addr ffff88006a4c35c8 Read of size 8 by task nft/1607 When we've destroyed last valid expr, nft_expr_next() returns an invalid expr. We must not dereference it unless it passes != nft_expr_last() check. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: nft_queue: use raw_smp_processor_id()Pablo Neira Ayuso2017-11-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit c2e756ff9e699865d294cdc112acfc36419cf5cc ] Using smp_processor_id() causes splats with PREEMPT_RCU: [19379.552780] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: ping/32389 [19379.552793] caller is debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x19 [...] [19379.552823] Call Trace: [19379.552832] [<ffffffff81274e9e>] dump_stack+0x67/0x90 [19379.552837] [<ffffffff8129a4d4>] check_preemption_disabled+0xe5/0xf5 [19379.552842] [<ffffffff8129a4fb>] debug_smp_processor_id+0x17/0x19 [19379.552849] [<ffffffffa07c42dd>] nft_queue_eval+0x35/0x20c [nft_queue] No need to disable preemption since we only fetch the numeric value, so let's use raw_smp_processor_id() instead. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: nf_ct_expect: Change __nf_ct_expect_check() return value.Jarno Rajahalme2017-10-211-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 4b86c459c7bee3acaf92f0e2b4c6ac803eaa1a58 ] Commit 4dee62b1b9b4 ("netfilter: nf_ct_expect: nf_ct_expect_insert() returns void") inadvertently changed the successful return value of nf_ct_expect_related_report() from 0 to 1 due to __nf_ct_expect_check() returning 1 on success. Prevent this regression in the future by changing the return value of __nf_ct_expect_check() to 0 on success. Signed-off-by: Jarno Rajahalme <jarno@ovn.org> Acked-by: Joe Stringer <joe@ovn.org> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: nfnl_cthelper: fix incorrect helper->expect_class_maxLiping Zhang2017-10-081-9/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ae5c682113f9f94cc5e76f92cf041ee624c173ee ] The helper->expect_class_max must be set to the total number of expect_policy minus 1, since we will use the statement "if (class > helper->expect_class_max)" to validate the CTA_EXPECT_CLASS attr in ctnetlink_alloc_expect. So for compatibility, set the helper->expect_class_max to the NFCTH_POLICY_SET_NUM attr's value minus 1. Also: it's invalid when the NFCTH_POLICY_SET_NUM attr's value is zero. 1. this will result "expect_policy = kzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL);"; 2. we cannot set the helper->expect_class_max to a proper value. So if nla_get_be32(tb[NFCTH_POLICY_SET_NUM]) is zero, report -EINVAL to the userspace. Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: invoke synchronize_rcu after set the _hook_ to NULLLiping Zhang2017-10-084-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 3b7dabf029478bb80507a6c4500ca94132a2bc0b ] Otherwise, another CPU may access the invalid pointer. For example: CPU0 CPU1 - rcu_read_lock(); - pfunc = _hook_; _hook_ = NULL; - mod unload - - pfunc(); // invalid, panic - rcu_read_unlock(); So we must call synchronize_rcu() to wait the rcu reader to finish. Also note, in nf_nat_snmp_basic_fini, synchronize_rcu() will be invoked by later nf_conntrack_helper_unregister, but I'm inclined to add a explicit synchronize_rcu after set the nf_nat_snmp_hook to NULL. Depend on such obscure assumptions is not a good idea. Last, in nfnetlink_cttimeout, we use kfree_rcu to free the time object, so in cttimeout_exit, invoking rcu_barrier() is not necessary at all, remove it too. Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: nf_ct_ext: fix possible panic after nf_ct_extend_unregisterLiping Zhang2017-08-241-3/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 9c3f3794926a997b1cab6c42480ff300efa2d162 upstream. If one cpu is doing nf_ct_extend_unregister while another cpu is doing __nf_ct_ext_add_length, then we may hit BUG_ON(t == NULL). Moreover, there's no synchronize_rcu invocation after set nf_ct_ext_types[id] to NULL, so it's possible that we may access invalid pointer. But actually, most of the ct extends are built-in, so the problem listed above will not happen. However, there are two exceptions: NF_CT_EXT_NAT and NF_CT_EXT_SYNPROXY. For _EXT_NAT, the panic will not happen, since adding the nat extend and unregistering the nat extend are located in the same file(nf_nat_core.c), this means that after the nat module is removed, we cannot add the nat extend too. For _EXT_SYNPROXY, synproxy extend may be added by init_conntrack, while synproxy extend unregister will be done by synproxy_core_exit. So after nf_synproxy_core.ko is removed, we may still try to add the synproxy extend, then kernel panic may happen. I know it's very hard to reproduce this issue, but I can play a tricky game to make it happen very easily :) Step 1. Enable SYNPROXY for tcp dport 1234 at FORWARD hook: # iptables -I FORWARD -p tcp --dport 1234 -j SYNPROXY Step 2. Queue the syn packet to the userspace at raw table OUTPUT hook. Also note, in the userspace we only add a 20s' delay, then reinject the syn packet to the kernel: # iptables -t raw -I OUTPUT -p tcp --syn -j NFQUEUE --queue-num 1 Step 3. Using "nc 2.2.2.2 1234" to connect the server. Step 4. Now remove the nf_synproxy_core.ko quickly: # iptables -F FORWARD # rmmod ipt_SYNPROXY # rmmod nf_synproxy_core Step 5. After 20s' delay, the syn packet is reinjected to the kernel. Now you will see the panic like this: kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_extend.c:91! Call Trace: ? __nf_ct_ext_add_length+0x53/0x3c0 [nf_conntrack] init_conntrack+0x12b/0x600 [nf_conntrack] nf_conntrack_in+0x4cc/0x580 [nf_conntrack] ipv4_conntrack_local+0x48/0x50 [nf_conntrack_ipv4] nf_reinject+0x104/0x270 nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x3e1/0x5f9 [nfnetlink_queue] ? nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x5/0x5f9 [nfnetlink_queue] ? nla_parse+0xa0/0x100 nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x175/0x6a9 [nfnetlink] [...] One possible solution is to make NF_CT_EXT_SYNPROXY extend built-in, i.e. introduce nf_conntrack_synproxy.c and only do ct extend register and unregister in it, similar to nf_conntrack_timeout.c. But having such a obscure restriction of nf_ct_extend_unregister is not a good idea, so we should invoke synchronize_rcu after set nf_ct_ext_types to NULL, and check the NULL pointer when do __nf_ct_ext_add_length. Then it will be easier if we add new ct extend in the future. Last, we use kfree_rcu to free nf_ct_ext, so rcu_barrier() is unnecessary anymore, remove it too. Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Cc: Stefan Bader <stefan.bader@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: synproxy: fix conntrackd interactionEric Leblond2017-07-051-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 87e94dbc210a720a34be5c1174faee5c84be963e upstream. This patch fixes the creation of connection tracking entry from netlink when synproxy is used. It was missing the addition of the synproxy extension. This was causing kernel crashes when a conntrack entry created by conntrackd was used after the switch of traffic from active node to the passive node. Signed-off-by: Eric Leblond <eric@regit.org> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: xt_TCPMSS: add more sanity tests on tcph->doffEric Dumazet2017-07-051-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 2638fd0f92d4397884fd991d8f4925cb3f081901 upstream. Denys provided an awesome KASAN report pointing to an use after free in xt_TCPMSS I have provided three patches to fix this issue, either in xt_TCPMSS or in xt_tcpudp.c. It seems xt_TCPMSS patch has the smallest possible impact. Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <nuclearcat@nuclearcat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter; Add some missing default cases to switch statements in nft_reject.David S. Miller2017-02-082-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 129d23a56623eea0947a05288158d76dc7f2f0ac upstream. This fixes: ==================== net/netfilter/nft_reject.c: In function ‘nft_reject_dump’: net/netfilter/nft_reject.c:61:2: warning: enumeration value ‘NFT_REJECT_TCP_RST’ not handled in switch [-Wswitch] switch (priv->type) { ^ net/netfilter/nft_reject.c:61:2: warning: enumeration value ‘NFT_REJECT_ICMPX_UNREACH’ not handled in switch [-Wswi\ tch] net/netfilter/nft_reject_inet.c: In function ‘nft_reject_inet_dump’: net/netfilter/nft_reject_inet.c:105:2: warning: enumeration value ‘NFT_REJECT_TCP_RST’ not handled in switch [-Wswi\ tch] switch (priv->type) { ^ ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: Fix switch statement warnings with recent gcc.David Miller2017-02-082-3/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c1f866767777d1c6abae0ec57effffcb72017c00 upstream. More recent GCC warns about two kinds of switch statement uses: 1) Switching on an enumeration, but not having an explicit case statement for all members of the enumeration. To show the compiler this is intentional, we simply add a default case with nothing more than a break statement. 2) Switching on a boolean value. I think this warning is dumb but nevertheless you get it wholesale with -Wswitch. This patch cures all such warnings in netfilter. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: x_tables: speed up jump target validationFlorian Westphal2016-08-031-0/+50
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit f4dc77713f8016d2e8a3295e1c9c53a21f296def ] The dummy ruleset I used to test the original validation change was broken, most rules were unreachable and were not tested by mark_source_chains(). In some cases rulesets that used to load in a few seconds now require several minutes. sample ruleset that shows the behaviour: echo "*filter" for i in $(seq 0 100000);do printf ":chain_%06x - [0:0]\n" $i done for i in $(seq 0 100000);do printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i printf -- "-A INPUT -j chain_%06x\n" $i done echo COMMIT [ pipe result into iptables-restore ] This ruleset will be about 74mbyte in size, with ~500k searches though all 500k[1] rule entries. iptables-restore will take forever (gave up after 10 minutes) Instead of always searching the entire blob for a match, fill an array with the start offsets of every single ipt_entry struct, then do a binary search to check if the jump target is present or not. After this change ruleset restore times get again close to what one gets when reverting 36472341017529e (~3 seconds on my workstation). [1] every user-defined rule gets an implicit RETURN, so we get 300k jumps + 100k userchains + 100k returns -> 500k rule entries Fixes: 36472341017529e ("netfilter: x_tables: validate targets of jumps") Reported-by: Jeff Wu <wujiafu@gmail.com> Tested-by: Jeff Wu <wujiafu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
* netfilter: x_tables: introduce and use xt_copy_counters_from_userFlorian Westphal2016-07-121-0/+74
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit d7591f0c41ce3e67600a982bab6989ef0f07b3ce ] The three variants use same copy&pasted code, condense this into a helper and use that. Make sure info.name is 0-terminated. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* netfilter: x_tables: do compat validation via translate_tableFlorian Westphal2016-07-121-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 09d9686047dbbe1cf4faa558d3ecc4aae2046054 ] This looks like refactoring, but its also a bug fix. Problem is that the compat path (32bit iptables, 64bit kernel) lacks a few sanity tests that are done in the normal path. For example, we do not check for underflows and the base chain policies. While its possible to also add such checks to the compat path, its more copy&pastry, for instance we cannot reuse check_underflow() helper as e->target_offset differs in the compat case. Other problem is that it makes auditing for validation errors harder; two places need to be checked and kept in sync. At a high level 32 bit compat works like this: 1- initial pass over blob: validate match/entry offsets, bounds checking lookup all matches and targets do bookkeeping wrt. size delta of 32/64bit structures assign match/target.u.kernel pointer (points at kernel implementation, needed to access ->compatsize etc.) 2- allocate memory according to the total bookkeeping size to contain the translated ruleset 3- second pass over original blob: for each entry, copy the 32bit representation to the newly allocated memory. This also does any special match translations (e.g. adjust 32bit to 64bit longs, etc). 4- check if ruleset is free of loops (chase all jumps) 5-first pass over translated blob: call the checkentry function of all matches and targets. The alternative implemented by this patch is to drop steps 3&4 from the compat process, the translation is changed into an intermediate step rather than a full 1:1 translate_table replacement. In the 2nd pass (step #3), change the 64bit ruleset back to a kernel representation, i.e. put() the kernel pointer and restore ->u.user.name . This gets us a 64bit ruleset that is in the format generated by a 64bit iptables userspace -- we can then use translate_table() to get the 'native' sanity checks. This has two drawbacks: 1. we re-validate all the match and target entry structure sizes even though compat translation is supposed to never generate bogus offsets. 2. we put and then re-lookup each match and target. THe upside is that we get all sanity tests and ruleset validations provided by the normal path and can remove some duplicated compat code. iptables-restore time of autogenerated ruleset with 300k chains of form -A CHAIN0001 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0002 -A CHAIN0002 -m limit --limit 1/s -j CHAIN0003 shows no noticeable differences in restore times: old: 0m30.796s new: 0m31.521s 64bit: 0m25.674s Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* netfilter: x_tables: xt_compat_match_from_user doesn't need a retvalFlorian Westphal2016-07-121-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 0188346f21e6546498c2a0f84888797ad4063fc5 ] Always returned 0. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* netfilter: x_tables: don't reject valid target size on some architecturesFlorian Westphal2016-07-121-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 7b7eba0f3515fca3296b8881d583f7c1042f5226 ] Quoting John Stultz: In updating a 32bit arm device from 4.6 to Linus' current HEAD, I noticed I was having some trouble with networking, and realized that /proc/net/ip_tables_names was suddenly empty. Digging through the registration process, it seems we're catching on the: if (strcmp(t->u.user.name, XT_STANDARD_TARGET) == 0 && target_offset + sizeof(struct xt_standard_target) != next_offset) return -EINVAL; Where next_offset seems to be 4 bytes larger then the offset + standard_target struct size. next_offset needs to be aligned via XT_ALIGN (so we can access all members of ip(6)t_entry struct). This problem didn't show up on i686 as it only needs 4-byte alignment for u64, but iptables userspace on other 32bit arches does insert extra padding. Reported-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Tested-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Fixes: 7ed2abddd20cf ("netfilter: x_tables: check standard target size too") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* netfilter: x_tables: validate all offsets and sizes in a ruleFlorian Westphal2016-07-121-5/+76
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 13631bfc604161a9d69cd68991dff8603edd66f9 ] Validate that all matches (if any) add up to the beginning of the target and that each match covers at least the base structure size. The compat path should be able to safely re-use the function as the structures only differ in alignment; added a BUILD_BUG_ON just in case we have an arch that adds padding as well. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* netfilter: x_tables: check for bogus target offsetFlorian Westphal2016-07-121-2/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ce683e5f9d045e5d67d1312a42b359cb2ab2a13c ] We're currently asserting that targetoff + targetsize <= nextoff. Extend it to also check that targetoff is >= sizeof(xt_entry). Since this is generic code, add an argument pointing to the start of the match/target, we can then derive the base structure size from the delta. We also need the e->elems pointer in a followup change to validate matches. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* netfilter: x_tables: check standard target size tooFlorian Westphal2016-07-121-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 7ed2abddd20cf8f6bd27f65bd218f26fa5bf7f44 ] We have targets and standard targets -- the latter carries a verdict. The ip/ip6tables validation functions will access t->verdict for the standard targets to fetch the jump offset or verdict for chainloop detection, but this happens before the targets get checked/validated. Thus we also need to check for verdict presence here, else t->verdict can point right after a blob. Spotted with UBSAN while testing malformed blobs. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* netfilter: x_tables: add compat version of xt_check_entry_offsetsFlorian Westphal2016-07-121-0/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit fc1221b3a163d1386d1052184202d5dc50d302d1 ] 32bit rulesets have different layout and alignment requirements, so once more integrity checks get added to xt_check_entry_offsets it will reject well-formed 32bit rulesets. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* netfilter: x_tables: assert minimum target sizeFlorian Westphal2016-07-121-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit a08e4e190b866579896c09af59b3bdca821da2cd ] The target size includes the size of the xt_entry_target struct. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* netfilter: x_tables: add and use xt_check_entry_offsetsFlorian Westphal2016-07-121-0/+34
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 7d35812c3214afa5b37a675113555259cfd67b98 ] Currently arp/ip and ip6tables each implement a short helper to check that the target offset is large enough to hold one xt_entry_target struct and that t->u.target_size fits within the current rule. Unfortunately these checks are not sufficient. To avoid adding new tests to all of ip/ip6/arptables move the current checks into a helper, then extend this helper in followup patches. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* ipvs: correct initial offset of Call-ID header search in SIP persistence engineMarco Angaroni2016-07-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 7617a24f83b5d67f4dab1844956be1cebc44aec8 ] The IPVS SIP persistence engine is not able to parse the SIP header "Call-ID" when such header is inserted in the first positions of the SIP message. When IPVS is configured with "--pe sip" option, like for example: ipvsadm -A -u 1.2.3.4:5060 -s rr --pe sip -p 120 -o some particular messages (see below for details) do not create entries in the connection template table, which can be listed with: ipvsadm -Lcn --persistent-conn Problematic SIP messages are SIP responses having "Call-ID" header positioned just after message first line: SIP/2.0 200 OK [Call-ID header here] [rest of the headers] When "Call-ID" header is positioned down (after a few other headers) it is correctly recognized. This is due to the data offset used in get_callid function call inside ip_vs_pe_sip.c file: since dptr already points to the start of the SIP message, the value of dataoff should be initially 0. Otherwise the header is searched starting from some bytes after the first character of the SIP message. Fixes: 758ff0338722 ("IPVS: sip persistence engine") Signed-off-by: Marco Angaroni <marcoangaroni@gmail.com> Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* nf_conntrack: avoid kernel pointer value leak in slab nameLinus Torvalds2016-05-171-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 31b0b385f69d8d5491a4bca288e25e63f1d945d0 ] The slab name ends up being visible in the directory structure under /sys, and even if you don't have access rights to the file you can see the filenames. Just use a 64-bit counter instead of the pointer to the 'net' structure to generate a unique name. This code will go away in 4.7 when the conntrack code moves to a single kmemcache, but this is the backportable simple solution to avoiding leaking kernel pointers to user space. Fixes: 5b3501faa874 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: per netns nf_conntrack_cachep") Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* ipvs: fix crash with sync protocol v0 and FTPJulian Anastasov2015-10-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 56184858d1fc95c46723436b455cb7261cd8be6f ] Fix crash in 3.5+ if FTP is used after switching sync_version to 0. Fixes: 749c42b620a9 ("ipvs: reduce sync rate with time thresholds") Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* ipvs: skb_orphan in case of forwardingAlex Gartrell2015-10-271-0/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 71563f3414e917c62acd8e0fb0edf8ed6af63e4b ] It is possible that we bind against a local socket in early_demux when we are actually going to want to forward it. In this case, the socket serves no purpose and only serves to confuse things (particularly functions which implicitly expect sk_fullsock to be true, like ip_local_out). Additionally, skb_set_owner_w is totally broken for non full-socks. Signed-off-by: Alex Gartrell <agartrell@fb.com> Fixes: 41063e9dd119 ("ipv4: Early TCP socket demux.") Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* ipvs: fix crash if scheduler is changedJulian Anastasov2015-10-273-37/+69
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 05f00505a89acd21f5d0d20f5797dfbc4cf85243 ] I overlooked the svc->sched_data usage from schedulers when the services were converted to RCU in 3.10. Now the rare ipvsadm -E command can change the scheduler but due to the reverse order of ip_vs_bind_scheduler and ip_vs_unbind_scheduler we provide new sched_data to the old scheduler resulting in a crash. To fix it without changing the scheduler methods we have to use synchronize_rcu() only for the editing case. It means all svc->scheduler readers should expect a NULL value. To avoid breakage for the service listing and ipvsadm -R we can use the "none" name to indicate that scheduler is not assigned, a state when we drop new connections. Reported-by: Alexander Vasiliev <a.vasylev@404-group.com> Fixes: ceec4c381681 ("ipvs: convert services to rcu") Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* ipvs: do not use random local source address for tunnelsJulian Anastasov2015-10-271-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 4754957f04f5f368792a0eb7dab0ae89fb93dcfd ] Michael Vallaly reports about wrong source address used in rare cases for tunneled traffic. Looks like __ip_vs_get_out_rt in 3.10+ is providing uninitialized dest_dst->dst_saddr.ip because ip_vs_dest_dst_alloc uses kmalloc. While we retry after seeing EINVAL from routing for data that does not look like valid local address, it still succeeded when this memory was previously used from other dests and with different local addresses. As result, we can use valid local address that is not suitable for our real server. Fix it by providing 0.0.0.0 every time our cache is refreshed. By this way we will get preferred source address from routing. Reported-by: Michael Vallaly <lvs@nolatency.com> Fixes: 026ace060dfe ("ipvs: optimize dst usage for real server") Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg> Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* netfilter: nf_log: don't zap all loggers on unregisterFlorian Westphal2015-10-271-2/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 205ee117d4dc4a11ac3bd9638bb9b2e839f4de9a ] like nf_log_unset, nf_log_unregister must not reset the list of loggers. Otherwise, a call to nf_log_unregister() will render loggers of other nf protocols unusable: iptables -A INPUT -j LOG modprobe nf_log_arp ; rmmod nf_log_arp iptables -A INPUT -j LOG iptables: No chain/target/match by that name Fixes: 30e0c6a6be ("netfilter: nf_log: prepare net namespace support for loggers") Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* netfilter: nf_log: Introduce nft_log_dereference() macroMarcelo Leitner2015-10-271-12/+9
| | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 0c26ed1c07f13ca27e2638ffdd1951013ed96c48 ] Wrap up a common call pattern in an easier to handle call. Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* netfilter: nft_compat: skip family comparison in case of NFPROTO_UNSPECPablo Neira Ayuso2015-10-271-6/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ba378ca9c04a5fc1b2cf0f0274a9d02eb3d1bad9 ] Fix lookup of existing match/target structures in the corresponding list by skipping the family check if NFPROTO_UNSPEC is used. This is resulting in the allocation and insertion of one match/target structure for each use of them. So this not only bloats memory consumption but also severely affects the time to reload the ruleset from the iptables-compat utility. After this patch, iptables-compat-restore and iptables-compat take almost the same time to reload large rulesets. Fixes: 0ca743a55991 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add compatibility layer for x_tables") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* netfilter: nf_log: wait for rcu grace after logger unregistrationPablo Neira Ayuso2015-10-271-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ad5001cc7cdf9aaee5eb213fdee657e4a3c94776 ] The nf_log_unregister() function needs to call synchronize_rcu() to make sure that the objects are not dereferenced anymore on module removal. Fixes: 5962815a6a56 ("netfilter: nf_log: use an array of loggers instead of list") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* netfilter: ctnetlink: put back references to master ct and expect objectsPablo Neira Ayuso2015-10-271-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 95dd8653de658143770cb0e55a58d2aab97c79d2 ] We have to put back the references to the master conntrack and the expectation that we just created, otherwise we'll leak them. Fixes: 0ef71ee1a5b9 ("netfilter: ctnetlink: refactor ctnetlink_create_expect") Reported-by: Tim Wiess <Tim.Wiess@watchguard.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* netfilter: nf_conntrack: Support expectations in different zonesJoe Stringer2015-10-271-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 4b31814d20cbe5cd4ccf18089751e77a04afe4f2 ] When zones were originally introduced, the expectation functions were all extended to perform lookup using the zone. However, insertion was not modified to check the zone. This means that two expectations which are intended to apply for different connections that have the same tuple but exist in different zones cannot both be tracked. Fixes: 5d0aa2ccd4 (netfilter: nf_conntrack: add support for "conntrack zones") Signed-off-by: Joe Stringer <joestringer@nicira.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
* netfilter: nfnetlink: work around wrong endianess in res_id fieldPablo Neira Ayuso2015-10-271-1/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit a9de9777d613500b089a7416f936bf3ae5f070d2 ] The convention in nfnetlink is to use network byte order in every header field as well as in the attribute payload. The initial version of the batching infrastructure assumes that res_id comes in host byte order though. The only client of the batching infrastructure is nf_tables, so let's add a workaround to address this inconsistency. We currently have 11 nfnetlink subsystems according to NFNL_SUBSYS_COUNT, so we can assume that the subsystem 2560, ie. htons(10), will not be allocated anytime soon, so it can be an alias of nf_tables from the nfnetlink batching path when interpreting the res_id field. Based on original patch from Florian Westphal. Reported-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.46.0) at 2025-04-24 17:59:27 +0000