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* ->permission() sanitizing: don't pass flags to exec_permission()Al Viro2011-07-201-10/+0
| | | | | | | pass mask instead; kill security_inode_exec_permission() since we can use security_inode_permission() instead. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* ->permission() sanitizing: don't pass flags to ->inode_permission()Al Viro2011-07-201-2/+5
| | | | | | pass that via mask instead. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* SECURITY: Move exec_permission RCU checks into security modulesAndi Kleen2011-04-221-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now all RCU walks fall back to reference walk when CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled, even though just the standard capability module is active. This is because security_inode_exec_permission unconditionally fails RCU walks. Move this decision to the low level security module. This requires passing the RCU flags down the security hook. This way at least the capability module and a few easy cases in selinux/smack work with RCU walks with CONFIG_SECURITY=y Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* userns: security: make capabilities relative to the user namespaceSerge E. Hallyn2011-03-231-6/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default user namespace. - Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default user namespace. The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with only potential uid confusion issues left. I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals. Changelog: 11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor 12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether he was the creator. Reverse those checks. 12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case 01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper 01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion 02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to it! Fix the check in cap_capable(). 02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable, fixing a compile failure. 02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use kernel-doc format. 02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable(). 02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable. (Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version acked by him) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs] [serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability] Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr> Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6Linus Torvalds2011-03-161-3/+4
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next-2.6: (1480 commits) bonding: enable netpoll without checking link status xfrm: Refcount destination entry on xfrm_lookup net: introduce rx_handler results and logic around that bonding: get rid of IFF_SLAVE_INACTIVE netdev->priv_flag bonding: wrap slave state work net: get rid of multiple bond-related netdevice->priv_flags bonding: register slave pointer for rx_handler be2net: Bump up the version number be2net: Copyright notice change. Update to Emulex instead of ServerEngines e1000e: fix kconfig for crc32 dependency netfilter ebtables: fix xt_AUDIT to work with ebtables xen network backend driver bonding: Improve syslog message at device creation time bonding: Call netif_carrier_off after register_netdevice bonding: Incorrect TX queue offset net_sched: fix ip_tos2prio xfrm: fix __xfrm_route_forward() be2net: Fix UDP packet detected status in RX compl Phonet: fix aligned-mode pipe socket buffer header reserve netxen: support for GbE port settings ... Fix up conflicts in drivers/staging/brcm80211/brcmsmac/wl_mac80211.c with the staging updates.
| * net: Put flowi_* prefix on AF independent members of struct flowiDavid S. Miller2011-03-121-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I intend to turn struct flowi into a union of AF specific flowi structs. There will be a common structure that each variant includes first, much like struct sock_common. This is the first step to move in that direction. Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * xfrm: Mark flowi arg to security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match() const.David S. Miller2011-02-221-1/+2
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-03-161-7/+12
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6 * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (33 commits) AppArmor: kill unused macros in lsm.c AppArmor: cleanup generated files correctly KEYS: Add an iovec version of KEYCTL_INSTANTIATE KEYS: Add a new keyctl op to reject a key with a specified error code KEYS: Add a key type op to permit the key description to be vetted KEYS: Add an RCU payload dereference macro AppArmor: Cleanup make file to remove cruft and make it easier to read SELinux: implement the new sb_remount LSM hook LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSM SELinux: Compute SID for the newly created socket SELinux: Socket retains creator role and MLS attribute SELinux: Auto-generate security_is_socket_class TOMOYO: Fix memory leak upon file open. Revert "selinux: simplify ioctl checking" selinux: drop unused packet flow permissions selinux: Fix packet forwarding checks on postrouting selinux: Fix wrong checks for selinux_policycap_netpeer selinux: Fix check for xfrm selinux context algorithm ima: remove unnecessary call to ima_must_measure IMA: remove IMA imbalance checking ...
| * \ Merge branch 'master' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/selinux into nextJames Morris2011-03-081-7/+9
| |\ \
| | * | LSM: Pass -o remount options to the LSMEric Paris2011-03-031-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The VFS mount code passes the mount options to the LSM. The LSM will remove options it understands from the data and the VFS will then pass the remaining options onto the underlying filesystem. This is how options like the SELinux context= work. The problem comes in that -o remount never calls into LSM code. So if you include an LSM specific option it will get passed to the filesystem and will cause the remount to fail. An example of where this is a problem is the 'seclabel' option. The SELinux LSM hook will print this word in /proc/mounts if the filesystem is being labeled using xattrs. If you pass this word on mount it will be silently stripped and ignored. But if you pass this word on remount the LSM never gets called and it will be passed to the FS. The FS doesn't know what seclabel means and thus should fail the mount. For example an ext3 fs mounted over loop # mount -o loop /tmp/fs /mnt/tmp # cat /proc/mounts | grep /mnt/tmp /dev/loop0 /mnt/tmp ext3 rw,seclabel,relatime,errors=continue,barrier=0,data=ordered 0 0 # mount -o remount /mnt/tmp mount: /mnt/tmp not mounted already, or bad option # dmesg EXT3-fs (loop0): error: unrecognized mount option "seclabel" or missing value This patch passes the remount mount options to an new LSM hook. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| | * | security: remove unused security_sysctl hookLucian Adrian Grijincu2011-02-011-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The only user for this hook was selinux. sysctl routes every call through /proc/sys/. Selinux and other security modules use the file system checks for sysctl too, so no need for this hook any more. Signed-off-by: Lucian Adrian Grijincu <lucian.grijincu@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| | * | fs/vfs/security: pass last path component to LSM on inode creationEric Paris2011-02-011-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SELinux would like to implement a new labeling behavior of newly created inodes. We currently label new inodes based on the parent and the creating process. This new behavior would also take into account the name of the new object when deciding the new label. This is not the (supposed) full path, just the last component of the path. This is very useful because creating /etc/shadow is different than creating /etc/passwd but the kernel hooks are unable to differentiate these operations. We currently require that userspace realize it is doing some difficult operation like that and than userspace jumps through SELinux hoops to get things set up correctly. This patch does not implement new behavior, that is obviously contained in a seperate SELinux patch, but it does pass the needed name down to the correct LSM hook. If no such name exists it is fine to pass NULL. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
| * | | Merge branch 'master'; commit 'v2.6.38-rc7' into nextJames Morris2011-03-081-3/+2
| |\ \ \ | | |/ / | |/| / | | |/
| * | CacheFiles: Add calls to path-based security hooksDavid Howells2011-01-241-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add calls to path-based security hooks into CacheFiles as, unlike inode-based security, these aren't implicit in the vfs_mkdir() and similar calls. Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | | Merge branch 'timers-core-for-linus' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-03-151-1/+1
|\ \ \ | |_|/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip * 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (62 commits) posix-clocks: Check write permissions in posix syscalls hrtimer: Remove empty hrtimer_init_hres_timer() hrtimer: Update hrtimer->state documentation hrtimer: Update base[CLOCK_BOOTTIME].offset correctly timers: Export CLOCK_BOOTTIME via the posix timers interface timers: Add CLOCK_BOOTTIME hrtimer base time: Extend get_xtime_and_monotonic_offset() to also return sleep time: Introduce get_monotonic_boottime and ktime_get_boottime hrtimers: extend hrtimer base code to handle more then 2 clockids ntp: Remove redundant and incorrect parameter check mn10300: Switch do_timer() to xtimer_update() posix clocks: Introduce dynamic clocks posix-timers: Cleanup namespace posix-timers: Add support for fd based clocks x86: Add clock_adjtime for x86 posix-timers: Introduce a syscall for clock tuning. time: Splitout compat timex accessors ntp: Add ADJ_SETOFFSET mode bit time: Introduce timekeeping_inject_offset posix-timer: Update comment ... Fix up new system-call-related conflicts in arch/x86/ia32/ia32entry.S arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_32.h arch/x86/include/asm/unistd_64.h arch/x86/kernel/syscall_table_32.S (name_to_handle_at()/open_by_handle_at() vs clock_adjtime()), and some due to movement of get_jiffies_64() in: kernel/time.c
| * | time: Correct the *settime* parametersRichard Cochran2011-02-021-1/+1
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Both settimeofday() and clock_settime() promise with a 'const' attribute not to alter the arguments passed in. This patch adds the missing 'const' attribute into the various kernel functions implementing these calls. Signed-off-by: Richard Cochran <richard.cochran@omicron.at> Acked-by: John Stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com> LKML-Reference: <20110201134417.545698637@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
* / security: add cred argument to security_capable()Chris Wright2011-02-111-3/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | Expand security_capable() to include cred, so that it can be usable in a wider range of call sites. Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'vfs-scale-working' of ↵Linus Torvalds2011-01-071-0/+9
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/npiggin/linux-npiggin * 'vfs-scale-working' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/npiggin/linux-npiggin: (57 commits) fs: scale mntget/mntput fs: rename vfsmount counter helpers fs: implement faster dentry memcmp fs: prefetch inode data in dcache lookup fs: improve scalability of pseudo filesystems fs: dcache per-inode inode alias locking fs: dcache per-bucket dcache hash locking bit_spinlock: add required includes kernel: add bl_list xfs: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation btrfs: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation ext2,3,4: provide simple rcu-walk ACL implementation fs: provide simple rcu-walk generic_check_acl implementation fs: provide rcu-walk aware permission i_ops fs: rcu-walk aware d_revalidate method fs: cache optimise dentry and inode for rcu-walk fs: dcache reduce branches in lookup path fs: dcache remove d_mounted fs: fs_struct use seqlock fs: rcu-walk for path lookup ...
| * fs: rcu-walk for path lookupNick Piggin2011-01-071-0/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Perform common cases of path lookups without any stores or locking in the ancestor dentry elements. This is called rcu-walk, as opposed to the current algorithm which is a refcount based walk, or ref-walk. This results in far fewer atomic operations on every path element, significantly improving path lookup performance. It also avoids cacheline bouncing on common dentries, significantly improving scalability. The overall design is like this: * LOOKUP_RCU is set in nd->flags, which distinguishes rcu-walk from ref-walk. * Take the RCU lock for the entire path walk, starting with the acquiring of the starting path (eg. root/cwd/fd-path). So now dentry refcounts are not required for dentry persistence. * synchronize_rcu is called when unregistering a filesystem, so we can access d_ops and i_ops during rcu-walk. * Similarly take the vfsmount lock for the entire path walk. So now mnt refcounts are not required for persistence. Also we are free to perform mount lookups, and to assume dentry mount points and mount roots are stable up and down the path. * Have a per-dentry seqlock to protect the dentry name, parent, and inode, so we can load this tuple atomically, and also check whether any of its members have changed. * Dentry lookups (based on parent, candidate string tuple) recheck the parent sequence after the child is found in case anything changed in the parent during the path walk. * inode is also RCU protected so we can load d_inode and use the inode for limited things. * i_mode, i_uid, i_gid can be tested for exec permissions during path walk. * i_op can be loaded. When we reach the destination dentry, we lock it, recheck lookup sequence, and increment its refcount and mountpoint refcount. RCU and vfsmount locks are dropped. This is termed "dropping rcu-walk". If the dentry refcount does not match, we can not drop rcu-walk gracefully at the current point in the lokup, so instead return -ECHILD (for want of a better errno). This signals the path walking code to re-do the entire lookup with a ref-walk. Aside from the final dentry, there are other situations that may be encounted where we cannot continue rcu-walk. In that case, we drop rcu-walk (ie. take a reference on the last good dentry) and continue with a ref-walk. Again, if we can drop rcu-walk gracefully, we return -ECHILD and do the whole lookup using ref-walk. But it is very important that we can continue with ref-walk for most cases, particularly to avoid the overhead of double lookups, and to gain the scalability advantages on common path elements (like cwd and root). The cases where rcu-walk cannot continue are: * NULL dentry (ie. any uncached path element) * parent with d_inode->i_op->permission or ACLs * dentries with d_revalidate * Following links In future patches, permission checks and d_revalidate become rcu-walk aware. It may be possible eventually to make following links rcu-walk aware. Uncached path elements will always require dropping to ref-walk mode, at the very least because i_mutex needs to be grabbed, and objects allocated. Signed-off-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk>
* | af_unix: Avoid socket->sk NULL OOPS in stream connect security hooks.David S. Miller2011-01-051-2/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | unix_release() can asynchornously set socket->sk to NULL, and it does so without holding the unix_state_lock() on "other" during stream connects. However, the reverse mapping, sk->sk_socket, is only transitioned to NULL under the unix_state_lock(). Therefore make the security hooks follow the reverse mapping instead of the forward mapping. Reported-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* capabilities/syslog: open code cap_syslog logic to fix build failureEric Paris2010-11-151-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The addition of CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT resulted in a build failure when CONFIG_PRINTK=n. This is because the capabilities code which used the new option was built even though the variable in question didn't exist. The patch here fixes this by moving the capabilities checks out of the LSM and into the caller. All (known) LSMs should have been calling the capabilities hook already so it actually makes the code organization better to eliminate the hook altogether. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge branch 'ima-memory-use-fixes'Linus Torvalds2010-10-261-9/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * ima-memory-use-fixes: IMA: fix the ToMToU logic IMA: explicit IMA i_flag to remove global lock on inode_delete IMA: drop refcnt from ima_iint_cache since it isn't needed IMA: only allocate iint when needed IMA: move read counter into struct inode IMA: use i_writecount rather than a private counter IMA: use inode->i_lock to protect read and write counters IMA: convert internal flags from long to char IMA: use unsigned int instead of long for counters IMA: drop the inode opencount since it isn't needed for operation IMA: use rbtree instead of radix tree for inode information cache
| * IMA: only allocate iint when neededEric Paris2010-10-261-9/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | IMA always allocates an integrity structure to hold information about every inode, but only needed this structure to track the number of readers and writers currently accessing a given inode. Since that information was moved into struct inode instead of the integrity struct this patch stops allocating the integrity stucture until it is needed. Thus greatly reducing memory usage. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | secmark: make secmark object handling genericEric Paris2010-10-211-0/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now secmark has lots of direct selinux calls. Use all LSM calls and remove all SELinux specific knowledge. The only SELinux specific knowledge we leave is the mode. The only point is to make sure that other LSMs at least test this generic code before they assume it works. (They may also have to make changes if they do not represent labels as strings) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | security: remove unused parameter from security_task_setscheduler()KOSAKI Motohiro2010-10-211-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | All security modules shouldn't change sched_param parameter of security_task_setscheduler(). This is not only meaningless, but also make a harmful result if caller pass a static variable. This patch remove policy and sched_param parameter from security_task_setscheduler() becuase none of security module is using it. Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | LSM: Fix security_module_enable() error.Tetsuo Handa2010-10-211-10/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | We can set default LSM module to DAC (which means "enable no LSM module"). If default LSM module was set to DAC, security_module_enable() must return 0 unless overridden via boot time parameter. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linuxLinus Torvalds2010-08-101-2/+3
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * 'writable_limits' of git://decibel.fi.muni.cz/~xslaby/linux: unistd: add __NR_prlimit64 syscall numbers rlimits: implement prlimit64 syscall rlimits: switch more rlimit syscalls to do_prlimit rlimits: redo do_setrlimit to more generic do_prlimit rlimits: add rlimit64 structure rlimits: do security check under task_lock rlimits: allow setrlimit to non-current tasks rlimits: split sys_setrlimit rlimits: selinux, do rlimits changes under task_lock rlimits: make sure ->rlim_max never grows in sys_setrlimit rlimits: add task_struct to update_rlimit_cpu rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimit Fix up various system call number conflicts. We not only added fanotify system calls in the meantime, but asm-generic/unistd.h added a wait4 along with a range of reserved per-architecture system calls.
| * rlimits: security, add task_struct to setrlimitJiri Slaby2010-07-161-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add task_struct to task_setrlimit of security_operations to be able to set rlimit of task other than current. Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/notifyLinus Torvalds2010-08-101-2/+14
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * 'for-linus' of git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/notify: (132 commits) fanotify: use both marks when possible fsnotify: pass both the vfsmount mark and inode mark fsnotify: walk the inode and vfsmount lists simultaneously fsnotify: rework ignored mark flushing fsnotify: remove global fsnotify groups lists fsnotify: remove group->mask fsnotify: remove the global masks fsnotify: cleanup should_send_event fanotify: use the mark in handler functions audit: use the mark in handler functions dnotify: use the mark in handler functions inotify: use the mark in handler functions fsnotify: send fsnotify_mark to groups in event handling functions fsnotify: Exchange list heads instead of moving elements fsnotify: srcu to protect read side of inode and vfsmount locks fsnotify: use an explicit flag to indicate fsnotify_destroy_mark has been called fsnotify: use _rcu functions for mark list traversal fsnotify: place marks on object in order of group memory address vfs/fsnotify: fsnotify_close can delay the final work in fput fsnotify: store struct file not struct path ... Fix up trivial delete/modify conflict in fs/notify/inotify/inotify.c.
| * | fsnotify: new fsnotify hooks and events types for access decisionsEric Paris2010-07-281-2/+14
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | introduce a new fsnotify hook, fsnotify_perm(), which is called from the security code. This hook is used to allow fsnotify groups to make access control decisions about events on the system. We also must change the generic fsnotify function to return an error code if we intend these hooks to be in any way useful. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
* / LSM: Remove unused arguments from security_path_truncate().Tetsuo Handa2010-08-021-3/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | When commit be6d3e56a6b9b3a4ee44a0685e39e595073c6f0d "introduce new LSM hooks where vfsmount is available." was proposed, regarding security_path_truncate(), only "struct file *" argument (which AppArmor wanted to use) was removed. But length and time_attrs arguments are not used by TOMOYO nor AppArmor. Thus, let's remove these arguments. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* LSM: Add __init to fixup function.Tetsuo Handa2010-05-171-2/+2
| | | | | | | | register_security() became __init function. So do verify() and security_fixup_ops(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook acctEric Paris2010-04-121-5/+0
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook key_session_to_parentEric Paris2010-04-121-7/+0
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook task_setgroupsEric Paris2010-04-121-5/+0
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook task_setgidEric Paris2010-04-121-5/+0
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook task_setuidEric Paris2010-04-121-5/+0
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook cred_commitEric Paris2010-04-121-5/+0
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook inode_deleteEric Paris2010-04-121-7/+0
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook sb_post_pivotrootEric Paris2010-04-121-5/+0
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook sb_post_addmountEric Paris2010-04-121-5/+0
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook sb_post_remountEric Paris2010-04-121-5/+0
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook sb_umount_busyEric Paris2010-04-121-5/+0
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove dead hook sb_umount_closeEric Paris2010-04-121-5/+0
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* security: remove sb_check_sb hooksEric Paris2010-04-121-5/+0
| | | | | | | Unused hook. Remove it. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* Merge branch 'next-queue' into nextJames Morris2010-03-091-1/+1
|\
| * Security: Add __init to register_security to disable load a security module ↵wzt.wzt@gmail.com2010-03-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | on runtime LSM framework doesn't allow to load a security module on runtime, it must be loaded on boot time. but in security/security.c: int register_security(struct security_operations *ops) { ... if (security_ops != &default_security_ops) return -EAGAIN; ... } if security_ops == &default_security_ops, it can access to register a security module. If selinux is enabled, other security modules can't register, but if selinux is disabled on boot time, the security_ops was set to default_security_ops, LSM allows other kernel modules to use register_security() to register a not trust security module. For example: disable selinux on boot time(selinux=0). #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/version.h> #include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/list.h> #include <linux/security.h> MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_AUTHOR("wzt"); extern int register_security(struct security_operations *ops); int (*new_register_security)(struct security_operations *ops); int rootkit_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { return 0; } struct security_operations rootkit_ops = { .bprm_check_security = rootkit_bprm_check_security, }; static int rootkit_init(void) { printk("Load LSM rootkit module.\n"); /* cat /proc/kallsyms | grep register_security */ new_register_security = 0xc0756689; if (new_register_security(&rootkit_ops)) { printk("Can't register rootkit module.\n"); return 0; } printk("Register rootkit module ok.\n"); return 0; } static void rootkit_exit(void) { printk("Unload LSM rootkit module.\n"); } module_init(rootkit_init); module_exit(rootkit_exit); Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* | Merge branch 'next' into for-linusJames Morris2010-03-011-21/+28
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| * Security: add static to security_ops and default_security_ops variablewzt.wzt@gmail.com2010-02-241-2/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Enhance the security framework to support resetting the active security module. This eliminates the need for direct use of the security_ops and default_security_ops variables outside of security.c, so make security_ops and default_security_ops static. Also remove the secondary_ops variable as a cleanup since there is no use for that. secondary_ops was originally used by SELinux to call the "secondary" security module (capability or dummy), but that was replaced by direct calls to capability and the only remaining use is to save and restore the original security ops pointer value if SELinux is disabled by early userspace based on /etc/selinux/config. Further, if we support this directly in the security framework, then we can just use &default_security_ops for this purpose since that is now available. Signed-off-by: Zhitong Wang <zhitong.wangzt@alibaba-inc.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
| * syslog: distinguish between /proc/kmsg and syscallsKees Cook2010-02-041-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This allows the LSM to distinguish between syslog functions originating from /proc/kmsg access and direct syscalls. By default, the commoncaps will now no longer require CAP_SYS_ADMIN to read an opened /proc/kmsg file descriptor. For example the kernel syslog reader can now drop privileges after opening /proc/kmsg, instead of staying privileged with CAP_SYS_ADMIN. MAC systems that implement security_syslog have unchanged behavior. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees.cook@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-22 20:08:18 +0000