| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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commit c3bcde026684c62d7a2b6f626dc7cf763833875c upstream.
udp_tunnel(6)_xmit_skb() called by tipc_udp_xmit() expects a tunnel device
to count packets on dev->tstats, a perpcu variable. However, TIPC is using
udp tunnel with no tunnel device, and pass the lower dev, like veth device
that only initializes dev->lstats(a perpcu variable) when creating it.
Later iptunnel_xmit_stats() called by ip(6)tunnel_xmit() thinks the dev as
a tunnel device, and uses dev->tstats instead of dev->lstats. tstats' each
pointer points to a bigger struct than lstats, so when tstats->tx_bytes is
increased, other percpu variable's members could be overwritten.
syzbot has reported quite a few crashes due to fib_nh_common percpu member
'nhc_pcpu_rth_output' overwritten, call traces are like:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in rt_cache_valid+0x158/0x190
net/ipv4/route.c:1556
rt_cache_valid+0x158/0x190 net/ipv4/route.c:1556
__mkroute_output net/ipv4/route.c:2332 [inline]
ip_route_output_key_hash_rcu+0x819/0x2d50 net/ipv4/route.c:2564
ip_route_output_key_hash+0x1ef/0x360 net/ipv4/route.c:2393
__ip_route_output_key include/net/route.h:125 [inline]
ip_route_output_flow+0x28/0xc0 net/ipv4/route.c:2651
ip_route_output_key include/net/route.h:135 [inline]
...
or:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
RIP: 0010:dst_dev_put+0x24/0x290 net/core/dst.c:168
<IRQ>
rt_fibinfo_free_cpus net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:200 [inline]
free_fib_info_rcu+0x2e1/0x490 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:217
__rcu_reclaim kernel/rcu/rcu.h:240 [inline]
rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2437 [inline]
invoke_rcu_callbacks kernel/rcu/tree.c:2716 [inline]
rcu_process_callbacks+0x100a/0x1ac0 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2697
...
The issue exists since tunnel stats update is moved to iptunnel_xmit by
Commit 039f50629b7f ("ip_tunnel: Move stats update to iptunnel_xmit()"),
and here to fix it by passing a NULL tunnel dev to udp_tunnel(6)_xmit_skb
so that the packets counting won't happen on dev->tstats.
Reported-by: syzbot+9d4c12bfd45a58738d0a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+a9e23ea2aa21044c2798@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+c4c4b2bb358bb936ad7e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+0290d2290a607e035ba1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+a43d8d4e7e8a7a9e149e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+a47c5f4c6c00fc1ed16e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 039f50629b7f ("ip_tunnel: Move stats update to iptunnel_xmit()")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4ac30c4b3659efac031818c418beb51e630d512d upstream.
__udp6_lib_err() may be called when handling icmpv6 message. For example,
the icmpv6 toobig(type=2). __udp6_lib_lookup() is then called
which may call reuseport_select_sock(). reuseport_select_sock() will
call into a bpf_prog (if there is one).
reuseport_select_sock() is expecting the skb->data pointing to the
transport header (udphdr in this case). For example, run_bpf_filter()
is pulling the transport header.
However, in the __udp6_lib_err() path, the skb->data is pointing to the
ipv6hdr instead of the udphdr.
One option is to pull and push the ipv6hdr in __udp6_lib_err().
Instead of doing this, this patch follows how the original
commit 538950a1b752 ("soreuseport: setsockopt SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_[CE]BPF")
was done in IPv4, which has passed a NULL skb pointer to
reuseport_select_sock().
Fixes: 538950a1b752 ("soreuseport: setsockopt SO_ATTACH_REUSEPORT_[CE]BPF")
Cc: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Acked-by: Craig Gallek <kraig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 257a525fe2e49584842c504a92c27097407f778f upstream.
When the commit a6024562ffd7 ("udp: Add GRO functions to UDP socket")
added udp[46]_lib_lookup_skb to the udp_gro code path, it broke
the reuseport_select_sock() assumption that skb->data is pointing
to the transport header.
This patch follows an earlier __udp6_lib_err() fix by
passing a NULL skb to avoid calling the reuseport's bpf_prog.
Fixes: a6024562ffd7 ("udp: Add GRO functions to UDP socket")
Cc: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4f07b80c973348a99b5d2a32476a2e7877e94a05 ]
This patch is to fix an uninit-value issue, reported by syzbot:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in memchr+0xce/0x110 lib/string.c:981
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x191/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
kmsan_report+0x130/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:622
__msan_warning+0x75/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:310
memchr+0xce/0x110 lib/string.c:981
string_is_valid net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:176 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable+0x2a1/0x480 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:449
__tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:327 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3ac/0xb00 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:360
tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1178 [inline]
tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x1b1b/0x27b0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1281
TLV_GET_DATA_LEN() may return a negtive int value, which will be
used as size_t (becoming a big unsigned long) passed into memchr,
cause this issue.
Similar to what it does in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(), this
fix is to return -EINVAL when TLV_GET_DATA_LEN() is negtive in
tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable(), as well as in
tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump() and tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats().
v1->v2:
- add the missing Fixes tags per Eric's request.
Fixes: 0762216c0ad2 ("tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable")
Fixes: 8b66fee7f8ee ("tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats")
Reported-by: syzbot+30eaa8bf392f7fafffaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit c492d4c74dd3f87559883ffa0f94a8f1ae3fe5f5 ]
This patch is to fix a dst defcnt leak, which can be reproduced by doing:
# ip net a c; ip net a s; modprobe tipc
# ip net e s ip l a n eth1 type veth peer n eth1 netns c
# ip net e c ip l s lo up; ip net e c ip l s eth1 up
# ip net e s ip l s lo up; ip net e s ip l s eth1 up
# ip net e c ip a a 1.1.1.2/8 dev eth1
# ip net e s ip a a 1.1.1.1/8 dev eth1
# ip net e c tipc b e m udp n u1 localip 1.1.1.2
# ip net e s tipc b e m udp n u1 localip 1.1.1.1
# ip net d c; ip net d s; rmmod tipc
and it will get stuck and keep logging the error:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for lo to become free. Usage count = 1
The cause is that a dst is held by the udp sock's sk_rx_dst set on udp rx
path with udp_early_demux == 1, and this dst (eventually holding lo dev)
can't be released as bearer's removal in tipc pernet .exit happens after
lo dev's removal, default_device pernet .exit.
"There are two distinct types of pernet_operations recognized: subsys and
device. At creation all subsys init functions are called before device
init functions, and at destruction all device exit functions are called
before subsys exit function."
So by calling register_pernet_device instead to register tipc_net_ops, the
pernet .exit() will be invoked earlier than loopback dev's removal when a
netns is being destroyed, as fou/gue does.
Note that vxlan and geneve udp tunnels don't have this issue, as the udp
sock is released in their device ndo_stop().
This fix is also necessary for tipc dst_cache, which will hold dsts on tx
path and I will introduce in my next patch.
Reported-by: Li Shuang <shuali@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 25bff6d5478b2a02368097015b7d8eb727c87e16 ]
Now in sctp_endpoint_init(), it holds the sk then creates auth
shkey. But when the creation fails, it doesn't release the sk,
which causes a sk defcnf leak,
Here to fix it by only holding the sk when auth shkey is created
successfully.
Fixes: a29a5bd4f5c3 ("[SCTP]: Implement SCTP-AUTH initializations.")
Reported-by: syzbot+afabda3890cc2f765041@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+276ca1c77a19977c0130@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d0bae4a0e3d8c5690a885204d7eb2341a5b4884d ]
In sock_getsockopt(), 'optlen' is fetched the first time from userspace.
'len < 0' is then checked. Then in condition 'SO_MEMINFO', 'optlen' is
fetched the second time from userspace.
If change it between two fetches may cause security problems or unexpected
behaivor, and there is no reason to fetch it a second time.
To fix this, we need to remove the second fetch.
Signed-off-by: JingYi Hou <houjingyi647@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 55655e3d1197fff16a7a05088fb0e5eba50eac55 ]
syzbot found we can leak memory in packet_set_ring(), if user application
provides buggy parameters.
Fixes: 7f953ab2ba46 ("af_packet: TX_RING support for TPACKET_V3")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Sowmini Varadhan <sowmini.varadhan@oracle.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 38c73529de13e1e10914de7030b659a2f8b01c3b ]
In commit 19e4e768064a8 ("ipv4: Fix raw socket lookup for local
traffic"), the dif argument to __raw_v4_lookup() is coming from the
returned value of inet_iif() but the change was done only for the first
lookup. Subsequent lookups in the while loop still use skb->dev->ifIndex.
Fixes: 19e4e768064a8 ("ipv4: Fix raw socket lookup for local traffic")
Signed-off-by: Stephen Suryaputra <ssuryaextr@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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AF_PACKET
[ Upstream commit 89ed5b519004a7706f50b70f611edbd3aaacff2c ]
When an application is run that:
a) Sets its scheduler to be SCHED_FIFO
and
b) Opens a memory mapped AF_PACKET socket, and sends frames with the
MSG_DONTWAIT flag cleared, its possible for the application to hang
forever in the kernel. This occurs because when waiting, the code in
tpacket_snd calls schedule, which under normal circumstances allows
other tasks to run, including ksoftirqd, which in some cases is
responsible for freeing the transmitted skb (which in AF_PACKET calls a
destructor that flips the status bit of the transmitted frame back to
available, allowing the transmitting task to complete).
However, when the calling application is SCHED_FIFO, its priority is
such that the schedule call immediately places the task back on the cpu,
preventing ksoftirqd from freeing the skb, which in turn prevents the
transmitting task from detecting that the transmission is complete.
We can fix this by converting the schedule call to a completion
mechanism. By using a completion queue, we force the calling task, when
it detects there are no more frames to send, to schedule itself off the
cpu until such time as the last transmitted skb is freed, allowing
forward progress to be made.
Tested by myself and the reporter, with good results
Change Notes:
V1->V2:
Enhance the sleep logic to support being interruptible and
allowing for honoring to SK_SNDTIMEO (Willem de Bruijn)
V2->V3:
Rearrage the point at which we wait for the completion queue, to
avoid needing to check for ph/skb being null at the end of the loop.
Also move the complete call to the skb destructor to avoid needing to
modify __packet_set_status. Also gate calling complete on
packet_read_pending returning zero to avoid multiple calls to complete.
(Willem de Bruijn)
Move timeo computation within loop, to re-fetch the socket
timeout since we also use the timeo variable to record the return code
from the wait_for_complete call (Neil Horman)
V3->V4:
Willem has requested that the control flow be restored to the
previous state. Doing so lets us eliminate the need for the
po->wait_on_complete flag variable, and lets us get rid of the
packet_next_frame function, but introduces another complexity.
Specifically, but using the packet pending count, we can, if an
applications calls sendmsg multiple times with MSG_DONTWAIT set, each
set of transmitted frames, when complete, will cause
tpacket_destruct_skb to issue a complete call, for which there will
never be a wait_on_completion call. This imbalance will lead to any
future call to wait_for_completion here to return early, when the frames
they sent may not have completed. To correct this, we need to re-init
the completion queue on every call to tpacket_snd before we enter the
loop so as to ensure we wait properly for the frames we send in this
iteration.
Change the timeout and interrupted gotos to out_put rather than
out_status so that we don't try to free a non-existant skb
Clean up some extra newlines (Willem de Bruijn)
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 52ad259eaac0454c1ac7123e7148cf8d6e6f5301 ]
This silences -Wmissing-prototypes when defining p9_release_pages.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b1c4df8f21689b10d451c28fe38e860722d20e71.1542089696.git.dato@net.com.org.es
Signed-off-by: Adeodato Simó <dato@net.com.org.es>
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ef5305f1f72eb1cfcda25c382bb0368509c0385b ]
strcpy to dirent->d_name could overflow the buffer, use strscpy to check
the provided string length and error out if the size was too big.
While we are here, make the function return an error when the pdu
parsing failed, instead of returning the pdu offset as if it had been a
success...
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536339057-21974-4-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.org
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 139133 ("Copy into fixed size buffer")
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 473c7dd1d7b59ff8f88a5154737e3eac78a96e5b ]
the client c is always dereferenced to get the rdma struct, so c has to
be a valid pointer at this point.
Gcc would optimize that away but let's make coverity happy...
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1536339057-21974-3-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.org
Addresses-Coverity-ID: 102778 ("Dereference before null check")
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8b894adb2b7e1d1e64b8954569c761eaf3d51ab5 ]
9p/rdma would sometimes drop the connection and display errors in
recv_done when the user does ^C.
The errors were caused by recv buffers that were posted at the time
of disconnect, and we just do not want to disconnect when
down_interruptible is... interrupted.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1535625307-18019-1-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.org
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 2f9ad0ac947ccbe3ffe7c6229c9330f2a7755f64 ]
If the xen bus exists but does not expose the proper interface, it is
possible to get a non-zero length but still some error, leading to
strcmp failing trying to load invalid memory addresses e.g.
fffffffffffffffe.
There is then no need to check length when there is no error, as the
xenbus driver guarantees that the string is nul-terminated.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1534236007-10170-1-git-send-email-asmadeus@codewreck.org
Signed-off-by: Dominique Martinet <dominique.martinet@cea.fr>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@gmail.com>
Cc: Latchesar Ionkov <lucho@ionkov.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit b6653b3629e5b88202be3c9abc44713973f5c4b4 upstream.
tcp_fragment() might be called for skbs in the write queue.
Memory limits might have been exceeded because tcp_sendmsg() only
checks limits at full skb (64KB) boundaries.
Therefore, we need to make sure tcp_fragment() wont punish applications
that might have setup very low SO_SNDBUF values.
Fixes: f070ef2ac667 ("tcp: tcp_fragment() should apply sane memory limits")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Tested-by: Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a71fd9dac23613d96ba3c05619a8ef4fd6cdf9b9 upstream.
ieee80211_aes_gmac() uses the mic argument directly in sg_set_buf() and
that does not allow use of stack memory (e.g., BUG_ON() is hit in
sg_set_buf() with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG). BIP GMAC TX side is fine for this
since it can use the skb data buffer, but the RX side was using a stack
variable for deriving the local MIC value to compare against the
received one.
Fix this by allocating heap memory for the mic buffer.
This was found with hwsim test case ap_cipher_bip_gmac_128 hitting that
BUG_ON() and kernel panic.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 79c92ca42b5a3e0ea172ea2ce8df8e125af237da upstream.
When receiving a deauthentication/disassociation frame from a TDLS
peer, a station should not disconnect the current AP, but only
disable the current TDLS link if it's enabled.
Without this change, a TDLS issue can be reproduced by following the
steps as below:
1. STA-1 and STA-2 are connected to AP, bidirection traffic is running
between STA-1 and STA-2.
2. Set up TDLS link between STA-1 and STA-2, stay for a while, then
teardown TDLS link.
3. Repeat step #2 and monitor the connection between STA and AP.
During the test, one STA may send a deauthentication/disassociation
frame to another, after TDLS teardown, with reason code 6/7, which
means: Class 2/3 frame received from nonassociated STA.
On receive this frame, the receiver STA will disconnect the current
AP and then reconnect. It's not a expected behavior, purpose of this
frame should be disabling the TDLS link, not the link with AP.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Yu Wang <yyuwang@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 588f7d39b3592a36fb7702ae3b8bdd9be4621e2f upstream.
When receiving a robust management frame, drop it if we don't have
rx->sta since then we don't have a security association and thus
couldn't possibly validate the frame.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 4f488fbca2a86cc7714a128952eead92cac279ab upstream.
In wiphy_new_nm(), if an error occurs after dev_set_name() and
device_initialize() have already been called, it's necessary to call
put_device() (via wiphy_free()) to avoid a memory leak.
Reported-by: syzbot+7fddca22578bc67c3fe4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 1f87f7d3a3b4 ("cfg80211: add rfkill support")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 693cd8ce3f882524a5d06f7800dd8492411877b3 upstream.
When trying to align the minimum encryption key size requirement for
Bluetooth connections, it turns out doing this in a central location in
the HCI connection handling code is not possible.
Original Bluetooth version up to 2.0 used a security model where the
L2CAP service would enforce authentication and encryption. Starting
with Bluetooth 2.1 and Secure Simple Pairing that model has changed into
that the connection initiator is responsible for providing an encrypted
ACL link before any L2CAP communication can happen.
Now connecting Bluetooth 2.1 or later devices with Bluetooth 2.0 and
before devices are causing a regression. The encryption key size check
needs to be moved out of the HCI connection handling into the L2CAP
channel setup.
To achieve this, the current check inside hci_conn_security() has been
moved into l2cap_check_enc_key_size() helper function and then called
from four decisions point inside L2CAP to cover all combinations of
Secure Simple Pairing enabled devices and device using legacy pairing
and legacy service security model.
Fixes: d5bb334a8e17 ("Bluetooth: Align minimum encryption key size for LE and BR/EDR connections")
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=203643
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.
The minimum encryption key size for LE connections is 56 bits and to
align LE with BR/EDR, enforce 56 bits of minimum encryption key size for
BR/EDR connections as well.
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fd704bd5ee749d560e86c4f1fd2ef486d8abf7cf upstream.
CAN supports software tx timestamps as of the below commit. Purge
any queued timestamp packets on socket destroy.
Fixes: 51f31cabe3ce ("ip: support for TX timestamps on UDP and RAW sockets")
Reported-by: syzbot+a90604060cb40f5bdd16@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 719c7d563c17b150877cee03a4b812a424989dfa ]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip_vs_in.part.29+0xe8/0xd20 [ip_vs]
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881e9b26e2c by task sshd/5603
CPU: 0 PID: 5603 Comm: sshd Not tainted 4.19.39+ #30
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x71/0xab
print_address_description+0x6a/0x270
kasan_report+0x179/0x2c0
ip_vs_in.part.29+0xe8/0xd20 [ip_vs]
ip_vs_in+0xd8/0x170 [ip_vs]
nf_hook_slow+0x5f/0xe0
__ip_local_out+0x1d5/0x250
ip_local_out+0x19/0x60
__tcp_transmit_skb+0xba1/0x14f0
tcp_write_xmit+0x41f/0x1ed0
? _copy_from_iter_full+0xca/0x340
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0x52/0x140
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x787/0x1600
? tcp_sendpage+0x60/0x60
? inet_sk_set_state+0xb0/0xb0
tcp_sendmsg+0x27/0x40
sock_sendmsg+0x6d/0x80
sock_write_iter+0x121/0x1c0
? sock_sendmsg+0x80/0x80
__vfs_write+0x23e/0x370
vfs_write+0xe7/0x230
ksys_write+0xa1/0x120
? __ia32_sys_read+0x50/0x50
? __audit_syscall_exit+0x3ce/0x450
do_syscall_64+0x73/0x200
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x7ff6f6147c60
Code: 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 28 12 2d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 83 3d 5d 73 2d 00 00 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 31 c3 48 83
RSP: 002b:00007ffd772ead18 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000034 RCX: 00007ff6f6147c60
RDX: 0000000000000034 RSI: 000055df30a31270 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000055df30a31270 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 00007ffd772ead70 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffd772ead74
R13: 00007ffd772eae20 R14: 00007ffd772eae24 R15: 000055df2f12ddc0
Allocated by task 6052:
kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
__kmalloc+0x10a/0x220
ops_init+0x97/0x190
register_pernet_operations+0x1ac/0x360
register_pernet_subsys+0x24/0x40
0xffffffffc0ea016d
do_one_initcall+0x8b/0x253
do_init_module+0xe3/0x335
load_module+0x2fc0/0x3890
__do_sys_finit_module+0x192/0x1c0
do_syscall_64+0x73/0x200
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
Freed by task 6067:
__kasan_slab_free+0x130/0x180
kfree+0x90/0x1a0
ops_free_list.part.7+0xa6/0xc0
unregister_pernet_operations+0x18b/0x1f0
unregister_pernet_subsys+0x1d/0x30
ip_vs_cleanup+0x1d/0xd2f [ip_vs]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x20c/0x300
do_syscall_64+0x73/0x200
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881e9b26600 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4096 of size 4096
The buggy address is located 2092 bytes inside of 4096-byte region [ffff8881e9b26600, ffff8881e9b27600)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0007a6c800 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff888107c0e600 index:0x0 compound_mapcount: 0
flags: 0x17ffffc0008100(slab|head)
raw: 0017ffffc0008100 dead000000000100 dead000000000200 ffff888107c0e600
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080070007 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
while unregistering ipvs module, ops_free_list calls
__ip_vs_cleanup, then nf_unregister_net_hooks be called to
do remove nf hook entries. It need a RCU period to finish,
however net->ipvs is set to NULL immediately, which will
trigger NULL pointer dereference when a packet is hooked
and handled by ip_vs_in where net->ipvs is dereferenced.
Another scene is ops_free_list call ops_free to free the
net_generic directly while __ip_vs_cleanup finished, then
calling ip_vs_in will triggers use-after-free.
This patch moves nf_unregister_net_hooks from __ip_vs_cleanup()
to __ip_vs_dev_cleanup(), where rcu_barrier() is called by
unregister_pernet_device -> unregister_pernet_operations,
that will do the needed grace period.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: efe41606184e ("ipvs: convert to use pernet nf_hook api")
Suggested-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 946c0d8e6ed43dae6527e878d0077c1e11015db0 ]
This patch fixes netfilter hook traversal when there are more than 1 hooks
returning NF_QUEUE verdict. When the first queue reinjects the packet,
'nf_reinject' starts traversing hooks with a proper hook_index. However,
if it again receives a NF_QUEUE verdict (by some other netfilter hook), it
queues the packet with a wrong hook_index. So, when the second queue
reinjects the packet, it re-executes hooks in between.
Fixes: 960632ece694 ("netfilter: convert hook list to an array")
Signed-off-by: Jagdish Motwani <jagdish.motwani@sophos.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit ce950f1050cece5e406a5cde723c69bba60e1b26 ]
Based on comments from Xin, even after fixes for our recent syzbot
report of cookie memory leaks, its possible to get a resend of an INIT
chunk which would lead to us leaking cookie memory.
To ensure that we don't leak cookie memory, free any previously
allocated cookie first.
Change notes
v1->v2
update subsystem tag in subject (davem)
repeat kfree check for peer_random and peer_hmacs (xin)
v2->v3
net->sctp
also free peer_chunks
v3->v4
fix subject tags
v4->v5
remove cut line
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+f7e9153b037eac9b1df8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
CC: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 309b66970ee2abf721ecd0876a48940fa0b99a35 ]
In order to create an internal vport, internal_dev_create() is used and
that calls register_netdevice() internally.
If register_netdevice() fails, it calls dev->priv_destructor() to free
private data of netdev. actually, a private data of this is a vport.
Hence internal_dev_create() should not free and use a vport after failure
of register_netdevice().
Test command
ovs-dpctl add-dp bonding_masters
Splat looks like:
[ 1035.667767] kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
[ 1035.675958] general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC KASAN PTI
[ 1035.676916] CPU: 1 PID: 1028 Comm: ovs-vswitchd Tainted: G B 5.2.0-rc3+ #240
[ 1035.676916] RIP: 0010:internal_dev_create+0x2e5/0x4e0 [openvswitch]
[ 1035.676916] Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 9f 01 00 00 4c 8b 23 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 49 8d bc 24 60 05 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 86 01 00 00 49 8b bc 24 60 05 00 00 e8 e4 68 f4
[ 1035.713720] RSP: 0018:ffff88810dcb7578 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 1035.713720] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88810d13fe08 RCX: ffffffff84297704
[ 1035.713720] RDX: 00000000000000ac RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000560
[ 1035.713720] RBP: 00000000ffffffef R08: fffffbfff0d3b881 R09: fffffbfff0d3b881
[ 1035.713720] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: fffffbfff0d3b880 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 1035.768776] R13: 0000607ee460b900 R14: ffff88810dcb7690 R15: ffff88810dcb7698
[ 1035.777709] FS: 00007f02095fc980(0000) GS:ffff88811b400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1035.777709] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1035.777709] CR2: 00007ffdf01d2f28 CR3: 0000000108258000 CR4: 00000000001006e0
[ 1035.777709] Call Trace:
[ 1035.777709] ovs_vport_add+0x267/0x4f0 [openvswitch]
[ 1035.777709] new_vport+0x15/0x1e0 [openvswitch]
[ 1035.777709] ovs_vport_cmd_new+0x567/0xd10 [openvswitch]
[ 1035.777709] ? ovs_dp_cmd_dump+0x490/0x490 [openvswitch]
[ 1035.777709] ? __kmalloc+0x131/0x2e0
[ 1035.777709] ? genl_family_rcv_msg+0xa54/0x1030
[ 1035.777709] genl_family_rcv_msg+0x63a/0x1030
[ 1035.777709] ? genl_unregister_family+0x630/0x630
[ 1035.841681] ? debug_show_all_locks+0x2d0/0x2d0
[ ... ]
Fixes: cf124db566e6 ("net: Fix inconsistent teardown and release of private netdev state.")
Signed-off-by: Taehee Yoo <ap420073@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Greg Rose <gvrose8192@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit f3e92cb8e2eb8c27d109e6fd73d3a69a8c09e288 ]
Nine years ago, I added RCU handling to neighbours, not pneighbours.
(pneigh are not commonly used)
Unfortunately I missed that /proc dump operations would use a
common entry and exit point : neigh_seq_start() and neigh_seq_stop()
We need to read_lock(tbl->lock) or risk use-after-free while
iterating the pneigh structures.
We might later convert pneigh to RCU and revert this patch.
sysbot reported :
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in pneigh_get_next.isra.0+0x24b/0x280 net/core/neighbour.c:3158
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888097f2a700 by task syz-executor.0/9825
CPU: 1 PID: 9825 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.2.0-rc4+ #32
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_address_description.cold+0x7c/0x20d mm/kasan/report.c:188
__kasan_report.cold+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:317
kasan_report+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/common.c:614
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/generic_report.c:132
pneigh_get_next.isra.0+0x24b/0x280 net/core/neighbour.c:3158
neigh_seq_next+0xdb/0x210 net/core/neighbour.c:3240
seq_read+0x9cf/0x1110 fs/seq_file.c:258
proc_reg_read+0x1fc/0x2c0 fs/proc/inode.c:221
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:714 [inline]
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:701 [inline]
do_iter_read+0x4a4/0x660 fs/read_write.c:935
vfs_readv+0xf0/0x160 fs/read_write.c:997
kernel_readv fs/splice.c:359 [inline]
default_file_splice_read+0x475/0x890 fs/splice.c:414
do_splice_to+0x127/0x180 fs/splice.c:877
splice_direct_to_actor+0x2d2/0x970 fs/splice.c:954
do_splice_direct+0x1da/0x2a0 fs/splice.c:1063
do_sendfile+0x597/0xd00 fs/read_write.c:1464
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1525 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1511 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1dd/0x220 fs/read_write.c:1511
do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x4592c9
Code: fd b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 cb b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f4aab51dc78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000028
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00000000004592c9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 0000000000000005
RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000080000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4aab51e6d4
R13: 00000000004c689d R14: 00000000004db828 R15: 00000000ffffffff
Allocated by task 9827:
save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:489 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0xcf/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:462
kasan_kmalloc+0x9/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:503
__do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3660 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x15c/0x740 mm/slab.c:3669
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:552 [inline]
pneigh_lookup+0x19c/0x4a0 net/core/neighbour.c:731
arp_req_set_public net/ipv4/arp.c:1010 [inline]
arp_req_set+0x613/0x720 net/ipv4/arp.c:1026
arp_ioctl+0x652/0x7f0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1226
inet_ioctl+0x2a0/0x340 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:926
sock_do_ioctl+0xd8/0x2f0 net/socket.c:1043
sock_ioctl+0x3ed/0x780 net/socket.c:1194
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:46 [inline]
file_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:509 [inline]
do_vfs_ioctl+0xd5f/0x1380 fs/ioctl.c:696
ksys_ioctl+0xab/0xd0 fs/ioctl.c:713
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:720 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:718 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:718
do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
Freed by task 9824:
save_stack+0x23/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:71
set_track mm/kasan/common.c:79 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0x102/0x150 mm/kasan/common.c:451
kasan_slab_free+0xe/0x10 mm/kasan/common.c:459
__cache_free mm/slab.c:3432 [inline]
kfree+0xcf/0x220 mm/slab.c:3755
pneigh_ifdown_and_unlock net/core/neighbour.c:812 [inline]
__neigh_ifdown+0x236/0x2f0 net/core/neighbour.c:356
neigh_ifdown+0x20/0x30 net/core/neighbour.c:372
arp_ifdown+0x1d/0x21 net/ipv4/arp.c:1274
inetdev_destroy net/ipv4/devinet.c:319 [inline]
inetdev_event+0xa14/0x11f0 net/ipv4/devinet.c:1544
notifier_call_chain+0xc2/0x230 kernel/notifier.c:95
__raw_notifier_call_chain kernel/notifier.c:396 [inline]
raw_notifier_call_chain+0x2e/0x40 kernel/notifier.c:403
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x3f/0x90 net/core/dev.c:1749
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:1761 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:1775 [inline]
rollback_registered_many+0x9b9/0xfc0 net/core/dev.c:8178
rollback_registered+0x109/0x1d0 net/core/dev.c:8220
unregister_netdevice_queue net/core/dev.c:9267 [inline]
unregister_netdevice_queue+0x1ee/0x2c0 net/core/dev.c:9260
unregister_netdevice include/linux/netdevice.h:2631 [inline]
__tun_detach+0xd8a/0x1040 drivers/net/tun.c:724
tun_detach drivers/net/tun.c:741 [inline]
tun_chr_close+0xe0/0x180 drivers/net/tun.c:3451
__fput+0x2ff/0x890 fs/file_table.c:280
____fput+0x16/0x20 fs/file_table.c:313
task_work_run+0x145/0x1c0 kernel/task_work.c:113
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:185 [inline]
exit_to_usermode_loop+0x273/0x2c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:168
prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:199 [inline]
syscall_return_slowpath arch/x86/entry/common.c:279 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x58e/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:304
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888097f2a700
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
64-byte region [ffff888097f2a700, ffff888097f2a740)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea00025fca80 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8880aa400340 index:0x0
flags: 0x1fffc0000000200(slab)
raw: 01fffc0000000200 ffffea000250d548 ffffea00025726c8 ffff8880aa400340
raw: 0000000000000000 ffff888097f2a000 0000000100000020 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff888097f2a600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888097f2a680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff888097f2a700: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
^
ffff888097f2a780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff888097f2a800: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
Fixes: 767e97e1e0db ("neigh: RCU conversion of struct neighbour")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6be8e297f9bcea666ea85ac7a6cd9d52d6deaf92 ]
lapb_register calls lapb_create_cb, which initializes the control-
block's ref-count to one, and __lapb_insert_cb, which increments it when
adding the new block to the list of blocks.
lapb_unregister calls __lapb_remove_cb, which decrements the ref-count
when removing control-block from the list of blocks, and calls lapb_put
itself to decrement the ref-count before returning.
However, lapb_unregister also calls __lapb_devtostruct to look up the
right control-block for the given net_device, and __lapb_devtostruct
also bumps the ref-count, which means that when lapb_unregister returns
the ref-count is still 1 and the control-block is leaked.
Call lapb_put after __lapb_devtostruct to fix leak.
Reported-by: syzbot+afb980676c836b4a0afa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Sowden <jeremy@azazel.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 65a3c497c0e965a552008db8bc2653f62bc925a1 ]
Before taking a refcount, make sure the object is not already
scheduled for deletion.
Same fix is needed in ipv6_flowlabel_opt()
Fixes: 18367681a10b ("ipv6 flowlabel: Convert np->ipv6_fl_list to RCU.")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit d4d5d8e83c9616aeef28a2869cea49cc3fb35526 ]
Before thread in process context uses bh_lock_sock()
we must disable bh.
sysbot reported :
WARNING: inconsistent lock state
5.2.0-rc3+ #32 Not tainted
inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage.
blkid/26581 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes:
00000000e0da85ee (slock-AF_AX25){+.?.}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline]
00000000e0da85ee (slock-AF_AX25){+.?.}, at: ax25_destroy_timer+0x53/0xc0 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:275
{SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4303
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline]
ax25_rt_autobind+0x3ca/0x720 net/ax25/ax25_route.c:429
ax25_connect.cold+0x30/0xa4 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:1221
__sys_connect+0x264/0x330 net/socket.c:1834
__do_sys_connect net/socket.c:1845 [inline]
__se_sys_connect net/socket.c:1842 [inline]
__x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:1842
do_syscall_64+0xfd/0x680 arch/x86/entry/common.c:301
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
irq event stamp: 2272
hardirqs last enabled at (2272): [<ffffffff810065f3>] trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
hardirqs last disabled at (2271): [<ffffffff8100660f>] trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
softirqs last enabled at (1522): [<ffffffff87400654>] __do_softirq+0x654/0x94c kernel/softirq.c:320
softirqs last disabled at (2267): [<ffffffff81449010>] invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:374 [inline]
softirqs last disabled at (2267): [<ffffffff81449010>] irq_exit+0x180/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:414
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(slock-AF_AX25);
<Interrupt>
lock(slock-AF_AX25);
*** DEADLOCK ***
1 lock held by blkid/26581:
#0: 0000000010fd154d ((&ax25->dtimer)){+.-.}, at: lockdep_copy_map include/linux/lockdep.h:175 [inline]
#0: 0000000010fd154d ((&ax25->dtimer)){+.-.}, at: call_timer_fn+0xe0/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1312
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 26581 Comm: blkid Not tainted 5.2.0-rc3+ #32
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x172/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
print_usage_bug.cold+0x393/0x4a2 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2935
valid_state kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2948 [inline]
mark_lock_irq kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3138 [inline]
mark_lock+0xd46/0x1370 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3513
mark_irqflags kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3391 [inline]
__lock_acquire+0x159f/0x5490 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3745
lock_acquire+0x16f/0x3f0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4303
__raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:142 [inline]
_raw_spin_lock+0x2f/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:151
spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:338 [inline]
ax25_destroy_timer+0x53/0xc0 net/ax25/af_ax25.c:275
call_timer_fn+0x193/0x720 kernel/time/timer.c:1322
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1366 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1685 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1653 [inline]
run_timer_softirq+0x66f/0x1740 kernel/time/timer.c:1698
__do_softirq+0x25c/0x94c kernel/softirq.c:293
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:374 [inline]
irq_exit+0x180/0x1d0 kernel/softirq.c:414
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline]
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x13b/0x550 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1068
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:806
</IRQ>
RIP: 0033:0x7f858d5c3232
Code: 8b 61 08 48 8b 84 24 d8 00 00 00 4c 89 44 24 28 48 8b ac 24 d0 00 00 00 4c 8b b4 24 e8 00 00 00 48 89 7c 24 68 48 89 4c 24 78 <48> 89 44 24 58 8b 84 24 e0 00 00 00 89 84 24 84 00 00 00 8b 84 24
RSP: 002b:00007ffcaf0cf5c0 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffff13
RAX: 00007f858d7d27a8 RBX: 00007f858d7d8820 RCX: 00007f858d3940d8
RDX: 00007ffcaf0cf798 RSI: 00000000f5e616f3 RDI: 00007f858d394fee
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007ffcaf0cf780 R09: 00007f858d7db480
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000009691a75 R12: 0000000000000005
R13: 00000000f5e616f3 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffcaf0cf798
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 967c05aee439e6e5d7d805e195b3a20ef5c433d6 upstream.
If mtu probing is enabled tcp_mtu_probing() could very well end up
with a too small MSS.
Use the new sysctl tcp_min_snd_mss to make sure MSS search
is performed in an acceptable range.
CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Cc: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5f3e2bf008c2221478101ee72f5cb4654b9fc363 upstream.
Some TCP peers announce a very small MSS option in their SYN and/or
SYN/ACK messages.
This forces the stack to send packets with a very high network/cpu
overhead.
Linux has enforced a minimal value of 48. Since this value includes
the size of TCP options, and that the options can consume up to 40
bytes, this means that each segment can include only 8 bytes of payload.
In some cases, it can be useful to increase the minimal value
to a saner value.
We still let the default to 48 (TCP_MIN_SND_MSS), for compatibility
reasons.
Note that TCP_MAXSEG socket option enforces a minimal value
of (TCP_MIN_MSS). David Miller increased this minimal value
in commit c39508d6f118 ("tcp: Make TCP_MAXSEG minimum more correct.")
from 64 to 88.
We might in the future merge TCP_MIN_SND_MSS and TCP_MIN_MSS.
CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f070ef2ac66716357066b683fb0baf55f8191a2e upstream.
Jonathan Looney reported that a malicious peer can force a sender
to fragment its retransmit queue into tiny skbs, inflating memory
usage and/or overflow 32bit counters.
TCP allows an application to queue up to sk_sndbuf bytes,
so we need to give some allowance for non malicious splitting
of retransmit queue.
A new SNMP counter is added to monitor how many times TCP
did not allow to split an skb if the allowance was exceeded.
Note that this counter might increase in the case applications
use SO_SNDBUF socket option to lower sk_sndbuf.
CVE-2019-11478 : tcp_fragment, prevent fragmenting a packet when the
socket is already using more than half the allowed space
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 3b4929f65b0d8249f19a50245cd88ed1a2f78cff upstream.
Jonathan Looney reported that TCP can trigger the following crash
in tcp_shifted_skb() :
BUG_ON(tcp_skb_pcount(skb) < pcount);
This can happen if the remote peer has advertized the smallest
MSS that linux TCP accepts : 48
An skb can hold 17 fragments, and each fragment can hold 32KB
on x86, or 64KB on PowerPC.
This means that the 16bit witdh of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
can overflow.
Note that tcp_sendmsg() builds skbs with less than 64KB
of payload, so this problem needs SACK to be enabled.
SACK blocks allow TCP to coalesce multiple skbs in the retransmit
queue, thus filling the 17 fragments to maximal capacity.
CVE-2019-11477 -- u16 overflow of TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->tcp_gso_segs
Backport notes, provided by Joao Martins <joao.m.martins@oracle.com>
v4.15 or since commit 737ff314563 ("tcp: use sequence distance to
detect reordering") had switched from the packet-based FACK tracking and
switched to sequence-based.
v4.14 and older still have the old logic and hence on
tcp_skb_shift_data() needs to retain its original logic and have
@fack_count in sync. In other words, we keep the increment of pcount with
tcp_skb_pcount(skb) to later used that to update fack_count. To make it
more explicit we track the new skb that gets incremented to pcount in
@next_pcount, and we get to avoid the constant invocation of
tcp_skb_pcount(skb) all together.
Fixes: 832d11c5cd07 ("tcp: Try to restore large SKBs while SACK processing")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8ba6ddaaf86c4c6814774e4e4ef158b732bd9f9f upstream.
With upcoming rb-tree implementation, the checks will trigger
more often, and this is expected.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Amit Shah <amit@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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connections"
This reverts commit 2fa7a155b25160696cd77cdd995536cf5e172e20 which is
commit d5bb334a8e171b262e48f378bd2096c0ea458265 upstream.
Lots of people have reported issues with this patch, and as there does
not seem to be a fix going into Linus's kernel tree any time soon,
revert the commit in the stable trees so as to get people's machines
working properly again.
Reported-by: Vasily Khoruzhick <anarsoul@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeremy Cline <jeremy@jcline.org>
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f9fc54d313fab2834f44f516459cdc8ac91d797f upstream.
The return type for get_regs_len in struct ethtool_ops is int,
the hns3 driver may return error when failing to get the regs
len by sending cmd to firmware.
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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NLM_F_EXCL not supplied"
[ Upstream commit 4970b42d5c362bf873982db7d93245c5281e58f4 ]
This reverts commit e9919a24d3022f72bcadc407e73a6ef17093a849.
Nathan reported the new behaviour breaks Android, as Android just add
new rules and delete old ones.
If we return 0 without adding dup rules, Android will remove the new
added rules and causing system to soft-reboot.
Fixes: e9919a24d302 ("fib_rules: return 0 directly if an exactly same rule exists when NLM_F_EXCL not supplied")
Reported-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Yaro Slav <yaro330@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <zenczykowski@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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0...")"
This reverts commit 691306ebd18f945e44b4552a4bfcca3475e5d957 as the
patch that this "fixes" is about to be reverted...
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 59e3e4b52663a9d97efbce7307f62e4bc5c9ce91 ]
As it was done in commit 8f659a03a0ba ("net: ipv4: fix for a race
condition in raw_sendmsg") and commit 20b50d79974e ("net: ipv4: emulate
READ_ONCE() on ->hdrincl bit-field in raw_sendmsg()") for ipv4, copy the
value of inet->hdrincl in a local variable, to avoid introducing a race
condition in the next commit.
Signed-off-by: Olivier Matz <olivier.matz@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit b9aa52c4cb457e7416cc0c95f475e72ef4a61336 ]
The following code returns EFAULT (Bad address):
s = socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_ICMPV6);
setsockopt(s, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_HDRINCL, 1);
sendto(ipv6_icmp6_packet, addr); /* returns -1, errno = EFAULT */
The IPv4 equivalent code works. A workaround is to use IPPROTO_RAW
instead of IPPROTO_ICMPV6.
The failure happens because 2 bytes are eaten from the msghdr by
rawv6_probe_proto_opt() starting from commit 19e3c66b52ca ("ipv6
equivalent of "ipv4: Avoid reading user iov twice after
raw_probe_proto_opt""), but at that time it was not a problem because
IPV6_HDRINCL was not yet introduced.
Only eat these 2 bytes if hdrincl == 0.
Fixes: 715f504b1189 ("ipv6: add IPV6_HDRINCL option for raw sockets")
Signed-off-by: Olivier Matz <olivier.matz@6wind.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 720f1de4021f09898b8c8443f3b3e995991b6e3a ]
Currently, the process issuing a "start" command on the pktgen procfs
interface, acquires the pktgen thread lock and never release it, until
all pktgen threads are completed. The above can blocks indefinitely any
other pktgen command and any (even unrelated) netdevice removal - as
the pktgen netdev notifier acquires the same lock.
The issue is demonstrated by the following script, reported by Matteo:
ip -b - <<'EOF'
link add type dummy
link add type veth
link set dummy0 up
EOF
modprobe pktgen
echo reset >/proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl
{
echo rem_device_all
echo add_device dummy0
} >/proc/net/pktgen/kpktgend_0
echo count 0 >/proc/net/pktgen/dummy0
echo start >/proc/net/pktgen/pgctrl &
sleep 1
rmmod veth
Fix the above releasing the thread lock around the sleep call.
Additionally we must prevent racing with forcefull rmmod - as the
thread lock no more protects from them. Instead, acquire a self-reference
before waiting for any thread. As a side effect, running
rmmod pktgen
while some thread is running now fails with "module in use" error,
before this patch such command hanged indefinitely.
Note: the issue predates the commit reported in the fixes tag, but
this fix can't be applied before the mentioned commit.
v1 -> v2:
- no need to check for thread existence after flipping the lock,
pktgen threads are freed only at net exit time
-
Fixes: 6146e6a43b35 ("[PKTGEN]: Removes thread_{un,}lock() macros.")
Reported-and-tested-by: Matteo Croce <mcroce@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 85cb928787eab6a2f4ca9d2a798b6f3bed53ced1 ]
When the following tests last for several hours, the problem will occur.
Server:
rds-stress -r 1.1.1.16 -D 1M
Client:
rds-stress -r 1.1.1.14 -s 1.1.1.16 -D 1M -T 30
The following will occur.
"
Starting up....
tsks tx/s rx/s tx+rx K/s mbi K/s mbo K/s tx us/c rtt us cpu
%
1 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00
1 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00
1 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00
1 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00
"
>From vmcore, we can find that clean_list is NULL.
>From the source code, rds_mr_flushd calls rds_ib_mr_pool_flush_worker.
Then rds_ib_mr_pool_flush_worker calls
"
rds_ib_flush_mr_pool(pool, 0, NULL);
"
Then in function
"
int rds_ib_flush_mr_pool(struct rds_ib_mr_pool *pool,
int free_all, struct rds_ib_mr **ibmr_ret)
"
ibmr_ret is NULL.
In the source code,
"
...
list_to_llist_nodes(pool, &unmap_list, &clean_nodes, &clean_tail);
if (ibmr_ret)
*ibmr_ret = llist_entry(clean_nodes, struct rds_ib_mr, llnode);
/* more than one entry in llist nodes */
if (clean_nodes->next)
llist_add_batch(clean_nodes->next, clean_tail, &pool->clean_list);
...
"
When ibmr_ret is NULL, llist_entry is not executed. clean_nodes->next
instead of clean_nodes is added in clean_list.
So clean_nodes is discarded. It can not be used again.
The workqueue is executed periodically. So more and more clean_nodes are
discarded. Finally the clean_list is NULL.
Then this problem will occur.
Fixes: 1bc144b62524 ("net, rds, Replace xlist in net/rds/xlist.h with llist")
Signed-off-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4b2a2bfeb3f056461a90bd621e8bd7d03fa47f60 ]
Commit cd9ff4de0107 changed the key for IFF_POINTOPOINT devices to
INADDR_ANY but neigh_xmit which is used for MPLS encapsulations was not
updated to use the altered key. The result is that every packet Tx does
a lookup on the gateway address which does not find an entry, a new one
is created only to find the existing one in the table right before the
insert since arp_constructor was updated to reset the primary key. This
is seen in the allocs and destroys counters:
ip -s -4 ntable show | head -10 | grep alloc
which increase for each packet showing the unnecessary overhread.
Fix by having neigh_xmit use __ipv4_neigh_lookup_noref for NEIGH_ARP_TABLE.
Fixes: cd9ff4de0107 ("ipv4: Make neigh lookup keys for loopback/point-to-point devices be INADDR_ANY")
Reported-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Alan Maguire <alan.maguire@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0a8dd9f67cd0da7dc284f48b032ce00db1a68791 ]
syzbot found the following leak in sctp_process_init
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810ef68400 (size 1024):
comm "syz-executor273", pid 7046, jiffies 4294945598 (age 28.770s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
1d de 28 8d de 0b 1b e3 b5 c2 f9 68 fd 1a 97 25 ..(........h...%
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000a02cebbd>] kmemleak_alloc_recursive include/linux/kmemleak.h:55
[inline]
[<00000000a02cebbd>] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:439 [inline]
[<00000000a02cebbd>] slab_alloc mm/slab.c:3326 [inline]
[<00000000a02cebbd>] __do_kmalloc mm/slab.c:3658 [inline]
[<00000000a02cebbd>] __kmalloc_track_caller+0x15d/0x2c0 mm/slab.c:3675
[<000000009e6245e6>] kmemdup+0x27/0x60 mm/util.c:119
[<00000000dfdc5d2d>] kmemdup include/linux/string.h:432 [inline]
[<00000000dfdc5d2d>] sctp_process_init+0xa7e/0xc20
net/sctp/sm_make_chunk.c:2437
[<00000000b58b62f8>] sctp_cmd_process_init net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:682
[inline]
[<00000000b58b62f8>] sctp_cmd_interpreter net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1384
[inline]
[<00000000b58b62f8>] sctp_side_effects net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1194
[inline]
[<00000000b58b62f8>] sctp_do_sm+0xbdc/0x1d60 net/sctp/sm_sideeffect.c:1165
[<0000000044e11f96>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x13c/0x200
net/sctp/associola.c:1074
[<00000000ec43804d>] sctp_inq_push+0x7f/0xb0 net/sctp/inqueue.c:95
[<00000000726aa954>] sctp_backlog_rcv+0x5e/0x2a0 net/sctp/input.c:354
[<00000000d9e249a8>] sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:950 [inline]
[<00000000d9e249a8>] __release_sock+0xab/0x110 net/core/sock.c:2418
[<00000000acae44fa>] release_sock+0x37/0xd0 net/core/sock.c:2934
[<00000000963cc9ae>] sctp_sendmsg+0x2c0/0x990 net/sctp/socket.c:2122
[<00000000a7fc7565>] inet_sendmsg+0x64/0x120 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:802
[<00000000b732cbd3>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
[<00000000b732cbd3>] sock_sendmsg+0x54/0x70 net/socket.c:671
[<00000000274c57ab>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x393/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2292
[<000000008252aedb>] __sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xf0 net/socket.c:2330
[<00000000f7bf23d1>] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2339 [inline]
[<00000000f7bf23d1>] __se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2337 [inline]
[<00000000f7bf23d1>] __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x23/0x30 net/socket.c:2337
[<00000000a8b4131f>] do_syscall_64+0x76/0x1a0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:3
The problem was that the peer.cookie value points to an skb allocated
area on the first pass through this function, at which point it is
overwritten with a heap allocated value, but in certain cases, where a
COOKIE_ECHO chunk is included in the packet, a second pass through
sctp_process_init is made, where the cookie value is re-allocated,
leaking the first allocation.
Fix is to always allocate the cookie value, and free it when we are done
using it.
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+f7e9153b037eac9b1df8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
CC: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0ee4e76937d69128a6a66861ba393ebdc2ffc8a2 ]
ethtool_get_regs() allocates a buffer of size ops->get_regs_len(),
and pass it to the kernel driver via ops->get_regs() for filling.
There is no restriction about what the kernel drivers can or cannot do
with the open ethtool_regs structure. They usually set regs->version
and ignore regs->len or set it to the same size as ops->get_regs_len().
But if userspace allocates a smaller buffer for the registers dump,
we would cause a userspace buffer overflow in the final copy_to_user()
call, which uses the regs.len value potentially reset by the driver.
To fix this, make this case obvious and store regs.len before calling
ops->get_regs(), to only copy as much data as requested by userspace,
up to the value returned by ops->get_regs_len().
While at it, remove the redundant check for non-null regbuf.
Signed-off-by: Vivien Didelot <vivien.didelot@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 526f5b851a96566803ee4bee60d0a34df56c77f8 upstream.
Error message printed:
modprobe: ERROR: could not insert 'tipc': Address family not
supported by protocol.
when modprobe tipc after the following patch: switch order of
device registration, commit 7e27e8d6130c
("tipc: switch order of device registration to fix a crash")
Because sock_create_kern(net, AF_TIPC, ...) called by
tipc_topsrv_create_listener() in the initialization process
of tipc_init_net(), so tipc_socket_init() must be execute before that.
Meanwhile, tipc_net_id need to be initialized when sock_create()
called, and tipc_socket_init() is no need to be called for each namespace.
I add a variable tipc_topsrv_net_ops, and split the
register_pernet_subsys() of tipc into two parts, and split
tipc_socket_init() with initialization of pernet params.
By the way, I fixed resources rollback error when tipc_bcast_init()
failed in tipc_init_net().
Fixes: 7e27e8d6130c ("tipc: switch order of device registration to fix a crash")
Signed-off-by: Junwei Hu <hujunwei4@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Wang Wang <wangwang2@huawei.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+1e8114b61079bfe9cbc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Kang Zhou <zhoukang7@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Suanming Mou <mousuanming@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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registration"
commit 5593530e56943182ebb6d81eca8a3be6db6dbba4 upstream.
This reverts commit 532b0f7ece4cb2ffd24dc723ddf55242d1188e5e.
More revisions coming up.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 903869bd10e6719b9df6718e785be7ec725df59f ]
ip_sf_list_clear_all() needs to be defined even if !CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST
Fixes: 3580d04aa674 ("ipv4/igmp: fix another memory leak in igmpv3_del_delrec()")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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