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* mac80211: drop A-MSDUs on old ciphersJohannes Berg2021-05-111-1/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With old ciphers (WEP and TKIP) we shouldn't be using A-MSDUs since A-MSDUs are only supported if we know that they are, and the only practical way for that is HT support which doesn't support old ciphers. However, we would normally accept them anyway. Since we check the MMIC before deaggregating A-MSDUs, and the A-MSDU bit in the QoS header is not protected in TKIP (or WEP), this enables attacks similar to CVE-2020-24588. To prevent that, drop A-MSDUs completely with old ciphers. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.076543300172.I548e6e71f1ee9cad4b9a37bf212ae7db723587aa@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
* cfg80211: mitigate A-MSDU aggregation attacksMathy Vanhoef2021-05-111-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Mitigate A-MSDU injection attacks (CVE-2020-24588) by detecting if the destination address of a subframe equals an RFC1042 (i.e., LLC/SNAP) header, and if so dropping the complete A-MSDU frame. This mitigates known attacks, although new (unknown) aggregation-based attacks may remain possible. This defense works because in A-MSDU aggregation injection attacks, a normal encrypted Wi-Fi frame is turned into an A-MSDU frame. This means the first 6 bytes of the first A-MSDU subframe correspond to an RFC1042 header. In other words, the destination MAC address of the first A-MSDU subframe contains the start of an RFC1042 header during an aggregation attack. We can detect this and thereby prevent this specific attack. For details, see Section 7.2 of "Fragment and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation". Note that for kernel 4.9 and above this patch depends on "mac80211: properly handle A-MSDUs that start with a rfc1042 header". Otherwise this patch has no impact and attacks will remain possible. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.25d93176ddaf.I9e265b597f2cd23eb44573f35b625947b386a9de@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
* mac80211: properly handle A-MSDUs that start with an RFC 1042 headerMathy Vanhoef2021-05-112-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | Properly parse A-MSDUs whose first 6 bytes happen to equal a rfc1042 header. This can occur in practice when the destination MAC address equals AA:AA:03:00:00:00. More importantly, this simplifies the next patch to mitigate A-MSDU injection attacks. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.0b2b886492f0.I23dd5d685fe16d3b0ec8106e8f01b59f499dffed@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
* mac80211: prevent mixed key and fragment cache attacksMathy Vanhoef2021-05-114-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Simultaneously prevent mixed key attacks (CVE-2020-24587) and fragment cache attacks (CVE-2020-24586). This is accomplished by assigning a unique color to every key (per interface) and using this to track which key was used to decrypt a fragment. When reassembling frames, it is now checked whether all fragments were decrypted using the same key. To assure that fragment cache attacks are also prevented, the ID that is assigned to keys is unique even over (re)associations and (re)connects. This means fragments separated by a (re)association or (re)connect will not be reassembled. Because mac80211 now also prevents the reassembly of mixed encrypted and plaintext fragments, all cache attacks are prevented. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.3f8290e59823.I622a67769ed39257327a362cfc09c812320eb979@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
* mac80211: assure all fragments are encryptedMathy Vanhoef2021-05-111-11/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Do not mix plaintext and encrypted fragments in protected Wi-Fi networks. This fixes CVE-2020-26147. Previously, an attacker was able to first forward a legitimate encrypted fragment towards a victim, followed by a plaintext fragment. The encrypted and plaintext fragment would then be reassembled. For further details see Section 6.3 and Appendix D in the paper "Fragment and Forge: Breaking Wi-Fi Through Frame Aggregation and Fragmentation". Because of this change there are now two equivalent conditions in the code to determine if a received fragment requires sequential PNs, so we also move this test to a separate function to make the code easier to maintain. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Mathy Vanhoef <Mathy.Vanhoef@kuleuven.be> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210511200110.30c4394bb835.I5acfdb552cc1d20c339c262315950b3eac491397@changeid Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
* tipc: make node link identity publish thread safeHoang Le2021-05-101-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The using of the node address and node link identity are not thread safe, meaning that two publications may be published the same values, as result one of them will get failure because of already existing in the name table. To avoid this we have to use the node address and node link identity values from inside the node item's write lock protection. Fixes: 50a3499ab853 ("tipc: simplify signature of tipc_namtbl_publish()") Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jmaloy@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Hoang Le <hoang.h.le@dektech.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* net: dsa: fix error code getting shifted with 4 in dsa_slave_get_sset_countVladimir Oltean2021-05-101-5/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | DSA implements a bunch of 'standardized' ethtool statistics counters, namely tx_packets, tx_bytes, rx_packets, rx_bytes. So whatever the hardware driver returns in .get_sset_count(), we need to add 4 to that. That is ok, except that .get_sset_count() can return a negative error code, for example: b53_get_sset_count -> phy_ethtool_get_sset_count -> return -EIO -EIO is -5, and with 4 added to it, it becomes -1, aka -EPERM. One can imagine that certain error codes may even become positive, although based on code inspection I did not see instances of that. Check the error code first, if it is negative return it as-is. Based on a similar patch for dsa_master_get_strings from Dan Carpenter: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/netdevbpf/patch/YJaSe3RPgn7gKxZv@mwanda/ Fixes: 91da11f870f0 ("net: Distributed Switch Architecture protocol support") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <vladimir.oltean@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* net: dsa: fix a crash if ->get_sset_count() failsDan Carpenter2021-05-101-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If ds->ops->get_sset_count() fails then it "count" is a negative error code such as -EOPNOTSUPP. Because "i" is an unsigned int, the negative error code is type promoted to a very high value and the loop will corrupt memory until the system crashes. Fix this by checking for error codes and changing the type of "i" to just int. Fixes: badf3ada60ab ("net: dsa: Provide CPU port statistics to master netdev") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch> Reviewed-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* net/nfc/rawsock.c: fix a permission check bugJeimon2021-05-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | The function rawsock_create() calls a privileged function sk_alloc(), which requires a ns-aware check to check net->user_ns, i.e., ns_capable(). However, the original code checks the init_user_ns using capable(). So we replace the capable() with ns_capable(). Signed-off-by: Jeimon <jjjinmeng.zhou@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* Merge tag 'net-5.13-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2021-05-0831-121/+407
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net Pull networking fixes from Jakub Kicinski: "Networking fixes for 5.13-rc1, including fixes from bpf, can and netfilter trees. Self-contained fixes, nothing risky. Current release - new code bugs: - dsa: ksz: fix a few bugs found by static-checker in the new driver - stmmac: fix frame preemption handshake not triggering after interface restart Previous releases - regressions: - make nla_strcmp handle more then one trailing null character - fix stack OOB reads while fragmenting IPv4 packets in openvswitch and net/sched - sctp: do asoc update earlier in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a - sctp: delay auto_asconf init until binding the first addr - stmmac: clear receive all(RA) bit when promiscuous mode is off - can: mcp251x: fix resume from sleep before interface was brought up Previous releases - always broken: - bpf: fix leakage of uninitialized bpf stack under speculation - bpf: fix masking negation logic upon negative dst register - netfilter: don't assume that skb_header_pointer() will never fail - only allow init netns to set default tcp cong to a restricted algo - xsk: fix xp_aligned_validate_desc() when len == chunk_size to avoid false positive errors - ethtool: fix missing NLM_F_MULTI flag when dumping - can: m_can: m_can_tx_work_queue(): fix tx_skb race condition - sctp: fix a SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB leak in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b - bridge: fix NULL-deref caused by a races between assigning rx_handler_data and setting the IFF_BRIDGE_PORT bit Latecomer: - seg6: add counters support for SRv6 Behaviors" * tag 'net-5.13-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net: (73 commits) atm: firestream: Use fallthrough pseudo-keyword net: stmmac: Do not enable RX FIFO overflow interrupts mptcp: fix splat when closing unaccepted socket i40e: Remove LLDP frame filters i40e: Fix PHY type identifiers for 2.5G and 5G adapters i40e: fix the restart auto-negotiation after FEC modified i40e: Fix use-after-free in i40e_client_subtask() i40e: fix broken XDP support netfilter: nftables: avoid potential overflows on 32bit arches netfilter: nftables: avoid overflows in nft_hash_buckets() tcp: Specify cmsgbuf is user pointer for receive zerocopy. mlxsw: spectrum_mr: Update egress RIF list before route's action net: ipa: fix inter-EE IRQ register definitions can: m_can: m_can_tx_work_queue(): fix tx_skb race condition can: mcp251x: fix resume from sleep before interface was brought up can: mcp251xfd: mcp251xfd_probe(): add missing can_rx_offload_del() in error path can: mcp251xfd: mcp251xfd_probe(): fix an error pointer dereference in probe netfilter: nftables: Fix a memleak from userdata error path in new objects netfilter: remove BUG_ON() after skb_header_pointer() netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: Fix a missing skb_header_pointer() NULL check ...
| * Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nfJakub Kicinski2021-05-0713-40/+117
| |\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pablo Neira Ayuso says: ==================== Netfilter fixes for net 1) Add SECMARK revision 1 to fix incorrect layout that prevents from remove rule with this target, from Phil Sutter. 2) Fix pernet exit path spat in arptables, from Florian Westphal. 3) Missing rcu_read_unlock() for unknown nfnetlink callbacks, reported by syzbot, from Eric Dumazet. 4) Missing check for skb_header_pointer() NULL pointer in nfnetlink_osf. 5) Remove BUG_ON() after skb_header_pointer() from packet path in several conntrack helper and the TCP tracker. 6) Fix memleak in the new object error path of userdata. 7) Avoid overflows in nft_hash_buckets(), reported by syzbot, also from Eric. 8) Avoid overflows in 32bit arches, from Eric. * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pablo/nf: netfilter: nftables: avoid potential overflows on 32bit arches netfilter: nftables: avoid overflows in nft_hash_buckets() netfilter: nftables: Fix a memleak from userdata error path in new objects netfilter: remove BUG_ON() after skb_header_pointer() netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: Fix a missing skb_header_pointer() NULL check netfilter: nfnetlink: add a missing rcu_read_unlock() netfilter: arptables: use pernet ops struct during unregister netfilter: xt_SECMARK: add new revision to fix structure layout ==================== Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210507174739.1850-1-pablo@netfilter.org Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
| | * netfilter: nftables: avoid potential overflows on 32bit archesEric Dumazet2021-05-072-7/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | User space could ask for very large hash tables, we need to make sure our size computations wont overflow. nf_tables_newset() needs to double check the u64 size will fit into size_t field. Fixes: 0ed6389c483d ("netfilter: nf_tables: rename set implementations") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
| | * netfilter: nftables: avoid overflows in nft_hash_buckets()Eric Dumazet2021-05-071-1/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Number of buckets being stored in 32bit variables, we have to ensure that no overflows occur in nft_hash_buckets() syzbot injected a size == 0x40000000 and reported: UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/linux/log2.h:57:13 shift exponent 64 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int' CPU: 1 PID: 29539 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc7-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120 ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:148 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x181 lib/ubsan.c:327 __roundup_pow_of_two include/linux/log2.h:57 [inline] nft_hash_buckets net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c:411 [inline] nft_hash_estimate.cold+0x19/0x1e net/netfilter/nft_set_hash.c:652 nft_select_set_ops net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:3586 [inline] nf_tables_newset+0xe62/0x3110 net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:4322 nfnetlink_rcv_batch+0xa09/0x24b0 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:488 nfnetlink_rcv_skb_batch net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:612 [inline] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3af/0x420 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:630 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338 netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46 Fixes: 0ed6389c483d ("netfilter: nf_tables: rename set implementations") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
| | * netfilter: nftables: Fix a memleak from userdata error path in new objectsPablo Neira Ayuso2021-05-051-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Release object name if userdata allocation fails. Fixes: b131c96496b3 ("netfilter: nf_tables: add userdata support for nft_object") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
| | * netfilter: remove BUG_ON() after skb_header_pointer()Pablo Neira Ayuso2021-05-056-7/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Several conntrack helpers and the TCP tracker assume that skb_header_pointer() never fails based on upfront header validation. Even if this should not ever happen, BUG_ON() is a too drastic measure, remove them. Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
| | * netfilter: nfnetlink_osf: Fix a missing skb_header_pointer() NULL checkPablo Neira Ayuso2021-05-051-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Do not assume that the tcph->doff field is correct when parsing for TCP options, skb_header_pointer() might fail to fetch these bits. Fixes: 11eeef41d5f6 ("netfilter: passive OS fingerprint xtables match") Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
| | * netfilter: nfnetlink: add a missing rcu_read_unlock()Eric Dumazet2021-05-051-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Reported by syzbot : BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at include/linux/sched/mm.h:201 in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 26899, name: syz-executor.5 1 lock held by syz-executor.5/26899: #0: ffffffff8bf797a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: nfnetlink_get_subsys net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:148 [inline] #0: ffffffff8bf797a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1da/0x1300 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:226 Preemption disabled at: [<ffffffff8917799e>] preempt_schedule_irq+0x3e/0x90 kernel/sched/core.c:5533 CPU: 1 PID: 26899 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.12.0-next-20210504-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline] dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120 ___might_sleep.cold+0x1f1/0x237 kernel/sched/core.c:8338 might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:201 [inline] slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:500 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2845 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x33d/0x3e0 mm/slub.c:2960 __alloc_skb+0x20b/0x340 net/core/skbuff.c:413 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1107 [inline] nlmsg_new include/net/netlink.h:953 [inline] netlink_ack+0x1ed/0xaa0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2437 netlink_rcv_skb+0x33d/0x420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2508 nfnetlink_rcv+0x1ac/0x420 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:650 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1312 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x533/0x7d0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1338 netlink_sendmsg+0x856/0xd90 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1927 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:654 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xcf/0x120 net/socket.c:674 ____sys_sendmsg+0x6e8/0x810 net/socket.c:2350 ___sys_sendmsg+0xf3/0x170 net/socket.c:2404 __sys_sendmsg+0xe5/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2433 do_syscall_64+0x3a/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x4665f9 Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fa8a03ee188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056bf60 RCX: 00000000004665f9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000480 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00000000004bfce1 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000056bf60 R13: 00007fffe864480f R14: 00007fa8a03ee300 R15: 0000000000022000 ================================================ WARNING: lock held when returning to user space! 5.12.0-next-20210504-syzkaller #0 Tainted: G W ------------------------------------------------ syz-executor.5/26899 is leaving the kernel with locks still held! 1 lock held by syz-executor.5/26899: #0: ffffffff8bf797a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: nfnetlink_get_subsys net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:148 [inline] #0: ffffffff8bf797a0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x1da/0x1300 net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c:226 ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 26899 at kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:359 rcu_note_context_switch+0xfd/0x16e0 kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:359 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 26899 Comm: syz-executor.5 Tainted: G W 5.12.0-next-20210504-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 RIP: 0010:rcu_note_context_switch+0xfd/0x16e0 kernel/rcu/tree_plugin.h:359 Code: 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 0f b6 14 02 48 89 f8 83 e0 07 83 c0 03 38 d0 7c 08 84 d2 0f 85 2e 0d 00 00 8b bd cc 03 00 00 85 ff 7e 02 <0f> 0b 65 48 8b 2c 25 00 f0 01 00 48 8d bd cc 03 00 00 48 b8 00 00 RSP: 0000:ffffc90002fffdb0 EFLAGS: 00010002 RAX: 0000000000000007 RBX: ffff8880b9c36080 RCX: ffffffff8dc99bac RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffff88808b9d1c80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8dc96917 R10: fffffbfff1b92d22 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88808b9d1c80 R14: ffff88808b9d1c80 R15: ffffc90002ff8000 FS: 00007fa8a03ee700(0000) GS:ffff8880b9c00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f09896ed000 CR3: 0000000032070000 CR4: 00000000001526f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: __schedule+0x214/0x23e0 kernel/sched/core.c:5044 schedule+0xcf/0x270 kernel/sched/core.c:5226 exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:162 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x13e/0x280 kernel/entry/common.c:208 irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x5/0x40 kernel/entry/common.c:314 asm_sysvec_reschedule_ipi+0x12/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:637 RIP: 0033:0x4665f9 Fixes: 50f2db9e368f ("netfilter: nfnetlink: consolidate callback types") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
| | * netfilter: arptables: use pernet ops struct during unregisterFlorian Westphal2021-05-032-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Like with iptables and ebtables, hook unregistration has to use the pernet ops struct, not the template. This triggered following splat: hook not found, pf 3 num 0 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 224 at net/netfilter/core.c:480 __nf_unregister_net_hook+0x1eb/0x610 net/netfilter/core.c:480 [..] nf_unregister_net_hook net/netfilter/core.c:502 [inline] nf_unregister_net_hooks+0x117/0x160 net/netfilter/core.c:576 arpt_unregister_table_pre_exit+0x67/0x80 net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c:1565 Fixes: f9006acc8dfe5 ("netfilter: arp_tables: pass table pointer via nf_hook_ops") Reported-by: syzbot+dcccba8a1e41a38cb9df@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
| | * netfilter: xt_SECMARK: add new revision to fix structure layoutPablo Neira Ayuso2021-05-031-19/+69
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This extension breaks when trying to delete rules, add a new revision to fix this. Fixes: 5e6874cdb8de ("[SECMARK]: Add xtables SECMARK target") Signed-off-by: Phil Sutter <phil@nwl.cc> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
| * | mptcp: fix splat when closing unaccepted socketPaolo Abeni2021-05-071-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If userspace exits before calling accept() on a listener that had at least one new connection ready, we get: Attempt to release TCP socket in state 8 This happens because the mptcp socket gets cloned when the TCP connection is ready, but the socket is never exposed to userspace. The client additionally sends a DATA_FIN, which brings connection into CLOSE_WAIT state. This in turn prevents the orphan+state reset fixup in mptcp_sock_destruct() from doing its job. Fixes: 3721b9b64676b ("mptcp: Track received DATA_FIN sequence number and add related helpers") Closes: https://github.com/multipath-tcp/mptcp_net-next/issues/185 Tested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210507001638.225468-1-mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
| * | tcp: Specify cmsgbuf is user pointer for receive zerocopy.Arjun Roy2021-05-061-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A prior change (1f466e1f15cf) introduces separate handling for ->msg_control depending on whether the pointer is a kernel or user pointer. However, while tcp receive zerocopy is using this field, it is not properly annotating that the buffer in this case is a user pointer. This can cause faults when the improper mechanism is used within put_cmsg(). This patch simply annotates tcp receive zerocopy's use as explicitly being a user pointer. Fixes: 7eeba1706eba ("tcp: Add receive timestamp support for receive zerocopy.") Signed-off-by: Arjun Roy <arjunroy@google.com> Acked-by: Soheil Hassas Yeganeh <soheil@google.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210506223530.2266456-1-arjunroy.kdev@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
| * | smc: disallow TCP_ULP in smc_setsockopt()Cong Wang2021-05-051-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | syzbot is able to setup kTLS on an SMC socket which coincidentally uses sk_user_data too. Later, kTLS treats it as psock so triggers a refcnt warning. The root cause is that smc_setsockopt() simply calls TCP setsockopt() which includes TCP_ULP. I do not think it makes sense to setup kTLS on top of SMC sockets, so we should just disallow this setup. It is hard to find a commit to blame, but we can apply this patch since the beginning of TCP_ULP. Reported-and-tested-by: syzbot+b54a1ce86ba4a623b7f0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Fixes: 734942cc4ea6 ("tcp: ULP infrastructure") Cc: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Karsten Graul <kgraul@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | ethtool: fix missing NLM_F_MULTI flag when dumpingFernando Fernandez Mancera2021-05-051-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When dumping the ethtool information from all the interfaces, the netlink reply should contain the NLM_F_MULTI flag. This flag allows userspace tools to identify that multiple messages are expected. Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/1953847 Fixes: 365f9ae4ee36 ("ethtool: fix genlmsg_put() failure handling in ethnl_default_dumpit()") Signed-off-by: Fernando Fernandez Mancera <ffmancera@riseup.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | net/nfc: fix use-after-free llcp_sock_bind/connectOr Cohen2021-05-041-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commits 8a4cd82d ("nfc: fix refcount leak in llcp_sock_connect()") and c33b1cc62 ("nfc: fix refcount leak in llcp_sock_bind()") fixed a refcount leak bug in bind/connect but introduced a use-after-free if the same local is assigned to 2 different sockets. This can be triggered by the following simple program: int sock1 = socket( AF_NFC, SOCK_STREAM, NFC_SOCKPROTO_LLCP ); int sock2 = socket( AF_NFC, SOCK_STREAM, NFC_SOCKPROTO_LLCP ); memset( &addr, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp) ); addr.sa_family = AF_NFC; addr.nfc_protocol = NFC_PROTO_NFC_DEP; bind( sock1, (struct sockaddr*) &addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp) ) bind( sock2, (struct sockaddr*) &addr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_nfc_llcp) ) close(sock1); close(sock2); Fix this by assigning NULL to llcp_sock->local after calling nfc_llcp_local_put. This addresses CVE-2021-23134. Reported-by: Or Cohen <orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com> Reported-by: Nadav Markus <nmarkus@paloaltonetworks.com> Fixes: c33b1cc62 ("nfc: fix refcount leak in llcp_sock_bind()") Signed-off-by: Or Cohen <orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | net: Only allow init netns to set default tcp cong to a restricted algoJonathon Reinhart2021-05-041-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | tcp_set_default_congestion_control() is netns-safe in that it writes to &net->ipv4.tcp_congestion_control, but it also sets ca->flags |= TCP_CONG_NON_RESTRICTED which is not namespaced. This has the unintended side-effect of changing the global net.ipv4.tcp_allowed_congestion_control sysctl, despite the fact that it is read-only: 97684f0970f6 ("net: Make tcp_allowed_congestion_control readonly in non-init netns") Resolve this netns "leak" by only allowing the init netns to set the default algorithm to one that is restricted. This restriction could be removed if tcp_allowed_congestion_control were namespace-ified in the future. This bug was uncovered with https://github.com/JonathonReinhart/linux-netns-sysctl-verify Fixes: 6670e1524477 ("tcp: Namespace-ify sysctl_tcp_default_congestion_control") Signed-off-by: Jonathon Reinhart <jonathon.reinhart@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpfDavid S. Miller2021-05-031-4/+3
| |\ \ | | |/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Daniel Borkmann says: ==================== pull-request: bpf 2021-05-04 The following pull-request contains BPF updates for your *net* tree. We've added 5 non-merge commits during the last 4 day(s) which contain a total of 6 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-). The main changes are: 1) Fix libbpf overflow when processing BPF ring buffer in case of extreme application behavior, from Brendan Jackman. 2) Fix potential data leakage of uninitialized BPF stack under speculative execution, from Daniel Borkmann. 3) Fix off-by-one when validating xsk pool chunks, from Xuan Zhuo. 4) Fix snprintf BPF selftest with a pid filter to avoid racing its output test buffer, from Florent Revest. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| | * xsk: Fix for xp_aligned_validate_desc() when len == chunk_sizeXuan Zhuo2021-05-041-4/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When desc->len is equal to chunk_size, it is legal. But when the xp_aligned_validate_desc() got chunk_end from desc->addr + desc->len pointing to the next chunk during the check, it caused the check to fail. This problem was first introduced in bbff2f321a86 ("xsk: new descriptor addressing scheme"). Later in 2b43470add8c ("xsk: Introduce AF_XDP buffer allocation API") this piece of code was moved into the new function called xp_aligned_validate_desc(). This function was then moved into xsk_queue.h via 26062b185eee ("xsk: Explicitly inline functions and move definitions"). Fixes: bbff2f321a86 ("xsk: new descriptor addressing scheme") Signed-off-by: Xuan Zhuo <xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Magnus Karlsson <magnus.karlsson@intel.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20210428094424.54435-1-xuanzhuo@linux.alibaba.com
| * | sctp: delay auto_asconf init until binding the first addrXin Long2021-05-031-14/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As Or Cohen described: If sctp_destroy_sock is called without sock_net(sk)->sctp.addr_wq_lock held and sp->do_auto_asconf is true, then an element is removed from the auto_asconf_splist without any proper locking. This can happen in the following functions: 1. In sctp_accept, if sctp_sock_migrate fails. 2. In inet_create or inet6_create, if there is a bpf program attached to BPF_CGROUP_INET_SOCK_CREATE which denies creation of the sctp socket. This patch is to fix it by moving the auto_asconf init out of sctp_init_sock(), by which inet_create()/inet6_create() won't need to operate it in sctp_destroy_sock() when calling sk_common_release(). It also makes more sense to do auto_asconf init while binding the first addr, as auto_asconf actually requires an ANY addr bind, see it in sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler(). This addresses CVE-2021-23133. Fixes: 610236587600 ("bpf: Add new cgroup attach type to enable sock modifications") Reported-by: Or Cohen <orcohen@paloaltonetworks.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | Revert "net/sctp: fix race condition in sctp_destroy_sock"Xin Long2021-05-031-5/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit b166a20b07382b8bc1dcee2a448715c9c2c81b5b. This one has to be reverted as it introduced a dead lock, as syzbot reported: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(&net->sctp.addr_wq_lock); lock(slock-AF_INET6); lock(&net->sctp.addr_wq_lock); lock(slock-AF_INET6); CPU0 is the thread of sctp_addr_wq_timeout_handler(), and CPU1 is that of sctp_close(). The original issue this commit fixed will be fixed in the next patch. Reported-by: syzbot+959223586843e69a2674@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | net: hsr: check skb can contain struct hsr_ethhdr in fill_frame_infoPhillip Potter2021-05-031-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Check at start of fill_frame_info that the MAC header in the supplied skb is large enough to fit a struct hsr_ethhdr, as otherwise this is not a valid HSR frame. If it is too small, return an error which will then cause the callers to clean up the skb. Fixes a KMSAN-found uninit-value bug reported by syzbot at: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=f7e9b601f1414f814f7602a82b6619a8d80bce3f Reported-by: syzbot+e267bed19bfc5478fb33@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Phillip Potter <phil@philpotter.co.uk> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | sctp: fix a SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB leak in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_bXin Long2021-05-031-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Normally SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB is always incremented once asoc enter into ESTABLISHED from the state < ESTABLISHED and decremented when the asoc is being deleted. However, in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b(), the asoc's state can be changed to ESTABLISHED from the state >= ESTABLISHED where it shouldn't increment SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB. Otherwise, one asoc may increment MIB_CURRESTAB multiple times but only decrement once at the end. I was able to reproduce it by using scapy to do the 4-way shakehands, after that I replayed the COOKIE-ECHO chunk with 'peer_vtag' field changed to different values, and SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB was incremented multiple times and never went back to 0 even when the asoc was freed. This patch is to fix it by only incrementing SCTP_MIB_CURRESTAB when the state < ESTABLISHED in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b(). Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Reported-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | Revert "sctp: Fix SHUTDOWN CTSN Ack in the peer restart case"Xin Long2021-05-031-5/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 12dfd78e3a74825e6f0bc8df7ef9f938fbc6bfe3. This can be reverted as shutdown and cookie_ack chunk are using the same asoc since commit 35b4f24415c8 ("sctp: do asoc update earlier in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a"). Reported-by: Jere Leppänen <jere.leppanen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | Revert "Revert "sctp: Fix bundling of SHUTDOWN with COOKIE-ACK""Xin Long2021-05-031-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 7e9269a5acec6d841d22e12770a0b02db4f5d8f2. As Jere notice, commit 35b4f24415c8 ("sctp: do asoc update earlier in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a") only keeps the SHUTDOWN and COOKIE-ACK with the same asoc, not transport. So we have to bring this patch back. Reported-by: Jere Leppänen <jere.leppanen@nokia.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | sctp: do asoc update earlier in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_bXin Long2021-04-302-43/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The same thing should be done for sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b(). Meanwhile, SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC cmd can be removed. v1->v2: - Fix the return value in sctp_sf_do_assoc_update(). Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | Revert "sctp: Fix bundling of SHUTDOWN with COOKIE-ACK"Xin Long2021-04-301-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This can be reverted as shutdown and cookie_ack chunk are using the same asoc since the last patch. This reverts commit 145cb2f7177d94bc54563ed26027e952ee0ae03c. Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | sctp: do asoc update earlier in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_aXin Long2021-04-301-5/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There's a panic that occurs in a few of envs, the call trace is as below: [] general protection fault, ... 0x29acd70f1000a: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [] RIP: 0010:sctp_ulpevent_notify_peer_addr_change+0x4b/0x1fa [sctp] [] sctp_assoc_control_transport+0x1b9/0x210 [sctp] [] sctp_do_8_2_transport_strike.isra.16+0x15c/0x220 [sctp] [] sctp_cmd_interpreter.isra.21+0x1231/0x1a10 [sctp] [] sctp_do_sm+0xc3/0x2a0 [sctp] [] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x81/0xf0 [sctp] This is caused by a transport use-after-free issue. When processing a duplicate COOKIE-ECHO chunk in sctp_sf_do_dupcook_a(), both COOKIE-ACK and SHUTDOWN chunks are allocated with the transort from the new asoc. However, later in the sideeffect machine, the old asoc is used to send them out and old asoc's shutdown_last_sent_to is set to the transport that SHUTDOWN chunk attached to in sctp_cmd_setup_t2(), which actually belongs to the new asoc. After the new_asoc is freed and the old asoc T2 timeout, the old asoc's shutdown_last_sent_to that is already freed would be accessed in sctp_sf_t2_timer_expire(). Thanks Alexander and Jere for helping dig into this issue. To fix it, this patch is to do the asoc update first, then allocate the COOKIE-ACK and SHUTDOWN chunks with the 'updated' old asoc. This would make more sense, as a chunk from an asoc shouldn't be sent out with another asoc. We had fixed quite a few issues caused by this. Fixes: 145cb2f7177d ("sctp: Fix bundling of SHUTDOWN with COOKIE-ACK") Reported-by: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nokia.com> Reported-by: syzbot+bbe538efd1046586f587@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Reported-by: Michal Tesar <mtesar@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | vsock/vmci: Remove redundant assignment to errYang Li2021-04-301-2/+0
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Variable 'err' is set to zero but this value is never read as it is overwritten with a new value later on, hence it is a redundant assignment and can be removed. Clean up the following clang-analyzer warning: net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c:948:2: warning: Value stored to 'err' is never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores] Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * net: Remove redundant assignment to errYang Li2021-04-291-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Variable 'err' is set to -ENOMEM but this value is never read as it is overwritten with a new value later on, hence the 'If statements' and assignments are redundantand and can be removed. Cleans up the following clang-analyzer warning: net/ipv6/seg6.c:126:4: warning: Value stored to 'err' is never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores] Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * bridge: Fix possible races between assigning rx_handler_data and setting ↵Zhang Zhengming2021-04-291-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IFF_BRIDGE_PORT bit There is a crash in the function br_get_link_af_size_filtered, as the port_exists(dev) is true and the rx_handler_data of dev is NULL. But the rx_handler_data of dev is correct saved in vmcore. The oops looks something like: ... pc : br_get_link_af_size_filtered+0x28/0x1c8 [bridge] ... Call trace: br_get_link_af_size_filtered+0x28/0x1c8 [bridge] if_nlmsg_size+0x180/0x1b0 rtnl_calcit.isra.12+0xf8/0x148 rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x334/0x370 netlink_rcv_skb+0x64/0x130 rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x38 netlink_unicast+0x1f0/0x250 netlink_sendmsg+0x310/0x378 sock_sendmsg+0x4c/0x70 __sys_sendto+0x120/0x150 __arm64_sys_sendto+0x30/0x40 el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130 el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78 el0_svc+0x8/0xc In br_add_if(), we found there is no guarantee that assigning rx_handler_data to dev->rx_handler_data will before setting the IFF_BRIDGE_PORT bit of priv_flags. So there is a possible data competition: CPU 0: CPU 1: (RCU read lock) (RTNL lock) rtnl_calcit() br_add_slave() if_nlmsg_size() br_add_if() br_get_link_af_size_filtered() -> netdev_rx_handler_register ... // The order is not guaranteed ... -> dev->priv_flags |= IFF_BRIDGE_PORT; // The IFF_BRIDGE_PORT bit of priv_flags has been set -> if (br_port_exists(dev)) { // The dev->rx_handler_data has NOT been assigned -> p = br_port_get_rcu(dev); .... -> rcu_assign_pointer(dev->rx_handler_data, rx_handler_data); ... Fix it in br_get_link_af_size_filtered, using br_port_get_check_rcu() and checking the return value. Signed-off-by: Zhang Zhengming <zhangzhengming@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Zhao Lei <zhaolei69@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Wang Xiaogang <wangxiaogang3@huawei.com> Suggested-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * net/sched: sch_frag: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packetsDavide Caratti2021-04-291-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | when 'act_mirred' tries to fragment IPv4 packets that had been previously re-assembled using 'act_ct', splats like the following can be observed on kernels built with KASAN: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888147009574 by task ping/947 CPU: 0 PID: 947 Comm: ping Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack+0x92/0xc1 print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150 kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111 ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60 sch_fragment+0x4bf/0xe40 tcf_mirred_act+0xc3d/0x11a0 [act_mirred] tcf_action_exec+0x104/0x3e0 fl_classify+0x49a/0x5e0 [cls_flower] tcf_classify_ingress+0x18a/0x820 __netif_receive_skb_core+0xae7/0x3340 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xb6/0x1b0 process_backlog+0x1ef/0x6c0 __napi_poll+0xaa/0x500 net_rx_action+0x702/0xac0 __do_softirq+0x1e4/0x97f do_softirq+0x71/0x90 </IRQ> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xdb/0xf0 ip_finish_output2+0x760/0x2120 ip_do_fragment+0x15a5/0x1f60 __ip_finish_output+0x4c2/0xea0 ip_output+0x1ca/0x4d0 ip_send_skb+0x37/0xa0 raw_sendmsg+0x1c4b/0x2d00 sock_sendmsg+0xdb/0x110 __sys_sendto+0x1d7/0x2b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xdd/0x1b0 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f82e13853eb Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 8d 05 75 42 2c 00 41 89 ca 8b 00 85 c0 75 14 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 75 c3 0f 1f 40 00 41 57 4d 89 c7 41 56 41 89 RSP: 002b:00007ffe01fad888 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005571aac13700 RCX: 00007f82e13853eb RDX: 0000000000002330 RSI: 00005571aac13700 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 0000000000002330 R08: 00005571aac10500 R09: 0000000000000010 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffe01faefb0 R13: 00007ffe01fad890 R14: 00007ffe01fad980 R15: 00005571aac0f0a0 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:000000001dff2e03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x147009 flags: 0x17ffffc0001000(reserved) raw: 0017ffffc0001000 ffffea00051c0248 ffffea00051c0248 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888147009400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888147009480: f1 f1 f1 f1 04 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 >ffff888147009500: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 ^ ffff888147009580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888147009600: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 for IPv4 packets, sch_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then, in the following call graph: ip_do_fragment() ip_skb_dst_mtu() ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward() ip_mtu_locked() the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets in sch_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below. Fixes: c129412f74e9 ("net/sched: sch_frag: add generic packet fragment support.") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 5.11 Reported-by: Shuang Li <shuali@redhat.com> Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Acked-by: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * openvswitch: fix stack OOB read while fragmenting IPv4 packetsDavide Caratti2021-04-291-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | running openvswitch on kernels built with KASAN, it's possible to see the following splat while testing fragmentation of IPv4 packets: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60 Read of size 1 at addr ffff888112fc713c by task handler2/1367 CPU: 0 PID: 1367 Comm: handler2 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc6+ #418 Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 1.11.1-4.module+el8.1.0+4066+0f1aadab 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x92/0xc1 print_address_description.constprop.7+0x1a/0x150 kasan_report.cold.13+0x7f/0x111 ip_do_fragment+0x1b03/0x1f60 ovs_fragment+0x5bf/0x840 [openvswitch] do_execute_actions+0x1bd5/0x2400 [openvswitch] ovs_execute_actions+0xc8/0x3d0 [openvswitch] ovs_packet_cmd_execute+0xa39/0x1150 [openvswitch] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit.isra.15+0x227/0x2d0 genl_rcv_msg+0x287/0x490 netlink_rcv_skb+0x120/0x380 genl_rcv+0x24/0x40 netlink_unicast+0x439/0x630 netlink_sendmsg+0x719/0xbf0 sock_sendmsg+0xe2/0x110 ____sys_sendmsg+0x5ba/0x890 ___sys_sendmsg+0xe9/0x160 __sys_sendmsg+0xd3/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f957079db07 Code: c3 66 90 41 54 41 89 d4 55 48 89 f5 53 89 fb 48 83 ec 10 e8 eb ec ff ff 44 89 e2 48 89 ee 89 df 41 89 c0 b8 2e 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 35 44 89 c7 48 89 44 24 08 e8 24 ed ff ff 48 RSP: 002b:00007f956ce35a50 EFLAGS: 00000293 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000019 RCX: 00007f957079db07 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007f956ce35ae0 RDI: 0000000000000019 RBP: 00007f956ce35ae0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007f9558006730 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000293 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f956ce37308 R14: 00007f956ce35f80 R15: 00007f956ce35ae0 The buggy address belongs to the page: page:00000000af2a1d93 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x112fc7 flags: 0x17ffffc0000000() raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected addr ffff888112fc713c is located in stack of task handler2/1367 at offset 180 in frame: ovs_fragment+0x0/0x840 [openvswitch] this frame has 2 objects: [32, 144) 'ovs_dst' [192, 424) 'ovs_rt' Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888112fc7000: f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888112fc7080: 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 >ffff888112fc7100: 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ^ ffff888112fc7180: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888112fc7200: 00 00 00 00 00 00 f2 f2 f2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 for IPv4 packets, ovs_fragment() uses a temporary struct dst_entry. Then, in the following call graph: ip_do_fragment() ip_skb_dst_mtu() ip_dst_mtu_maybe_forward() ip_mtu_locked() the pointer to struct dst_entry is used as pointer to struct rtable: this turns the access to struct members like rt_mtu_locked into an OOB read in the stack. Fix this changing the temporary variable used for IPv4 packets in ovs_fragment(), similarly to what is done for IPv6 few lines below. Fixes: d52e5a7e7ca4 ("ipv4: lock mtu in fnhe when received PMTU < net.ipv4.route.min_pmt") Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Acked-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * seg6: add counters support for SRv6 BehaviorsAndrea Mayer2021-04-291-2/+196
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch provides counters for SRv6 Behaviors as defined in [1], section 6. For each SRv6 Behavior instance, counters defined in [1] are: - the total number of packets that have been correctly processed; - the total amount of traffic in bytes of all packets that have been correctly processed; In addition, this patch introduces a new counter that counts the number of packets that have NOT been properly processed (i.e. errors) by an SRv6 Behavior instance. Counters are not only interesting for network monitoring purposes (i.e. counting the number of packets processed by a given behavior) but they also provide a simple tool for checking whether a behavior instance is working as we expect or not. Counters can be useful for troubleshooting misconfigured SRv6 networks. Indeed, an SRv6 Behavior can silently drop packets for very different reasons (i.e. wrong SID configuration, interfaces set with SID addresses, etc) without any notification/message to the user. Due to the nature of SRv6 networks, diagnostic tools such as ping and traceroute may be ineffective: paths used for reaching a given router can be totally different from the ones followed by probe packets. In addition, paths are often asymmetrical and this makes it even more difficult to keep up with the journey of the packets and to understand which behaviors are actually processing our traffic. When counters are enabled on an SRv6 Behavior instance, it is possible to verify if packets are actually processed by such behavior and what is the outcome of the processing. Therefore, the counters for SRv6 Behaviors offer an non-invasive observability point which can be leveraged for both traffic monitoring and troubleshooting purposes. [1] https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8986.html#name-counters Troubleshooting using SRv6 Behavior counters -------------------------------------------- Let's make a brief example to see how helpful counters can be for SRv6 networks. Let's consider a node where an SRv6 End Behavior receives an SRv6 packet whose Segment Left (SL) is equal to 0. In this case, the End Behavior (which accepts only packets with SL >= 1) discards the packet and increases the error counter. This information can be leveraged by the network operator for troubleshooting. Indeed, the error counter is telling the user that the packet: (i) arrived at the node; (ii) the packet has been taken into account by the SRv6 End behavior; (iii) but an error has occurred during the processing. The error (iii) could be caused by different reasons, such as wrong route settings on the node or due to an invalid SID List carried by the SRv6 packet. Anyway, the error counter is used to exclude that the packet did not arrive at the node or it has not been processed by the behavior at all. Turning on/off counters for SRv6 Behaviors ------------------------------------------ Each SRv6 Behavior instance can be configured, at the time of its creation, to make use of counters. This is done through iproute2 which allows the user to create an SRv6 Behavior instance specifying the optional "count" attribute as shown in the following example: $ ip -6 route add 2001:db8::1 encap seg6local action End count dev eth0 per-behavior counters can be shown by adding "-s" to the iproute2 command line, i.e.: $ ip -s -6 route show 2001:db8::1 2001:db8::1 encap seg6local action End packets 0 bytes 0 errors 0 dev eth0 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Impact of counters for SRv6 Behaviors on performance ==================================================== To determine the performance impact due to the introduction of counters in the SRv6 Behavior subsystem, we have carried out extensive tests. We chose to test the throughput achieved by the SRv6 End.DX2 Behavior because, among all the other behaviors implemented so far, it reaches the highest throughput which is around 1.5 Mpps (per core at 2.4 GHz on a Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630 v3) on kernel 5.12-rc2 using packets of size ~ 100 bytes. Three different tests were conducted in order to evaluate the overall throughput of the SRv6 End.DX2 Behavior in the following scenarios: 1) vanilla kernel (without the SRv6 Behavior counters patch) and a single instance of an SRv6 End.DX2 Behavior; 2) patched kernel with SRv6 Behavior counters and a single instance of an SRv6 End.DX2 Behavior with counters turned off; 3) patched kernel with SRv6 Behavior counters and a single instance of SRv6 End.DX2 Behavior with counters turned on. All tests were performed on a testbed deployed on the CloudLab facilities [2], a flexible infrastructure dedicated to scientific research on the future of Cloud Computing. Results of tests are shown in the following table: Scenario (1): average 1504764,81 pps (~1504,76 kpps); std. dev 3956,82 pps Scenario (2): average 1501469,78 pps (~1501,47 kpps); std. dev 2979,85 pps Scenario (3): average 1501315,13 pps (~1501,32 kpps); std. dev 2956,00 pps As can be observed, throughputs achieved in scenarios (2),(3) did not suffer any observable degradation compared to scenario (1). Thanks to Jakub Kicinski and David Ahern for their valuable suggestions and comments provided during the discussion of the proposed RFCs. [2] https://www.cloudlab.us Signed-off-by: Andrea Mayer <andrea.mayer@uniroma2.it> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | Merge tag 'nfs-for-5.13-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfsLinus Torvalds2021-05-0710-227/+237
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull NFS client updates from Trond Myklebust: "Highlights include: Stable fixes: - Add validation of the UDP retrans parameter to prevent shift out-of-bounds - Don't discard pNFS layout segments that are marked for return Bugfixes: - Fix a NULL dereference crash in xprt_complete_bc_request() when the NFSv4.1 server misbehaves. - Fix the handling of NFS READDIR cookie verifiers - Sundry fixes to ensure attribute revalidation works correctly when the server does not return post-op attributes. - nfs4_bitmask_adjust() must not change the server global bitmasks - Fix major timeout handling in the RPC code. - NFSv4.2 fallocate() fixes. - Fix the NFSv4.2 SEEK_HOLE/SEEK_DATA end-of-file handling - Copy offload attribute revalidation fixes - Fix an incorrect filehandle size check in the pNFS flexfiles driver - Fix several RDMA transport setup/teardown races - Fix several RDMA queue wrapping issues - Fix a misplaced memory read barrier in sunrpc's call_decode() Features: - Micro optimisation of the TCP transmission queue using TCP_CORK - statx() performance improvements by further splitting up the tracking of invalid cached file metadata. - Support the NFSv4.2 'change_attr_type' attribute and use it to optimise handling of change attribute updates" * tag 'nfs-for-5.13-1' of git://git.linux-nfs.org/projects/trondmy/linux-nfs: (85 commits) xprtrdma: Fix a NULL dereference in frwr_unmap_sync() sunrpc: Fix misplaced barrier in call_decode NFSv4.2: Remove ifdef CONFIG_NFSD from NFSv4.2 client SSC code. xprtrdma: Move fr_mr field to struct rpcrdma_mr xprtrdma: Move the Work Request union to struct rpcrdma_mr xprtrdma: Move fr_linv_done field to struct rpcrdma_mr xprtrdma: Move cqe to struct rpcrdma_mr xprtrdma: Move fr_cid to struct rpcrdma_mr xprtrdma: Remove the RPC/RDMA QP event handler xprtrdma: Don't display r_xprt memory addresses in tracepoints xprtrdma: Add an rpcrdma_mr_completion_class xprtrdma: Add tracepoints showing FastReg WRs and remote invalidation xprtrdma: Avoid Send Queue wrapping xprtrdma: Do not wake RPC consumer on a failed LocalInv xprtrdma: Do not recycle MR after FastReg/LocalInv flushes xprtrdma: Clarify use of barrier in frwr_wc_localinv_done() xprtrdma: Rename frwr_release_mr() xprtrdma: rpcrdma_mr_pop() already does list_del_init() xprtrdma: Delete rpcrdma_recv_buffer_put() xprtrdma: Fix cwnd update ordering ...
| * | xprtrdma: Fix a NULL dereference in frwr_unmap_sync()Chuck Lever2021-05-011-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The normal mechanism that invalidates and unmaps MRs is frwr_unmap_async(). frwr_unmap_sync() is used only when an RPC Reply bearing Write or Reply chunks has been lost (ie, almost never). Coverity found that after commit 9a301cafc861 ("xprtrdma: Move fr_linv_done field to struct rpcrdma_mr"), the while() loop in frwr_unmap_sync() exits only once @mr is NULL, unconditionally causing subsequent dereferences of @mr to Oops. I've tested this fix by creating a client that skips invoking frwr_unmap_async() when RPC Replies complete. That forces all invalidation tasks to fall upon frwr_unmap_sync(). Simple workloads with this fix applied to the adulterated client work as designed. Reported-by: coverity-bot <keescook+coverity-bot@chromium.org> Addresses-Coverity-ID: 1504556 ("Null pointer dereferences") Fixes: 9a301cafc861 ("xprtrdma: Move fr_linv_done field to struct rpcrdma_mr") Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
| * | sunrpc: Fix misplaced barrier in call_decodeBaptiste Lepers2021-05-011-6/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a misplaced barrier in call_decode. The struct rpc_rqst is modified as follows by xprt_complete_rqst: req->rq_private_buf.len = copied; /* Ensure all writes are done before we update */ /* req->rq_reply_bytes_recvd */ smp_wmb(); req->rq_reply_bytes_recvd = copied; And currently read as follows by call_decode: smp_rmb(); // misplaced if (!req->rq_reply_bytes_recvd) goto out; req->rq_rcv_buf.len = req->rq_private_buf.len; This patch places the smp_rmb after the if to ensure that rq_reply_bytes_recvd and rq_private_buf.len are read in order. Fixes: 9ba828861c56a ("SUNRPC: Don't try to parse incomplete RPC messages") Signed-off-by: Baptiste Lepers <baptiste.lepers@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
| * | xprtrdma: Move fr_mr field to struct rpcrdma_mrChuck Lever2021-04-262-9/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Clean up: The last remaining field in struct rpcrdma_frwr has been removed, so the struct can be eliminated. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
| * | xprtrdma: Move the Work Request union to struct rpcrdma_mrChuck Lever2021-04-262-23/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Clean up. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
| * | xprtrdma: Move fr_linv_done field to struct rpcrdma_mrChuck Lever2021-04-262-6/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Clean up: Move more of struct rpcrdma_frwr into its parent. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
| * | xprtrdma: Move cqe to struct rpcrdma_mrChuck Lever2021-04-262-21/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Clean up. - Simplify variable initialization in the completion handlers. - Move another field out of struct rpcrdma_frwr. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
| * | xprtrdma: Move fr_cid to struct rpcrdma_mrChuck Lever2021-04-262-17/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Clean up (for several purposes): - The MR's cid is initialized sooner so that tracepoints can show something reasonable even if the MR is never posted. - The MR's res.id doesn't change so the cid won't change either. Initializing the cid once is sufficient. - struct rpcrdma_frwr is going away soon. Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-07-12 11:21:11 +0000