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* udpv6: Fix the checksum computation when HW checksum does not applySubash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan2017-10-121-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 63ecc3d9436f8012e49dc846d6cb0a85a3433517 ] While trying an ESP transport mode encryption for UDPv6 packets of datagram size 1436 with MTU 1500, checksum error was observed in the secondary fragment. This error occurs due to the UDP payload checksum being missed out when computing the full checksum for these packets in udp6_hwcsum_outgoing(). Fixes: d39d938c8228 ("ipv6: Introduce udpv6_send_skb()") Signed-off-by: Subash Abhinov Kasiviswanathan <subashab@codeaurora.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* tcp: fix data delivery rateEric Dumazet2017-10-121-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit fc22579917eb7e13433448a342f1cb1592920940 ] Now skb->mstamp_skb is updated later, we also need to call tcp_rate_skb_sent() after the update is done. Fixes: 8c72c65b426b ("tcp: update skb->skb_mstamp more carefully") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* tcp: update skb->skb_mstamp more carefullyEric Dumazet2017-10-121-7/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 8c72c65b426b47b3c166a8fef0d8927fe5e8a28d ] liujian reported a problem in TCP_USER_TIMEOUT processing with a patch in tcp_probe_timer() : https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg454496.html After investigations, the root cause of the problem is that we update skb->skb_mstamp of skbs in write queue, even if the attempt to send a clone or copy of it failed. One reason being a routing problem. This patch prevents this, solving liujian issue. It also removes a potential RTT miscalculation, since __tcp_retransmit_skb() is not OR-ing TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->sacked with TCPCB_EVER_RETRANS if a failure happens, but skb->skb_mstamp has been changed. A future ACK would then lead to a very small RTT sample and min_rtt would then be lowered to this too small value. Tested: # cat user_timeout.pkt --local_ip=192.168.102.64 0 socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP) = 3 +0 setsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, [1], 4) = 0 +0 bind(3, ..., ...) = 0 +0 listen(3, 1) = 0 +0 `ifconfig tun0 192.168.102.64/16; ip ro add 192.0.2.1 dev tun0` +0 < S 0:0(0) win 0 <mss 1460> +0 > S. 0:0(0) ack 1 <mss 1460> +.1 < . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 65530 +0 accept(3, ..., ...) = 4 +0 setsockopt(4, SOL_TCP, TCP_USER_TIMEOUT, [3000], 4) = 0 +0 write(4, ..., 24) = 24 +0 > P. 1:25(24) ack 1 win 29200 +.1 < . 1:1(0) ack 25 win 65530 //change the ipaddress +1 `ifconfig tun0 192.168.0.10/16` +1 write(4, ..., 24) = 24 +1 write(4, ..., 24) = 24 +1 write(4, ..., 24) = 24 +1 write(4, ..., 24) = 24 +0 `ifconfig tun0 192.168.102.64/16` +0 < . 1:2(1) ack 25 win 65530 +0 `ifconfig tun0 192.168.0.10/16` +3 write(4, ..., 24) = -1 # ./packetdrill user_timeout.pkt Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@googl.com> Reported-by: liujian <liujian56@huawei.com> Acked-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* net: sched: fix use-after-free in tcf_action_destroy and tcf_del_walkerJiri Pirko2017-10-121-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 255cd50f207ae8ec7b22663246c833407744e634 ] Recent commit d7fb60b9cafb ("net_sched: get rid of tcfa_rcu") removed freeing in call_rcu, which changed already existing hard-to-hit race condition into 100% hit: [ 598.599825] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000030 [ 598.607782] IP: tcf_action_destroy+0xc0/0x140 Or: [ 40.858924] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000030 [ 40.862840] IP: tcf_generic_walker+0x534/0x820 Fix this by storing the ops and use them directly for module_put call. Fixes: a85a970af265 ("net_sched: move tc_action into tcf_common") Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* rds: ib: add error handleZhu Yanjun2017-10-081-11/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 3b12f73a5c2977153f28a224392fd4729b50d1dc ] In the function rds_ib_setup_qp, the error handle is missing. When some error occurs, it is possible that memory leak occurs. As such, error handle is added. Cc: Joe Jin <joe.jin@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Guanglei Li <guanglei.li@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Zhu Yanjun <yanjun.zhu@oracle.com> Acked-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: nfnl_cthelper: fix incorrect helper->expect_class_maxLiping Zhang2017-10-081-9/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ae5c682113f9f94cc5e76f92cf041ee624c173ee ] The helper->expect_class_max must be set to the total number of expect_policy minus 1, since we will use the statement "if (class > helper->expect_class_max)" to validate the CTA_EXPECT_CLASS attr in ctnetlink_alloc_expect. So for compatibility, set the helper->expect_class_max to the NFCTH_POLICY_SET_NUM attr's value minus 1. Also: it's invalid when the NFCTH_POLICY_SET_NUM attr's value is zero. 1. this will result "expect_policy = kzalloc(0, GFP_KERNEL);"; 2. we cannot set the helper->expect_class_max to a proper value. So if nla_get_be32(tb[NFCTH_POLICY_SET_NUM]) is zero, report -EINVAL to the userspace. Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: invoke synchronize_rcu after set the _hook_ to NULLLiping Zhang2017-10-085-1/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 3b7dabf029478bb80507a6c4500ca94132a2bc0b ] Otherwise, another CPU may access the invalid pointer. For example: CPU0 CPU1 - rcu_read_lock(); - pfunc = _hook_; _hook_ = NULL; - mod unload - - pfunc(); // invalid, panic - rcu_read_unlock(); So we must call synchronize_rcu() to wait the rcu reader to finish. Also note, in nf_nat_snmp_basic_fini, synchronize_rcu() will be invoked by later nf_conntrack_helper_unregister, but I'm inclined to add a explicit synchronize_rcu after set the nf_nat_snmp_hook to NULL. Depend on such obscure assumptions is not a good idea. Last, in nfnetlink_cttimeout, we use kfree_rcu to free the time object, so in cttimeout_exit, invoking rcu_barrier() is not necessary at all, remove it too. Signed-off-by: Liping Zhang <zlpnobody@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* bridge: netlink: register netdevice before executing changelinkIdo Schimmel2017-10-081-2/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 5b8d5429daa05bebef6ffd3297df3b502cc6f184 ] Peter reported a kernel oops when executing the following command: $ ip link add name test type bridge vlan_default_pvid 1 [13634.939408] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000190 [13634.939436] IP: __vlan_add+0x73/0x5f0 [...] [13634.939783] Call Trace: [13634.939791] ? pcpu_next_unpop+0x3b/0x50 [13634.939801] ? pcpu_alloc+0x3d2/0x680 [13634.939810] ? br_vlan_add+0x135/0x1b0 [13634.939820] ? __br_vlan_set_default_pvid.part.28+0x204/0x2b0 [13634.939834] ? br_changelink+0x120/0x4e0 [13634.939844] ? br_dev_newlink+0x50/0x70 [13634.939854] ? rtnl_newlink+0x5f5/0x8a0 [13634.939864] ? rtnl_newlink+0x176/0x8a0 [13634.939874] ? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0x7c/0x4e0 [13634.939886] ? rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xe1/0x220 [13634.939896] ? lookup_fast+0x52/0x370 [13634.939905] ? rtnl_newlink+0x8a0/0x8a0 [13634.939915] ? netlink_rcv_skb+0xa1/0xc0 [13634.939925] ? rtnetlink_rcv+0x24/0x30 [13634.939934] ? netlink_unicast+0x177/0x220 [13634.939944] ? netlink_sendmsg+0x2fe/0x3b0 [13634.939954] ? _copy_from_user+0x39/0x40 [13634.939964] ? sock_sendmsg+0x30/0x40 [13634.940159] ? ___sys_sendmsg+0x29d/0x2b0 [13634.940326] ? __alloc_pages_nodemask+0xdf/0x230 [13634.940478] ? mem_cgroup_commit_charge+0x7c/0x4e0 [13634.940592] ? mem_cgroup_try_charge+0x76/0x1a0 [13634.940701] ? __handle_mm_fault+0xdb9/0x10b0 [13634.940809] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90 [13634.940917] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1e/0xad The problem is that the bridge's VLAN group is created after setting the default PVID, when registering the netdevice and executing its ndo_init(). Fix this by changing the order of both operations, so that br_changelink() is only processed after the netdevice is registered, when the VLAN group is already initialized. Fixes: b6677449dff6 ("bridge: netlink: call br_changelink() during br_dev_newlink()") Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Reported-by: Peter V. Saveliev <peter@svinota.eu> Tested-by: Peter V. Saveliev <peter@svinota.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* udp: disable inner UDP checksum offloads in IPsec caseAnsis Atteka2017-10-081-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit b40c5f4fde22fb98eff205b3aece05b471c24eed ] Otherwise, UDP checksum offloads could corrupt ESP packets by attempting to calculate UDP checksum when this inner UDP packet is already protected by IPsec. One way to reproduce this bug is to have a VM with virtio_net driver (UFO set to ON in the guest VM); and then encapsulate all guest's Ethernet frames in Geneve; and then further encrypt Geneve with IPsec. In this case following symptoms are observed: 1. If using ixgbe NIC, then it will complain with following error message: ixgbe 0000:01:00.1: partial checksum but l4 proto=32! 2. Receiving IPsec stack will drop all the corrupted ESP packets and increase XfrmInStateProtoError counter in /proc/net/xfrm_stat. 3. iperf UDP test from the VM with packet sizes above MTU will not work at all. 4. iperf TCP test from the VM will get ridiculously low performance because. Signed-off-by: Ansis Atteka <aatteka@ovn.org> Co-authored-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* net/packet: check length in getsockopt() called with PACKET_HDRLENAlexander Potapenko2017-10-081-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit fd2c83b35752f0a8236b976978ad4658df14a59f ] In the case getsockopt() is called with PACKET_HDRLEN and optlen < 4 |val| remains uninitialized and the syscall may behave differently depending on its value, and even copy garbage to userspace on certain architectures. To fix this we now return -EINVAL if optlen is too small. This bug has been detected with KMSAN. Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* net: core: Prevent from dereferencing null pointer when releasing SKBMyungho Jung2017-10-081-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 9899886d5e8ec5b343b1efe44f185a0e68dc6454 ] Added NULL check to make __dev_kfree_skb_irq consistent with kfree family of functions. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=195289 Signed-off-by: Myungho Jung <mhjungk@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* audit: log 32-bit socketcallsRichard Guy Briggs2017-10-081-3/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 62bc306e2083436675e33b5bdeb6a77907d35971 ] 32-bit socketcalls were not being logged by audit on x86_64 systems. Log them. This is basically a duplicate of the call from net/socket.c:sys_socketcall(), but it addresses the impedance mismatch between 32-bit userspace process and 64-bit kernel audit. See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/14 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* RDS: RDMA: Fix the composite message user notificationSantosh Shilimkar2017-10-084-11/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 941f8d55f6d613a460a5e080d25a38509f45eb75 ] When application sends an RDS RDMA composite message consist of RDMA transfer to be followed up by non RDMA payload, it expect to be notified *only* when the full message gets delivered. RDS RDMA notification doesn't behave this way though. Thanks to Venkat for debug and root casuing the issue where only first part of the message(RDMA) was successfully delivered but remainder payload delivery failed. In that case, application should not be notified with a false positive of message delivery success. Fix this case by making sure the user gets notified only after the full message delivery. Reviewed-by: Venkat Venkatsubra <venkat.x.venkatsubra@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Santosh Shilimkar <santosh.shilimkar@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* nl80211: check for the required netlink attributes presenceVladis Dronov2017-10-051-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e785fa0a164aa11001cba931367c7f94ffaff888 upstream. nl80211_set_rekey_data() does not check if the required attributes NL80211_REKEY_DATA_{REPLAY_CTR,KEK,KCK} are present when processing NL80211_CMD_SET_REKEY_OFFLOAD request. This request can be issued by users with CAP_NET_ADMIN privilege and may result in NULL dereference and a system crash. Add a check for the required attributes presence. This patch is based on the patch by bo Zhang. This fixes CVE-2017-12153. References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1491046 Fixes: e5497d766ad ("cfg80211/nl80211: support GTK rekey offload") Reported-by: bo Zhang <zhangbo5891001@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* mac80211: flush hw_roc_start work before cancelling the ROCAvraham Stern2017-10-051-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 6e46d8ce894374fc135c96a8d1057c6af1fef237 upstream. When HW ROC is supported it is possible that after the HW notified that the ROC has started, the ROC was cancelled and another ROC was added while the hw_roc_start worker is waiting on the mutex (since cancelling the ROC and adding another one also holds the same mutex). As a result, the hw_roc_start worker will continue to run after the new ROC is added but before it is actually started by the HW. This may result in notifying userspace that the ROC has started before it actually does, or in case of management tx ROC, in an attempt to tx while not on the right channel. In addition, when the driver will notify mac80211 that the second ROC has started, mac80211 will warn that this ROC has already been notified. Fix this by flushing the hw_roc_start work before cancelling an ROC. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Avraham Stern <avraham.stern@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Luca Coelho <luciano.coelho@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* mac80211: fix VLAN handling with TXQsJohannes Berg2017-10-052-9/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 53168215909281a09d3afc6fb51a9d4f81f74d39 upstream. With TXQs, the AP_VLAN interfaces are resolved to their owner AP interface when enqueuing the frame, which makes sense since the frame really goes out on that as far as the driver is concerned. However, this introduces a problem: frames to be encrypted with a VLAN-specific GTK will now be encrypted with the AP GTK, since the information about which virtual interface to use to select the key is taken from the TXQ. Fix this by preserving info->control.vif and using that in the dequeue function. This now requires doing the driver-mapping in the dequeue as well. Since there's no way to filter the frames that are sitting on a TXQ, drop all frames, which may affect other interfaces, when an AP_VLAN is removed. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_core: Fix net_conntrack_lock()Manfred Spraul2017-09-271-23/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3ef0c7a730de0bae03d86c19570af764fa3c4445 upstream. As we want to remove spin_unlock_wait() and replace it with explicit spin_lock()/spin_unlock() calls, we can use this to simplify the locking. In addition: - Reading nf_conntrack_locks_all needs ACQUIRE memory ordering. - The new code avoids the backwards loop. Only slightly tested, I did not manage to trigger calls to nf_conntrack_all_lock(). V2: With improved comments, to clearly show how the barriers pair. Fixes: b16c29191dc8 ("netfilter: nf_conntrack: use safer way to lock all buckets") Signed-off-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu> Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdownTrond Myklebust2017-09-271-0/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit ed6473ddc704a2005b9900ca08e236ebb2d8540a upstream. We want to use kthread_stop() in order to ensure the threads are shut down before we tear down the nfs_callback_info in nfs_callback_down. Tested-and-reviewed-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com> Reported-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com> Fixes: bb6aeba736ba9 ("NFSv4.x: Switch to using svc_set_num_threads()...") Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Hudoba <kernel@jahu.sk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()Trond Myklebust2017-09-271-38/+58
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 9e0d87680d689f1758185851c3da6eafb16e71e1 upstream. Refactor to separate out the functions of starting and stopping threads so that they can be used in other helpers. Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com> Tested-and-reviewed-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Hudoba <kernel@jahu.sk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: Fix may be used uninitialized warning in rt6_checkSteffen Klassert2017-09-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 3614364527daa870264f6dde77f02853cdecd02c upstream. rt_cookie might be used uninitialized, fix this by initializing it. Fixes: c5cff8561d2d ("ipv6: add rcu grace period before freeing fib6_node") Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ip_tunnel: fix setting ttl and tos value in collect_md modeHaishuang Yan2017-09-201-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 0f693f1995cf002432b70f43ce73f79bf8d0b6c9 ] ttl and tos variables are declared and assigned, but are not used in iptunnel_xmit() function. Fixes: cfc7381b3002 ("ip_tunnel: add collect_md mode to IPIP tunnel") Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Haishuang Yan <yanhaishuang@cmss.chinamobile.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* sctp: fix missing wake ups in some situationsMarcelo Ricardo Leitner2017-09-201-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 7906b00f5cd1cd484fced7fcda892176e3202c8a ] Commit fb586f25300f ("sctp: delay calls to sk_data_ready() as much as possible") minimized the number of wake ups that are triggered in case the association receives a packet with multiple data chunks on it and/or when io_events are enabled and then commit 0970f5b36659 ("sctp: signal sk_data_ready earlier on data chunks reception") moved the wake up to as soon as possible. It thus relies on the state machine running later to clean the flag that the event was already generated. The issue is that there are 2 call paths that calls sctp_ulpq_tail_event() outside of the state machine, causing the flag to linger and possibly omitting a needed wake up in the sequence. One of the call paths is when enabling SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENTS via setsockopt(SCTP_EVENTS), as noticed by Harald Welte. The other is when partial reliability triggers removal of chunks from the send queue when the application calls sendmsg(). This commit fixes it by not setting the flag in case the socket is not owned by the user, as it won't be cleaned later. This works for user-initiated calls and also for rx path processing. Fixes: fb586f25300f ("sctp: delay calls to sk_data_ready() as much as possible") Reported-by: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org> Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: fix typo in fib6_net_exit()Eric Dumazet2017-09-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 32a805baf0fb70b6dbedefcd7249ac7f580f9e3b ] IPv6 FIB should use FIB6_TABLE_HASHSZ, not FIB_TABLE_HASHSZ. Fixes: ba1cc08d9488 ("ipv6: fix memory leak with multiple tables during netns destruction") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: fix memory leak with multiple tables during netns destructionSabrina Dubroca2017-09-201-6/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ba1cc08d9488c94cb8d94f545305688b72a2a300 ] fib6_net_exit only frees the main and local tables. If another table was created with fib6_alloc_table, we leak it when the netns is destroyed. Fix this in the same way ip_fib_net_exit cleans up tables, by walking through the whole hashtable of fib6_table's. We can get rid of the special cases for local and main, since they're also part of the hashtable. Reproducer: ip netns add x ip -net x -6 rule add from 6003:1::/64 table 100 ip netns del x Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Fixes: 58f09b78b730 ("[NETNS][IPV6] ip6_fib - make it per network namespace") Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ip6_gre: update mtu properly in ip6gre_errXin Long2017-09-201-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 5c25f30c93fdc5bf25e62101aeaae7a4f9b421b3 ] Now when probessing ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG, ip6gre_err only subtracts the offset of gre header from mtu info. The expected mtu of gre device should also subtract gre header. Otherwise, the next packets still can't be sent out. Jianlin found this issue when using the topo: client(ip6gre)<---->(nic1)route(nic2)<----->(ip6gre)server and reducing nic2's mtu, then both tcp and sctp's performance with big size data became 0. This patch is to fix it by also subtracting grehdr (tun->tun_hlen) from mtu info when updating gre device's mtu in ip6gre_err(). It also needs to subtract ETH_HLEN if gre dev'type is ARPHRD_ETHER. Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Revert "net: fix percpu memory leaks"Jesper Dangaard Brouer2017-09-204-35/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 5a63643e583b6a9789d7a225ae076fb4e603991c ] This reverts commit 1d6119baf0610f813eb9d9580eb4fd16de5b4ceb. After reverting commit 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting") then here is no need for this fix-up patch. As percpu_counter is no longer used, it cannot memory leak it any-longer. Fixes: 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting") Fixes: 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks") Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Revert "net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting"Jesper Dangaard Brouer2017-09-201-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit fb452a1aa3fd4034d7999e309c5466ff2d7005aa ] This reverts commit 6d7b857d541ecd1d9bd997c97242d4ef94b19de2. There is a bug in fragmentation codes use of the percpu_counter API, that can cause issues on systems with many CPUs. The frag_mem_limit() just reads the global counter (fbc->count), without considering other CPUs can have upto batch size (130K) that haven't been subtracted yet. Due to the 3MBytes lower thresh limit, this become dangerous at >=24 CPUs (3*1024*1024/130000=24). The correct API usage would be to use __percpu_counter_compare() which does the right thing, and takes into account the number of (online) CPUs and batch size, to account for this and call __percpu_counter_sum() when needed. We choose to revert the use of the lib/percpu_counter API for frag memory accounting for several reasons: 1) On systems with CPUs > 24, the heavier fully locked __percpu_counter_sum() is always invoked, which will be more expensive than the atomic_t that is reverted to. Given systems with more than 24 CPUs are becoming common this doesn't seem like a good option. To mitigate this, the batch size could be decreased and thresh be increased. 2) The add_frag_mem_limit+sub_frag_mem_limit pairs happen on the RX CPU, before SKBs are pushed into sockets on remote CPUs. Given NICs can only hash on L2 part of the IP-header, the NIC-RXq's will likely be limited. Thus, a fair chance that atomic add+dec happen on the same CPU. Revert note that commit 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks") removed init_frag_mem_limit() and instead use inet_frags_init_net(). After this revert, inet_frags_uninit_net() becomes empty. Fixes: 6d7b857d541e ("net: use lib/percpu_counter API for fragmentation mem accounting") Fixes: 1d6119baf061 ("net: fix percpu memory leaks") Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com> Acked-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* bridge: switchdev: Clear forward mark when transmitting packetIdo Schimmel2017-09-201-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 79e99bdd60b484af9afe0147e85a13e66d5c1cdb ] Commit 6bc506b4fb06 ("bridge: switchdev: Add forward mark support for stacked devices") added the 'offload_fwd_mark' bit to the skb in order to allow drivers to indicate to the bridge driver that they already forwarded the packet in L2. In case the bit is set, before transmitting the packet from each port, the port's mark is compared with the mark stored in the skb's control block. If both marks are equal, we know the packet arrived from a switch device that already forwarded the packet and it's not re-transmitted. However, if the packet is transmitted from the bridge device itself (e.g., br0), we should clear the 'offload_fwd_mark' bit as the mark stored in the skb's control block isn't valid. This scenario can happen in rare cases where a packet was trapped during L3 forwarding and forwarded by the kernel to a bridge device. Fixes: 6bc506b4fb06 ("bridge: switchdev: Add forward mark support for stacked devices") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Reported-by: Yotam Gigi <yotamg@mellanox.com> Tested-by: Yotam Gigi <yotamg@mellanox.com> Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Acked-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@cumulusnetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* mlxsw: spectrum: Forbid linking to devices that have uppersIdo Schimmel2017-09-201-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 25cc72a33835ed8a6f53180a822cadab855852ac ] The mlxsw driver relies on NETDEV_CHANGEUPPER events to configure the device in case a port is enslaved to a master netdev such as bridge or bond. Since the driver ignores events unrelated to its ports and their uppers, it's possible to engineer situations in which the device's data path differs from the kernel's. One example to such a situation is when a port is enslaved to a bond that is already enslaved to a bridge. When the bond was enslaved the driver ignored the event - as the bond wasn't one of its uppers - and therefore a bridge port instance isn't created in the device. Until such configurations are supported forbid them by checking that the upper device doesn't have uppers of its own. Fixes: 0d65fc13042f ("mlxsw: spectrum: Implement LAG port join/leave") Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@mellanox.com> Reported-by: Nogah Frankel <nogahf@mellanox.com> Tested-by: Nogah Frankel <nogahf@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@mellanox.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* tcp: initialize rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0Wei Wang2017-09-201-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 499350a5a6e7512d9ed369ed63a4244b6536f4f8 ] When tcp_disconnect() is called, inet_csk_delack_init() sets icsk->icsk_ack.rcv_mss to 0. This could potentially cause tcp_recvmsg() => tcp_cleanup_rbuf() => __tcp_select_window() call path to have division by 0 issue. So this patch initializes rcv_mss to TCP_MIN_MSS instead of 0. Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com> Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* kcm: do not attach PF_KCM sockets to avoid deadlockEric Dumazet2017-09-201-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 351050ecd6523374b370341cc29fe61e2201556b ] syzkaller had no problem to trigger a deadlock, attaching a KCM socket to another one (or itself). (original syzkaller report was a very confusing lockdep splat during a sendmsg()) It seems KCM claims to only support TCP, but no enforcement is done, so we might need to add additional checks. Fixes: ab7ac4eb9832 ("kcm: Kernel Connection Multiplexor module") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Acked-by: Tom Herbert <tom@quantonium.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* packet: Don't write vnet header beyond end of bufferBenjamin Poirier2017-09-201-3/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit edbd58be15a957f6a760c4a514cd475217eb97fd ] ... which may happen with certain values of tp_reserve and maclen. Fixes: 58d19b19cd99 ("packet: vnet_hdr support for tpacket_rcv") Signed-off-by: Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@suse.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* sctp: Avoid out-of-bounds reads from address storageStefano Brivio2017-09-202-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit ee6c88bb754e3d363e568da78086adfedb692447 ] inet_diag_msg_sctp{,l}addr_fill() and sctp_get_sctp_info() copy sizeof(sockaddr_storage) bytes to fill in sockaddr structs used to export diagnostic information to userspace. However, the memory allocated to store sockaddr information is smaller than that and depends on the address family, so we leak up to 100 uninitialized bytes to userspace. Just use the size of the source structs instead, in all the three cases this is what userspace expects. Zero out the remaining memory. Unused bytes (i.e. when IPv4 addresses are used) in source structs sctp_sockaddr_entry and sctp_transport are already cleared by sctp_add_bind_addr() and sctp_transport_new(), respectively. Noticed while testing KASAN-enabled kernel with 'ss': [ 2326.885243] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag] at addr ffff881be8779800 [ 2326.896800] Read of size 128 by task ss/9527 [ 2326.901564] CPU: 0 PID: 9527 Comm: ss Not tainted 4.11.0-22.el7a.x86_64 #1 [ 2326.909236] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017 [ 2326.917585] Call Trace: [ 2326.920312] dump_stack+0x63/0x8d [ 2326.924014] kasan_object_err+0x21/0x70 [ 2326.928295] kasan_report+0x288/0x540 [ 2326.932380] ? inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag] [ 2326.938500] ? skb_put+0x8b/0xd0 [ 2326.942098] ? memset+0x31/0x40 [ 2326.945599] check_memory_region+0x13c/0x1a0 [ 2326.950362] memcpy+0x23/0x50 [ 2326.953669] inet_sctp_diag_fill+0x42c/0x6c0 [sctp_diag] [ 2326.959596] ? inet_diag_msg_sctpasoc_fill+0x460/0x460 [sctp_diag] [ 2326.966495] ? __lock_sock+0x102/0x150 [ 2326.970671] ? sock_def_wakeup+0x60/0x60 [ 2326.975048] ? remove_wait_queue+0xc0/0xc0 [ 2326.979619] sctp_diag_dump+0x44a/0x760 [sctp_diag] [ 2326.985063] ? sctp_ep_dump+0x280/0x280 [sctp_diag] [ 2326.990504] ? memset+0x31/0x40 [ 2326.994007] ? mutex_lock+0x12/0x40 [ 2326.997900] __inet_diag_dump+0x57/0xb0 [inet_diag] [ 2327.003340] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x150/0x150 [ 2327.007715] inet_diag_dump+0x4d/0x80 [inet_diag] [ 2327.012979] netlink_dump+0x1e6/0x490 [ 2327.017064] __netlink_dump_start+0x28e/0x2c0 [ 2327.021924] inet_diag_handler_cmd+0x189/0x1a0 [inet_diag] [ 2327.028045] ? inet_diag_rcv_msg_compat+0x1b0/0x1b0 [inet_diag] [ 2327.034651] ? inet_diag_dump_compat+0x190/0x190 [inet_diag] [ 2327.040965] ? __netlink_lookup+0x1b9/0x260 [ 2327.045631] sock_diag_rcv_msg+0x18b/0x1e0 [ 2327.050199] netlink_rcv_skb+0x14b/0x180 [ 2327.054574] ? sock_diag_bind+0x60/0x60 [ 2327.058850] sock_diag_rcv+0x28/0x40 [ 2327.062837] netlink_unicast+0x2e7/0x3b0 [ 2327.067212] ? netlink_attachskb+0x330/0x330 [ 2327.071975] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 2327.076544] netlink_sendmsg+0x5be/0x730 [ 2327.080918] ? netlink_unicast+0x3b0/0x3b0 [ 2327.085486] ? kasan_check_write+0x14/0x20 [ 2327.090057] ? selinux_socket_sendmsg+0x24/0x30 [ 2327.095109] ? netlink_unicast+0x3b0/0x3b0 [ 2327.099678] sock_sendmsg+0x74/0x80 [ 2327.103567] ___sys_sendmsg+0x520/0x530 [ 2327.107844] ? __get_locked_pte+0x178/0x200 [ 2327.112510] ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x270/0x270 [ 2327.117660] ? vm_insert_page+0x360/0x360 [ 2327.122133] ? vm_insert_pfn_prot+0xb4/0x150 [ 2327.126895] ? vm_insert_pfn+0x32/0x40 [ 2327.131077] ? vvar_fault+0x71/0xd0 [ 2327.134968] ? special_mapping_fault+0x69/0x110 [ 2327.140022] ? __do_fault+0x42/0x120 [ 2327.144008] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x1062/0x17a0 [ 2327.148965] ? __fget_light+0xa7/0xc0 [ 2327.153049] __sys_sendmsg+0xcb/0x150 [ 2327.157133] ? __sys_sendmsg+0xcb/0x150 [ 2327.161409] ? SyS_shutdown+0x140/0x140 [ 2327.165688] ? exit_to_usermode_loop+0xd0/0xd0 [ 2327.170646] ? __do_page_fault+0x55d/0x620 [ 2327.175216] ? __sys_sendmsg+0x150/0x150 [ 2327.179591] SyS_sendmsg+0x12/0x20 [ 2327.183384] do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230 [ 2327.187471] entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 [ 2327.192622] RIP: 0033:0x7f41d18fa3b0 [ 2327.196608] RSP: 002b:00007ffc3b731218 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e [ 2327.205055] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc3b731380 RCX: 00007f41d18fa3b0 [ 2327.213017] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007ffc3b731340 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 2327.220978] RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000040 [ 2327.228939] R10: 00007ffc3b730f30 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003 [ 2327.236901] R13: 00007ffc3b731340 R14: 00007ffc3b7313d0 R15: 0000000000000084 [ 2327.244865] Object at ffff881be87797e0, in cache kmalloc-64 size: 64 [ 2327.251953] Allocated: [ 2327.254581] PID = 9484 [ 2327.257215] save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 [ 2327.261485] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 2327.265179] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 [ 2327.269165] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xe6/0x1d0 [ 2327.274138] sctp_add_bind_addr+0x58/0x180 [sctp] [ 2327.279400] sctp_do_bind+0x208/0x310 [sctp] [ 2327.284176] sctp_bind+0x61/0xa0 [sctp] [ 2327.288455] inet_bind+0x5f/0x3a0 [ 2327.292151] SYSC_bind+0x1a4/0x1e0 [ 2327.295944] SyS_bind+0xe/0x10 [ 2327.299349] do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230 [ 2327.303433] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a [ 2327.308194] Freed: [ 2327.310434] PID = 4131 [ 2327.313065] save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 [ 2327.317344] save_stack+0x46/0xd0 [ 2327.321040] kasan_slab_free+0x73/0xc0 [ 2327.325220] kfree+0x96/0x1a0 [ 2327.328530] dynamic_kobj_release+0x15/0x40 [ 2327.333195] kobject_release+0x99/0x1e0 [ 2327.337472] kobject_put+0x38/0x70 [ 2327.341266] free_notes_attrs+0x66/0x80 [ 2327.345545] mod_sysfs_teardown+0x1a5/0x270 [ 2327.350211] free_module+0x20/0x2a0 [ 2327.354099] SyS_delete_module+0x2cb/0x2f0 [ 2327.358667] do_syscall_64+0xe3/0x230 [ 2327.362750] return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x0/0x6a [ 2327.367510] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 2327.372855] ffff881be8779700: fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc [ 2327.380914] ffff881be8779780: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 [ 2327.388972] >ffff881be8779800: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb [ 2327.397031] ^ [ 2327.401792] ffff881be8779880: fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc [ 2327.409850] ffff881be8779900: 00 00 00 00 00 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc 00 00 00 00 [ 2327.417907] ================================================================== This fixes CVE-2017-7558. References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1480266 Fixes: 8f840e47f190 ("sctp: add the sctp_diag.c file") Cc: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* udp: on peeking bad csum, drop packets even if not at headEric Dumazet2017-09-201-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit fd6055a806edc4019be1b9fb7d25262599bca5b1 ] When peeking, if a bad csum is discovered, the skb is unlinked from the queue with __sk_queue_drop_skb and the peek operation restarted. __sk_queue_drop_skb only drops packets that match the queue head. This fails if the skb was found after the head, using SO_PEEK_OFF socket option. This causes an infinite loop. We MUST drop this problematic skb, and we can simply check if skb was already removed by another thread, by looking at skb->next : This pointer is set to NULL by the __skb_unlink() operation, that might have happened only under the spinlock protection. Many thanks to syzkaller team (and particularly Dmitry Vyukov who provided us nice C reproducers exhibiting the lockup) and Willem de Bruijn who provided first version for this patch and a test program. Fixes: 627d2d6b5500 ("udp: enable MSG_PEEK at non-zero offset") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Acked-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Acked-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: fix sparse warning on rt6i_nodeWei Wang2017-09-203-6/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 4e587ea71bf924f7dac621f1351653bd41e446cb ] Commit c5cff8561d2d adds rcu grace period before freeing fib6_node. This generates a new sparse warning on rt->rt6i_node related code: net/ipv6/route.c:1394:30: error: incompatible types in comparison expression (different address spaces) ./include/net/ip6_fib.h:187:14: error: incompatible types in comparison expression (different address spaces) This commit adds "__rcu" tag for rt6i_node and makes sure corresponding rcu API is used for it. After this fix, sparse no longer generates the above warning. Fixes: c5cff8561d2d ("ipv6: add rcu grace period before freeing fib6_node") Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: add rcu grace period before freeing fib6_nodeWei Wang2017-09-202-7/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit c5cff8561d2d0006e972bd114afd51f082fee77c ] We currently keep rt->rt6i_node pointing to the fib6_node for the route. And some functions make use of this pointer to dereference the fib6_node from rt structure, e.g. rt6_check(). However, as there is neither refcount nor rcu taken when dereferencing rt->rt6i_node, it could potentially cause crashes as rt->rt6i_node could be set to NULL by other CPUs when doing a route deletion. This patch introduces an rcu grace period before freeing fib6_node and makes sure the functions that dereference it takes rcu_read_lock(). Note: there is no "Fixes" tag because this bug was there in a very early stage. Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Acked-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: accept 64k - 1 packet length in ip6_find_1stfragopt()Stefano Brivio2017-09-201-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 3de33e1ba0506723ab25734e098cf280ecc34756 ] A packet length of exactly IPV6_MAXPLEN is allowed, we should refuse parsing options only if the size is 64KiB or more. While at it, remove one extra variable and one assignment which were also introduced by the commit that introduced the size check. Checking the sum 'offset + len' and only later adding 'len' to 'offset' doesn't provide any advantage over directly summing to 'offset' and checking it. Fixes: 6399f1fae4ec ("ipv6: avoid overflow of offset in ip6_find_1stfragopt") Signed-off-by: Stefano Brivio <sbrivio@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Bluetooth: Properly check L2CAP config option output buffer lengthBen Seri2017-09-131-37/+43
| | | | | | | | | | | | | commit e860d2c904d1a9f38a24eb44c9f34b8f915a6ea3 upstream. Validate the output buffer length for L2CAP config requests and responses to avoid overflowing the stack buffer used for building the option blocks. Signed-off-by: Ben Seri <ben@armis.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* xfrm: policy: check policy direction valueVladis Dronov2017-09-071-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 7bab09631c2a303f87a7eb7e3d69e888673b9b7e upstream. The 'dir' parameter in xfrm_migrate() is a user-controlled byte which is used as an array index. This can lead to an out-of-bound access, kernel lockup and DoS. Add a check for the 'dir' value. This fixes CVE-2017-11600. References: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1474928 Fixes: 80c9abaabf42 ("[XFRM]: Extension for dynamic update of endpoint address(es)") Reported-by: "bo Zhang" <zhangbo5891001@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Bluetooth: bnep: fix possible might sleep error in bnep_sessionJeffy Chen2017-08-301-6/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 25717382c1dd0ddced2059053e3ca5088665f7a5 upstream. It looks like bnep_session has same pattern as the issue reported in old rfcomm: while (1) { set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); if (condition) break; // may call might_sleep here schedule(); } __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); Which fixed at: dfb2fae Bluetooth: Fix nested sleeps So let's fix it at the same way, also follow the suggestion of: https://lwn.net/Articles/628628/ Signed-off-by: Jeffy Chen <jeffy.chen@rock-chips.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: AL Yu-Chen Cho <acho@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Bluetooth: cmtp: fix possible might sleep error in cmtp_sessionJeffy Chen2017-08-301-7/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit f06d977309d09253c744e54e75c5295ecc52b7b4 upstream. It looks like cmtp_session has same pattern as the issue reported in old rfcomm: while (1) { set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); if (condition) break; // may call might_sleep here schedule(); } __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); Which fixed at: dfb2fae Bluetooth: Fix nested sleeps So let's fix it at the same way, also follow the suggestion of: https://lwn.net/Articles/628628/ Signed-off-by: Jeffy Chen <jeffy.chen@rock-chips.com> Reviewed-by: Brian Norris <briannorris@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: AL Yu-Chen Cho <acho@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Bluetooth: hidp: fix possible might sleep error in hidp_session_threadJeffy Chen2017-08-301-11/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 5da8e47d849d3d37b14129f038782a095b9ad049 upstream. It looks like hidp_session_thread has same pattern as the issue reported in old rfcomm: while (1) { set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE); if (condition) break; // may call might_sleep here schedule(); } __set_current_state(TASK_RUNNING); Which fixed at: dfb2fae Bluetooth: Fix nested sleeps So let's fix it at the same way, also follow the suggestion of: https://lwn.net/Articles/628628/ Signed-off-by: Jeffy Chen <jeffy.chen@rock-chips.com> Tested-by: AL Yu-Chen Cho <acho@suse.com> Tested-by: Rohit Vaswani <rvaswani@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* netfilter: nat: fix src map lookupFlorian Westphal2017-08-301-8/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 97772bcd56efa21d9d8976db6f205574ea602f51 upstream. When doing initial conversion to rhashtable I replaced the bucket walk with a single rhashtable_lookup_fast(). When moving to rhlist I failed to properly walk the list of identical tuples, but that is what is needed for this to work correctly. The table contains the original tuples, so the reply tuples are all distinct. We currently decide that mapping is (not) in range only based on the first entry, but in case its not we need to try the reply tuple of the next entry until we either find an in-range mapping or we checked all the entries. This bug makes nat core attempt collision resolution while it might be able to use the mapping as-is. Fixes: 870190a9ec90 ("netfilter: nat: convert nat bysrc hash to rhashtable") Reported-by: Jaco Kroon <jaco@uls.co.za> Tested-by: Jaco Kroon <jaco@uls.co.za> Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* net: sunrpc: svcsock: fix NULL-pointer exceptionVadim Lomovtsev2017-08-301-2/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit eebe53e87f97975ee58a21693e44797608bf679c upstream. While running nfs/connectathon tests kernel NULL-pointer exception has been observed due to races in svcsock.c. Race is appear when kernel accepts connection by kernel_accept (which creates new socket) and start queuing ingress packets to new socket. This happens in ksoftirq context which could run concurrently on a different core while new socket setup is not done yet. The fix is to re-order socket user data init sequence and add write/read barrier calls to be sure that we got proper values for callback pointers before actually calling them. Test results: nfs/connectathon reports '0' failed tests for about 200+ iterations. Crash log: ---<-snip->--- [ 6708.638984] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000000 [ 6708.647093] pgd = ffff0000094e0000 [ 6708.650497] [00000000] *pgd=0000010ffff90003, *pud=0000010ffff90003, *pmd=0000010ffff80003, *pte=0000000000000000 [ 6708.660761] Internal error: Oops: 86000005 [#1] SMP [ 6708.665630] Modules linked in: nfsv3 nfnetlink_queue nfnetlink_log nfnetlink rpcsec_gss_krb5 nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs fscache overlay xt_CONNSECMARK xt_SECMARK xt_conntrack iptable_security ip_tables ah4 xfrm4_mode_transport sctp tun binfmt_misc ext4 jbd2 mbcache loop tcp_diag udp_diag inet_diag rpcrdma ib_isert iscsi_target_mod ib_iser rdma_cm iw_cm libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib ib_ucm ib_uverbs ib_umad ib_cm ib_core nls_koi8_u nls_cp932 ts_kmp nf_conntrack_ipv4 nf_defrag_ipv4 nf_conntrack vfat fat ghash_ce sha2_ce sha1_ce cavium_rng_vf i2c_thunderx sg thunderx_edac i2c_smbus edac_core cavium_rng nfsd auth_rpcgss nfs_acl lockd grace sunrpc xfs libcrc32c nicvf nicpf ast i2c_algo_bit drm_kms_helper syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt fb_sys_fops [ 6708.736446] ttm drm i2c_core thunder_bgx thunder_xcv mdio_thunder mdio_cavium dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [last unloaded: stap_3c300909c5b3f46dcacd49aab3334af_87021] [ 6708.752275] CPU: 84 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/84 Tainted: G W OE 4.11.0-4.el7.aarch64 #1 [ 6708.760787] Hardware name: www.cavium.com CRB-2S/CRB-2S, BIOS 0.3 Mar 13 2017 [ 6708.767910] task: ffff810006842e80 task.stack: ffff81000689c000 [ 6708.773822] PC is at 0x0 [ 6708.776739] LR is at svc_data_ready+0x38/0x88 [sunrpc] [ 6708.781866] pc : [<0000000000000000>] lr : [<ffff0000029d7378>] pstate: 60000145 [ 6708.789248] sp : ffff810ffbad3900 [ 6708.792551] x29: ffff810ffbad3900 x28: ffff000008c73d58 [ 6708.797853] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: ffff81000bbe1e00 [ 6708.803156] x25: 0000000000000020 x24: ffff800f7410bf28 [ 6708.808458] x23: ffff000008c63000 x22: ffff000008c63000 [ 6708.813760] x21: ffff800f7410bf28 x20: ffff81000bbe1e00 [ 6708.819063] x19: ffff810012412400 x18: 00000000d82a9df2 [ 6708.824365] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 [ 6708.829667] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000001 [ 6708.834969] x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 722e736f622e676e [ 6708.840271] x11: 00000000f814dd99 x10: 0000000000000000 [ 6708.845573] x9 : 7374687225000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 6708.850875] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 6708.856177] x5 : 0000000000000028 x4 : 0000000000000000 [ 6708.861479] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 00000000e5000000 [ 6708.866781] x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff81000bbe1e00 [ 6708.872084] [ 6708.873565] Process swapper/84 (pid: 0, stack limit = 0xffff81000689c000) [ 6708.880341] Stack: (0xffff810ffbad3900 to 0xffff8100068a0000) [ 6708.886075] Call trace: [ 6708.888513] Exception stack(0xffff810ffbad3710 to 0xffff810ffbad3840) [ 6708.894942] 3700: ffff810012412400 0001000000000000 [ 6708.902759] 3720: ffff810ffbad3900 0000000000000000 0000000060000145 ffff800f79300000 [ 6708.910577] 3740: ffff000009274d00 00000000000003ea 0000000000000015 ffff000008c63000 [ 6708.918395] 3760: ffff810ffbad3830 ffff800f79300000 000000000000004d 0000000000000000 [ 6708.926212] 3780: ffff810ffbad3890 ffff0000080f88dc ffff800f79300000 000000000000004d [ 6708.934030] 37a0: ffff800f7930093c ffff000008c63000 0000000000000000 0000000000000140 [ 6708.941848] 37c0: ffff000008c2c000 0000000000040b00 ffff81000bbe1e00 0000000000000000 [ 6708.949665] 37e0: 00000000e5000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000028 [ 6708.957483] 3800: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 7374687225000000 [ 6708.965300] 3820: 0000000000000000 00000000f814dd99 722e736f622e676e 0000000000000000 [ 6708.973117] [< (null)>] (null) [ 6708.977824] [<ffff0000086f9fa4>] tcp_data_queue+0x754/0xc5c [ 6708.983386] [<ffff0000086fa64c>] tcp_rcv_established+0x1a0/0x67c [ 6708.989384] [<ffff000008704120>] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x15c/0x22c [ 6708.994858] [<ffff000008707418>] tcp_v4_rcv+0xaf0/0xb58 [ 6709.000077] [<ffff0000086df784>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0x10c/0x254 [ 6709.006419] [<ffff0000086dfea4>] ip_local_deliver+0xf0/0xfc [ 6709.011980] [<ffff0000086dfad4>] ip_rcv_finish+0x208/0x3a4 [ 6709.017454] [<ffff0000086e018c>] ip_rcv+0x2dc/0x3c8 [ 6709.022328] [<ffff000008692fc8>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x2f8/0xa0c [ 6709.028758] [<ffff000008696068>] __netif_receive_skb+0x38/0x84 [ 6709.034580] [<ffff00000869611c>] netif_receive_skb_internal+0x68/0xdc [ 6709.041010] [<ffff000008696bc0>] napi_gro_receive+0xcc/0x1a8 [ 6709.046690] [<ffff0000014b0fc4>] nicvf_cq_intr_handler+0x59c/0x730 [nicvf] [ 6709.053559] [<ffff0000014b1380>] nicvf_poll+0x38/0xb8 [nicvf] [ 6709.059295] [<ffff000008697a6c>] net_rx_action+0x2f8/0x464 [ 6709.064771] [<ffff000008081824>] __do_softirq+0x11c/0x308 [ 6709.070164] [<ffff0000080d14e4>] irq_exit+0x12c/0x174 [ 6709.075206] [<ffff00000813101c>] __handle_domain_irq+0x78/0xc4 [ 6709.081027] [<ffff000008081608>] gic_handle_irq+0x94/0x190 [ 6709.086501] Exception stack(0xffff81000689fdf0 to 0xffff81000689ff20) [ 6709.092929] fde0: 0000810ff2ec0000 ffff000008c10000 [ 6709.100747] fe00: ffff000008c70ef4 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 ffff810ffbad9b18 [ 6709.108565] fe20: ffff810ffbad9c70 ffff8100169d3800 ffff810006843ab0 ffff81000689fe80 [ 6709.116382] fe40: 0000000000000bd0 0000ffffdf979cd0 183f5913da192500 0000ffff8a254ce4 [ 6709.124200] fe60: 0000ffff8a254b78 0000aaab10339808 0000000000000000 0000ffff8a0c2a50 [ 6709.132018] fe80: 0000ffffdf979b10 ffff000008d6d450 ffff000008c10000 ffff000008d6d000 [ 6709.139836] fea0: 0000000000000054 ffff000008cd3dbc 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 6709.147653] fec0: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 ffff81000689ff20 [ 6709.155471] fee0: ffff000008085240 ffff81000689ff20 ffff000008085244 0000000060000145 [ 6709.163289] ff00: ffff81000689ff10 ffff00000813f1e4 ffffffffffffffff ffff00000813f238 [ 6709.171107] [<ffff000008082eb4>] el1_irq+0xb4/0x140 [ 6709.175976] [<ffff000008085244>] arch_cpu_idle+0x44/0x11c [ 6709.181368] [<ffff0000087bf3b8>] default_idle_call+0x20/0x30 [ 6709.187020] [<ffff000008116d50>] do_idle+0x158/0x1e4 [ 6709.191973] [<ffff000008116ff4>] cpu_startup_entry+0x2c/0x30 [ 6709.197624] [<ffff00000808e7cc>] secondary_start_kernel+0x13c/0x160 [ 6709.203878] [<0000000001bc71c4>] 0x1bc71c4 [ 6709.207967] Code: bad PC value [ 6709.211061] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 6709.218830] Starting crashdump kernel... [ 6709.222749] Bye! ---<-snip>--- Signed-off-by: Vadim Lomovtsev <vlomovts@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* net: sched: fix NULL pointer dereference when action calls some targetsXin Long2017-08-301-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 4f8a881acc9d1adaf1e552349a0b1df28933a04c ] As we know in some target's checkentry it may dereference par.entryinfo to check entry stuff inside. But when sched action calls xt_check_target, par.entryinfo is set with NULL. It would cause kernel panic when calling some targets. It can be reproduce with: # tc qd add dev eth1 ingress handle ffff: # tc filter add dev eth1 parent ffff: u32 match u32 0 0 action xt \ -j ECN --ecn-tcp-remove It could also crash kernel when using target CLUSTERIP or TPROXY. By now there's no proper value for par.entryinfo in ipt_init_target, but it can not be set with NULL. This patch is to void all these panics by setting it with an ipt_entry obj with all members = 0. Note that this issue has been there since the very beginning. Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* irda: do not leak initialized list.dev to userspaceColin Ian King2017-08-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit b024d949a3c24255a7ef1a470420eb478949aa4c ] list.dev has not been initialized and so the copy_to_user is copying data from the stack back to user space which is a potential information leak. Fix this ensuring all of list is initialized to zero. Detected by CoverityScan, CID#1357894 ("Uninitialized scalar variable") Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* tcp: when rearming RTO, if RTO time is in past then fire RTO ASAPNeal Cardwell2017-08-301-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit cdbeb633ca71a02b7b63bfeb94994bf4e1a0b894 ] In some situations tcp_send_loss_probe() can realize that it's unable to send a loss probe (TLP), and falls back to calling tcp_rearm_rto() to schedule an RTO timer. In such cases, sometimes tcp_rearm_rto() realizes that the RTO was eligible to fire immediately or at some point in the past (delta_us <= 0). Previously in such cases tcp_rearm_rto() was scheduling such "overdue" RTOs to happen at now + icsk_rto, which caused needless delays of hundreds of milliseconds (and non-linear behavior that made reproducible testing difficult). This commit changes the logic to schedule "overdue" RTOs ASAP, rather than at now + icsk_rto. Fixes: 6ba8a3b19e76 ("tcp: Tail loss probe (TLP)") Suggested-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com> Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: repair fib6 tree in failure caseWei Wang2017-08-301-11/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 348a4002729ccab8b888b38cbc099efa2f2a2036 ] In fib6_add(), it is possible that fib6_add_1() picks an intermediate node and sets the node's fn->leaf to NULL in order to add this new route. However, if fib6_add_rt2node() fails to add the new route for some reason, fn->leaf will be left as NULL and could potentially cause crash when fn->leaf is accessed in fib6_locate(). This patch makes sure fib6_repair_tree() is called to properly repair fn->leaf in the above failure case. Here is the syzkaller reported general protection fault in fib6_locate: kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 40937 Comm: syz-executor3 Not tainted Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 task: ffff8801d7d64100 ti: ffff8801d01a0000 task.ti: ffff8801d01a0000 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82a3e0e1>] [<ffffffff82a3e0e1>] __ipv6_prefix_equal64_half include/net/ipv6.h:475 [inline] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82a3e0e1>] [<ffffffff82a3e0e1>] ipv6_prefix_equal include/net/ipv6.h:492 [inline] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82a3e0e1>] [<ffffffff82a3e0e1>] fib6_locate_1 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1210 [inline] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff82a3e0e1>] [<ffffffff82a3e0e1>] fib6_locate+0x281/0x3c0 net/ipv6/ip6_fib.c:1233 RSP: 0018:ffff8801d01a36a8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000020 RBX: ffff8801bc790e00 RCX: ffffc90002983000 RDX: 0000000000001219 RSI: ffff8801d01a37a0 RDI: 0000000000000100 RBP: ffff8801d01a36f0 R08: 00000000000000ff R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: ffff8801d01a37a0 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f6afd68c700(0000) GS:ffff8801db400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000004c6340 CR3: 00000000ba41f000 CR4: 00000000001426f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Stack: ffff8801d01a37a8 ffff8801d01a3780 ffffed003a0346f5 0000000c82a23ea0 ffff8800b7bd7700 ffff8801d01a3780 ffff8800b6a1c940 ffffffff82a23ea0 ffff8801d01a3920 ffff8801d01a3748 ffffffff82a223d6 ffff8801d7d64988 Call Trace: [<ffffffff82a223d6>] ip6_route_del+0x106/0x570 net/ipv6/route.c:2109 [<ffffffff82a23f9d>] inet6_rtm_delroute+0xfd/0x100 net/ipv6/route.c:3075 [<ffffffff82621359>] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x549/0x7a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3450 [<ffffffff8274c1d1>] netlink_rcv_skb+0x141/0x370 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2281 [<ffffffff82613ddf>] rtnetlink_rcv+0x2f/0x40 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3456 [<ffffffff8274ad38>] netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1206 [inline] [<ffffffff8274ad38>] netlink_unicast+0x518/0x750 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1232 [<ffffffff8274b83e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x8ce/0xc30 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1778 [<ffffffff82564aff>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:609 [inline] [<ffffffff82564aff>] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x110 net/socket.c:619 [<ffffffff82564d62>] sock_write_iter+0x222/0x3a0 net/socket.c:834 [<ffffffff8178523d>] new_sync_write+0x1dd/0x2b0 fs/read_write.c:478 [<ffffffff817853f4>] __vfs_write+0xe4/0x110 fs/read_write.c:491 [<ffffffff81786c38>] vfs_write+0x178/0x4b0 fs/read_write.c:538 [<ffffffff817892a9>] SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:585 [inline] [<ffffffff817892a9>] SyS_write+0xd9/0x1b0 fs/read_write.c:577 [<ffffffff82c71e32>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Note: there is no "Fixes" tag as this seems to be a bug introduced very early. Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* ipv6: reset fn->rr_ptr when replacing routeWei Wang2017-08-301-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 383143f31d7d3525a1dbff733d52fff917f82f15 ] syzcaller reported the following use-after-free issue in rt6_select(): BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in rt6_select net/ipv6/route.c:755 [inline] at addr ffff8800bc6994e8 BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ip6_pol_route.isra.46+0x1429/0x1470 net/ipv6/route.c:1084 at addr ffff8800bc6994e8 Read of size 4 by task syz-executor1/439628 CPU: 0 PID: 439628 Comm: syz-executor1 Not tainted 4.3.5+ #8 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 0000000000000000 ffff88018fe435b0 ffffffff81ca384d ffff8801d3588c00 ffff8800bc699380 ffff8800bc699500 dffffc0000000000 ffff8801d40a47c0 ffff88018fe435d8 ffffffff81735751 ffff88018fe43660 ffff8800bc699380 Call Trace: [<ffffffff81ca384d>] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15 [inline] [<ffffffff81ca384d>] dump_stack+0xc1/0x124 lib/dump_stack.c:51 sctp: [Deprecated]: syz-executor0 (pid 439615) Use of struct sctp_assoc_value in delayed_ack socket option. Use struct sctp_sack_info instead [<ffffffff81735751>] kasan_object_err+0x21/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:158 [<ffffffff817359c4>] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:196 [inline] [<ffffffff817359c4>] kasan_report_error+0x1b4/0x4a0 mm/kasan/report.c:285 [<ffffffff81735d93>] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:305 [inline] [<ffffffff81735d93>] __asan_report_load4_noabort+0x43/0x50 mm/kasan/report.c:325 [<ffffffff82a28e39>] rt6_select net/ipv6/route.c:755 [inline] [<ffffffff82a28e39>] ip6_pol_route.isra.46+0x1429/0x1470 net/ipv6/route.c:1084 [<ffffffff82a28fb1>] ip6_pol_route_output+0x81/0xb0 net/ipv6/route.c:1203 [<ffffffff82ab0a50>] fib6_rule_action+0x1f0/0x680 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:95 [<ffffffff8265cbb6>] fib_rules_lookup+0x2a6/0x7a0 net/core/fib_rules.c:223 [<ffffffff82ab1430>] fib6_rule_lookup+0xd0/0x250 net/ipv6/fib6_rules.c:41 [<ffffffff82a22006>] ip6_route_output+0x1d6/0x2c0 net/ipv6/route.c:1224 [<ffffffff829e83d2>] ip6_dst_lookup_tail+0x4d2/0x890 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:943 [<ffffffff829e889a>] ip6_dst_lookup_flow+0x9a/0x250 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1079 [<ffffffff82a9f7d8>] ip6_datagram_dst_update+0x538/0xd40 net/ipv6/datagram.c:91 [<ffffffff82aa0978>] __ip6_datagram_connect net/ipv6/datagram.c:251 [inline] [<ffffffff82aa0978>] ip6_datagram_connect+0x518/0xe50 net/ipv6/datagram.c:272 [<ffffffff82aa1313>] ip6_datagram_connect_v6_only+0x63/0x90 net/ipv6/datagram.c:284 [<ffffffff8292f790>] inet_dgram_connect+0x170/0x1f0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:564 [<ffffffff82565547>] SYSC_connect+0x1a7/0x2f0 net/socket.c:1582 [<ffffffff8256a649>] SyS_connect+0x29/0x30 net/socket.c:1563 [<ffffffff82c72032>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x17 Object at ffff8800bc699380, in cache ip6_dst_cache size: 384 The root cause of it is that in fib6_add_rt2node(), when it replaces an existing route with the new one, it does not update fn->rr_ptr. This commit resets fn->rr_ptr to NULL when it points to a route which is replaced in fib6_add_rt2node(). Fixes: 27596472473a ("ipv6: fix ECMP route replacement") Signed-off-by: Wei Wang <weiwan@google.com> Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* tipc: fix use-after-freeEric Dumazet2017-08-301-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [ Upstream commit 5bfd37b4de5c98e86b12bd13be5aa46c7484a125 ] syszkaller reported use-after-free in tipc [1] When msg->rep skb is freed, set the pointer to NULL, so that caller does not free it again. [1] ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_push+0xd4/0xe0 net/core/skbuff.c:1466 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801c6e71e90 by task syz-executor5/4115 CPU: 1 PID: 4115 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc4+ #32 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:52 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x24e/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430 skb_push+0xd4/0xe0 net/core/skbuff.c:1466 tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x833/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1209 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:598 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:623 netlink_rcv_skb+0x216/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:898 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1743 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:457 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:470 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:565 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:557 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x4512e9 RSP: 002b:00007f3bc8184c08 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000718000 RCX: 00000000004512e9 RDX: 0000000000000020 RSI: 0000000020fdb000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000086 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00000000004b5e76 R13: 00007f3bc8184b48 R14: 00000000004b5e86 R15: 0000000000000000 Allocated by task 4115: save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 [inline] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:489 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x13d/0x750 mm/slab.c:3651 __alloc_skb+0xf1/0x740 net/core/skbuff.c:219 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:903 [inline] tipc_tlv_alloc+0x26/0xb0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:148 tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0xf2/0x3c0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:248 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1130 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x756/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1199 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:598 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:623 netlink_rcv_skb+0x216/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:898 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1743 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:457 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:470 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:565 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:557 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe Freed by task 4115: save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 [inline] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3503 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x77/0x280 mm/slab.c:3763 kfree_skbmem+0x1a1/0x1d0 net/core/skbuff.c:622 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:682 [inline] kfree_skb+0x165/0x4c0 net/core/skbuff.c:699 tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x36a/0x3c0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:260 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1130 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x756/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1199 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:598 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:623 netlink_rcv_skb+0x216/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:898 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1743 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:457 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:470 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:565 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:557 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801c6e71dc0 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224 The buggy address is located 208 bytes inside of 224-byte region [ffff8801c6e71dc0, ffff8801c6e71ea0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00071b9c40 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801c6e71000 index:0x0 flags: 0x200000000000100(slab) raw: 0200000000000100 ffff8801c6e71000 0000000000000000 000000010000000c raw: ffffea0007224a20 ffff8801d98caf48 ffff8801d9e79040 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8801c6e71d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8801c6e71e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff8801c6e71e80: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff8801c6e71f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff8801c6e71f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Cc: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-03-21 22:18:58 +0000