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* xfrm: Avoid clang fortify warning in copy_to_user_tmpl()Nathan Chancellor2024-04-131-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 1a807e46aa93ebad1dfbed4f82dc3bf779423a6e upstream. After a couple recent changes in LLVM, there is a warning (or error with CONFIG_WERROR=y or W=e) from the compile time fortify source routines, specifically the memset() in copy_to_user_tmpl(). In file included from net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c:14: ... include/linux/fortify-string.h:438:4: error: call to '__write_overflow_field' declared with 'warning' attribute: detected write beyond size of field (1st parameter); maybe use struct_group()? [-Werror,-Wattribute-warning] 438 | __write_overflow_field(p_size_field, size); | ^ 1 error generated. While ->xfrm_nr has been validated against XFRM_MAX_DEPTH when its value is first assigned in copy_templates() by calling validate_tmpl() first (so there should not be any issue in practice), LLVM/clang cannot really deduce that across the boundaries of these functions. Without that knowledge, it cannot assume that the loop stops before i is greater than XFRM_MAX_DEPTH, which would indeed result a stack buffer overflow in the memset(). To make the bounds of ->xfrm_nr clear to the compiler and add additional defense in case copy_to_user_tmpl() is ever used in a path where ->xfrm_nr has not been properly validated against XFRM_MAX_DEPTH first, add an explicit bound check and early return, which clears up the warning. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1985 Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: interface: use DEV_STATS_INC()Eric Dumazet2023-10-251-12/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f7c4e3e5d4f6609b4725a97451948ca2e425379a upstream. syzbot/KCSAN reported data-races in xfrm whenever dev->stats fields are updated. It appears all of these updates can happen from multiple cpus. Adopt SMP safe DEV_STATS_INC() to update dev->stats fields. BUG: KCSAN: data-race in xfrmi_xmit / xfrmi_xmit read-write to 0xffff88813726b160 of 8 bytes by task 23986 on cpu 1: xfrmi_xmit+0x74e/0xb20 net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c:583 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4889 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4903 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3544 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11b/0x3f0 net/core/dev.c:3560 __dev_queue_xmit+0xeee/0x1de0 net/core/dev.c:4340 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3082 [inline] neigh_connected_output+0x231/0x2a0 net/core/neighbour.c:1581 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:542 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x74a/0x850 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:230 ip_finish_output+0xf4/0x240 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:318 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:293 [inline] ip_output+0xe5/0x1b0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:432 dst_output include/net/dst.h:458 [inline] ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:127 [inline] ip_send_skb+0x72/0xe0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1487 udp_send_skb+0x6a4/0x990 net/ipv4/udp.c:963 udp_sendmsg+0x1249/0x12d0 net/ipv4/udp.c:1246 inet_sendmsg+0x63/0x80 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:840 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:753 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x37c/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2540 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2594 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x269/0x500 net/socket.c:2680 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2709 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2706 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x57/0x60 net/socket.c:2706 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd read-write to 0xffff88813726b160 of 8 bytes by task 23987 on cpu 0: xfrmi_xmit+0x74e/0xb20 net/xfrm/xfrm_interface_core.c:583 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4889 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4903 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3544 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11b/0x3f0 net/core/dev.c:3560 __dev_queue_xmit+0xeee/0x1de0 net/core/dev.c:4340 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3082 [inline] neigh_connected_output+0x231/0x2a0 net/core/neighbour.c:1581 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:542 [inline] ip_finish_output2+0x74a/0x850 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:230 ip_finish_output+0xf4/0x240 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:318 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:293 [inline] ip_output+0xe5/0x1b0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:432 dst_output include/net/dst.h:458 [inline] ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:127 [inline] ip_send_skb+0x72/0xe0 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:1487 udp_send_skb+0x6a4/0x990 net/ipv4/udp.c:963 udp_sendmsg+0x1249/0x12d0 net/ipv4/udp.c:1246 inet_sendmsg+0x63/0x80 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:840 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:753 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x37c/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2540 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2594 [inline] __sys_sendmmsg+0x269/0x500 net/socket.c:2680 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2709 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2706 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x57/0x60 net/socket.c:2706 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd value changed: 0x00000000000010d7 -> 0x00000000000010d8 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 0 PID: 23987 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 6.5.0-syzkaller-10885-g0468be89b3fa #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023 Fixes: f203b76d7809 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: fix a data-race in xfrm_gen_index()Eric Dumazet2023-10-251-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3e4bc23926b83c3c67e5f61ae8571602754131a6 upstream. xfrm_gen_index() mutual exclusion uses net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock. This means we must use a per-netns idx_generator variable, instead of a static one. Alternative would be to use an atomic variable. syzbot reported: BUG: KCSAN: data-race in xfrm_sk_policy_insert / xfrm_sk_policy_insert write to 0xffffffff87005938 of 4 bytes by task 29466 on cpu 0: xfrm_gen_index net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1385 [inline] xfrm_sk_policy_insert+0x262/0x640 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:2347 xfrm_user_policy+0x413/0x540 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:2639 do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x1317/0x2ce0 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:943 ipv6_setsockopt+0x57/0x130 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1012 rawv6_setsockopt+0x21e/0x410 net/ipv6/raw.c:1054 sock_common_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3697 __sys_setsockopt+0x1c9/0x230 net/socket.c:2263 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2274 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2271 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x66/0x80 net/socket.c:2271 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd read to 0xffffffff87005938 of 4 bytes by task 29460 on cpu 1: xfrm_sk_policy_insert+0x13e/0x640 xfrm_user_policy+0x413/0x540 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c:2639 do_ipv6_setsockopt+0x1317/0x2ce0 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:943 ipv6_setsockopt+0x57/0x130 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1012 rawv6_setsockopt+0x21e/0x410 net/ipv6/raw.c:1054 sock_common_setsockopt+0x61/0x70 net/core/sock.c:3697 __sys_setsockopt+0x1c9/0x230 net/socket.c:2263 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2274 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2271 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x66/0x80 net/socket.c:2271 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd value changed: 0x00006ad8 -> 0x00006b18 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on: CPU: 1 PID: 29460 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc5-syzkaller-00243-g9106536c1aa3 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023 Fixes: 1121994c803f ("netns xfrm: policy insertion in netns") Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* net: xfrm: Amend XFRMA_SEC_CTX nla_policy structureLin Ma2023-08-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit d1e0e61d617ba17aa516db707aa871387566bbf7 upstream. According to all consumers code of attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX], like * verify_sec_ctx_len(), convert to xfrm_user_sec_ctx* * xfrm_state_construct(), call security_xfrm_state_alloc whose prototype is int security_xfrm_state_alloc(.., struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx *sec_ctx); * copy_from_user_sec_ctx(), convert to xfrm_user_sec_ctx * ... It seems that the expected parsing result for XFRMA_SEC_CTX should be structure xfrm_user_sec_ctx, and the current xfrm_sec_ctx is confusing and misleading (Luckily, they happen to have same size 8 bytes). This commit amend the policy structure to xfrm_user_sec_ctx to avoid ambiguity. Fixes: cf5cb79f6946 ("[XFRM] netlink: Establish an attribute policy") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: add NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_paramsLin Ma2023-08-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 00374d9b6d9f932802b55181be9831aa948e5b7c ] Normally, x->replay_esn and x->preplay_esn should be allocated at xfrm_alloc_replay_state_esn(...) in xfrm_state_construct(...), hence the xfrm_update_ae_params(...) is okay to update them. However, the current implementation of xfrm_new_ae(...) allows a malicious user to directly dereference a NULL pointer and crash the kernel like below. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 PGD 8253067 P4D 8253067 PUD 8e0e067 PMD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 0 PID: 98 Comm: poc.npd Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-00072-gdad9774deaf1 #8 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.0-0-gd239552ce722-prebuilt.qemu.o4 RIP: 0010:memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140 Code: e8 4c 89 5f e0 48 8d 7f e0 73 d2 83 c2 20 48 29 d6 48 29 d7 83 fa 10 72 34 4c 8b 06 4c 8b 4e 08 c RSP: 0018:ffff888008f57658 EFLAGS: 00000202 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888008bd0000 RCX: ffffffff8238e571 RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: ffff888007f64844 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff888008f57818 R13: ffff888007f64aa4 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00000000014013c0(0000) GS:ffff88806d600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000054d8000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x1e8/0x500 ? __pfx_is_prefetch.constprop.0+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_page_fault_oops+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40 ? fixup_exception+0x36/0x460 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x11/0x40 ? exc_page_fault+0x5e/0xc0 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 ? xfrm_update_ae_params+0xd1/0x260 ? memcpy_orig+0xad/0x140 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_bh+0x10/0x10 xfrm_update_ae_params+0xe7/0x260 xfrm_new_ae+0x298/0x4e0 ? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_xfrm_new_ae+0x10/0x10 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x25a/0x410 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __alloc_skb+0xcf/0x210 ? stack_trace_save+0x90/0xd0 ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1c/0x70 ? __stack_depot_save+0x39/0x4e0 ? __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 ? kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340 ? netlink_recvmsg+0x23c/0x660 ? sock_recvmsg+0xeb/0xf0 ? __sys_recvfrom+0x13c/0x1f0 ? __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x71/0x90 ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc ? copyout+0x3e/0x50 netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210 ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10 ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50 netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0 ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 ? netlink_recvmsg+0x500/0x660 netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700 This Null-ptr-deref bug is assigned CVE-2023-3772. And this commit adds additional NULL check in xfrm_update_ae_params to fix the NPD. Fixes: d8647b79c3b7 ("xfrm: Add user interface for esn and big anti-replay windows") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: fix slab-use-after-free in decode_session6Zhengchao Shao2023-08-301-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 53223f2ed1ef5c90dad814daaaefea4e68a933c8 ] When the xfrm device is set to the qdisc of the sfb type, the cb field of the sent skb may be modified during enqueuing. Then, slab-use-after-free may occur when the xfrm device sends IPv6 packets. The stack information is as follows: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881111458ef by task swapper/3/0 CPU: 3 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/3 Not tainted 6.4.0-next-20230707 #409 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 kasan_report+0x11d/0x130 decode_session6+0x103f/0x1890 __xfrm_decode_session+0x54/0xb0 xfrmi_xmit+0x173/0x1ca0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x187/0x700 sch_direct_xmit+0x1a3/0xc30 __qdisc_run+0x510/0x17a0 __dev_queue_xmit+0x2215/0x3b10 neigh_connected_output+0x3c2/0x550 ip6_finish_output2+0x55a/0x1550 ip6_finish_output+0x6b9/0x1270 ip6_output+0x1f1/0x540 ndisc_send_skb+0xa63/0x1890 ndisc_send_rs+0x132/0x6f0 addrconf_rs_timer+0x3f1/0x870 call_timer_fn+0x1a0/0x580 expire_timers+0x29b/0x4b0 run_timer_softirq+0x326/0x910 __do_softirq+0x1d4/0x905 irq_exit_rcu+0xb7/0x120 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x97/0xc0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:intel_idle_hlt+0x23/0x30 Code: 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 54 41 89 d4 0f 1f 44 00 00 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 0f 00 2d c4 9f ab 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 fb f4 <fa> 44 89 e0 41 5c c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 54 41 89 d4 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000197d78 EFLAGS: 00000246 RAX: 00000000000a83c3 RBX: ffffe8ffffd09c50 RCX: ffffffff8a22d8e5 RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff8d3f8080 RDI: ffffe8ffffd09c50 RBP: ffffffff8d3f8080 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffed1026ba6d9d R10: ffff888135d36ceb R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: ffffffff8d3f8100 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000 cpuidle_enter_state+0xd3/0x6f0 cpuidle_enter+0x4e/0xa0 do_idle+0x2fe/0x3c0 cpu_startup_entry+0x18/0x20 start_secondary+0x200/0x290 secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x167/0x16b </TASK> Allocated by task 939: kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x40 kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x7f/0x90 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1cd/0x410 kmalloc_reserve+0x165/0x270 __alloc_skb+0x129/0x330 inet6_ifa_notify+0x118/0x230 __ipv6_ifa_notify+0x177/0xbe0 addrconf_dad_completed+0x133/0xe00 addrconf_dad_work+0x764/0x1390 process_one_work+0xa32/0x16f0 worker_thread+0x67d/0x10c0 kthread+0x344/0x440 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888111145800 which belongs to the cache skbuff_small_head of size 640 The buggy address is located 239 bytes inside of freed 640-byte region [ffff888111145800, ffff888111145a80) As commit f855691975bb ("xfrm6: Fix the nexthdr offset in _decode_session6.") showed, xfrm_decode_session was originally intended only for the receive path. IP6CB(skb)->nhoff is not set during transmission. Therefore, set the cb field in the skb to 0 before sending packets. Fixes: f855691975bb ("xfrm6: Fix the nexthdr offset in _decode_session6.") Signed-off-by: Zhengchao Shao <shaozhengchao@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: interface: rename xfrm_interface.c to xfrm_interface_core.cEyal Birger2023-08-302-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ee9a113ab63468137802898bcd2c598998c96938 ] This change allows adding additional files to the xfrm_interface module. Signed-off-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20221203084659.1837829-2-eyal.birger@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org> Stable-dep-of: 53223f2ed1ef ("xfrm: fix slab-use-after-free in decode_session6") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* net: xfrm: Fix xfrm_address_filter OOB readLin Ma2023-08-301-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit dfa73c17d55b921e1d4e154976de35317e43a93a ] We found below OOB crash: [ 44.211730] ================================================================== [ 44.212045] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 [ 44.212045] Read of size 8 at addr ffff88800870f320 by task poc.xfrm/97 [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] CPU: 0 PID: 97 Comm: poc.xfrm Not tainted 6.4.0-rc7-00072-gdad9774deaf1-dirty #4 [ 44.212045] Call Trace: [ 44.212045] <TASK> [ 44.212045] dump_stack_lvl+0x37/0x50 [ 44.212045] print_report+0xcc/0x620 [ 44.212045] ? __virt_addr_valid+0xf3/0x170 [ 44.212045] ? memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 [ 44.212045] kasan_report+0xb2/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 [ 44.212045] kasan_check_range+0x39/0x1c0 [ 44.212045] memcmp+0x8b/0xb0 [ 44.212045] xfrm_state_walk+0x21c/0x420 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_dump_one_state+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] xfrm_dump_sa+0x1e2/0x290 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __kernel_text_address+0xd/0x40 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_unpoison+0x27/0x60 [ 44.212045] ? mutex_lock+0x60/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 44.212045] netlink_dump+0x322/0x6c0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_dump+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? mutex_unlock+0x7f/0xd0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] __netlink_dump_start+0x353/0x430 [ 44.212045] xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x3a4/0x410 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_dump_sa_done+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __stack_depot_save+0x382/0x4e0 [ 44.212045] ? filter_irq_stacks+0x1c/0x70 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x32/0x50 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [ 44.212045] ? __kasan_slab_alloc+0x59/0x70 [ 44.212045] ? kmem_cache_alloc_node+0xf7/0x260 [ 44.212045] ? kmalloc_reserve+0xab/0x120 [ 44.212045] ? __alloc_skb+0xcf/0x210 [ 44.212045] ? netlink_sendmsg+0x509/0x700 [ 44.212045] ? sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230 [ 44.212045] ? __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] ? netlink_sendmsg+0x509/0x700 [ 44.212045] ? sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230 [ 44.212045] ? __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [ 44.212045] ? kasan_save_free_info+0x2e/0x50 [ 44.212045] ? __kasan_slab_free+0x10a/0x190 [ 44.212045] ? kmem_cache_free+0x9c/0x340 [ 44.212045] ? netlink_recvmsg+0x23c/0x660 [ 44.212045] ? sock_recvmsg+0xeb/0xf0 [ 44.212045] ? __sys_recvfrom+0x13c/0x1f0 [ 44.212045] ? __x64_sys_recvfrom+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] ? copyout+0x3e/0x50 [ 44.212045] netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_rcv_skb+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50 [ 44.212045] netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_unicast+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? netlink_recvmsg+0x500/0x660 [ 44.212045] netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_netlink_sendmsg+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0 [ 44.212045] __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx___sys_sendto+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? rcu_core+0x44a/0xe10 [ 44.212045] ? __rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x45b/0x740 [ 44.212045] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x81/0xe0 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx___rseq_handle_notify_resume+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_blkcg_maybe_throttle_current+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] ? __pfx_task_work_run+0x10/0x10 [ 44.212045] __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] RIP: 0033:0x44b7da [ 44.212045] RSP: 002b:00007ffdc8838548 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c [ 44.212045] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffdc8839978 RCX: 000000000044b7da [ 44.212045] RDX: 0000000000000038 RSI: 00007ffdc8838770 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 44.212045] RBP: 00007ffdc88385b0 R08: 00007ffdc883858c R09: 000000000000000c [ 44.212045] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 44.212045] R13: 00007ffdc8839968 R14: 00000000004c37d0 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 44.212045] </TASK> [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] Allocated by task 97: [ 44.212045] kasan_save_stack+0x22/0x50 [ 44.212045] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30 [ 44.212045] __kasan_kmalloc+0x7f/0x90 [ 44.212045] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0x5b/0x140 [ 44.212045] kmemdup+0x21/0x50 [ 44.212045] xfrm_dump_sa+0x17d/0x290 [ 44.212045] netlink_dump+0x322/0x6c0 [ 44.212045] __netlink_dump_start+0x353/0x430 [ 44.212045] xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x3a4/0x410 [ 44.212045] netlink_rcv_skb+0xd6/0x210 [ 44.212045] xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x44/0x50 [ 44.212045] netlink_unicast+0x36f/0x4c0 [ 44.212045] netlink_sendmsg+0x3b7/0x700 [ 44.212045] sock_sendmsg+0xde/0xe0 [ 44.212045] __sys_sendto+0x18d/0x230 [ 44.212045] __x64_sys_sendto+0x71/0x90 [ 44.212045] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90 [ 44.212045] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0xdc [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800870f300 [ 44.212045] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64 [ 44.212045] The buggy address is located 32 bytes inside of [ 44.212045] allocated 36-byte region [ffff88800870f300, ffff88800870f324) [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 44.212045] page:00000000e4de16ee refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:000000000 ... [ 44.212045] flags: 0x100000000000200(slab|node=0|zone=1) [ 44.212045] page_type: 0xffffffff() [ 44.212045] raw: 0100000000000200 ffff888004c41640 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 [ 44.212045] raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 [ 44.212045] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 44.212045] [ 44.212045] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 44.212045] ffff88800870f200: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] ffff88800870f280: 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] >ffff88800870f300: 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] ^ [ 44.212045] ffff88800870f380: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] ffff88800870f400: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 44.212045] ================================================================== By investigating the code, we find the root cause of this OOB is the lack of checks in xfrm_dump_sa(). The buggy code allows a malicious user to pass arbitrary value of filter->splen/dplen. Hence, with crafted xfrm states, the attacker can achieve 8 bytes heap OOB read, which causes info leak. if (attrs[XFRMA_ADDRESS_FILTER]) { filter = kmemdup(nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_ADDRESS_FILTER]), sizeof(*filter), GFP_KERNEL); if (filter == NULL) return -ENOMEM; // NO MORE CHECKS HERE !!! } This patch fixes the OOB by adding necessary boundary checks, just like the code in pfkey_dump() function. Fixes: d3623099d350 ("ipsec: add support of limited SA dump") Signed-off-by: Lin Ma <linma@zju.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: Check if_id in inbound policy/secpath matchBenedict Wong2023-06-091-5/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 8680407b6f8f5fba59e8f1d63c869abc280f04df ] This change ensures that if configured in the policy, the if_id set in the policy and secpath states match during the inbound policy check. Without this, there is potential for ambiguity where entries in the secpath differing by only the if_id could be mismatched. Notably, this is checked in the outbound direction when resolving templates to SAs, but not on the inbound path when matching SAs and policies. Test: Tested against Android kernel unit tests & CTS Signed-off-by: Benedict Wong <benedictwong@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: Update ipcomp_scratches with NULL when freedKhalid Masum2022-10-261-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 8a04d2fc700f717104bfb95b0f6694e448a4537f ] Currently if ipcomp_alloc_scratches() fails to allocate memory ipcomp_scratches holds obsolete address. So when we try to free the percpu scratches using ipcomp_free_scratches() it tries to vfree non existent vm area. Described below: static void * __percpu *ipcomp_alloc_scratches(void) { ... scratches = alloc_percpu(void *); if (!scratches) return NULL; ipcomp_scratches does not know about this allocation failure. Therefore holding the old obsolete address. ... } So when we free, static void ipcomp_free_scratches(void) { ... scratches = ipcomp_scratches; Assigning obsolete address from ipcomp_scratches if (!scratches) return; for_each_possible_cpu(i) vfree(*per_cpu_ptr(scratches, i)); Trying to free non existent page, causing warning: trying to vfree existent vm area. ... } Fix this breakage by updating ipcomp_scrtches with NULL when scratches is freed Suggested-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Reported-by: syzbot+5ec9bb042ddfe9644773@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: syzbot+5ec9bb042ddfe9644773@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Khalid Masum <khalid.masum.92@gmail.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: fix refcount leak in __xfrm_policy_check()Xin Xiong2022-09-051-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 9c9cb23e00ddf45679b21b4dacc11d1ae7961ebe ] The issue happens on an error path in __xfrm_policy_check(). When the fetching process of the object `pols[1]` fails, the function simply returns 0, forgetting to decrement the reference count of `pols[0]`, which is incremented earlier by either xfrm_sk_policy_lookup() or xfrm_policy_lookup(). This may result in memory leaks. Fix it by decreasing the reference count of `pols[0]` in that path. Fixes: 134b0fc544ba ("IPsec: propagate security module errors up from flow_cache_lookup") Signed-off-by: Xin Xiong <xiongx18@fudan.edu.cn> Signed-off-by: Xin Tan <tanxin.ctf@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: xfrm_policy: fix a possible double xfrm_pols_put() in xfrm_bundle_lookup()Hangyu Hua2022-07-291-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit f85daf0e725358be78dfd208dea5fd665d8cb901 ] xfrm_policy_lookup() will call xfrm_pol_hold_rcu() to get a refcount of pols[0]. This refcount can be dropped in xfrm_expand_policies() when xfrm_expand_policies() return error. pols[0]'s refcount is balanced in here. But xfrm_bundle_lookup() will also call xfrm_pols_put() with num_pols == 1 to drop this refcount when xfrm_expand_policies() return error. This patch also fix an illegal address access. pols[0] will save a error point when xfrm_policy_lookup fails. This lead to xfrm_pols_put to resolve an illegal address in xfrm_bundle_lookup's error path. Fix these by setting num_pols = 0 in xfrm_expand_policies()'s error path. Fixes: 80c802f3073e ("xfrm: cache bundles instead of policies for outgoing flows") Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <hbh25y@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: policy: match with both mark and mask on user interfacesXin Long2022-04-152-26/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 4f47e8ab6ab796b5380f74866fa5287aca4dcc58 upstream. In commit ed17b8d377ea ("xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list"), it would take 'priority' to make a policy unique, and allow duplicated policies with different 'priority' to be added, which is not expected by userland, as Tobias reported in strongswan. To fix this duplicated policies issue, and also fix the issue in commit ed17b8d377ea ("xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list"), when doing add/del/get/update on user interfaces, this patch is to change to look up a policy with both mark and mask by doing: mark.v == pol->mark.v && mark.m == pol->mark.m and leave the check: (mark & pol->mark.m) == pol->mark.v for tx/rx path only. As the userland expects an exact mark and mask match to manage policies. v1->v2: - make xfrm_policy_mark_match inline and fix the changelog as Tobias suggested. Fixes: 295fae568885 ("xfrm: Allow user space manipulation of SPD mark") Fixes: ed17b8d377ea ("xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_list") Reported-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> Tested-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: fix tunnel model fragmentation behaviorLina Wang2022-04-151-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 4ff2980b6bd2aa6b4ded3ce3b7c0ccfab29980af ] in tunnel mode, if outer interface(ipv4) is less, it is easily to let inner IPV6 mtu be less than 1280. If so, a Packet Too Big ICMPV6 message is received. When send again, packets are fragmentized with 1280, they are still rejected with ICMPV6(Packet Too Big) by xfrmi_xmit2(). According to RFC4213 Section3.2.2: if (IPv4 path MTU - 20) is less than 1280 if packet is larger than 1280 bytes Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with MTU=1280 Drop packet else Encapsulate but do not set the Don't Fragment flag in the IPv4 header. The resulting IPv4 packet might be fragmented by the IPv4 layer on the encapsulator or by some router along the IPv4 path. endif else if packet is larger than (IPv4 path MTU - 20) Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with MTU = (IPv4 path MTU - 20). Drop packet. else Encapsulate and set the Don't Fragment flag in the IPv4 header. endif endif Packets should be fragmentized with ipv4 outer interface, so change it. After it is fragemtized with ipv4, there will be double fragmenation. No.48 & No.51 are ipv6 fragment packets, No.48 is double fragmentized, then tunneled with IPv4(No.49& No.50), which obey spec. And received peer cannot decrypt it rightly. 48 2002::10 2002::11 1296(length) IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0xa20da5bc nxt=50) 49 0x0000 (0) 2002::10 2002::11 1304 IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0x7448042c nxt=44) 50 0x0000 (0) 2002::10 2002::11 200 ESP (SPI=0x00035000) 51 2002::10 2002::11 180 Echo (ping) request 52 0x56dc 2002::10 2002::11 248 IPv6 fragment (off=1232 more=n ident=0xa20da5bc nxt=50) xfrm6_noneed_fragment has fixed above issues. Finally, it acted like below: 1 0x6206 192.168.1.138 192.168.1.1 1316 Fragmented IP protocol (proto=Encap Security Payload 50, off=0, ID=6206) [Reassembled in #2] 2 0x6206 2002::10 2002::11 88 IPv6 fragment (off=0 more=y ident=0x1f440778 nxt=50) 3 0x0000 2002::10 2002::11 248 ICMPv6 Echo (ping) request Signed-off-by: Lina Wang <lina.wang@mediatek.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: Fix xfrm migrate issues when address family changesYan Yan2022-03-231-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit e03c3bba351f99ad932e8f06baa9da1afc418e02 ] xfrm_migrate cannot handle address family change of an xfrm_state. The symptons are the xfrm_state will be migrated to a wrong address, and sending as well as receiving packets wil be broken. This commit fixes it by breaking the original xfrm_state_clone method into two steps so as to update the props.family before running xfrm_init_state. As the result, xfrm_state's inner mode, outer mode, type and IP header length in xfrm_state_migrate can be updated with the new address family. Tested with additions to Android's kernel unit test suite: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/kernel/tests/+/1885354 Signed-off-by: Yan Yan <evitayan@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: Check if_id in xfrm_migrateYan Yan2022-03-233-8/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit c1aca3080e382886e2e58e809787441984a2f89b ] This patch enables distinguishing SAs and SPs based on if_id during the xfrm_migrate flow. This ensures support for xfrm interfaces throughout the SA/SP lifecycle. When there are multiple existing SPs with the same direction, the same xfrm_selector and different endpoint addresses, xfrm_migrate might fail with ENODATA. Specifically, the code path for performing xfrm_migrate is: Stage 1: find policy to migrate with xfrm_migrate_policy_find(sel, dir, type, net) Stage 2: find and update state(s) with xfrm_migrate_state_find(mp, net) Stage 3: update endpoint address(es) of template(s) with xfrm_policy_migrate(pol, m, num_migrate) Currently "Stage 1" always returns the first xfrm_policy that matches, and "Stage 3" looks for the xfrm_tmpl that matches the old endpoint address. Thus if there are multiple xfrm_policy with same selector, direction, type and net, "Stage 1" might rertun a wrong xfrm_policy and "Stage 3" will fail with ENODATA because it cannot find a xfrm_tmpl with the matching endpoint address. The fix is to allow userspace to pass an if_id and add if_id to the matching rule in Stage 1 and Stage 2 since if_id is a unique ID for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state. For compatibility, if_id will only be checked if the attribute is set. Tested with additions to Android's kernel unit test suite: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/kernel/tests/+/1668886 Signed-off-by: Yan Yan <evitayan@google.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* Revert "xfrm: state and policy should fail if XFRMA_IF_ID 0"Kai Lueke2022-03-231-18/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a3d9001b4e287fc043e5539d03d71a32ab114bcb upstream. This reverts commit 68ac0f3810e76a853b5f7b90601a05c3048b8b54 because ID 0 was meant to be used for configuring the policy/state without matching for a specific interface (e.g., Cilium is affected, see https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/18789 and https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/19019). Signed-off-by: Kai Lueke <kailueke@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: enforce validity of offload input flagsLeon Romanovsky2022-03-081-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 7c76ecd9c99b6e9a771d813ab1aa7fa428b3ade1 upstream. struct xfrm_user_offload has flags variable that received user input, but kernel didn't check if valid bits were provided. It caused a situation where not sanitized input was forwarded directly to the drivers. For example, XFRM_OFFLOAD_IPV6 define that was exposed, was used by strongswan, but not implemented in the kernel at all. As a solution, check and sanitize input flags to forward XFRM_OFFLOAD_INBOUND to the drivers. Fixes: d77e38e612a0 ("xfrm: Add an IPsec hardware offloading API") Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: fix the if_id check in changelinkAntony Antony2022-03-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | commit 6d0d95a1c2b07270870e7be16575c513c29af3f1 upstream. if_id will be always 0, because it was not yet initialized. Fixes: 8dce43919566 ("xfrm: interface with if_id 0 should return error") Reported-by: Pavel Machek <pavel@denx.de> Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: state and policy should fail if XFRMA_IF_ID 0Antony Antony2022-01-271-3/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 68ac0f3810e76a853b5f7b90601a05c3048b8b54 ] xfrm ineterface does not allow xfrm if_id = 0 fail to create or update xfrm state and policy. With this commit: ip xfrm policy add src 192.0.2.1 dst 192.0.2.2 dir out if_id 0 RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument ip xfrm state add src 192.0.2.1 dst 192.0.2.2 proto esp spi 1 \ reqid 1 mode tunnel aead 'rfc4106(gcm(aes))' \ 0x1111111111111111111111111111111111111111 96 if_id 0 RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument v1->v2 change: - add Fixes: tag Fixes: 9f8550e4bd9d ("xfrm: fix disable_xfrm sysctl when used on xfrm interfaces") Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: interface with if_id 0 should return errorAntony Antony2022-01-271-2/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 8dce43919566f06e865f7e8949f5c10d8c2493f5 ] xfrm interface if_id = 0 would cause xfrm policy lookup errors since Commit 9f8550e4bd9d. Now explicitly fail to create an xfrm interface when if_id = 0 With this commit: ip link add ipsec0 type xfrm dev lo if_id 0 Error: if_id must be non zero. v1->v2 change: - add Fixes: tag Fixes: 9f8550e4bd9d ("xfrm: fix disable_xfrm sysctl when used on xfrm interfaces") Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com> Reviewed-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: fix a small bug in xfrm_sa_len()Eric Dumazet2022-01-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 7770a39d7c63faec6c4f33666d49a8cb664d0482 ] copy_user_offload() will actually push a struct struct xfrm_user_offload, which is different than (struct xfrm_state *)->xso (struct xfrm_state_offload) Fixes: d77e38e612a01 ("xfrm: Add an IPsec hardware offloading API") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: Fix error reporting in xfrm_state_construct.Steffen Klassert2021-07-201-14/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 6fd06963fa74197103cdbb4b494763127b3f2f34 ] When memory allocation for XFRMA_ENCAP or XFRMA_COADDR fails, the error will not be reported because the -ENOMEM assignment to the err variable is overwritten before. Fix this by moving these two in front of the function so that memory allocation failures will be reported. Reported-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* net: xfrm: Localize sequence counter per network namespaceAhmed S. Darwish2021-04-141-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit e88add19f68191448427a6e4eb059664650a837f ] A sequence counter write section must be serialized or its internal state can get corrupted. The "xfrm_state_hash_generation" seqcount is global, but its write serialization lock (net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock) is instantiated per network namespace. The write protection is thus insufficient. To provide full protection, localize the sequence counter per network namespace instead. This should be safe as both the seqcount read and write sections access data exclusively within the network namespace. It also lays the foundation for transforming "xfrm_state_hash_generation" data type from seqcount_t to seqcount_LOCKNAME_t in further commits. Fixes: b65e3d7be06f ("xfrm: state: add sequence count to detect hash resizes") Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <a.darwish@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: interface: fix ipv4 pmtu check to honor ip header dfEyal Birger2021-04-141-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 8fc0e3b6a8666d656923d214e4dc791e9a17164a ] Frag needed should only be sent if the header enables DF. This fix allows packets larger than MTU to pass the xfrm interface and be fragmented after encapsulation, aligning behavior with non-interface xfrm. Fixes: f203b76d7809 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces") Signed-off-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: interface: use icmp_ndo_send helperJason A. Donenfeld2021-03-041-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 45942ba890e6f35232727a5fa33d732681f4eb9f upstream. Because xfrmi is calling icmp from network device context, it should use the ndo helper so that the rate limiting applies correctly. Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: fix disable_xfrm sysctl when used on xfrm interfacesEyal Birger2021-02-031-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 9f8550e4bd9d78a8436c2061ad2530215f875376 ] The disable_xfrm flag signals that xfrm should not be performed during routing towards a device before reaching device xmit. For xfrm interfaces this is usually desired as they perform the outbound policy lookup as part of their xmit using their if_id. Before this change enabling this flag on xfrm interfaces prevented them from xmitting as xfrm_lookup_with_ifid() would not perform a policy lookup in case the original dst had the DST_NOXFRM flag. This optimization is incorrect when the lookup is done by the xfrm interface xmit logic. Fix by performing policy lookup when invoked by xfrmi as if_id != 0. Similarly it's unlikely for the 'no policy exists on net' check to yield any performance benefits when invoked from xfrmi. Fixes: f203b76d7809 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces") Signed-off-by: Eyal Birger <eyal.birger@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: Fix oops in xfrm_replay_advance_bmpShmulik Ladkani2021-02-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 56ce7c25ae1525d83cf80a880cf506ead1914250 ] When setting xfrm replay_window to values higher than 32, a rare page-fault occurs in xfrm_replay_advance_bmp: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffff8af350ad7920 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD ad001067 P4D ad001067 PUD 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 3 PID: 30 Comm: ksoftirqd/3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.4.52-050452-generic #202007160732 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:xfrm_replay_advance_bmp+0xbb/0x130 RSP: 0018:ffffa1304013ba40 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: 000000000000010d RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000ffffff4b RDX: 0000000000000018 RSI: 00000000004c234c RDI: 00000000ffb3dbff RBP: ffffa1304013ba50 R08: ffff8af330ad7920 R09: 0000000007fffffa R10: 0000000000000800 R11: 0000000000000010 R12: ffff8af29d6258c0 R13: ffff8af28b95c700 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff8af29d6258fc FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8af339ac0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: ffff8af350ad7920 CR3: 0000000015ee4000 CR4: 00000000001406e0 Call Trace: xfrm_input+0x4e5/0xa10 xfrm4_rcv_encap+0xb5/0xe0 xfrm4_udp_encap_rcv+0x140/0x1c0 Analysis revealed offending code is when accessing: replay_esn->bmp[nr] |= (1U << bitnr); with 'nr' being 0x07fffffa. This happened in an SMP system when reordering of packets was present; A packet arrived with a "too old" sequence number (outside the window, i.e 'diff > replay_window'), and therefore the following calculation: bitnr = replay_esn->replay_window - (diff - pos); yields a negative result, but since bitnr is u32 we get a large unsigned quantity (in crash dump above: 0xffffff4b seen in ecx). This was supposed to be protected by xfrm_input()'s former call to: if (x->repl->check(x, skb, seq)) { However, the state's spinlock x->lock is *released* after '->check()' is performed, and gets re-acquired before '->advance()' - which gives a chance for a different core to update the xfrm state, e.g. by advancing 'replay_esn->seq' when it encounters more packets - leading to a 'diff > replay_window' situation when original core continues to xfrm_replay_advance_bmp(). An attempt to fix this issue was suggested in commit bcf66bf54aab ("xfrm: Perform a replay check after return from async codepaths"), by calling 'x->repl->recheck()' after lock is re-acquired, but fix applied only to asyncronous crypto algorithms. Augment the fix, by *always* calling 'recheck()' - irrespective if we're using async crypto. Fixes: 0ebea8ef3559 ("[IPSEC]: Move state lock into x->type->input") Signed-off-by: Shmulik Ladkani <shmulik.ladkani@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* net: xfrm: fix a race condition during allocing spizhuoliang zhang2020-11-181-3/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit a779d91314ca7208b7feb3ad817b62904397c56d ] we found that the following race condition exists in xfrm_alloc_userspi flow: user thread state_hash_work thread ---- ---- xfrm_alloc_userspi() __find_acq_core() /*alloc new xfrm_state:x*/ xfrm_state_alloc() /*schedule state_hash_work thread*/ xfrm_hash_grow_check() xfrm_hash_resize() xfrm_alloc_spi /*hold lock*/ x->id.spi = htonl(spi) spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock) /*waiting lock release*/ xfrm_hash_transfer() spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock) /*add x into hlist:net->xfrm.state_byspi*/ hlist_add_head_rcu(&x->byspi) spin_unlock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock) /*add x into hlist:net->xfrm.state_byspi 2 times*/ hlist_add_head_rcu(&x->byspi) 1. a new state x is alloced in xfrm_state_alloc() and added into the bydst hlist in __find_acq_core() on the LHS; 2. on the RHS, state_hash_work thread travels the old bydst and tranfers every xfrm_state (include x) into the new bydst hlist and new byspi hlist; 3. user thread on the LHS gets the lock and adds x into the new byspi hlist again. So the same xfrm_state (x) is added into the same list_hash (net->xfrm.state_byspi) 2 times that makes the list_hash become an inifite loop. To fix the race, x->id.spi = htonl(spi) in the xfrm_alloc_spi() is moved to the back of spin_lock_bh, sothat state_hash_work thread no longer add x which id.spi is zero into the hash_list. Fixes: f034b5d4efdf ("[XFRM]: Dynamic xfrm_state hash table sizing.") Signed-off-by: zhuoliang zhang <zhuoliang.zhang@mediatek.com> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: Use correct address family in xfrm_state_findHerbert Xu2020-10-141-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit e94ee171349db84c7cfdc5fefbebe414054d0924 ] The struct flowi must never be interpreted by itself as its size depends on the address family. Therefore it must always be grouped with its original family value. In this particular instance, the original family value is lost in the function xfrm_state_find. Therefore we get a bogus read when it's coupled with the wrong family which would occur with inter- family xfrm states. This patch fixes it by keeping the original family value. Note that the same bug could potentially occur in LSM through the xfrm_state_pol_flow_match hook. I checked the current code there and it seems to be safe for now as only secid is used which is part of struct flowi_common. But that API should be changed so that so that we don't get new bugs in the future. We could do that by replacing fl with just secid or adding a family field. Reported-by: syzbot+577fbac3145a6eb2e7a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 48b8d78315bf ("[XFRM]: State selection update to use inner...") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: clone whole liftime_cur structure in xfrm_do_migrateAntony Antony2020-10-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 8366685b2883e523f91e9816d7be371eb1144749 ] When we clone state only add_time was cloned. It missed values like bytes, packets. Now clone the all members of the structure. v1->v3: - use memcpy to copy the entire structure Fixes: 80c9abaabf42 ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)") Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: clone XFRMA_SEC_CTX in xfrm_do_migrateAntony Antony2020-10-141-0/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 7aa05d304785204703a67a6aa7f1db402889a172 ] XFRMA_SEC_CTX was not cloned from the old to the new. Migrate this attribute during XFRMA_MSG_MIGRATE v1->v2: - return -ENOMEM on error v2->v3: - fix return type to int Fixes: 80c9abaabf42 ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)") Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: clone XFRMA_SET_MARK in xfrm_do_migrateAntony Antony2020-10-141-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 545e5c571662b1cd79d9588f9d3b6e36985b8007 ] XFRMA_SET_MARK and XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK was not cloned from the old to the new. Migrate these two attributes during XFRMA_MSG_MIGRATE Fixes: 9b42c1f179a6 ("xfrm: Extend the output_mark to support input direction and masking.") Signed-off-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrmi: drop ignore_df check before updating pmtuSabrina Dubroca2020-10-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 45a36a18d01907710bad5258d81f76c18882ad88 upstream. xfrm interfaces currently test for !skb->ignore_df when deciding whether to update the pmtu on the skb's dst. Because of this, no pmtu exception is created when we do something like: ping -s 1438 <dest> By dropping this check, the pmtu exception will be created and the next ping attempt will work. Fixes: f203b76d7809 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces") Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: Fix double ESP trailer insertion in IPsec crypto offload.Huy Nguyen2020-06-301-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 94579ac3f6d0820adc83b5dc5358ead0158101e9 ] During IPsec performance testing, we see bad ICMP checksum. The error packet has duplicated ESP trailer due to double validate_xmit_xfrm calls. The first call is from ip_output, but the packet cannot be sent because netif_xmit_frozen_or_stopped is true and the packet gets dev_requeue_skb. The second call is from NET_TX softirq. However after the first call, the packet already has the ESP trailer. Fix by marking the skb with XFRM_XMIT bit after the packet is handled by validate_xmit_xfrm to avoid duplicate ESP trailer insertion. Fixes: f6e27114a60a ("net: Add a xfrm validate function to validate_xmit_skb") Signed-off-by: Huy Nguyen <huyn@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Raed Salem <raeds@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm: fix a NULL-ptr deref in xfrm_local_errorXin Long2020-06-031-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f6a23d85d078c2ffde79c66ca81d0a1dde451649 upstream. This patch is to fix a crash: [ ] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access [ ] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI [ ] RIP: 0010:ipv6_local_error+0xac/0x7a0 [ ] Call Trace: [ ] xfrm6_local_error+0x1eb/0x300 [ ] xfrm_local_error+0x95/0x130 [ ] __xfrm6_output+0x65f/0xb50 [ ] xfrm6_output+0x106/0x46f [ ] udp_tunnel6_xmit_skb+0x618/0xbf0 [ip6_udp_tunnel] [ ] vxlan_xmit_one+0xbc6/0x2c60 [vxlan] [ ] vxlan_xmit+0x6a0/0x4276 [vxlan] [ ] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x165/0x820 [ ] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1ff0/0x2b90 [ ] ip_finish_output2+0xd3e/0x1480 [ ] ip_do_fragment+0x182d/0x2210 [ ] ip_output+0x1d0/0x510 [ ] ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0 [ ] raw_sendmsg+0x1b4c/0x2b80 [ ] sock_sendmsg+0xc0/0x110 This occurred when sending a v4 skb over vxlan6 over ipsec, in which case skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6) while skb->sk->sk_family == AF_INET in xfrm_local_error(). Then it will go to xfrm6_local_error() where it tries to get ipv6 info from a ipv4 sk. This issue was actually fixed by Commit 628e341f319f ("xfrm: make local error reporting more robust"), but brought back by Commit 844d48746e4b ("xfrm: choose protocol family by skb protocol"). So to fix it, we should call xfrm6_local_error() only when skb->protocol is htons(ETH_P_IPV6) and skb->sk->sk_family is AF_INET6. Fixes: 844d48746e4b ("xfrm: choose protocol family by skb protocol") Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: fix a warning in xfrm_policy_insert_listXin Long2020-06-031-6/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit ed17b8d377eaf6b4a01d46942b4c647378a79bdd upstream. This waring can be triggered simply by: # ip xfrm policy update src 192.168.1.1/24 dst 192.168.1.2/24 dir in \ priority 1 mark 0 mask 0x10 #[1] # ip xfrm policy update src 192.168.1.1/24 dst 192.168.1.2/24 dir in \ priority 2 mark 0 mask 0x1 #[2] # ip xfrm policy update src 192.168.1.1/24 dst 192.168.1.2/24 dir in \ priority 2 mark 0 mask 0x10 #[3] Then dmesg shows: [ ] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 7265 at net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:1548 [ ] RIP: 0010:xfrm_policy_insert_list+0x2f2/0x1030 [ ] Call Trace: [ ] xfrm_policy_inexact_insert+0x85/0xe50 [ ] xfrm_policy_insert+0x4ba/0x680 [ ] xfrm_add_policy+0x246/0x4d0 [ ] xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x331/0x5c0 [ ] netlink_rcv_skb+0x121/0x350 [ ] xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x66/0x80 [ ] netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630 [ ] netlink_sendmsg+0x714/0xbf0 [ ] sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110 The issue was introduced by Commit 7cb8a93968e3 ("xfrm: Allow inserting policies with matching mark and different priorities"). After that, the policies [1] and [2] would be able to be added with different priorities. However, policy [3] will actually match both [1] and [2]. Policy [1] was matched due to the 1st 'return true' in xfrm_policy_mark_match(), and policy [2] was matched due to the 2nd 'return true' in there. It caused WARN_ON() in xfrm_policy_insert_list(). This patch is to fix it by only (the same value and priority) as the same policy in xfrm_policy_mark_match(). Thanks to Yuehaibing, we could make this fix better. v1->v2: - check policy->mark.v == pol->mark.v only without mask. Fixes: 7cb8a93968e3 ("xfrm: Allow inserting policies with matching mark and different priorities") Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm interface: fix oops when deleting a x-netns interfaceNicolas Dichtel2020-06-031-0/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c95c5f58b35ef995f66cb55547eee6093ab5fcb8 upstream. Here is the steps to reproduce the problem: ip netns add foo ip netns add bar ip -n foo link add xfrmi0 type xfrm dev lo if_id 42 ip -n foo link set xfrmi0 netns bar ip netns del foo ip netns del bar Which results to: [ 186.686395] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6b6b6b6b6b6b6bd3: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 186.687665] CPU: 7 PID: 232 Comm: kworker/u16:2 Not tainted 5.6.0+ #1 [ 186.688430] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 [ 186.689420] Workqueue: netns cleanup_net [ 186.689903] RIP: 0010:xfrmi_dev_uninit+0x1b/0x4b [xfrm_interface] [ 186.690657] Code: 44 f6 ff ff 31 c0 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e c3 48 8d 8f c0 08 00 00 8b 05 ce 14 00 00 48 8b 97 d0 08 00 00 48 8b 92 c0 0e 00 00 <48> 8b 14 c2 48 8b 02 48 85 c0 74 19 48 39 c1 75 0c 48 8b 87 c0 08 [ 186.692838] RSP: 0018:ffffc900003b7d68 EFLAGS: 00010286 [ 186.693435] RAX: 000000000000000d RBX: ffff8881b0f31000 RCX: ffff8881b0f318c0 [ 186.694334] RDX: 6b6b6b6b6b6b6b6b RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff8881b0f31000 [ 186.695190] RBP: ffffc900003b7df0 R08: ffff888236c07740 R09: 0000000000000040 [ 186.696024] R10: ffffffff81fce1b8 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffffc900003b7d80 [ 186.696859] R13: ffff8881edcc6a40 R14: ffff8881a1b6e780 R15: ffffffff81ed47c8 [ 186.697738] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888237dc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 186.698705] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 186.699408] CR2: 00007f2129e93148 CR3: 0000000001e0a000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 [ 186.700221] Call Trace: [ 186.700508] rollback_registered_many+0x32b/0x3fd [ 186.701058] ? __rtnl_unlock+0x20/0x3d [ 186.701494] ? arch_local_irq_save+0x11/0x17 [ 186.702012] unregister_netdevice_many+0x12/0x55 [ 186.702594] default_device_exit_batch+0x12b/0x150 [ 186.703160] ? prepare_to_wait_exclusive+0x60/0x60 [ 186.703719] cleanup_net+0x17d/0x234 [ 186.704138] process_one_work+0x196/0x2e8 [ 186.704652] worker_thread+0x1a4/0x249 [ 186.705087] ? cancel_delayed_work+0x92/0x92 [ 186.705620] kthread+0x105/0x10f [ 186.706000] ? __kthread_bind_mask+0x57/0x57 [ 186.706501] ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40 [ 186.706978] Modules linked in: xfrm_interface nfsv3 nfs_acl auth_rpcgss nfsv4 nfs lockd grace fscache sunrpc button parport_pc parport serio_raw evdev pcspkr loop ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 crc32c_generic 8139too ide_cd_mod cdrom ide_gd_mod ata_generic ata_piix libata scsi_mod piix psmouse i2c_piix4 ide_core 8139cp i2c_core mii floppy [ 186.710423] ---[ end trace 463bba18105537e5 ]--- The problem is that x-netns xfrm interface are not removed when the link netns is removed. This causes later this oops when thoses interfaces are removed. Let's add a handler to remove all interfaces related to a netns when this netns is removed. Fixes: f203b76d7809 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces") Reported-by: Christophe Gouault <christophe.gouault@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: call xfrm_output_gso when inner_protocol is set in xfrm_outputXin Long2020-06-031-5/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a204aef9fd77dce1efd9066ca4e44eede99cd858 upstream. An use-after-free crash can be triggered when sending big packets over vxlan over esp with esp offload enabled: [] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ipv6_gso_pull_exthdrs.part.8+0x32c/0x4e0 [] Call Trace: [] dump_stack+0x75/0xa0 [] kasan_report+0x37/0x50 [] ipv6_gso_pull_exthdrs.part.8+0x32c/0x4e0 [] ipv6_gso_segment+0x2c8/0x13c0 [] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x1cb/0x420 [] skb_udp_tunnel_segment+0x6b5/0x1c90 [] inet_gso_segment+0x440/0x1380 [] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x1cb/0x420 [] esp4_gso_segment+0xae8/0x1709 [esp4_offload] [] inet_gso_segment+0x440/0x1380 [] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x1cb/0x420 [] __skb_gso_segment+0x2d7/0x5f0 [] validate_xmit_skb+0x527/0xb10 [] __dev_queue_xmit+0x10f8/0x2320 <--- [] ip_finish_output2+0xa2e/0x1b50 [] ip_output+0x1a8/0x2f0 [] xfrm_output_resume+0x110e/0x15f0 [] __xfrm4_output+0xe1/0x1b0 [] xfrm4_output+0xa0/0x200 [] iptunnel_xmit+0x5a7/0x920 [] vxlan_xmit_one+0x1658/0x37a0 [vxlan] [] vxlan_xmit+0x5e4/0x3ec8 [vxlan] [] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x125/0x540 [] __dev_queue_xmit+0x17bd/0x2320 <--- [] ip6_finish_output2+0xb20/0x1b80 [] ip6_output+0x1b3/0x390 [] ip6_xmit+0xb82/0x17e0 [] inet6_csk_xmit+0x225/0x3d0 [] __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1763/0x3520 [] tcp_write_xmit+0xd64/0x5fe0 [] __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x8c/0x320 [] tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2245/0x3500 [] tcp_sendmsg+0x27/0x40 As on the tx path of vxlan over esp, skb->inner_network_header would be set on vxlan_xmit() and xfrm4_tunnel_encap_add(), and the later one can overwrite the former one. It causes skb_udp_tunnel_segment() to use a wrong skb->inner_network_header, then the issue occurs. This patch is to fix it by calling xfrm_output_gso() instead when the inner_protocol is set, in which gso_segment of inner_protocol will be done first. While at it, also improve some code around. Fixes: 7862b4058b9f ("esp: Add gso handlers for esp4 and esp6") Reported-by: Xiumei Mu <xmu@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: allow to accept packets with ipv6 NEXTHDR_HOP in xfrm_inputXin Long2020-06-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit afcaf61be9d1dbdee5ec186d1dcc67b6b692180f upstream. For beet mode, when it's ipv6 inner address with nexthdrs set, the packet format might be: ---------------------------------------------------- | outer | | dest | | | ESP | ESP | | IP hdr | ESP | opts.| TCP | Data | Trailer | ICV | ---------------------------------------------------- The nexthdr from ESP could be NEXTHDR_HOP(0), so it should continue processing the packet when nexthdr returns 0 in xfrm_input(). Otherwise, when ipv6 nexthdr is set, the packet will be dropped. I don't see any error cases that nexthdr may return 0. So fix it by removing the check for nexthdr == 0. Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: policy: Fix doulbe free in xfrm_policy_timerYueHaibing2020-04-021-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 4c59406ed00379c8663f8663d82b2537467ce9d7 upstream. After xfrm_add_policy add a policy, its ref is 2, then xfrm_policy_timer read_lock xp->walk.dead is 0 .... mod_timer() xfrm_policy_kill policy->walk.dead = 1 .... del_timer(&policy->timer) xfrm_pol_put //ref is 1 xfrm_pol_put //ref is 0 xfrm_policy_destroy call_rcu xfrm_pol_hold //ref is 1 read_unlock xfrm_pol_put //ref is 0 xfrm_policy_destroy call_rcu xfrm_policy_destroy is called twice, which may leads to double free. Call Trace: RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x161/0x210 ... xfrm_policy_timer+0x522/0x600 call_timer_fn+0x1b3/0x5e0 ? __xfrm_decode_session+0x2990/0x2990 ? msleep+0xb0/0xb0 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x24/0x40 ? __xfrm_decode_session+0x2990/0x2990 ? __xfrm_decode_session+0x2990/0x2990 run_timer_softirq+0x5c5/0x10e0 Fix this by use write_lock_bh in xfrm_policy_kill. Fixes: ea2dea9dacc2 ("xfrm: remove policy lock when accessing policy->walk.dead") Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Acked-by: Timo Teräs <timo.teras@iki.fi> Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: add the missing verify_sec_ctx_len check in xfrm_add_acquireXin Long2020-04-021-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit a1a7e3a36e01ca6e67014f8cf673cb8e47be5550 upstream. Without doing verify_sec_ctx_len() check in xfrm_add_acquire(), it may be out-of-bounds to access uctx->ctx_str with uctx->ctx_len, as noticed by syz: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in selinux_xfrm_alloc_user+0x237/0x430 Read of size 768 at addr ffff8880123be9b4 by task syz-executor.1/11650 Call Trace: dump_stack+0xe8/0x16e print_address_description.cold.3+0x9/0x23b kasan_report.cold.4+0x64/0x95 memcpy+0x1f/0x50 selinux_xfrm_alloc_user+0x237/0x430 security_xfrm_policy_alloc+0x5c/0xb0 xfrm_policy_construct+0x2b1/0x650 xfrm_add_acquire+0x21d/0xa10 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x431/0x6f0 netlink_rcv_skb+0x15a/0x410 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x6d/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x50e/0x6a0 netlink_sendmsg+0x8ae/0xd40 sock_sendmsg+0x133/0x170 ___sys_sendmsg+0x834/0x9a0 __sys_sendmsg+0x100/0x1e0 do_syscall_64+0xe5/0x660 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf So fix it by adding the missing verify_sec_ctx_len check there. Fixes: 980ebd25794f ("[IPSEC]: Sync series - acquire insert") Reported-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: fix uctx len check in verify_sec_ctx_lenXin Long2020-04-021-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 171d449a028573b2f0acdc7f31ecbb045391b320 upstream. It's not sufficient to do 'uctx->len != (sizeof(struct xfrm_user_sec_ctx) + uctx->ctx_len)' check only, as uctx->len may be greater than nla_len(rt), in which case it will cause slab-out-of-bounds when accessing uctx->ctx_str later. This patch is to fix it by return -EINVAL when uctx->len > nla_len(rt). Fixes: df71837d5024 ("[LSM-IPSec]: Security association restriction.") Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: handle NETDEV_UNREGISTER for xfrm deviceRaed Salem2020-04-021-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 03891f820c2117b19e80b370281eb924a09cf79f upstream. This patch to handle the asynchronous unregister device event so the device IPsec offload resources could be cleanly released. Fixes: e4db5b61c572 ("xfrm: policy: remove pcpu policy cache") Signed-off-by: Raed Salem <raeds@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Boris Pismenny <borisp@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: interface: do not confirm neighbor when do pmtu updateXu Wang2020-02-051-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 8aaea2b0428b6aad7c7e22d3fddc31a78bb1d724 ] When do IPv6 tunnel PMTU update and calls __ip6_rt_update_pmtu() in the end, we should not call dst_confirm_neigh() as there is no two-way communication. Signed-off-by: Xu Wang <vulab@iscas.ac.cn> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm interface: fix packet tx through bpf_redirect()Nicolas Dichtel2020-02-051-7/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit f042365dbffea98fb8148c98c700402e8d099f02 ] With an ebpf program that redirects packets through a xfrm interface, packets are dropped because no dst is attached to skb. This could also be reproduced with an AF_PACKET socket, with the following python script (xfrm1 is a xfrm interface): import socket send_s = socket.socket(socket.AF_PACKET, socket.SOCK_RAW, 0) # scapy # p = IP(src='10.100.0.2', dst='10.200.0.1')/ICMP(type='echo-request') # raw(p) req = b'E\x00\x00\x1c\x00\x01\x00\x00@\x01e\xb2\nd\x00\x02\n\xc8\x00\x01\x08\x00\xf7\xff\x00\x00\x00\x00' send_s.sendto(req, ('xfrm1', 0x800, 0, 0)) It was also not possible to send an ip packet through an AF_PACKET socket because a LL header was expected. Let's remove those LL header constraints. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm interface: ifname may be wrong in logsNicolas Dichtel2020-01-271-9/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit e0aaa332e6a97dae57ad59cdb19e21f83c3d081c ] The ifname is copied when the interface is created, but is never updated later. In fact, this property is used only in one error message, where the netdevice pointer is available, thus let's use it. Fixes: f203b76d7809 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
* xfrm interface: fix management of phydevNicolas Dichtel2019-12-131-15/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 22d6552f827ef76ade3edf6bbb3f05048a0a7d8b upstream. With the current implementation, phydev cannot be removed: $ ip link add dummy type dummy $ ip link add xfrm1 type xfrm dev dummy if_id 1 $ ip l d dummy kernel:[77938.465445] unregister_netdevice: waiting for dummy to become free. Usage count = 1 Manage it like in ip tunnels, ie just keep the ifindex. Not that the side effect, is that the phydev is now optional. Fixes: f203b76d7809 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Tested-by: Julien Floret <julien.floret@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm interface: fix list corruption for x-netnsNicolas Dichtel2019-12-131-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit c5d1030f23002430c2a336b2b629b9d6f72b3564 upstream. dev_net(dev) is the netns of the device and xi->net is the link netns, where the device has been linked. changelink() must operate in the link netns to avoid a corruption of the xfrm lists. Note that xi->net and dev_net(xi->physdev) are always the same. Before the patch, the xfrmi lists may be corrupted and can later trigger a kernel panic. Fixes: f203b76d7809 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces") Reported-by: Julien Floret <julien.floret@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Tested-by: Julien Floret <julien.floret@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm interface: avoid corruption on changelinkNicolas Dichtel2019-12-131-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e9e7e85d75f3731079ffd77c1a66f037aef04fe7 upstream. The new parameters must not be stored in the netdev_priv() before validation, it may corrupt the interface. Note also that if data is NULL, only a memset() is done. $ ip link add xfrm1 type xfrm dev lo if_id 1 $ ip link add xfrm2 type xfrm dev lo if_id 2 $ ip link set xfrm1 type xfrm dev lo if_id 2 RTNETLINK answers: File exists $ ip -d link list dev xfrm1 5: xfrm1@lo: <NOARP> mtu 1500 qdisc noop state DOWN mode DEFAULT group default qlen 1000 link/none 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00 promiscuity 0 minmtu 68 maxmtu 1500 xfrm if_id 0x2 addrgenmode eui64 numtxqueues 1 numrxqueues 1 gso_max_size 65536 gso_max_segs 65535 => "if_id 0x2" Fixes: f203b76d7809 ("xfrm: Add virtual xfrm interfaces") Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Tested-by: Julien Floret <julien.floret@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-06-29 10:02:26 +0000