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* Merge tag 'tpmdd-v6.6' of ↵Linus Torvalds2023-08-294-5/+80
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd Pull tpm updates from Jarkko Sakkinen: - Restrict linking of keys to .ima and .evm keyrings based on digitalSignature attribute in the certificate - PowerVM: load machine owner keys into the .machine [1] keyring - PowerVM: load module signing keys into the secondary trusted keyring (keys blessed by the vendor) - tpm_tis_spi: half-duplex transfer mode - tpm_tis: retry corrupted transfers - Apply revocation list (.mokx) to an all system keyrings (e.g. .machine keyring) Link: https://blogs.oracle.com/linux/post/the-machine-keyring [1] * tag 'tpmdd-v6.6' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd: certs: Reference revocation list for all keyrings tpm/tpm_tis_synquacer: Use module_platform_driver macro to simplify the code tpm: remove redundant variable len tpm_tis: Resend command to recover from data transfer errors tpm_tis: Use responseRetry to recover from data transfer errors tpm_tis: Move CRC check to generic send routine tpm_tis_spi: Add hardware wait polling KEYS: Replace all non-returning strlcpy with strscpy integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keys integrity: PowerVM machine keyring enablement integrity: check whether imputed trust is enabled integrity: remove global variable from machine_keyring.c integrity: ignore keys failing CA restrictions on non-UEFI platform integrity: PowerVM support for loading CA keys on machine keyring integrity: Enforce digitalSignature usage in the ima and evm keyrings KEYS: DigitalSignature link restriction tpm_tis: Revert "tpm_tis: Disable interrupts on ThinkPad T490s"
| * integrity: PowerVM support for loading third party code signing keysNayna Jain2023-08-173-0/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On secure boot enabled PowerVM LPAR, third party code signing keys are needed during early boot to verify signed third party modules. These third party keys are stored in moduledb object in the Platform KeyStore (PKS). Load third party code signing keys onto .secondary_trusted_keys keyring. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
| * integrity: check whether imputed trust is enabledNayna Jain2023-08-172-3/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | trust_moklist() is specific to UEFI enabled systems. Other platforms rely only on the Kconfig. Define a generic wrapper named imputed_trust_enabled(). Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
| * integrity: remove global variable from machine_keyring.cNayna Jain2023-08-171-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | trust_mok variable is accessed within a single function locally. Change trust_mok from global to local static variable. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
| * integrity: ignore keys failing CA restrictions on non-UEFI platformNayna Jain2023-08-171-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On non-UEFI platforms, handle restrict_link_by_ca failures differently. Certificates which do not satisfy CA restrictions on non-UEFI platforms are ignored. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
| * integrity: PowerVM support for loading CA keys on machine keyringNayna Jain2023-08-173-0/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Keys that derive their trust from an entity such as a security officer, administrator, system owner, or machine owner are said to have "imputed trust". CA keys with imputed trust can be loaded onto the machine keyring. The mechanism for loading these keys onto the machine keyring is platform dependent. Load keys stored in the variable trustedcadb onto the .machine keyring on PowerVM platform. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-and-tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* | s390/ipl: fix virtual vs physical address confusionAlexander Gordeev2023-08-181-2/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The value of ipl_cert_list_addr boot variable contains a physical address, which is used directly. That works because virtual and physical address spaces are currently the same, but otherwise it is wrong. While at it, fix also a comment for the platform keyring. Signed-off-by: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230816132942.2540411-1-agordeev@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
* security/integrity: fix pointer to ESL data and its size on pseriesNayna Jain2023-06-211-14/+26
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | On PowerVM guest, variable data is prefixed with 8 bytes of timestamp. Extract ESL by stripping off the timestamp before passing to ESL parser. Fixes: 4b3e71e9a34c ("integrity/powerpc: Support loading keys from PLPKS") Cc: stable@vger.kenrnel.org # v6.3 Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Tested-by: Nageswara R Sastry <rnsastry@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://msgid.link/20230608120444.382527-1-nayna@linux.ibm.com
* integrity/powerpc: Support loading keys from PLPKSRussell Currey2023-02-131-7/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for loading keys from the PLPKS on pseries machines, with the "ibm,plpks-sb-v1" format. The object format is expected to be the same, so there shouldn't be any functional differences between objects retrieved on powernv or pseries. Unlike on powernv, on pseries the format string isn't contained in the device tree. Use secvar_ops->format() to fetch the format string in a generic manner, rather than searching the device tree ourselves. (The current code searches the device tree for a node compatible with "ibm,edk2-compat-v1". This patch switches to calling secvar_ops->format(), which in the case of OPAL/powernv means opal_secvar_format(), which searches the device tree for a node compatible with "ibm,secvar-backend" and checks its "format" property. These are equivalent, as skiboot creates a node with both "ibm,edk2-compat-v1" and "ibm,secvar-backend" as compatible strings.) Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-27-ajd@linux.ibm.com
* integrity/powerpc: Improve error handling & reporting when loading certsRussell Currey2023-02-131-6/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A few improvements to load_powerpc.c: - include integrity.h for the pr_fmt() - move all error reporting out of get_cert_list() - use ERR_PTR() to better preserve error detail - don't use pr_err() for missing keys Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-26-ajd@linux.ibm.com
* powerpc/secvar: Use u64 in secvar_operationsMichael Ellerman2023-02-121-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There's no reason for secvar_operations to use uint64_t vs the more common kernel type u64. The types are compatible, but they require different printk format strings which can lead to confusion. Change all the secvar related routines to use u64. Reviewed-by: Russell Currey <ruscur@russell.cc> Reviewed-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Donnellan <ajd@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230210080401.345462-5-ajd@linux.ibm.com
* efi: Add iMac Pro 2017 to uefi skip cert quirkAditya Garg2022-11-011-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | The iMac Pro 2017 is also a T2 Mac. Thus add it to the list of uefi skip cert. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 155ca952c7ca ("efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/9D46D92F-1381-4F10-989C-1A12CD2FFDD8@live.com/ Signed-off-by: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* efi: Correct Macmini DMI match in uefi cert quirkOrlando Chamberlain2022-09-301-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It turns out Apple doesn't capitalise the "mini" in "Macmini" in DMI, which is inconsistent with other model line names. Correct the capitalisation of Macmini in the quirk for skipping loading platform certs on T2 Macs. Currently users get: ------------[ cut here ]------------ [Firmware Bug]: Page fault caused by firmware at PA: 0xffffa30640054000 WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 8 at arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c:735 efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault+0x55/0xe0 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 8 Comm: kworker/u12:0 Not tainted 5.18.14-arch1-2-t2 #1 4535eb3fc40fd08edab32a509fbf4c9bc52d111e Hardware name: Apple Inc. Macmini8,1/Mac-7BA5B2DFE22DDD8C, BIOS 1731.120.10.0.0 (iBridge: 19.16.15071.0.0,0) 04/24/2022 Workqueue: efi_rts_wq efi_call_rts ... ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- efi: Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015 integrity: MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list efi: EFI Runtime Services are disabled! integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015 integrity: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list Fixes: 155ca952c7ca ("efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com> Tested-by: Samuel Jiang <chyishian.jiang@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Orlando Chamberlain <redecorating@protonmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* Merge tag 'integrity-v5.19' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-05-243-3/+44
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull IMA updates from Mimi Zohar: "New is IMA support for including fs-verity file digests and signatures in the IMA measurement list as well as verifying the fs-verity file digest based signatures, both based on policy. In addition, are two bug fixes: - avoid reading UEFI variables, which cause a page fault, on Apple Macs with T2 chips. - remove the original "ima" template Kconfig option to address a boot command line ordering issue. The rest is a mixture of code/documentation cleanup" * tag 'integrity-v5.19' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: integrity: Fix sparse warnings in keyring_handler evm: Clean up some variables evm: Return INTEGRITY_PASS for enum integrity_status value '0' efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 Macs fsverity: update the documentation ima: support fs-verity file digest based version 3 signatures ima: permit fsverity's file digests in the IMA measurement list ima: define a new template field named 'd-ngv2' and templates fs-verity: define a function to return the integrity protected file digest ima: use IMA default hash algorithm for integrity violations ima: fix 'd-ng' comments and documentation ima: remove the IMA_TEMPLATE Kconfig option ima: remove redundant initialization of pointer 'file'.
| * integrity: Fix sparse warnings in keyring_handlerStefan Berger2022-05-161-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix the following sparse warnings: CHECK security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:76:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:91:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:106:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
| * efi: Do not import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot for T2 MacsAditya Garg2022-05-152-0/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On Apple T2 Macs, when Linux attempts to read the db and dbx efi variables at early boot to load UEFI Secure Boot certificates, a page fault occurs in Apple firmware code and EFI runtime services are disabled with the following logs: [Firmware Bug]: Page fault caused by firmware at PA: 0xffffb1edc0068000 WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 104 at arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c:735 efi_crash_gracefully_on_page_fault+0x50/0xf0 (Removed some logs from here) Call Trace: <TASK> page_fault_oops+0x4f/0x2c0 ? search_bpf_extables+0x6b/0x80 ? search_module_extables+0x50/0x80 ? search_exception_tables+0x5b/0x60 kernelmode_fixup_or_oops+0x9e/0x110 __bad_area_nosemaphore+0x155/0x190 bad_area_nosemaphore+0x16/0x20 do_kern_addr_fault+0x8c/0xa0 exc_page_fault+0xd8/0x180 asm_exc_page_fault+0x1e/0x30 (Removed some logs from here) ? __efi_call+0x28/0x30 ? switch_mm+0x20/0x30 ? efi_call_rts+0x19a/0x8e0 ? process_one_work+0x222/0x3f0 ? worker_thread+0x4a/0x3d0 ? kthread+0x17a/0x1a0 ? process_one_work+0x3f0/0x3f0 ? set_kthread_struct+0x40/0x40 ? ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30 </TASK> ---[ end trace 1f82023595a5927f ]--- efi: Froze efi_rts_wq and disabled EFI Runtime Services integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015 integrity: MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list efi: EFI Runtime Services are disabled! integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015 integrity: Couldn't get UEFI dbx list integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x8000000000000015 integrity: Couldn't get mokx list integrity: Couldn't get size: 0x80000000 So we avoid reading these UEFI variables and thus prevent the crash. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Aditya Garg <gargaditya08@live.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* | certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creationMickaël Salaün2022-05-231-24/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper. This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private, which help to manage them consistently. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Cc: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210712170313.884724-5-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is trueEric Snowberg2022-03-082-1/+17
| | | | | | | | | | | | | With the introduction of uefi_check_trust_mok_keys, it signifies the end- user wants to trust the machine keyring as trusted keys. If they have chosen to trust the machine keyring, load the qualifying keys into it during boot, then link it to the secondary keyring . If the user has not chosen to trust the machine keyring, it will be empty and not linked to the secondary keyring. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT foundEric Snowberg2022-03-081-0/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | A new Machine Owner Key (MOK) variable called MokListTrustedRT has been introduced in shim. When this UEFI variable is set, it indicates the end-user has made the decision themselves that they wish to trust MOK keys within the Linux trust boundary. It is not an error if this variable does not exist. If it does not exist, the MOK keys should not be trusted within the kernel. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keysEric Snowberg2022-03-083-3/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently both Secure Boot DB and Machine Owner Keys (MOK) go through the same keyring handler (get_handler_for_db). With the addition of the new machine keyring, the end-user may choose to trust MOK keys. Introduce a new keyring handler specific for MOK keys. If MOK keys are trusted by the end-user, use the new keyring handler instead. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machineEric Snowberg2022-03-081-0/+42
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Many UEFI Linux distributions boot using shim. The UEFI shim provides what is called Machine Owner Keys (MOK). Shim uses both the UEFI Secure Boot DB and MOK keys to validate the next step in the boot chain. The MOK facility can be used to import user generated keys. These keys can be used to sign an end-users development kernel build. When Linux boots, both UEFI Secure Boot DB and MOK keys get loaded in the Linux .platform keyring. Define a new Linux keyring called machine. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys and not the remaining keys in the platform keyring. This new machine keyring will be used in follow on patches. Unlike keys in the platform keyring, keys contained in the machine keyring will be trusted within the kernel if the end-user has chosen to do so. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* integrity: Fix warning about missing prototypesEric Snowberg2022-03-081-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | make W=1 generates the following warning in keyring_handler.c security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:71:30: warning: no previous prototype for get_handler_for_db [-Wmissing-prototypes] __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c:82:30: warning: no previous prototype for get_handler_for_dbx [-Wmissing-prototypes] __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type) ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Add the missing prototypes by including keyring_handler.h. Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* integrity: Do not load MOK and MOKx when secure boot be disabledLee, Chun-Yi2021-12-241-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | The security of Machine Owner Key (MOK) relies on secure boot. When secure boot is disabled, EFI firmware will not verify binary code. Then arbitrary efi binary code can modify MOK when rebooting. This patch prevents MOK/MOKx be loaded when secure boot be disabled. Signed-off-by: "Lee, Chun-Yi" <jlee@suse.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* efi: Don't use knowledge about efi_guid_t internalsAndy Shevchenko2021-08-271-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | When print GUIDs supply pointer to the efi_guid_t (guid_t) type rather its internal members. Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
* integrity: Load mokx variables into the blacklist keyringEric Snowberg2021-03-111-2/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | During boot the Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, is loaded into the blacklist keyring. Systems booted with shim have an equivalent Forbidden Signature Database called mokx. Currently mokx is only used by shim and grub, the contents are ignored by the kernel. Add the ability to load mokx into the blacklist keyring during boot. Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Suggested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c33c8e3839a41e9654f41cc92c7231104931b1d7.camel@HansenPartnership.com/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-5-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428674320.677100.12637282414018170743.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433313205.902181.2502803393898221637.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529607422.163428.13530426573612578854.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3
* certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entriesEric Snowberg2021-03-111-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This fixes CVE-2020-26541. The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI Secure Boot enabled. The dbx is capable of containing any number of EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and EFI_CERT_X509_GUID entries. Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the entries are skipped. Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a EFI_CERT_X509_GUID is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to the .blacklist keyring. Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the keys in the .blacklist keyring are referenced, if a matching key is found, the key will be rejected. [DH: Made the following changes: - Added to have a config option to enable the facility. This allows a Kconfig solution to make sure that pkcs7_validate_trust() is enabled.[1][2] - Moved the functions out from the middle of the blacklist functions. - Added kerneldoc comments.] Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> cc: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@kernel.org> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200901165143.10295-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # rfc Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200909172736.73003-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200911182230.62266-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200916004927.64276-1-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210122181054.32635-2-eric.snowberg@oracle.com/ # v5 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161428672051.677100.11064981943343605138.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161433310942.902181.4901864302675874242.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/161529605075.163428.14625520893961300757.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/bc2c24e3-ed68-2521-0bf4-a1f6be4a895d@infradead.org/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225125638.1841436-1-arnd@kernel.org/ [2]
* integrity: Load certs from the EFI MOK config tableLenny Szubowicz2020-09-161-0/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Because of system-specific EFI firmware limitations, EFI volatile variables may not be capable of holding the required contents of the Machine Owner Key (MOK) certificate store when the certificate list grows above some size. Therefore, an EFI boot loader may pass the MOK certs via a EFI configuration table created specifically for this purpose to avoid this firmware limitation. An EFI configuration table is a much more primitive mechanism compared to EFI variables and is well suited for one-way passage of static information from a pre-OS environment to the kernel. This patch adds the support to load certs from the MokListRT entry in the MOK variable configuration table, if it's present. The pre-existing support to load certs from the MokListRT EFI variable remains and is used if the EFI MOK configuration table isn't present or can't be successfully used. Signed-off-by: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200905013107.10457-4-lszubowi@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
* integrity: Move import of MokListRT certs to a separate routineLenny Szubowicz2020-09-161-19/+44
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the loading of certs from the UEFI MokListRT into a separate routine to facilitate additional MokList functionality. There is no visible functional change as a result of this patch. Although the UEFI dbx certs are now loaded before the MokList certs, they are loaded onto different key rings. So the order of the keys on their respective key rings is the same. Signed-off-by: Lenny Szubowicz <lszubowi@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200905013107.10457-3-lszubowi@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
* Merge tag 'efi-next' of ↵Ingo Molnar2020-02-261-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi into efi/core Pull EFI updates for v5.7 from Ard Biesheuvel: This time, the set of changes for the EFI subsystem is much larger than usual. The main reasons are: - Get things cleaned up before EFI support for RISC-V arrives, which will increase the size of the validation matrix, and therefore the threshold to making drastic changes, - After years of defunct maintainership, the GRUB project has finally started to consider changes from the distros regarding UEFI boot, some of which are highly specific to the way x86 does UEFI secure boot and measured boot, based on knowledge of both shim internals and the layout of bootparams and the x86 setup header. Having this maintenance burden on other architectures (which don't need shim in the first place) is hard to justify, so instead, we are introducing a generic Linux/UEFI boot protocol. Summary of changes: - Boot time GDT handling changes (Arvind) - Simplify handling of EFI properties table on arm64 - Generic EFI stub cleanups, to improve command line handling, file I/O, memory allocation, etc. - Introduce a generic initrd loading method based on calling back into the firmware, instead of relying on the x86 EFI handover protocol or device tree. - Introduce a mixed mode boot method that does not rely on the x86 EFI handover protocol either, and could potentially be adopted by other architectures (if another one ever surfaces where one execution mode is a superset of another) - Clean up the contents of struct efi, and move out everything that doesn't need to be stored there. - Incorporate support for UEFI spec v2.8A changes that permit firmware implementations to return EFI_UNSUPPORTED from UEFI runtime services at OS runtime, and expose a mask of which ones are supported or unsupported via a configuration table. - Various documentation updates and minor code cleanups (Heinrich) - Partial fix for the lack of by-VA cache maintenance in the decompressor on 32-bit ARM. Note that these patches were deliberately put at the beginning so they can be used as a stable branch that will be shared with a PR containing the complete fix, which I will send to the ARM tree. Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
| * integrity: Check properly whether EFI GetVariable() is availableArd Biesheuvel2020-02-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Testing the value of the efi.get_variable function pointer is not the right way to establish whether the platform supports EFI variables at runtime. Instead, use the newly added granular check that can test for the presence of each EFI runtime service individually. Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
* | efi: Only print errors about failing to get certs if EFI vars are foundJavier Martinez Canillas2020-02-181-14/+26
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS is enabled, the kernel attempts to load the certs from the db, dbx and MokListRT EFI variables into the appropriate keyrings. But it just assumes that the variables will be present and prints an error if the certs can't be loaded, even when is possible that the variables may not exist. For example the MokListRT variable will only be present if shim is used. So only print an error message about failing to get the certs list from an EFI variable if this is found. Otherwise these printed errors just pollute the kernel log ring buffer with confusing messages like the following: [ 5.427251] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 5.427261] MODSIGN: Couldn't get UEFI db list [ 5.428012] Couldn't get size: 0x800000000000000e [ 5.428023] Couldn't get UEFI MokListRT Reported-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> Tested-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* x86/efi: remove unused variablesYueHaibing2019-11-291-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | commit ad723674d675 ("x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file") leave this unused. Fixes: ad723674d675 ("x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new file") Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191115130830.13320-1-yuehaibing@huawei.com
* powerpc: Load firmware trusted keys/hashes into kernel keyringNayna Jain2019-11-131-0/+96
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The keys used to verify the Host OS kernel are managed by firmware as secure variables. This patch loads the verification keys into the .platform keyring and revocation hashes into .blacklist keyring. This enables verification and loading of the kernels signed by the boot time keys which are trusted by firmware. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> [mpe: Search by compatible in load_powerpc_certs(), not using format] Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-5-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
* x86/efi: move common keyring handler functions to new fileNayna Jain2019-11-133-66/+113
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The handlers to add the keys to the .platform keyring and blacklisted hashes to the .blacklist keyring is common for both the uefi and powerpc mechanisms of loading the keys/hashes from the firmware. This patch moves the common code from load_uefi.c to keyring_handler.c Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Richter <erichte@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1573441836-3632-4-git-send-email-nayna@linux.ibm.com
* Revert "Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-07-101-10/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs" This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus effectively commits 7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION") 2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL") that the merge brought in). It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of in-kernel X.509 certificates [2]. The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in order to not impact the rest of the merge window. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACLDavid Howells2019-06-271-4/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a greater range of subjects to represented. ============ WHY DO THIS? ============ The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of which should be grouped together. For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a key: (1) Changing a key's ownership. (2) Changing a key's security information. (3) Setting a keyring's restriction. And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime: (4) Setting an expiry time. (5) Revoking a key. and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache: (6) Invalidating a key. Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with controlling access to that key. Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however, be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is probably okay. As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers: (1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search. (2) Permitting keyrings to be joined. (3) Invalidation. But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really need to be controlled separately. Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks. =============== WHAT IS CHANGED =============== The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions: (1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring. (2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked. The SEARCH permission is split to create: (1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found. (2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring. (3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated. The WRITE permission is also split to create: (1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be added, removed and replaced in a keyring. (2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator. (3) REVOKE - see above. Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as: (*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key (*) Owner - permitted to the key owner (*) Group - permitted to the key group (*) Everyone - permitted to everyone Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to everyone else. Further subjects may be made available by later patches. The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now: VIEW Can view the key metadata READ Can read the key content WRITE Can update/modify the key content SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting LINK Can make a link to the key SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry INVAL Can invalidate REVOKE Can revoke JOIN Can join this keyring CLEAR Can clear this keyring The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated. The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set, or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token. The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL. The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE. The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an existing keyring. The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually created keyrings only. ====================== BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY ====================== To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be returned. It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero. SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned on if a keyring is being altered. The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs. It will make the following mappings: (1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH (2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR (3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set (4) CLEAR -> WRITE Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR. ======= TESTING ======= This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests: (1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the key. (2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* s390/ipl: read IPL report at early bootMartin Schwidefsky2019-04-261-0/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Read the IPL Report block provided by secure-boot, add the entries of the certificate list to the system key ring and print the list of components. PR: Adjust to Vasilys bootdata_preserved patch set. Preserve ipl_cert_list for later use in kexec_file. Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Philipp Rudo <prudo@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
* efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressedJosh Boyer2018-12-121-10/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If a user tells shim to not use the certs/hashes in the UEFI db variable for verification purposes, shim will set a UEFI variable called MokIgnoreDB. Have the uefi import code look for this and ignore the db variable if it is found. [zohar@linux.ibm.com: removed reference to "secondary" keyring comment] Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure BootJosh Boyer2018-12-121-0/+169
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Secure Boot stores a list of allowed certificates in the 'db' variable. This patch imports those certificates into the platform keyring. The shim UEFI bootloader has a similar certificate list stored in the 'MokListRT' variable. We import those as well. Secure Boot also maintains a list of disallowed certificates in the 'dbx' variable. We load those certificates into the system blacklist keyring and forbid any kernel signed with those from loading. [zohar@linux.ibm.com: dropped Josh's original patch description] Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* efi: Add an EFI signature blob parserDave Howells2018-12-121-0/+108
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a function to parse an EFI signature blob looking for elements of interest. A list is made up of a series of sublists, where all the elements in a sublist are of the same type, but sublists can be of different types. For each sublist encountered, the function pointed to by the get_handler_for_guid argument is called with the type specifier GUID and returns either a pointer to a function to handle elements of that type or NULL if the type is not of interest. If the sublist is of interest, each element is passed to the handler function in turn. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* integrity: Load certs to the platform keyringNayna Jain2018-12-121-0/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The patch refactors integrity_load_x509(), making it a wrapper for a new function named integrity_add_key(). This patch also defines a new function named integrity_load_cert() for loading the platform keys. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* integrity: Define a trusted platform keyringNayna Jain2018-12-121-0/+35
On secure boot enabled systems, a verified kernel may need to kexec additional kernels. For example, it may be used as a bootloader needing to kexec a target kernel or it may need to kexec a crashdump kernel. In such cases, it may want to verify the signature of the next kernel image. It is further possible that the kernel image is signed with third party keys which are stored as platform or firmware keys in the 'db' variable. The kernel, however, can not directly verify these platform keys, and an administrator may therefore not want to trust them for arbitrary usage. In order to differentiate platform keys from other keys and provide the necessary separation of trust, the kernel needs an additional keyring to store platform keys. This patch creates the new keyring called ".platform" to isolate keys provided by platform from keys by kernel. These keys are used to facilitate signature verification during kexec. Since the scope of this keyring is only the platform/firmware keys, it cannot be updated from userspace. This keyring can be enabled by setting CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING. Signed-off-by: Nayna Jain <nayna@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-12-15 03:02:58 +0000