| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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[ Upstream commit 42ca63f980842918560b25f0244307fd83b4777c ]
I got kmemleak report when doing fuzz test:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810c909b80 (size 64):
comm "syz", pid 957, jiffies 4295220394 (age 399.090s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 00 00 00 01 02 00 04 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000ca1f2e2e>] garp_request_join+0x285/0x3d0
[<00000000bf153351>] vlan_gvrp_request_join+0x15b/0x190
[<0000000024005e72>] vlan_dev_open+0x706/0x980
[<00000000dc20c4d4>] __dev_open+0x2bb/0x460
[<0000000066573004>] __dev_change_flags+0x501/0x650
[<0000000035b42f83>] rtnl_configure_link+0xee/0x280
[<00000000a5e69de0>] __rtnl_newlink+0xed5/0x1550
[<00000000a5258f4a>] rtnl_newlink+0x66/0x90
[<00000000506568ee>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x439/0xbd0
[<00000000b7eaeae1>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x14d/0x420
[<00000000c373ce66>] netlink_unicast+0x550/0x750
[<00000000ec74ce74>] netlink_sendmsg+0x88b/0xda0
[<00000000381ff246>] sock_sendmsg+0xc9/0x120
[<000000008f6a2db3>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x820
[<000000008d9c1735>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x145/0x1c0
[<00000000aa39dd8b>] __sys_sendmsg+0xfe/0x1d0
Calling garp_request_leave() after garp_request_join(), the attr->state
is set to GARP_APPLICANT_VO, garp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last
transmit event in garp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be
leaked. To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before
rerturning from garp_uninit_applicant().
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 996af62167d0e0ec69b938a3561e96f84ffff1aa ]
I got kmemleak report when doing fuzz test:
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810c239500 (size 64):
comm "syz-executor940", pid 882, jiffies 4294712870 (age 14.631s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00 01 02 00 04 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000a323afa4>] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2972 [inline]
[<00000000a323afa4>] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2980 [inline]
[<00000000a323afa4>] __kmalloc+0x167/0x340 mm/slub.c:4130
[<000000005034ca11>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:595 [inline]
[<000000005034ca11>] mrp_attr_create net/802/mrp.c:276 [inline]
[<000000005034ca11>] mrp_request_join+0x265/0x550 net/802/mrp.c:530
[<00000000fcfd81f3>] vlan_mvrp_request_join+0x145/0x170 net/8021q/vlan_mvrp.c:40
[<000000009258546e>] vlan_dev_open+0x477/0x890 net/8021q/vlan_dev.c:292
[<0000000059acd82b>] __dev_open+0x281/0x410 net/core/dev.c:1609
[<000000004e6dc695>] __dev_change_flags+0x424/0x560 net/core/dev.c:8767
[<00000000471a09af>] rtnl_configure_link+0xd9/0x210 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3122
[<0000000037a4672b>] __rtnl_newlink+0xe08/0x13e0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3448
[<000000008d5d0fda>] rtnl_newlink+0x64/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3488
[<000000004882fe39>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x369/0xa10 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5552
[<00000000907e6c54>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x134/0x3d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504
[<00000000e7d7a8c4>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
[<00000000e7d7a8c4>] netlink_unicast+0x4a0/0x6a0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340
[<00000000e0645d50>] netlink_sendmsg+0x78e/0xc90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929
[<00000000c24559b7>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
[<00000000c24559b7>] sock_sendmsg+0x139/0x170 net/socket.c:674
[<00000000fc210bc2>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x658/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2350
[<00000000be4577b5>] ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
Calling mrp_request_leave() after mrp_request_join(), the attr->state
is set to MRP_APPLICANT_VO, mrp_attr_destroy() won't be called in last
TX event in mrp_uninit_applicant(), the attr of applicant will be leaked.
To fix this leak, iterate and free each attr of applicant before rerturning
from mrp_uninit_applicant().
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit cbcf01128d0a92e131bd09f1688fe032480b65ca upstream.
unix_gc() assumes that candidate sockets can never gain an external
reference (i.e. be installed into an fd) while the unix_gc_lock is
held. Except for MSG_PEEK this is guaranteed by modifying inflight
count under the unix_gc_lock.
MSG_PEEK does not touch any variable protected by unix_gc_lock (file
count is not), yet it needs to be serialized with garbage collection.
Do this by locking/unlocking unix_gc_lock:
1) increment file count
2) lock/unlock barrier to make sure incremented file count is visible
to garbage collection
3) install file into fd
This is a lock barrier (unlike smp_mb()) that ensures that garbage
collection is run completely before or completely after the barrier.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit f4e65870e5cede5ca1ec0006b6c9803994e5f7b8 upstream.
We need this functionality for the io_uring file registration, but
we cannot rely on it since CONFIG_UNIX can be modular. Move the helpers
to a separate file, that's always builtin to the kernel if CONFIG_UNIX is
m/y.
No functional changes in this patch, just moving code around.
Reviewed-by: Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.com>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
[ backported to older kernels to get access to unix_gc_lock - gregkh ]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 517a16b1a88bdb6b530f48d5d153478b2552d9a8 ]
Commit 63346650c1a9 ("netrom: switch to sock timer API") switched to use
sock timer API. It replaces mod_timer() by sk_reset_timer(), and
del_timer() by sk_stop_timer().
Function sk_reset_timer() will increase the refcount of sock if it is
called on an inactive timer, hence, in case the timer expires, we need to
decrease the refcount ourselves in the handler, otherwise, the sock
refcount will be unbalanced and the sock will never be freed.
Signed-off-by: Nguyen Dinh Phi <phind.uet@gmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+10f1194569953b72f1ae@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 63346650c1a9 ("netrom: switch to sock timer API")
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5f119ba1d5771bbf46d57cff7417dcd84d3084ba ]
The release_sock() is blocking function, it would change the state
after sleeping. use wait_woken() instead.
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Yajun Deng <yajun.deng@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 991e634360f2622a683b48dfe44fe6d9cb765a09 ]
When nr_segs equal to zero in iovec_from_user, the object
msg->msg_iter.iov is uninit stack memory in caif_seqpkt_sendmsg
which is defined in ___sys_sendmsg. So we cann't just judge
msg->msg_iter.iov->base directlly. We can use nr_segs to judge
msg in caif_seqpkt_sendmsg whether has data buffers.
=====================================================
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in caif_seqpkt_sendmsg+0x693/0xf60 net/caif/caif_socket.c:542
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack+0x1c9/0x220 lib/dump_stack.c:118
kmsan_report+0xf7/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:118
__msan_warning+0x58/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:215
caif_seqpkt_sendmsg+0x693/0xf60 net/caif/caif_socket.c:542
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:652 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:672 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x12b6/0x1350 net/socket.c:2343
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2397 [inline]
__sys_sendmmsg+0x808/0xc90 net/socket.c:2480
__compat_sys_sendmmsg net/compat.c:656 [inline]
Reported-by: syzbot+09a5d591c1f98cf5efcb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=1ace85e8fc9b0d5a45c08c2656c3e91762daa9b8
Fixes: bece7b2398d0 ("caif: Rewritten socket implementation")
Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit c7bb4b89033b764eb07db4e060548a6311d801ee upstream.
While TCP stack scales reasonably well, there is still one part that
can be used to DDOS it.
IPv6 Packet too big messages have to lookup/insert a new route,
and if abused by attackers, can easily put hosts under high stress,
with many cpus contending on a spinlock while one is stuck in fib6_run_gc()
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu()
icmpv6_rcv()
icmpv6_notify()
tcp_v6_err()
tcp_v6_mtu_reduced()
inet6_csk_update_pmtu()
ip6_rt_update_pmtu()
__ip6_rt_update_pmtu()
ip6_rt_cache_alloc()
ip6_dst_alloc()
dst_alloc()
ip6_dst_gc()
fib6_run_gc()
spin_lock_bh() ...
Some of our servers have been hit by malicious ICMPv6 packets
trying to _increase_ the MTU/MSS of TCP flows.
We believe these ICMPv6 packets are a result of a bug in one ISP stack,
since they were blindly sent back for _every_ (small) packet sent to them.
These packets are for one TCP flow:
09:24:36.266491 IP6 Addr1 > Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240
09:24:36.266509 IP6 Addr1 > Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240
09:24:36.316688 IP6 Addr1 > Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240
09:24:36.316704 IP6 Addr1 > Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240
09:24:36.608151 IP6 Addr1 > Victim ICMP6, packet too big, mtu 1460, length 1240
TCP stack can filter some silly requests :
1) MTU below IPV6_MIN_MTU can be filtered early in tcp_v6_err()
2) tcp_v6_mtu_reduced() can drop requests trying to increase current MSS.
This tests happen before the IPv6 routing stack is entered, thus
removing the potential contention and route exhaustion.
Note that IPv6 stack was performing these checks, but too late
(ie : after the route has been added, and after the potential
garbage collect war)
v2: fix typo caught by Martin, thanks !
v3: exports tcp_mtu_to_mss(), caught by David, thanks !
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 561022acb1ce62e50f7a8258687a21b84282a4cb upstream.
While tp->mtu_info is read while socket is owned, the write
sides happen from err handlers (tcp_v[46]_mtu_reduced)
which only own the socket spinlock.
Fixes: 563d34d05786 ("tcp: dont drop MTU reduction indications")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 43b90bfad34bcb81b8a5bc7dc650800f4be1787e upstream.
commit e05a90ec9e16 ("net: reflect mark on tcp syn ack packets")
fixed IPv4 only.
This part is for the IPv6 side.
Fixes: e05a90ec9e16 ("net: reflect mark on tcp syn ack packets")
Signed-off-by: Alexander Ovechkin <ovov@yandex-team.ru>
Acked-by: Dmitry Yakunin <zeil@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit a019abd8022061b917da767cd1a66ed823724eab upstream.
Since commit 2796d0c648c9 ("bridge: Automatically manage
port promiscuous mode.")
bridges with `vlan_filtering 1` and only 1 auto-port don't
set IFF_PROMISC for unicast-filtering-capable ports.
Normally on port changes `br_manage_promisc` is called to
update the promisc flags and unicast filters if necessary,
but it cannot distinguish between *new* ports and ones
losing their promisc flag, and new ports end up not
receiving the MAC address list.
Fix this by calling `br_fdb_sync_static` in `br_add_if`
after the port promisc flags are updated and the unicast
filter was supposed to have been filled.
Fixes: 2796d0c648c9 ("bridge: Automatically manage port promiscuous mode.")
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Bumiller <w.bumiller@proxmox.com>
Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit c23a9fd209bc6f8c1fa6ee303fdf037d784a1627 upstream.
Two patches listed below removed ctnetlink_dump_helpinfo call from under
rcu_read_lock. Now its rcu_dereference generates following warning:
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
5.13.0+ #5 Not tainted
-----------------------------
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c:221 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
other info that might help us debug this:
rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 2251 Comm: conntrack Not tainted 5.13.0+ #5
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x7f/0xa1
ctnetlink_dump_helpinfo+0x134/0x150 [nf_conntrack_netlink]
ctnetlink_fill_info+0x2c2/0x390 [nf_conntrack_netlink]
ctnetlink_dump_table+0x13f/0x370 [nf_conntrack_netlink]
netlink_dump+0x10c/0x370
__netlink_dump_start+0x1a7/0x260
ctnetlink_get_conntrack+0x1e5/0x250 [nf_conntrack_netlink]
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x613/0x993 [nfnetlink]
netlink_rcv_skb+0x50/0x100
nfnetlink_rcv+0x55/0x120 [nfnetlink]
netlink_unicast+0x181/0x260
netlink_sendmsg+0x23f/0x460
sock_sendmsg+0x5b/0x60
__sys_sendto+0xf1/0x160
__x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x36/0x70
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Fixes: 49ca022bccc5 ("netfilter: ctnetlink: don't dump ct extensions of unconfirmed conntracks")
Fixes: 0b35f6031a00 ("netfilter: Remove duplicated rcu_read_lock.")
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 40fc3054b45820c28ea3c65e2c86d041dc244a8a upstream.
Commit 628a5c561890 ("[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE") introduced
ip6_skb_dst_mtu with return value of signed int which is inconsistent
with actually returned values. Also 2 users of this function actually
assign its value to unsigned int variable and only __xfrm6_output
assigns result of this function to signed variable but actually uses
as unsigned in further comparisons and calls. Change this function
to return unsigned int value.
Fixes: 628a5c561890 ("[INET]: Add IP(V6)_PMTUDISC_RPOBE")
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vadim Fedorenko <vfedorenko@novek.ru>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 04bef83a3358946bfc98a5ecebd1b0003d83d882 upstream.
When a PIM hello packet is received on a bridge port with multicast
snooping enabled, we mark it as a router port automatically, that
includes adding that port the router port list. The multicast lock
protects that list, but it is not acquired in the PIM message case
leading to a race condition, we need to take it to fix the race.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 91b02d3d133b ("bridge: mcast: add router port on PIM hello message")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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Commit e3d4030498c3 ("mac80211: do not accept/forward invalid EAPOL
frames") uses skb_mac_header() before eth_type_trans() is called
leading to incorrect pointer, the pointer gets written to. This issue
has appeared during backporting to 4.4, 4.9 and 4.14.
Fixes: e3d4030498c3 ("mac80211: do not accept/forward invalid EAPOL frames")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHQn7pKcyC_jYmGyTcPCdk9xxATwW5QPNph=bsZV8d-HPwNsyA@mail.gmail.com
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.4.x
Signed-off-by: Davis Mosenkovs <davis@mosenkovs.lv>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 50619dbf8db77e98d821d615af4f634d08e22698 ]
The first chunk in a packet is ensured to be present at the beginning of
sctp_rcv(), as a packet needs to have at least 1 chunk. But the second
one, may not be completely available and ch->length can be over
uninitialized memory.
Fix here is by only trying to walk on the next chunk if there is enough to
hold at least the header, and then proceed with the ch->length validation
that is already there.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0c5dc070ff3d6246d22ddd931f23a6266249e3db ]
Ilja reported that, simply putting it, nothing was validating that
from_addr_param functions were operating on initialized memory. That is,
the parameter itself was being validated by sctp_walk_params, but it
doesn't check for types and their specific sizes and it could be a 0-length
one, causing from_addr_param to potentially work over the next parameter or
even uninitialized memory.
The fix here is to, in all calls to from_addr_param, check if enough space
is there for the wanted IP address type.
Reported-by: Ilja Van Sprundel <ivansprundel@ioactive.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0ea9fd001a14ebc294f112b0361a4e601551d508 ]
Rfkill block and unblock Intel USB Bluetooth [8087:0026] may make it
stops working:
[ 509.691509] Bluetooth: hci0: HCI reset during shutdown failed
[ 514.897584] Bluetooth: hci0: MSFT filter_enable is already on
[ 530.044751] usb 3-10: reset full-speed USB device number 5 using xhci_hcd
[ 545.660350] usb 3-10: device descriptor read/64, error -110
[ 561.283530] usb 3-10: device descriptor read/64, error -110
[ 561.519682] usb 3-10: reset full-speed USB device number 5 using xhci_hcd
[ 566.686650] Bluetooth: hci0: unexpected event for opcode 0x0500
[ 568.752452] Bluetooth: hci0: urb 0000000096cd309b failed to resubmit (113)
[ 578.797955] Bluetooth: hci0: Failed to read MSFT supported features (-110)
[ 586.286565] Bluetooth: hci0: urb 00000000c522f633 failed to resubmit (113)
[ 596.215302] Bluetooth: hci0: Failed to read MSFT supported features (-110)
Or kernel panics because other workqueues already freed skb:
[ 2048.663763] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
[ 2048.663775] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 2048.663779] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 2048.663782] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 2048.663787] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 2048.663793] CPU: 3 PID: 4491 Comm: rfkill Tainted: G W 5.13.0-rc1-next-20210510+ #20
[ 2048.663799] Hardware name: HP HP EliteBook 850 G8 Notebook PC/8846, BIOS T76 Ver. 01.01.04 12/02/2020
[ 2048.663801] RIP: 0010:__skb_ext_put+0x6/0x50
[ 2048.663814] Code: 8b 1b 48 85 db 75 db 5b 41 5c 5d c3 be 01 00 00 00 e8 de 13 c0 ff eb e7 be 02 00 00 00 e8 d2 13 c0 ff eb db 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 <8b> 07 48 89 e5 83 f8 01 74 14 b8 ff ff ff ff f0 0f c1
07 83 f8 01
[ 2048.663819] RSP: 0018:ffffc1d105b6fd80 EFLAGS: 00010286
[ 2048.663824] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9d9ac5649000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 2048.663827] RDX: ffffffffc0d1daf6 RSI: 0000000000000206 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 2048.663830] RBP: ffffc1d105b6fd98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff9d9ace8ceac0
[ 2048.663834] R10: ffff9d9ace8ceac0 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff9d9ac5649000
[ 2048.663838] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007ffe0354d650 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 2048.663843] FS: 00007fe02ab19740(0000) GS:ffff9d9e5f8c0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 2048.663849] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 2048.663853] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000111a52004 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 2048.663856] PKRU: 55555554
[ 2048.663859] Call Trace:
[ 2048.663865] ? skb_release_head_state+0x5e/0x80
[ 2048.663873] kfree_skb+0x2f/0xb0
[ 2048.663881] btusb_shutdown_intel_new+0x36/0x60 [btusb]
[ 2048.663905] hci_dev_do_close+0x48c/0x5e0 [bluetooth]
[ 2048.663954] ? __cond_resched+0x1a/0x50
[ 2048.663962] hci_rfkill_set_block+0x56/0xa0 [bluetooth]
[ 2048.664007] rfkill_set_block+0x98/0x170
[ 2048.664016] rfkill_fop_write+0x136/0x1e0
[ 2048.664022] vfs_write+0xc7/0x260
[ 2048.664030] ksys_write+0xb1/0xe0
[ 2048.664035] ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x37/0x1c0
[ 2048.664042] __x64_sys_write+0x1a/0x20
[ 2048.664048] do_syscall_64+0x40/0xb0
[ 2048.664055] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[ 2048.664060] RIP: 0033:0x7fe02ac23c27
[ 2048.664066] Code: 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 02 48 c7 c0 ff ff ff ff eb b7 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 10 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 51 c3 48 83 ec 28 48 89 54 24 18 48 89 74 24
[ 2048.664070] RSP: 002b:00007ffe0354d638 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
[ 2048.664075] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007fe02ac23c27
[ 2048.664078] RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: 00007ffe0354d650 RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 2048.664081] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000559b05998440 R09: 0000559b05998440
[ 2048.664084] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
[ 2048.664086] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffffffff00000000 R15: 00000000ffffffff
So move the shutdown callback to a place where workqueues are either
flushed or cancelled to resolve the issue.
Signed-off-by: Kai-Heng Feng <kai.heng.feng@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 4ef36a52b0e47c80bbfd69c0cce61c7ae9f541ed ]
0x2B, 0x31 and 0x33 are reserved for future use but were not present in
the HCI to MGMT conversion table, this caused the conversion to be
incorrect for the HCI status code greater than 0x2A.
Reviewed-by: Miao-chen Chou <mcchou@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Yu Liu <yudiliu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit e93bdd78406da9ed01554c51e38b2a02c8ef8025 ]
Fix the following out-of-bounds warning:
net/wireless/wext-spy.c:178:2: warning: 'memcpy' offset [25, 28] from the object at 'threshold' is out of the bounds of referenced subobject 'low' with type 'struct iw_quality' at offset 20 [-Warray-bounds]
The problem is that the original code is trying to copy data into a
couple of struct members adjacent to each other in a single call to
memcpy(). This causes a legitimate compiler warning because memcpy()
overruns the length of &threshold.low and &spydata->spy_thr_low. As
these are just a couple of struct members, fix this by using direct
assignments, instead of memcpy().
This helps with the ongoing efforts to globally enable -Warray-bounds
and get us closer to being able to tighten the FORTIFY_SOURCE routines
on memcpy().
Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/109
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavoars@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422200032.GA168995@embeddedor
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c7ff9cff70601ea19245d997bb977344663434c7 ]
The client's sk_state will be set to TCP_ESTABLISHED if the server
replay the client's connect request.
However, if the client has pending signal, its sk_state will be set
to TCP_CLOSE without notify the server, so the server will hold the
corrupt connection.
client server
1. sk_state=TCP_SYN_SENT |
2. call ->connect() |
3. wait reply |
| 4. sk_state=TCP_ESTABLISHED
| 5. insert to connected list
| 6. reply to the client
7. sk_state=TCP_ESTABLISHED |
8. insert to connected list |
9. *signal pending* <--------------------- the user kill client
10. sk_state=TCP_CLOSE |
client is exiting... |
11. call ->release() |
virtio_transport_close
if (!(sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED ||
sk->sk_state == TCP_CLOSING))
return true; *return at here, the server cannot notice the connection is corrupt*
So the client should notify the peer in this case.
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Jorgen Hansen <jhansen@vmware.com>
Cc: Norbert Slusarek <nslusarek@gmx.net>
Cc: Andra Paraschiv <andraprs@amazon.com>
Cc: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Cc: David Brazdil <dbrazdil@google.com>
Cc: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Suggested-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.org/lkml/2021/5/17/418
Signed-off-by: lixianming <lixianming5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Longpeng(Mike) <longpeng2@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 6fd06963fa74197103cdbb4b494763127b3f2f34 ]
When memory allocation for XFRMA_ENCAP or XFRMA_COADDR fails,
the error will not be reported because the -ENOMEM assignment
to the err variable is overwritten before. Fix this by moving
these two in front of the function so that memory allocation
failures will be reported.
Reported-by: Tobias Brunner <tobias@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 62f20e068ccc50d6ab66fdb72ba90da2b9418c99 ]
This is a complement to commit aa6dd211e4b1 ("inet: use bigger hash
table for IP ID generation"), but focusing on some specific aspects
of IPv6.
Contary to IPv4, IPv6 only uses packet IDs with fragments, and with a
minimum MTU of 1280, it's much less easy to force a remote peer to
produce many fragments to explore its ID sequence. In addition packet
IDs are 32-bit in IPv6, which further complicates their analysis. On
the other hand, it is often easier to choose among plenty of possible
source addresses and partially work around the bigger hash table the
commit above permits, which leaves IPv6 partially exposed to some
possibilities of remote analysis at the risk of weakening some
protocols like DNS if some IDs can be predicted with a good enough
probability.
Given the wide range of permitted IDs, the risk of collision is extremely
low so there's no need to rely on the positive increment algorithm that
is shared with the IPv4 code via ip_idents_reserve(). We have a fast
PRNG, so let's simply call prandom_u32() and be done with it.
Performance measurements at 10 Gbps couldn't show any difference with
the previous code, even when using a single core, because due to the
large fragments, we're limited to only ~930 kpps at 10 Gbps and the cost
of the random generation is completely offset by other operations and by
the network transfer time. In addition, this change removes the need to
update a shared entry in the idents table so it may even end up being
slightly faster on large scale systems where this matters.
The risk of at least one collision here is about 1/80 million among
10 IDs, 1/850k among 100 IDs, and still only 1/8.5k among 1000 IDs,
which remains very low compared to IPv4 where all IDs are reused
every 4 to 80ms on a 10 Gbps flow depending on packet sizes.
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210529110746.6796-1-w@1wt.eu
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 8380c81d5c4fced6f4397795a5ae65758272bbfd ]
__napi_schedule_irqoff() is an optimized version of __napi_schedule()
which can be used where it is known that interrupts are disabled,
e.g. in interrupt-handlers, spin_lock_irq() sections or hrtimer
callbacks.
On PREEMPT_RT enabled kernels this assumptions is not true. Force-
threaded interrupt handlers and spinlocks are not disabling interrupts
and the NAPI hrtimer callback is forced into softirq context which runs
with interrupts enabled as well.
Chasing all usage sites of __napi_schedule_irqoff() is a whack-a-mole
game so make __napi_schedule_irqoff() invoke __napi_schedule() for
PREEMPT_RT kernels.
The callers of ____napi_schedule() in the networking core have been
audited and are correct on PREEMPT_RT kernels as well.
Reported-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Juri Lelli <juri.lelli@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 3f2db250099f46988088800052cdf2332c7aba61 ]
Syzbot reported warning in tcindex_alloc_perfect_hash. The problem
was in too big cp->hash, which triggers warning in kmalloc. Since
cp->hash comes from userspace, there is no need to warn if value
is not correct
Fixes: b9a24bb76bf6 ("net_sched: properly handle failure case of tcf_exts_init()")
Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+1071ad60cd7df39fdadb@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Pavel Skripkin <paskripkin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 799acb9347915bfe4eac0ff2345b468f0a1ca207 ]
This fixes parsing of LTV entries when the length is 0.
Found with:
tools/mgmt-tester -s "Add Advertising - Success (ScRsp only)"
Add Advertising - Success (ScRsp only) - run
Sending Add Advertising (0x003e)
Test condition added, total 1
[ 11.004577] ==================================================================
[ 11.005292] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in tlv_data_is_valid+0x87/0xe0
[ 11.005984] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888002c695b0 by task mgmt-tester/87
[ 11.006711]
[ 11.007176]
[ 11.007429] Allocated by task 87:
[ 11.008151]
[ 11.008438] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888002c69580
[ 11.008438] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-64 of size 64
[ 11.010526] The buggy address is located 48 bytes inside of
[ 11.010526] 64-byte region [ffff888002c69580, ffff888002c695c0)
[ 11.012423] The buggy address belongs to the page:
[ 11.013291]
[ 11.013544] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 11.014359] ffff888002c69480: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 11.015453] ffff888002c69500: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 11.016232] >ffff888002c69580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 11.017010] ^
[ 11.017547] ffff888002c69600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 11.018296] ffff888002c69680: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 11.019116] ==================================================================
Fixes: 2bb36870e8cb2 ("Bluetooth: Unify advertising instance flags check")
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0cd58e5c53babb9237b741dbef711f0a9eb6d3fd ]
If qfq_change_class() is unable to allocate memory for qfq_aggregate,
it frees the class that has been inserted in the class hash table,
but does not unhash it.
Defer the insertion after the problematic allocation.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hlist_add_head include/linux/list.h:884 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in qdisc_class_hash_insert+0x200/0x210 net/sched/sch_api.c:731
Write of size 8 at addr ffff88814a534f10 by task syz-executor.4/31478
CPU: 0 PID: 31478 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x5b/0x2f8 mm/kasan/report.c:233
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:419 [inline]
kasan_report.cold+0x7c/0xd8 mm/kasan/report.c:436
hlist_add_head include/linux/list.h:884 [inline]
qdisc_class_hash_insert+0x200/0x210 net/sched/sch_api.c:731
qfq_change_class+0x96c/0x1990 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:489
tc_ctl_tclass+0x514/0xe50 net/sched/sch_api.c:2113
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xad0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5564
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340
netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x4665d9
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fdc7b5f0188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056bf80 RCX: 00000000004665d9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fdc7b5f01d0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: 00007ffcf7310b3f R14: 00007fdc7b5f0300 R15: 0000000000022000
Allocated by task 31445:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track mm/kasan/common.c:46 [inline]
set_alloc_info mm/kasan/common.c:428 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:507 [inline]
____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:466 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x9b/0xd0 mm/kasan/common.c:516
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:556 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:686 [inline]
qfq_change_class+0x705/0x1990 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:464
tc_ctl_tclass+0x514/0xe50 net/sched/sch_api.c:2113
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xad0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5564
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340
netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Freed by task 31445:
kasan_save_stack+0x1b/0x40 mm/kasan/common.c:38
kasan_set_track+0x1c/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:46
kasan_set_free_info+0x20/0x30 mm/kasan/generic.c:357
____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:360 [inline]
____kasan_slab_free mm/kasan/common.c:325 [inline]
__kasan_slab_free+0xfb/0x130 mm/kasan/common.c:368
kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:212 [inline]
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1583 [inline]
slab_free_freelist_hook+0xdf/0x240 mm/slub.c:1608
slab_free mm/slub.c:3168 [inline]
kfree+0xe5/0x7f0 mm/slub.c:4212
qfq_change_class+0x10fb/0x1990 net/sched/sch_qfq.c:518
tc_ctl_tclass+0x514/0xe50 net/sched/sch_api.c:2113
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x44e/0xad0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:5564
netlink_rcv_skb+0x153/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2504
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1314 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1340
netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1929
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674
____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404
__sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433
do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88814a534f00
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128
The buggy address is located 16 bytes inside of
128-byte region [ffff88814a534f00, ffff88814a534f80)
The buggy address belongs to the page:
page:ffffea0005294d00 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x14a534
flags: 0x57ff00000000200(slab|node=1|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x7ff)
raw: 057ff00000000200 ffffea00004fee00 0000000600000006 ffff8880110418c0
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x12cc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 29797, ts 604817765317, free_ts 604810151744
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2358 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x1033/0x2b60 mm/page_alloc.c:3994
__alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5200
alloc_pages+0x18c/0x2a0 mm/mempolicy.c:2272
alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:1646 [inline]
allocate_slab+0x2c5/0x4c0 mm/slub.c:1786
new_slab mm/slub.c:1849 [inline]
new_slab_objects mm/slub.c:2595 [inline]
___slab_alloc+0x4a1/0x810 mm/slub.c:2758
__slab_alloc.constprop.0+0xa7/0xf0 mm/slub.c:2798
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2880 [inline]
slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2922 [inline]
__kmalloc+0x315/0x330 mm/slub.c:4050
kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:561 [inline]
kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:686 [inline]
__register_sysctl_table+0x112/0x1090 fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:1318
mpls_dev_sysctl_register+0x1b7/0x2d0 net/mpls/af_mpls.c:1421
mpls_add_dev net/mpls/af_mpls.c:1472 [inline]
mpls_dev_notify+0x214/0x8b0 net/mpls/af_mpls.c:1588
notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:83
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x130 net/core/dev.c:2121
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2133 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2147 [inline]
register_netdevice+0x106b/0x1500 net/core/dev.c:10312
veth_newlink+0x585/0xac0 drivers/net/veth.c:1547
__rtnl_newlink+0x1062/0x1710 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3452
rtnl_newlink+0x64/0xa0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3500
page last free stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:24 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1298 [inline]
free_pcp_prepare+0x223/0x300 mm/page_alloc.c:1342
free_unref_page_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:3250 [inline]
free_unref_page+0x12/0x1d0 mm/page_alloc.c:3298
__vunmap+0x783/0xb60 mm/vmalloc.c:2566
free_work+0x58/0x70 mm/vmalloc.c:80
process_one_work+0x98d/0x1600 kernel/workqueue.c:2276
worker_thread+0x64c/0x1120 kernel/workqueue.c:2422
kthread+0x3b1/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:313
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:294
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88814a534e00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff88814a534e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff88814a534f00: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff88814a534f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff88814a535000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Fixes: 462dbc9101acd ("pkt_sched: QFQ Plus: fair-queueing service at DRR cost")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit cdd73cc545c0fb9b1a1f7b209f4f536e7990cff4 ]
ipv6_find_hdr() does not validate that this is an IPv6 packet. Add a
sanity check for calling ipv6_find_hdr() to make sure an IPv6 packet
is passed for parsing.
Fixes: 96518518cc41 ("netfilter: add nftables")
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit b8f6b0522c298ae9267bd6584e19b942a0636910 ]
Hulk Robot reported memory leak in netlbl_mgmt_add_common.
The problem is non-freed map in case of netlbl_domhsh_add() failed.
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888100ab7080 (size 96):
comm "syz-executor537", pid 360, jiffies 4294862456 (age 22.678s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
fe 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 ................
backtrace:
[<0000000008b40026>] netlbl_mgmt_add_common.isra.0+0xb2a/0x1b40
[<000000003be10950>] netlbl_mgmt_add+0x271/0x3c0
[<00000000c70487ed>] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.0+0x20e/0x320
[<000000001f2ff614>] genl_rcv_msg+0x2bf/0x4f0
[<0000000089045792>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x134/0x3d0
[<0000000020e96fdd>] genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
[<0000000042810c66>] netlink_unicast+0x4a0/0x6a0
[<000000002e1659f0>] netlink_sendmsg+0x789/0xc70
[<000000006e43415f>] sock_sendmsg+0x139/0x170
[<00000000680a73d7>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x658/0x7d0
[<0000000065cbb8af>] ___sys_sendmsg+0xf8/0x170
[<0000000019932b6c>] __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x190
[<00000000643ac172>] do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90
[<000000009b79d6dc>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Fixes: 63c416887437 ("netlabel: Add network address selectors to the NetLabel/LSM domain mapping")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Liu Shixin <liushixin2@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit 5483b904bf336948826594610af4c9bbb0d9e3aa upstream.
When find a task from wait queue to wake up, a non-privileged task may
be found out, rather than the privileged. This maybe lead a deadlock
same as commit dfe1fe75e00e ("NFSv4: Fix deadlock between nfs4_evict_inode()
and nfs4_opendata_get_inode()"):
Privileged delegreturn task is queued to privileged list because all
the slots are assigned. If there has no enough slot to wake up the
non-privileged batch tasks(session less than 8 slot), then the privileged
delegreturn task maybe lost waked up because the found out task can't
get slot since the session is on draining.
So we should treate the privileged task as the emergency task, and
execute it as for as we can.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 5fcdfacc01f3 ("NFSv4: Return delegations synchronously in evict_inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fcb170a9d825d7db4a3fb870b0300f5a40a8d096 upstream.
The 'queue->nr' will wraparound from 0 to 255 when only current
priority queue has tasks. This maybe lead a deadlock same as commit
dfe1fe75e00e ("NFSv4: Fix deadlock between nfs4_evict_inode()
and nfs4_opendata_get_inode()"):
Privileged delegreturn task is queued to privileged list because all
the slots are assigned. When non-privileged task complete and release
the slot, a non-privileged maybe picked out. It maybe allocate slot
failed when the session on draining.
If the 'queue->nr' has wraparound to 255, and no enough slot to
service it, then the privileged delegreturn will lost to wake up.
So we should avoid the wraparound on 'queue->nr'.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 5fcdfacc01f3 ("NFSv4: Return delegations synchronously in evict_inode")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Zhang Xiaoxu <zhangxiaoxu5@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit fb8696ab14adadb2e3f6c17c18ed26b3ecd96691 upstream.
can_can_gw_rcv() is called under RCU protection, so after calling
can_rx_unregister(), we have to call synchronize_rcu in order to wait
for any RCU read-side critical sections to finish before removing the
kmem_cache entry with the referenced gw job entry.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210618173645.2238-1-socketcan@hartkopp.net
Fixes: c1aabdf379bc ("can-gw: add netlink based CAN routing")
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit d5f9023fa61ee8b94f37a93f08e94b136cf1e463 upstream.
can_rx_register() callbacks may be called concurrently to the call to
can_rx_unregister(). The callbacks and callback data, though, are
protected by RCU and the struct sock reference count.
So the callback data is really attached to the life of sk, meaning
that it should be released on sk_destruct. However, bcm_remove_op()
calls tasklet_kill(), and RCU callbacks may be called under RCU
softirq, so that cannot be used on kernels before the introduction of
HRTIMER_MODE_SOFT.
However, bcm_rx_handler() is called under RCU protection, so after
calling can_rx_unregister(), we may call synchronize_rcu() in order to
wait for any RCU read-side critical sections to finish. That is,
bcm_rx_handler() won't be called anymore for those ops. So, we only
free them, after we do that synchronize_rcu().
Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210619161813.2098382-1-cascardo@canonical.com
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot+0f7e7e5e2f4f40fa89c0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: Norbert Slusarek <nslusarek@gmx.net>
Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit e032f7c9c7cefffcfb79b9fc16c53011d2d9d11f ]
Like prior patch, we need to annotate lockless accesses to po->ifindex
For instance, packet_getname() is reading po->ifindex (twice) while
another thread is able to change po->ifindex.
KCSAN reported:
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_getname
write to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25573 on cpu 1:
packet_do_bind+0x420/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3191
packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255
__sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637
__do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline]
__se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline]
__x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff888143ce3cbc of 4 bytes by task 25578 on cpu 0:
packet_getname+0x5b/0x1a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3525
__sys_getsockname+0x10e/0x1a0 net/socket.c:1887
__do_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1902 [inline]
__se_sys_getsockname net/socket.c:1899 [inline]
__x64_sys_getsockname+0x3e/0x50 net/socket.c:1899
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x00000000 -> 0x00000001
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 25578 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit c7d2ef5dd4b03ed0ee1d13bc0c55f9cf62d49bd6 ]
tpacket_snd(), packet_snd(), packet_getname() and packet_seq_show()
can read po->num without holding a lock. This means other threads
can change po->num at the same time.
KCSAN complained about this known fact [1]
Add READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() to address the issue.
[1] BUG: KCSAN: data-race in packet_do_bind / packet_sendmsg
write to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24714 on cpu 0:
packet_do_bind+0x3ab/0x7e0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3181
packet_bind+0xc3/0xd0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3255
__sys_bind+0x200/0x290 net/socket.c:1637
__do_sys_bind net/socket.c:1648 [inline]
__se_sys_bind net/socket.c:1646 [inline]
__x64_sys_bind+0x3d/0x50 net/socket.c:1646
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff888131a0dcc0 of 2 bytes by task 24719 on cpu 1:
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:2899 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x317/0x3570 net/packet/af_packet.c:3040
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
__sys_sendmsg+0x1ed/0x270 net/socket.c:2433
__do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2442 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2440 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmsg+0x42/0x50 net/socket.c:2440
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0x0000 -> 0x1200
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 PID: 24719 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 9d44fa3e50cc91691896934d106c86e4027e61ca ]
Function 'ping_queue_rcv_skb' not always return success, which will
also return fail. If not check the wrong return value of it, lead to function
`ping_rcv` return success.
Signed-off-by: Zheng Yongjun <zhengyongjun3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a9799541ca34652d9996e45f80e8e03144c12949 ]
These are not permitted by the spec, just drop them.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210609161305.23def022b750.Ibd6dd3cdce573dae262fcdc47f8ac52b883a9c50@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a64b6a25dd9f984ed05fade603a00e2eae787d2f ]
If the userland switches back-and-forth between NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB and
NL80211_IFTYPE_ADHOC via send_msg(NL80211_CMD_SET_INTERFACE), there is a
chance where the cleanup cfg80211_leave_ocb() is not called. This leads
to initialization of in-use memory (e.g. init u.ibss while in-use by
u.ocb) due to a shared struct/union within ieee80211_sub_if_data:
struct ieee80211_sub_if_data {
...
union {
struct ieee80211_if_ap ap;
struct ieee80211_if_vlan vlan;
struct ieee80211_if_managed mgd;
struct ieee80211_if_ibss ibss; // <- shares address
struct ieee80211_if_mesh mesh;
struct ieee80211_if_ocb ocb; // <- shares address
struct ieee80211_if_mntr mntr;
struct ieee80211_if_nan nan;
} u;
...
}
Therefore add handling of otype == NL80211_IFTYPE_OCB, during
cfg80211_change_iface() to perform cleanup when leaving OCB mode.
link to syzkaller bug:
https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=0612dbfa595bf4b9b680ff7b4948257b8e3732d5
Reported-by: syzbot+105896fac213f26056f9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Du Cheng <ducheng2@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210428063941.105161-1-ducheng2@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 0ee4d55534f82a0624701d0bb9fc2304d4529086 ]
Syzbot reports that it's possible to hit this from userspace,
by trying to add a station before any other connection setup
has been done. Instead of trying to catch this in some other
way simply remove the warning, that will appropriately reject
the call from userspace.
Reported-by: syzbot+7716dbc401d9a437890d@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210517164715.f537da276d17.Id05f40ec8761d6a8cc2df87f1aa09c651988a586@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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commit aa6dd211e4b1dde9d5dc25d699d35f789ae7eeba upstream.
In commit 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count")
I used a very small hash table that could be abused
by patient attackers to reveal sensitive information.
Switch to a dynamic sizing, depending on RAM size.
Typical big hosts will now use 128x more storage (2 MB)
to get a similar increase in security and reduction
of hash collisions.
As a bonus, use of alloc_large_system_hash() spreads
allocated memory among all NUMA nodes.
Fixes: 73f156a6e8c1 ("inetpeer: get rid of ip_id_count")
Reported-by: Amit Klein <aksecurity@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 8d0caedb759683041d9db82069937525999ada53 upstream.
syzbot is reporting hung task at register_netdevice_notifier() [1] and
unregister_netdevice_notifier() [2], for cleanup_net() might perform
time consuming operations while CAN driver's raw/bcm/isotp modules are
calling {register,unregister}_netdevice_notifier() on each socket.
Change raw/bcm/isotp modules to call register_netdevice_notifier() from
module's __init function and call unregister_netdevice_notifier() from
module's __exit function, as with gw/j1939 modules are doing.
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=391b9498827788b3cc6830226d4ff5be87107c30 [1]
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=1724d278c83ca6e6df100a2e320c10d991cf2bce [2]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/54a5f451-05ed-f977-8534-79e7aa2bcc8f@i-love.sakura.ne.jp
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+355f8edb2ff45d5f95fa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+0f1827363a305f74996f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+355f8edb2ff45d5f95fa@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Tested-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit cfc579f9d89af4ada58c69b03bcaa4887840f3b3 upstream.
The egress tunnel code uses dst_clone() and directly sets the result
which is wrong because the entry might have 0 refcnt or be already deleted,
causing number of problems. It also triggers the WARN_ON() in dst_hold()[1]
when a refcnt couldn't be taken. Fix it by using dst_hold_safe() and
checking if a reference was actually taken before setting the dst.
[1] dmesg WARN_ON log and following refcnt errors
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 38 at include/net/dst.h:230 br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel+0x10b/0x134 [bridge]
Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp bridge stp llc bonding ipv6 virtio_net
CPU: 5 PID: 38 Comm: ksoftirqd/5 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 5.13.0-rc3+ #360
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel+0x10b/0x134 [bridge]
Code: e8 85 bc 01 e1 45 84 f6 74 90 45 31 f6 85 db 48 c7 c7 a0 02 19 a0 41 0f 94 c6 31 c9 31 d2 44 89 f6 e8 64 bc 01 e1 85 db 75 02 <0f> 0b 31 c9 31 d2 44 89 f6 48 c7 c7 70 02 19 a0 e8 4b bc 01 e1 49
RSP: 0018:ffff8881003d39e8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffa01902a0
RBP: ffff8881040c6700 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 2ce93d0054fe0d00 R11: 54fe0d00000e0000 R12: ffff888109515000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000401
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88822bf40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f42ba70f030 CR3: 0000000109926000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
br_handle_vlan+0xbc/0xca [bridge]
__br_forward+0x23/0x164 [bridge]
deliver_clone+0x41/0x48 [bridge]
br_handle_frame_finish+0x36f/0x3aa [bridge]
? skb_dst+0x2e/0x38 [bridge]
? br_handle_ingress_vlan_tunnel+0x3e/0x1c8 [bridge]
? br_handle_frame_finish+0x3aa/0x3aa [bridge]
br_handle_frame+0x2c3/0x377 [bridge]
? __skb_pull+0x33/0x51
? vlan_do_receive+0x4f/0x36a
? br_handle_frame_finish+0x3aa/0x3aa [bridge]
__netif_receive_skb_core+0x539/0x7c6
? __list_del_entry_valid+0x16e/0x1c2
__netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x6d/0xd6
netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1d9/0x1fa
gro_normal_list+0x22/0x3e
dev_gro_receive+0x55b/0x600
? detach_buf_split+0x58/0x140
napi_gro_receive+0x94/0x12e
virtnet_poll+0x15d/0x315 [virtio_net]
__napi_poll+0x2c/0x1c9
net_rx_action+0xe6/0x1fb
__do_softirq+0x115/0x2d8
run_ksoftirqd+0x18/0x20
smpboot_thread_fn+0x183/0x19c
? smpboot_unregister_percpu_thread+0x66/0x66
kthread+0x10a/0x10f
? kthread_mod_delayed_work+0xb6/0xb6
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
---[ end trace 49f61b07f775fd2b ]---
dst_release: dst:00000000c02d677a refcnt:-1
dst_release underflow
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 11538d039ac6 ("bridge: vlan dst_metadata hooks in ingress and egress paths")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 58e2071742e38f29f051b709a5cca014ba51166f upstream.
This patch fixes a tunnel_dst null pointer dereference due to lockless
access in the tunnel egress path. When deleting a vlan tunnel the
tunnel_dst pointer is set to NULL without waiting a grace period (i.e.
while it's still usable) and packets egressing are dereferencing it
without checking. Use READ/WRITE_ONCE to annotate the lockless use of
tunnel_id, use RCU for accessing tunnel_dst and make sure it is read
only once and checked in the egress path. The dst is already properly RCU
protected so we don't need to do anything fancy than to make sure
tunnel_id and tunnel_dst are read only once and checked in the egress path.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 11538d039ac6 ("bridge: vlan dst_metadata hooks in ingress and egress paths")
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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commit 5e87ddbe3942e27e939bdc02deb8579b0cbd8ecc upstream.
On 64-bit systems, struct bcm_msg_head has an added padding of 4 bytes between
struct members count and ival1. Even though all struct members are initialized,
the 4-byte hole will contain data from the kernel stack. This patch zeroes out
struct bcm_msg_head before usage, preventing infoleaks to userspace.
Fixes: ffd980f976e7 ("[CAN]: Add broadcast manager (bcm) protocol")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/trinity-7c1b2e82-e34f-4885-8060-2cd7a13769ce-1623532166177@3c-app-gmx-bs52
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Norbert Slusarek <nslusarek@gmx.net>
Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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[ Upstream commit 321827477360934dc040e9d3c626bf1de6c3ab3c ]
When constructing ICMP response messages, the kernel will try to pick a
suitable source address for the outgoing packet. However, if no IPv4
addresses are configured on the system at all, this will fail and we end up
producing an ICMP message with a source address of 0.0.0.0. This can happen
on a box routing IPv4 traffic via v6 nexthops, for instance.
Since 0.0.0.0 is not generally routable on the internet, there's a good
chance that such ICMP messages will never make it back to the sender of the
original packet that the ICMP message was sent in response to. This, in
turn, can create connectivity and PMTUd problems for senders. Fortunately,
RFC7600 reserves a dummy address to be used as a source for ICMP
messages (192.0.0.8/32), so let's teach the kernel to substitute that
address as a last resort if the regular source address selection procedure
fails.
Below is a quick example reproducing this issue with network namespaces:
ip netns add ns0
ip l add type veth peer netns ns0
ip l set dev veth0 up
ip a add 10.0.0.1/24 dev veth0
ip a add fc00:dead:cafe:42::1/64 dev veth0
ip r add 10.1.0.0/24 via inet6 fc00:dead:cafe:42::2
ip -n ns0 l set dev veth0 up
ip -n ns0 a add fc00:dead:cafe:42::2/64 dev veth0
ip -n ns0 r add 10.0.0.0/24 via inet6 fc00:dead:cafe:42::1
ip netns exec ns0 sysctl -w net.ipv4.icmp_ratelimit=0
ip netns exec ns0 sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
tcpdump -tpni veth0 -c 2 icmp &
ping -w 1 10.1.0.1 > /dev/null
tcpdump: verbose output suppressed, use -v[v]... for full protocol decode
listening on veth0, link-type EN10MB (Ethernet), snapshot length 262144 bytes
IP 10.0.0.1 > 10.1.0.1: ICMP echo request, id 29, seq 1, length 64
IP 0.0.0.0 > 10.0.0.1: ICMP net 10.1.0.1 unreachable, length 92
2 packets captured
2 packets received by filter
0 packets dropped by kernel
With this patch the above capture changes to:
IP 10.0.0.1 > 10.1.0.1: ICMP echo request, id 31127, seq 1, length 64
IP 192.0.0.8 > 10.0.0.1: ICMP net 10.1.0.1 unreachable, length 92
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: Juliusz Chroboczek <jch@irif.fr>
Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a494bd642d9120648b06bb7d28ce6d05f55a7819 ]
While unix_may_send(sk, osk) is called while osk is locked, it appears
unix_release_sock() can overwrite unix_peer() after this lock has been
released, making KCSAN unhappy.
Changing unix_release_sock() to access/change unix_peer()
before lock is released should fix this issue.
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in unix_dgram_sendmsg / unix_release_sock
write to 0xffff88810465a338 of 8 bytes by task 20852 on cpu 1:
unix_release_sock+0x4ed/0x6e0 net/unix/af_unix.c:558
unix_release+0x2f/0x50 net/unix/af_unix.c:859
__sock_release net/socket.c:599 [inline]
sock_close+0x6c/0x150 net/socket.c:1258
__fput+0x25b/0x4e0 fs/file_table.c:280
____fput+0x11/0x20 fs/file_table.c:313
task_work_run+0xae/0x130 kernel/task_work.c:164
tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:175 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x156/0x190 kernel/entry/common.c:209
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:291 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x20/0x40 kernel/entry/common.c:302
do_syscall_64+0x56/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:57
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
read to 0xffff88810465a338 of 8 bytes by task 20888 on cpu 0:
unix_may_send net/unix/af_unix.c:189 [inline]
unix_dgram_sendmsg+0x923/0x1610 net/unix/af_unix.c:1712
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline]
sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:674 [inline]
____sys_sendmsg+0x360/0x4d0 net/socket.c:2350
___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2404 [inline]
__sys_sendmmsg+0x315/0x4b0 net/socket.c:2490
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2519 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2516 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0x53/0x60 net/socket.c:2516
do_syscall_64+0x4a/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
value changed: 0xffff888167905400 -> 0x0000000000000000
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 20888 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.13.0-rc5-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d8e2973029b8b2ce477b564824431f3385c77083 ]
BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff888101bc4c00 (size 32):
comm "syz-executor527", pid 360, jiffies 4294807421 (age 19.329s)
hex dump (first 32 bytes):
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ac 14 14 bb 00 00 02 00 ................
backtrace:
[<00000000f17c5244>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:558 [inline]
[<00000000f17c5244>] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:688 [inline]
[<00000000f17c5244>] ip_mc_add1_src net/ipv4/igmp.c:1971 [inline]
[<00000000f17c5244>] ip_mc_add_src+0x95f/0xdb0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2095
[<000000001cb99709>] ip_mc_source+0x84c/0xea0 net/ipv4/igmp.c:2416
[<0000000052cf19ed>] do_ip_setsockopt net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1294 [inline]
[<0000000052cf19ed>] ip_setsockopt+0x114b/0x30c0 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1423
[<00000000477edfbc>] raw_setsockopt+0x13d/0x170 net/ipv4/raw.c:857
[<00000000e75ca9bb>] __sys_setsockopt+0x158/0x270 net/socket.c:2117
[<00000000bdb993a8>] __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2128 [inline]
[<00000000bdb993a8>] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2125 [inline]
[<00000000bdb993a8>] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xba/0x150 net/socket.c:2125
[<000000006a1ffdbd>] do_syscall_64+0x40/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47
[<00000000b11467c4>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
In commit 24803f38a5c0 ("igmp: do not remove igmp souce list info when set
link down"), the ip_mc_clear_src() in ip_mc_destroy_dev() was removed,
because it was also called in igmpv3_clear_delrec().
Rough callgraph:
inetdev_destroy
-> ip_mc_destroy_dev
-> igmpv3_clear_delrec
-> ip_mc_clear_src
-> RCU_INIT_POINTER(dev->ip_ptr, NULL)
However, ip_mc_clear_src() called in igmpv3_clear_delrec() doesn't
release in_dev->mc_list->sources. And RCU_INIT_POINTER() assigns the
NULL to dev->ip_ptr. As a result, in_dev cannot be obtained through
inetdev_by_index() and then in_dev->mc_list->sources cannot be released
by ip_mc_del1_src() in the sock_close. Rough call sequence goes like:
sock_close
-> __sock_release
-> inet_release
-> ip_mc_drop_socket
-> inetdev_by_index
-> ip_mc_leave_src
-> ip_mc_del_src
-> ip_mc_del1_src
So we still need to call ip_mc_clear_src() in ip_mc_destroy_dev() to free
in_dev->mc_list->sources.
Fixes: 24803f38a5c0 ("igmp: do not remove igmp souce list info ...")
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Chengyang Fan <cy.fan@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit 5fc177ab759418c9537433e63301096e733fb915 ]
The TCP option parser in synproxy (synproxy_parse_options) could read
one byte out of bounds. When the length is 1, the execution flow gets
into the loop, reads one byte of the opcode, and if the opcode is
neither TCPOPT_EOL nor TCPOPT_NOP, it reads one more byte, which exceeds
the length of 1.
This fix is inspired by commit 9609dad263f8 ("ipv4: tcp_input: fix stack
out of bounds when parsing TCP options.").
v2 changes:
Added an early return when length < 0 to avoid calling
skb_header_pointer with negative length.
Cc: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Fixes: 48b1de4c110a ("netfilter: add SYNPROXY core/target")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Mikityanskiy <maximmi@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit d2e381c4963663bca6f30c3b996fa4dbafe8fcb5 ]
Cited commit started returning errors when notification info is not
filled by the bridge driver, resulting in the following regression:
# ip link add name br1 type bridge vlan_filtering 1
# bridge vlan add dev br1 vid 555 self pvid untagged
RTNETLINK answers: Invalid argument
As long as the bridge driver does not fill notification info for the
bridge device itself, an empty notification should not be considered as
an error. This is explained in commit 59ccaaaa49b5 ("bridge: dont send
notification when skb->len == 0 in rtnl_bridge_notify").
Fix by removing the error and add a comment to avoid future bugs.
Fixes: a8db57c1d285 ("rtnetlink: Fix missing error code in rtnl_bridge_notify()")
Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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[ Upstream commit a8b897c7bcd47f4147d066e22cc01d1026d7640e ]
Kaustubh reported and diagnosed a panic in udp_lib_lookup().
The root cause is udp_abort() racing with close(). Both
racing functions acquire the socket lock, but udp{v6}_destroy_sock()
release it before performing destructive actions.
We can't easily extend the socket lock scope to avoid the race,
instead use the SOCK_DEAD flag to prevent udp_abort from doing
any action when the critical race happens.
Diagnosed-and-tested-by: Kaustubh Pandey <kapandey@codeaurora.org>
Fixes: 5d77dca82839 ("net: diag: support SOCK_DESTROY for UDP sockets")
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
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