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* | selinux: fix NULL-pointer dereference when hashtab allocation failsOndrej Mosnacek2021-11-191-5/+12
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the hash table slot array allocation fails in hashtab_init(), h->size is left initialized with a non-zero value, but the h->htable pointer is NULL. This may then cause a NULL pointer dereference, since the policydb code relies on the assumption that even after a failed hashtab_init(), hashtab_map() and hashtab_destroy() can be safely called on it. Yet, these detect an empty hashtab only by looking at the size. Fix this by making sure that hashtab_init() always leaves behind a valid empty hashtab when the allocation fails. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 03414a49ad5f ("selinux: do not allocate hashtabs dynamically") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* net,lsm,selinux: revert the security_sctp_assoc_established() hookPaul Moore2021-11-121-13/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch reverts two prior patches, e7310c94024c ("security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinux") and 7c2ef0240e6a ("security: add sctp_assoc_established hook"), which create the security_sctp_assoc_established() LSM hook and provide a SELinux implementation. Unfortunately these two patches were merged without proper review (the Reviewed-by and Tested-by tags from Richard Haines were for previous revisions of these patches that were significantly different) and there are outstanding objections from the SELinux maintainers regarding these patches. Work is currently ongoing to correct the problems identified in the reverted patches, as well as others that have come up during review, but it is unclear at this point in time when that work will be ready for inclusion in the mainline kernel. In the interest of not keeping objectionable code in the kernel for multiple weeks, and potentially a kernel release, we are reverting the two problematic patches. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* security: implement sctp_assoc_established hook in selinuxXin Long2021-11-031-1/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Different from selinux_inet_conn_established(), it also gives the secid to asoc->peer_secid in selinux_sctp_assoc_established(), as one UDP-type socket may have more than one asocs. Note that peer_secid in asoc will save the peer secid for this asoc connection, and peer_sid in sksec will just keep the peer secid for the latest connection. So the right use should be do peeloff for UDP-type socket if there will be multiple asocs in one socket, so that the peeloff socket has the right label for its asoc. v1->v2: - call selinux_inet_conn_established() to reduce some code duplication in selinux_sctp_assoc_established(), as Ondrej suggested. - when doing peeloff, it calls sock_create() where it actually gets secid for socket from socket_sockcreate_sid(). So reuse SECSID_WILD to ensure the peeloff socket keeps using that secid after calling selinux_sctp_sk_clone() for client side. Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks") Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* security: pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_cloneXin Long2021-11-033-22/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch is to move secid and peer_secid from endpoint to association, and pass asoc to sctp_assoc_request and sctp_sk_clone instead of ep. As ep is the local endpoint and asoc represents a connection, and in SCTP one sk/ep could have multiple asoc/connection, saving secid/peer_secid for new asoc will overwrite the old asoc's. Note that since asoc can be passed as NULL, security_sctp_assoc_request() is moved to the place right after the new_asoc is created in sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() and sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(). v1->v2: - fix the description of selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(), as Jakub noticed. - fix the annotation in selinux_sctp_assoc_request(), as Richard Noticed. Fixes: 72e89f50084c ("security: Add support for SCTP security hooks") Reported-by: Prashanth Prahlad <pprahlad@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Tested-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com> Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of ↵Linus Torvalds2021-11-018-244/+202
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Add LSM/SELinux/Smack controls and auditing for io-uring. As usual, the individual commit descriptions have more detail, but we were basically missing two things which we're adding here: + establishment of a proper audit context so that auditing of io-uring ops works similarly to how it does for syscalls (with some io-uring additions because io-uring ops are *not* syscalls) + additional LSM hooks to enable access control points for some of the more unusual io-uring features, e.g. credential overrides. The additional audit callouts and LSM hooks were done in conjunction with the io-uring folks, based on conversations and RFC patches earlier in the year. - Fixup the binder credential handling so that the proper credentials are used in the LSM hooks; the commit description and the code comment which is removed in these patches are helpful to understand the background and why this is the proper fix. - Enable SELinux genfscon policy support for securityfs, allowing improved SELinux filesystem labeling for other subsystems which make use of securityfs, e.g. IMA. * tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: security: Return xattr name from security_dentry_init_security() selinux: fix a sock regression in selinux_ip_postroute_compat() binder: use cred instead of task for getsecid binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks binder: use euid from cred instead of using task LSM: Avoid warnings about potentially unused hook variables selinux: fix all of the W=1 build warnings selinux: make better use of the nf_hook_state passed to the NF hooks selinux: fix race condition when computing ocontext SIDs selinux: remove unneeded ipv6 hook wrappers selinux: remove the SELinux lockdown implementation selinux: enable genfscon labeling for securityfs Smack: Brutalist io_uring support selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to anon_inode_getfd_secure() audit: add filtering for io_uring records audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls
| * security: Return xattr name from security_dentry_init_security()Vivek Goyal2021-10-201-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Right now security_dentry_init_security() only supports single security label and is used by SELinux only. There are two users of this hook, namely ceph and nfs. NFS does not care about xattr name. Ceph hardcodes the xattr name to security.selinux (XATTR_NAME_SELINUX). I am making changes to fuse/virtiofs to send security label to virtiofsd and I need to send xattr name as well. I also hardcoded the name of xattr to security.selinux. Stephen Smalley suggested that it probably is a good idea to modify security_dentry_init_security() to also return name of xattr so that we can avoid this hardcoding in the callers. This patch adds a new parameter "const char **xattr_name" to security_dentry_init_security() and LSM puts the name of xattr too if caller asked for it (xattr_name != NULL). Signed-off-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> [PM: fixed typos in the commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: fix a sock regression in selinux_ip_postroute_compat()Paul Moore2021-10-191-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Unfortunately we can't rely on nf_hook_state->sk being the proper originating socket so revert to using skb_to_full_sk(skb). Fixes: 1d1e1ded1356 ("selinux: make better use of the nf_hook_state passed to the NF hooks") Reported-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org> Suggested-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checksTodd Kjos2021-10-141-35/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since binder was integrated with selinux, it has passed 'struct task_struct' associated with the binder_proc to represent the source and target of transactions. The conversion of task to SID was then done in the hook implementations. It turns out that there are race conditions which can result in an incorrect security context being used. Fix by using the 'struct cred' saved during binder_open and pass it to the selinux subsystem. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.14 (need backport for earlier stables) Fixes: 79af73079d75 ("Add security hooks to binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.") Suggested-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: fix all of the W=1 build warningsPaul Moore2021-10-136-8/+33
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There were a number of places in the code where the function definition did not match the associated comment block as well at least one file where the appropriate header files were not included (missing function declaration/prototype); this patch fixes all of these issue such that building the SELinux code with "W=1" is now warning free. % make W=1 security/selinux/ Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: make better use of the nf_hook_state passed to the NF hooksPaul Moore2021-10-131-27/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch builds on a previous SELinux/netfilter patch by Florian Westphal and makes better use of the nf_hook_state variable passed into the SELinux/netfilter hooks as well as a number of other small cleanups in the related code. Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: fix race condition when computing ocontext SIDsOndrej Mosnacek2021-10-111-85/+77
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Current code contains a lot of racy patterns when converting an ocontext's context structure to an SID. This is being done in a "lazy" fashion, such that the SID is looked up in the SID table only when it's first needed and then cached in the "sid" field of the ocontext structure. However, this is done without any locking or memory barriers and is thus unsafe. Between commits 24ed7fdae669 ("selinux: use separate table for initial SID lookup") and 66f8e2f03c02 ("selinux: sidtab reverse lookup hash table"), this race condition lead to an actual observable bug, because a pointer to the shared sid field was passed directly to sidtab_context_to_sid(), which was using this location to also store an intermediate value, which could have been read by other threads and interpreted as an SID. In practice this caused e.g. new mounts to get a wrong (seemingly random) filesystem context, leading to strange denials. This bug has been spotted in the wild at least twice, see [1] and [2]. Fix the race condition by making all the racy functions use a common helper that ensures the ocontext::sid accesses are made safely using the appropriate SMP constructs. Note that security_netif_sid() was populating the sid field of both contexts stored in the ocontext, but only the first one was actually used. The SELinux wiki's documentation on the "netifcon" policy statement [3] suggests that using only the first context is intentional. I kept only the handling of the first context here, as there is really no point in doing the SID lookup for the unused one. I wasn't able to reproduce the bug mentioned above on any kernel that includes commit 66f8e2f03c02, even though it has been reported that the issue occurs with that commit, too, just less frequently. Thus, I wasn't able to verify that this patch fixes the issue, but it makes sense to avoid the race condition regardless. [1] https://github.com/containers/container-selinux/issues/89 [2] https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/selinux@lists.fedoraproject.org/thread/6DMTAMHIOAOEMUAVTULJD45JZU7IBAFM/ [3] https://selinuxproject.org/page/NetworkStatements#netifcon Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Xinjie Zheng <xinjie@google.com> Reported-by: Sujithra Periasamy <sujithra@google.com> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: remove unneeded ipv6 hook wrappersFlorian Westphal2021-10-111-62/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Netfilter places the protocol number the hook function is getting called from in state->pf, so we can use that instead of an extra wrapper. While at it, remove one-line wrappers too and make selinux_ip_{out,forward,postroute} useable as hook function. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Message-Id: <20211011202229.28289-1-fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: remove the SELinux lockdown implementationPaul Moore2021-09-302-32/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | NOTE: This patch intentionally omits any "Fixes:" metadata or stable tagging since it removes a SELinux access control check; while removing the control point is the right thing to do moving forward, removing it in stable kernels could be seen as a regression. The original SELinux lockdown implementation in 59438b46471a ("security,lockdown,selinux: implement SELinux lockdown") used the current task's credentials as both the subject and object in the SELinux lockdown hook, selinux_lockdown(). Unfortunately that proved to be incorrect in a number of cases as the core kernel was calling the LSM lockdown hook in places where the credentials from the "current" task_struct were not the correct credentials to use in the SELinux access check. Attempts were made to resolve this by adding a credential pointer to the LSM lockdown hook as well as suggesting that the single hook be split into two: one for user tasks, one for kernel tasks; however neither approach was deemed acceptable by Linus. Faced with the prospect of either changing the subj/obj in the access check to a constant context (likely the kernel's label) or removing the SELinux lockdown check entirely, the SELinux community decided that removing the lockdown check was preferable. The supporting changes to the general LSM layer are left intact, this patch only removes the SELinux implementation. Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: enable genfscon labeling for securityfsChristian Göttsche2021-09-281-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add support for genfscon per-file labeling of securityfs files. This allows for separate labels and thereby access control for different files. For example a genfscon statement genfscon securityfs /integrity/ima/policy \ system_u:object_r:ima_policy_t:s0 will set a private label to the IMA policy file and thus allow to control the ability to set the IMA policy. Setting labels directly with setxattr(2), e.g. by chcon(1) or setfiles(8), is still not supported. Signed-off-by: Christian Göttsche <cgzones@googlemail.com> [PM: line width fixes in the commit description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * selinux: add support for the io_uring access controlsPaul Moore2021-09-192-0/+36
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch implements two new io_uring access controls, specifically support for controlling the io_uring "personalities" and IORING_SETUP_SQPOLL. Controlling the sharing of io_urings themselves is handled via the normal file/inode labeling and sharing mechanisms. The io_uring { override_creds } permission restricts which domains the subject domain can use to override it's own credentials. Granting a domain the io_uring { override_creds } permission allows it to impersonate another domain in io_uring operations. The io_uring { sqpoll } permission restricts which domains can create asynchronous io_uring polling threads. This is important from a security perspective as operations queued by this asynchronous thread inherit the credentials of the thread creator by default; if an io_uring is shared across process/domain boundaries this could result in one domain impersonating another. Controlling the creation of sqpoll threads, and the sharing of io_urings across processes, allow policy authors to restrict the ability of one domain to impersonate another via io_uring. As a quick summary, this patch adds a new object class with two permissions: io_uring { override_creds sqpoll } These permissions can be seen in the two simple policy statements below: allow domA_t domB_t : io_uring { override_creds }; allow domA_t self : io_uring { sqpoll }; Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | Merge branch 'master' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/klassert/David S. Miller2021-10-071-1/+3
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ipsec Steffen Klassert says: ==================== pull request (net): ipsec 2021-10-07 1) Fix a sysbot reported shift-out-of-bounds in xfrm_get_default. From Pavel Skripkin. 2) Fix XFRM_MSG_MAPPING ABI breakage. The new XFRM_MSG_MAPPING messages were accidentally not paced at the end. Fix by Eugene Syromiatnikov. 3) Fix the uapi for the default policy, use explicit field and macros and make it accessible to userland. From Nicolas Dichtel. 4) Fix a missing rcu lock in xfrm_notify_userpolicy(). From Nicolas Dichtel. Please pull or let me know if there are problems. ==================== Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h: Fix XFRM_MSG_MAPPING ABI breakageEugene Syromiatnikov2021-09-141-1/+3
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 2d151d39073a ("xfrm: Add possibility to set the default to block if we have no policy") broke ABI by changing the value of the XFRM_MSG_MAPPING enum item, thus also evading the build-time check in security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c:selinux_nlmsg_lookup for presence of proper security permission checks in nlmsg_xfrm_perms. Fix it by placing XFRM_MSG_SETDEFAULT/XFRM_MSG_GETDEFAULT to the end of the enum, right before __XFRM_MSG_MAX, and updating the nlmsg_xfrm_perms accordingly. Fixes: 2d151d39073a ("xfrm: Add possibility to set the default to block if we have no policy") References: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20210901151402.GA2557@altlinux.org/ Signed-off-by: Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com> Acked-by: Antony Antony <antony.antony@secunet.com> Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
* / selinux,smack: fix subjective/objective credential use mixupsPaul Moore2021-09-231-2/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Jann Horn reported a problem with commit eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials") where some LSM hooks were attempting to access the subjective credentials of a task other than the current task. Generally speaking, it is not safe to access another task's subjective credentials and doing so can cause a number of problems. Further, while looking into the problem, I realized that Smack was suffering from a similar problem brought about by a similar commit 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials"). This patch addresses this problem by restoring the use of the task's objective credentials in those cases where the task is other than the current executing task. Not only does this resolve the problem reported by Jann, it is arguably the correct thing to do in these cases. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials") Fixes: 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Merge tag 'integrity-v5.15' of ↵Linus Torvalds2021-09-021-2/+4
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar: - Limit the allowed hash algorithms when writing security.ima xattrs or verifying them, based on the IMA policy and the configured hash algorithms. - Return the calculated "critical data" measurement hash and size to avoid code duplication. (Preparatory change for a proposed LSM.) - and a single patch to address a compiler warning. * tag 'integrity-v5.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity: IMA: reject unknown hash algorithms in ima_get_hash_algo IMA: prevent SETXATTR_CHECK policy rules with unavailable algorithms IMA: introduce a new policy option func=SETXATTR_CHECK IMA: add a policy option to restrict xattr hash algorithms on appraisal IMA: add support to restrict the hash algorithms used for file appraisal IMA: block writes of the security.ima xattr with unsupported algorithms IMA: remove the dependency on CRYPTO_MD5 ima: Add digest and digest_len params to the functions to measure a buffer ima: Return int in the functions to measure a buffer ima: Introduce ima_get_current_hash_algo() IMA: remove -Wmissing-prototypes warning
| * ima: Add digest and digest_len params to the functions to measure a bufferRoberto Sassu2021-07-231-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch performs the final modification necessary to pass the buffer measurement to callers, so that they provide a functionality similar to ima_file_hash(). It adds the 'digest' and 'digest_len' parameters to ima_measure_critical_data() and process_buffer_measurement(). These functions calculate the digest even if there is no suitable rule in the IMA policy and, in this case, they simply return 1 before generating a new measurement entry. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* | Merge tag 'net-next-5.15' of ↵Linus Torvalds2021-08-312-2/+6
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski: "Core: - Enable memcg accounting for various networking objects. BPF: - Introduce bpf timers. - Add perf link and opaque bpf_cookie which the program can read out again, to be used in libbpf-based USDT library. - Add bpf_task_pt_regs() helper to access user space pt_regs in kprobes, to help user space stack unwinding. - Add support for UNIX sockets for BPF sockmap. - Extend BPF iterator support for UNIX domain sockets. - Allow BPF TCP congestion control progs and bpf iterators to call bpf_setsockopt(), e.g. to switch to another congestion control algorithm. Protocols: - Support IOAM Pre-allocated Trace with IPv6. - Support Management Component Transport Protocol. - bridge: multicast: add vlan support. - netfilter: add hooks for the SRv6 lightweight tunnel driver. - tcp: - enable mid-stream window clamping (by user space or BPF) - allow data-less, empty-cookie SYN with TFO_SERVER_COOKIE_NOT_REQD - more accurate DSACK processing for RACK-TLP - mptcp: - add full mesh path manager option - add partial support for MP_FAIL - improve use of backup subflows - optimize option processing - af_unix: add OOB notification support. - ipv6: add IFLA_INET6_RA_MTU to expose MTU value advertised by the router. - mac80211: Target Wake Time support in AP mode. - can: j1939: extend UAPI to notify about RX status. Driver APIs: - Add page frag support in page pool API. - Many improvements to the DSA (distributed switch) APIs. - ethtool: extend IRQ coalesce uAPI with timer reset modes. - devlink: control which auxiliary devices are created. - Support CAN PHYs via the generic PHY subsystem. - Proper cross-chip support for tag_8021q. - Allow TX forwarding for the software bridge data path to be offloaded to capable devices. Drivers: - veth: more flexible channels number configuration. - openvswitch: introduce per-cpu upcall dispatch. - Add internet mix (IMIX) mode to pktgen. - Transparently handle XDP operations in the bonding driver. - Add LiteETH network driver. - Renesas (ravb): - support Gigabit Ethernet IP - NXP Ethernet switch (sja1105): - fast aging support - support for "H" switch topologies - traffic termination for ports under VLAN-aware bridge - Intel 1G Ethernet - support getcrosststamp() with PCIe PTM (Precision Time Measurement) for better time sync - support Credit-Based Shaper (CBS) offload, enabling HW traffic prioritization and bandwidth reservation - Broadcom Ethernet (bnxt) - support pulse-per-second output - support larger Rx rings - Mellanox Ethernet (mlx5) - support ethtool RSS contexts and MQPRIO channel mode - support LAG offload with bridging - support devlink rate limit API - support packet sampling on tunnels - Huawei Ethernet (hns3): - basic devlink support - add extended IRQ coalescing support - report extended link state - Netronome Ethernet (nfp): - add conntrack offload support - Broadcom WiFi (brcmfmac): - add WPA3 Personal with FT to supported cipher suites - support 43752 SDIO device - Intel WiFi (iwlwifi): - support scanning hidden 6GHz networks - support for a new hardware family (Bz) - Xen pv driver: - harden netfront against malicious backends - Qualcomm mobile - ipa: refactor power management and enable automatic suspend - mhi: move MBIM to WWAN subsystem interfaces Refactor: - Ambient BPF run context and cgroup storage cleanup. - Compat rework for ndo_ioctl. Old code removal: - prism54 remove the obsoleted driver, deprecated by the p54 driver. - wan: remove sbni/granch driver" * tag 'net-next-5.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (1715 commits) net: Add depends on OF_NET for LiteX's LiteETH ipv6: seg6: remove duplicated include net: hns3: remove unnecessary spaces net: hns3: add some required spaces net: hns3: clean up a type mismatch warning net: hns3: refine function hns3_set_default_feature() ipv6: remove duplicated 'net/lwtunnel.h' include net: w5100: check return value after calling platform_get_resource() net/mlxbf_gige: Make use of devm_platform_ioremap_resourcexxx() net: mdio: mscc-miim: Make use of the helper function devm_platform_ioremap_resource() net: mdio-ipq4019: Make use of devm_platform_ioremap_resource() fou: remove sparse errors ipv4: fix endianness issue in inet_rtm_getroute_build_skb() octeontx2-af: Set proper errorcode for IPv4 checksum errors octeontx2-af: Fix static code analyzer reported issues octeontx2-af: Fix mailbox errors in nix_rss_flowkey_cfg octeontx2-af: Fix loop in free and unmap counter af_unix: fix potential NULL deref in unix_dgram_connect() dpaa2-eth: Replace strlcpy with strscpy octeontx2-af: Use NDC TX for transmit packet data ...
| * \ Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/netJakub Kicinski2021-08-051-6/+4
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Build failure in drivers/net/wwan/mhi_wwan_mbim.c: add missing parameter (0, assuming we don't want buffer pre-alloc). Conflict in drivers/net/dsa/sja1105/sja1105_main.c between: 589918df9322 ("net: dsa: sja1105: be stateless with FDB entries on SJA1105P/Q/R/S/SJA1110 too") 0fac6aa098ed ("net: dsa: sja1105: delete the best_effort_vlan_filtering mode") Follow the instructions from the commit message of the former commit - removed the if conditions. When looking at commit 589918df9322 ("net: dsa: sja1105: be stateless with FDB entries on SJA1105P/Q/R/S/SJA1110 too") note that the mask_iotag fields get removed by the following patch. Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
| * | | mctp: Add MCTP baseJeremy Kerr2021-07-292-2/+6
| | |/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add basic Kconfig, an initial (empty) af_mctp source object, and {AF,PF}_MCTP definitions, and the required definitions for a new protocol type. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Kerr <jk@codeconstruct.com.au> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | | Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210830' of ↵Linus Torvalds2021-08-312-0/+6
|\ \ \ | |_|/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux update from Paul Moore: "We've got an unusually small SELinux pull request for v5.15 that consists of only one (?!) patch that is really pretty minor when you look at it. Unsurprisingly it passes all of our tests and merges cleanly on top of your tree right now, please merge this for v5.15" * tag 'selinux-pr-20210830' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: return early for possible NULL audit buffers
| * | selinux: return early for possible NULL audit buffersAustin Kim2021-07-142-0/+6
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | audit_log_start() may return NULL in below cases: - when audit is not initialized. - when audit backlog limit exceeds. After the call to audit_log_start() is made and then possible NULL audit buffer argument is passed to audit_log_*() functions, audit_log_*() functions return immediately in case of a NULL audit buffer argument. But it is optimal to return early when audit_log_start() returns NULL, because it is not necessary for audit_log_*() functions to be called with NULL audit buffer argument. So add exception handling for possible NULL audit buffers where return value can be handled from callers. Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austin.kim@lge.com> [PM: tweak subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* / selinux: correct the return value when loads initial sidsXiu Jianfeng2021-08-021-6/+4
|/ | | | | | | | | | | It should not return 0 when SID 0 is assigned to isids. This patch fixes it. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: e3e0b582c321a ("selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling") Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> [PM: remove changelog from description] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* selinux: kill 'flags' argument in avc_has_perm_flags() and avc_audit()Al Viro2021-06-113-31/+5
| | | | | | | | | ... along with avc_has_perm_flags() itself, since now it's identical to avc_has_perm() (as pointed out by Paul Moore) Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> [PM: add "selinux:" prefix to subj and tweak for length] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* selinux: slow_avc_audit has become non-blockingAl Viro2021-06-113-35/+10
| | | | | | | | dump_common_audit_data() is safe to use under rcu_read_lock() now; no need for AVC_NONBLOCKING and games around it Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* selinux: Fix kernel-docYang Li2021-06-111-1/+22
| | | | | | | | | Fix function name and add comment for parameter state in ss/services.c kernel-doc to remove some warnings found by running make W=1 LLVM=1. Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Yang Li <yang.lee@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* selinux: use __GFP_NOWARN with GFP_NOWAIT in the AVCMinchan Kim2021-06-101-6/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In the field, we have seen lots of allocation failure from the call path below. 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W Binder : 31542_2: page allocation failure: order:0, mode:0x800(GFP_NOWAIT), nodemask=(null),cpuset=background,mems_allowed=0 ... ... 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W Call trace: 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : dump_backtrace.cfi_jt+0x0/0x8 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : dump_stack+0xc8/0x14c 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : warn_alloc+0x158/0x1c8 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __alloc_pages_slowpath+0x9d8/0xb80 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x1c4/0x430 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : allocate_slab+0xb4/0x390 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : ___slab_alloc+0x12c/0x3a4 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : kmem_cache_alloc+0x358/0x5e4 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_alloc_node+0x30/0x184 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_update_node+0x54/0x4f0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : avc_has_extended_perms+0x1a4/0x460 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : selinux_file_ioctl+0x320/0x3d0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : __arm64_sys_ioctl+0xec/0x1fc 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_svc_common+0xc0/0x24c 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_svc+0x28/0x88 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_sync_handler+0x8c/0xf0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W : el0_sync+0x1a4/0x1c0 .. .. 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010315 31557 31557 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:12.999 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 1010161 10686 10686 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W node 0 : slabs: 57, objs: 2907, free: 0 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W SLUB : Unable to allocate memory on node -1, gfp=0x900(GFP_NOWAIT|__GFP_ZERO) 06-03 13:29:13.000 10230 30892 30892 W cache : avc_node, object size: 72, buffer size: 80, default order: 0, min order: 0 Based on [1], selinux is tolerate for failure of memory allocation. Then, use __GFP_NOWARN together. [1] 476accbe2f6e ("selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches") Signed-off-by: Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org> [PM: subj fix, line wraps, normalized commit refs] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* lsm_audit,selinux: pass IB device name by referenceOndrej Mosnacek2021-05-141-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | While trying to address a Coverity warning that the dev_name string might end up unterminated when strcpy'ing it in selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(), I realized that it is possible (and simpler) to just pass the dev_name pointer directly, rather than copying the string to a buffer. The ibendport variable goes out of scope at the end of the function anyway, so the lifetime of the dev_name pointer will never be shorter than that of ibendport, thus we can safely just pass the dev_name pointer and be done with it. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Acked-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* selinux: Remove redundant assignment to rcJiapeng Chong2021-05-102-5/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Variable rc is set to '-EINVAL' but this value is never read as it is overwritten or not used later on, hence it is a redundant assignment and can be removed. Cleans up the following clang-analyzer warning: security/selinux/ss/services.c:2103:3: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores]. security/selinux/ss/services.c:2079:2: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores]. security/selinux/ss/services.c:2071:2: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores]. security/selinux/ss/services.c:2062:2: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores]. security/selinux/ss/policydb.c:2592:3: warning: Value stored to 'rc' is never read [clang-analyzer-deadcode.DeadStores]. Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* selinux: Corrected comment to match kernel-doc commentSouptick Joarder2021-05-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | Minor documentation update. Signed-off-by: Souptick Joarder <jrdr.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* selinux: delete selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() useless argumentZhongjun Tan2021-05-102-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | seliunx_xfrm_policy_lookup() is hooks of security_xfrm_policy_lookup(). The dir argument is uselss in security_xfrm_policy_lookup(). So remove the dir argument from selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup() and security_xfrm_policy_lookup(). Signed-off-by: Zhongjun Tan <tanzhongjun@yulong.com> [PM: reformat the subject line] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* selinux: constify some avtab function argumentsOndrej Mosnacek2021-05-103-21/+26
| | | | | | | This makes the code a bit easier to reason about. Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* selinux: simplify duplicate_policydb_cond_list() by using kmemdup()Ondrej Mosnacek2021-05-101-5/+6
| | | | | | | | We can do the allocation + copying of expr.nodes in one go using kmemdup(). Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Merge tag 'landlock_v34' of ↵Linus Torvalds2021-05-013-37/+30
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull Landlock LSM from James Morris: "Add Landlock, a new LSM from Mickaël Salaün. Briefly, Landlock provides for unprivileged application sandboxing. From Mickaël's cover letter: "The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable LSM [1], it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or unexpected/malicious behaviors in user-space applications. Landlock empowers any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves. Landlock is inspired by seccomp-bpf but instead of filtering syscalls and their raw arguments, a Landlock rule can restrict the use of kernel objects like file hierarchies, according to the kernel semantic. Landlock also takes inspiration from other OS sandbox mechanisms: XNU Sandbox, FreeBSD Capsicum or OpenBSD Pledge/Unveil. In this current form, Landlock misses some access-control features. This enables to minimize this patch series and ease review. This series still addresses multiple use cases, especially with the combined use of seccomp-bpf: applications with built-in sandboxing, init systems, security sandbox tools and security-oriented APIs [2]" The cover letter and v34 posting is here: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20210422154123.13086-1-mic@digikod.net/ See also: https://landlock.io/ This code has had extensive design discussion and review over several years" Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/50db058a-7dde-441b-a7f9-f6837fe8b69f@schaufler-ca.com/ [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/f646e1c7-33cf-333f-070c-0a40ad0468cd@digikod.net/ [2] * tag 'landlock_v34' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: landlock: Enable user space to infer supported features landlock: Add user and kernel documentation samples/landlock: Add a sandbox manager example selftests/landlock: Add user space tests landlock: Add syscall implementations arch: Wire up Landlock syscalls fs,security: Add sb_delete hook landlock: Support filesystem access-control LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock landlock: Add ptrace restrictions landlock: Set up the security framework and manage credentials landlock: Add ruleset and domain management landlock: Add object management
| * LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblockCasey Schaufler2021-04-223-37/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move management of the superblock->sb_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules, the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-6-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
* | Merge tag 'net-next-5.13' of ↵Linus Torvalds2021-04-291-1/+4
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next Pull networking updates from Jakub Kicinski: "Core: - bpf: - allow bpf programs calling kernel functions (initially to reuse TCP congestion control implementations) - enable task local storage for tracing programs - remove the need to store per-task state in hash maps, and allow tracing programs access to task local storage previously added for BPF_LSM - add bpf_for_each_map_elem() helper, allowing programs to walk all map elements in a more robust and easier to verify fashion - sockmap: support UDP and cross-protocol BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT redirection - lpm: add support for batched ops in LPM trie - add BTF_KIND_FLOAT support - mostly to allow use of BTF on s390 which has floats in its headers files - improve BPF syscall documentation and extend the use of kdoc parsing scripts we already employ for bpf-helpers - libbpf, bpftool: support static linking of BPF ELF files - improve support for encapsulation of L2 packets - xdp: restructure redirect actions to avoid a runtime lookup, improving performance by 4-8% in microbenchmarks - xsk: build skb by page (aka generic zerocopy xmit) - improve performance of software AF_XDP path by 33% for devices which don't need headers in the linear skb part (e.g. virtio) - nexthop: resilient next-hop groups - improve path stability on next-hops group changes (incl. offload for mlxsw) - ipv6: segment routing: add support for IPv4 decapsulation - icmp: add support for RFC 8335 extended PROBE messages - inet: use bigger hash table for IP ID generation - tcp: deal better with delayed TX completions - make sure we don't give up on fast TCP retransmissions only because driver is slow in reporting that it completed transmitting the original - tcp: reorder tcp_congestion_ops for better cache locality - mptcp: - add sockopt support for common TCP options - add support for common TCP msg flags - include multiple address ids in RM_ADDR - add reset option support for resetting one subflow - udp: GRO L4 improvements - improve 'forward' / 'frag_list' co-existence with UDP tunnel GRO, allowing the first to take place correctly even for encapsulated UDP traffic - micro-optimize dev_gro_receive() and flow dissection, avoid retpoline overhead on VLAN and TEB GRO - use less memory for sysctls, add a new sysctl type, to allow using u8 instead of "int" and "long" and shrink networking sysctls - veth: allow GRO without XDP - this allows aggregating UDP packets before handing them off to routing, bridge, OvS, etc. - allow specifing ifindex when device is moved to another namespace - netfilter: - nft_socket: add support for cgroupsv2 - nftables: add catch-all set element - special element used to define a default action in case normal lookup missed - use net_generic infra in many modules to avoid allocating per-ns memory unnecessarily - xps: improve the xps handling to avoid potential out-of-bound accesses and use-after-free when XPS change race with other re-configuration under traffic - add a config knob to turn off per-cpu netdev refcnt to catch underflows in testing Device APIs: - add WWAN subsystem to organize the WWAN interfaces better and hopefully start driving towards more unified and vendor- independent APIs - ethtool: - add interface for reading IEEE MIB stats (incl. mlx5 and bnxt support) - allow network drivers to dump arbitrary SFP EEPROM data, current offset+length API was a poor fit for modern SFP which define EEPROM in terms of pages (incl. mlx5 support) - act_police, flow_offload: add support for packet-per-second policing (incl. offload for nfp) - psample: add additional metadata attributes like transit delay for packets sampled from switch HW (and corresponding egress and policy-based sampling in the mlxsw driver) - dsa: improve support for sandwiched LAGs with bridge and DSA - netfilter: - flowtable: use direct xmit in topologies with IP forwarding, bridging, vlans etc. - nftables: counter hardware offload support - Bluetooth: - improvements for firmware download w/ Intel devices - add support for reading AOSP vendor capabilities - add support for virtio transport driver - mac80211: - allow concurrent monitor iface and ethernet rx decap - set priority and queue mapping for injected frames - phy: add support for Clause-45 PHY Loopback - pci/iov: add sysfs MSI-X vector assignment interface to distribute MSI-X resources to VFs (incl. mlx5 support) New hardware/drivers: - dsa: mv88e6xxx: add support for Marvell mv88e6393x - 11-port Ethernet switch with 8x 1-Gigabit Ethernet and 3x 10-Gigabit interfaces. - dsa: support for legacy Broadcom tags used on BCM5325, BCM5365 and BCM63xx switches - Microchip KSZ8863 and KSZ8873; 3x 10/100Mbps Ethernet switches - ath11k: support for QCN9074 a 802.11ax device - Bluetooth: Broadcom BCM4330 and BMC4334 - phy: Marvell 88X2222 transceiver support - mdio: add BCM6368 MDIO mux bus controller - r8152: support RTL8153 and RTL8156 (USB Ethernet) chips - mana: driver for Microsoft Azure Network Adapter (MANA) - Actions Semi Owl Ethernet MAC - can: driver for ETAS ES58X CAN/USB interfaces Pure driver changes: - add XDP support to: enetc, igc, stmmac - add AF_XDP support to: stmmac - virtio: - page_to_skb() use build_skb when there's sufficient tailroom (21% improvement for 1000B UDP frames) - support XDP even without dedicated Tx queues - share the Tx queues with the stack when necessary - mlx5: - flow rules: add support for mirroring with conntrack, matching on ICMP, GTP, flex filters and more - support packet sampling with flow offloads - persist uplink representor netdev across eswitch mode changes - allow coexistence of CQE compression and HW time-stamping - add ethtool extended link error state reporting - ice, iavf: support flow filters, UDP Segmentation Offload - dpaa2-switch: - move the driver out of staging - add spanning tree (STP) support - add rx copybreak support - add tc flower hardware offload on ingress traffic - ionic: - implement Rx page reuse - support HW PTP time-stamping - octeon: support TC hardware offloads - flower matching on ingress and egress ratelimitting. - stmmac: - add RX frame steering based on VLAN priority in tc flower - support frame preemption (FPE) - intel: add cross time-stamping freq difference adjustment - ocelot: - support forwarding of MRP frames in HW - support multiple bridges - support PTP Sync one-step timestamping - dsa: mv88e6xxx, dpaa2-switch: offload bridge port flags like learning, flooding etc. - ipa: add IPA v4.5, v4.9 and v4.11 support (Qualcomm SDX55, SM8350, SC7280 SoCs) - mt7601u: enable TDLS support - mt76: - add support for 802.3 rx frames (mt7915/mt7615) - mt7915 flash pre-calibration support - mt7921/mt7663 runtime power management fixes" * tag 'net-next-5.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net-next: (2451 commits) net: selftest: fix build issue if INET is disabled net: netrom: nr_in: Remove redundant assignment to ns net: tun: Remove redundant assignment to ret net: phy: marvell: add downshift support for M88E1240 net: dsa: ksz: Make reg_mib_cnt a u8 as it never exceeds 255 net/sched: act_ct: Remove redundant ct get and check icmp: standardize naming of RFC 8335 PROBE constants bpf, selftests: Update array map tests for per-cpu batched ops bpf: Add batched ops support for percpu array bpf: Implement formatted output helpers with bstr_printf seq_file: Add a seq_bprintf function sfc: adjust efx->xdp_tx_queue_count with the real number of initialized queues net:nfc:digital: Fix a double free in digital_tg_recv_dep_req net: fix a concurrency bug in l2tp_tunnel_register() net/smc: Remove redundant assignment to rc mpls: Remove redundant assignment to err llc2: Remove redundant assignment to rc net/tls: Remove redundant initialization of record rds: Remove redundant assignment to nr_sig dt-bindings: net: mdio-gpio: add compatible for microchip,mdio-smi0 ...
| * \ Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/netJakub Kicinski2021-04-096-112/+185
| |\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Conflicts: MAINTAINERS - keep Chandrasekar drivers/net/ethernet/mellanox/mlx5/core/en_main.c - simple fix + trust the code re-added to param.c in -next is fine include/linux/bpf.h - trivial include/linux/ethtool.h - trivial, fix kdoc while at it include/linux/skmsg.h - move to relevant place in tcp.c, comment re-wrapped net/core/skmsg.c - add the sk = sk // sk = NULL around calls net/tipc/crypto.c - trivial Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
| * \ \ Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/netDavid S. Miller2021-03-253-41/+59
| |\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
| * | | | nexthop: Add netlink defines and enumerators for resilient NH groupsIdo Schimmel2021-03-111-1/+4
| | |_|/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - RTM_NEWNEXTHOP et.al. that handle resilient groups will have a new nested attribute, NHA_RES_GROUP, whose elements are attributes NHA_RES_GROUP_*. - RTM_NEWNEXTHOPBUCKET et.al. is a suite of new messages that will currently serve only for dumping of individual buckets of resilient next hop groups. For nexthop group buckets, these messages will carry a nested attribute NHA_RES_BUCKET, whose elements are attributes NHA_RES_BUCKET_*. There are several reasons why a new suite of messages is created for nexthop buckets instead of overloading the information on the existing RTM_{NEW,DEL,GET}NEXTHOP messages. First, a nexthop group can contain a large number of nexthop buckets (4k is not unheard of). This imposes limits on the amount of information that can be encoded for each nexthop bucket given a netlink message is limited to 64k bytes. Second, while RTM_NEWNEXTHOPBUCKET is only used for notifications at this point, in the future it can be extended to provide user space with control over nexthop buckets configuration. - The new group type is NEXTHOP_GRP_TYPE_RES. Note that nexthop code is adjusted to bounce groups with that type for now. Signed-off-by: Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Reviewed-by: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Petr Machata <petrm@nvidia.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | | | Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of ↵Linus Torvalds2021-04-278-48/+232
|\ \ \ \ | |_|_|/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Add support for measuring the SELinux state and policy capabilities using IMA. - A handful of SELinux/NFS patches to compare the SELinux state of one mount with a set of mount options. Olga goes into more detail in the patch descriptions, but this is important as it allows more flexibility when using NFS and SELinux context mounts. - Properly differentiate between the subjective and objective LSM credentials; including support for the SELinux and Smack. My clumsy attempt at a proper fix for AppArmor didn't quite pass muster so John is working on a proper AppArmor patch, in the meantime this set of patches shouldn't change the behavior of AppArmor in any way. This change explains the bulk of the diffstat beyond security/. - Fix a problem where we were not properly terminating the permission list for two SELinux object classes. * tag 'selinux-pr-20210426' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: add proper NULL termination to the secclass_map permissions smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants nfs: account for selinux security context when deciding to share superblock nfs: remove unneeded null check in nfs_fill_super() lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mount selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool selinux: fix misspellings using codespell tool selinux: measure state and policy capabilities selinux: Allow context mounts for unpriviliged overlayfs
| * | | selinux: add proper NULL termination to the secclass_map permissionsPaul Moore2021-04-211-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch adds the missing NULL termination to the "bpf" and "perf_event" object class permission lists. This missing NULL termination should really only affect the tools under scripts/selinux, with the most important being genheaders.c, although in practice this has not been an issue on any of my dev/test systems. If the problem were to manifest itself it would likely result in bogus permissions added to the end of the object class; thankfully with no access control checks using these bogus permissions and no policies defining these permissions the impact would likely be limited to some noise about undefined permissions during policy load. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ec27c3568a34 ("selinux: bpf: Add selinux check for eBPF syscall operations") Fixes: da97e18458fb ("perf_event: Add support for LSM and SELinux checks") Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentialsPaul Moore2021-03-221-39/+73
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SELinux has a function, task_sid(), which returns the task's objective credentials, but unfortunately is used in a few places where the subjective task credentials should be used. Most notably in the new security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook. This patch fixes this and attempts to make things more obvious by introducing a new function, task_sid_subj(), and renaming the existing task_sid() function to task_sid_obj(). This patch also adds an interesting function in task_sid_binder(). The task_sid_binder() function has a comment which hopefully describes it's reason for being, but it basically boils down to the simple fact that we can't safely access another task's subjective credentials so in the case of binder we need to stick with the objective credentials regardless. Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variantsPaul Moore2021-03-221-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Of the three LSMs that implement the security_task_getsecid() LSM hook, all three LSMs provide the task's objective security credentials. This turns out to be unfortunate as most of the hook's callers seem to expect the task's subjective credentials, although a small handful of callers do correctly expect the objective credentials. This patch is the first step towards fixing the problem: it splits the existing security_task_getsecid() hook into two variants, one for the subjective creds, one for the objective creds. void security_task_getsecid_subj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid); While this patch does fix all of the callers to use the correct variant, in order to keep this patch focused on the callers and to ease review, the LSMs continue to use the same implementation for both hooks. The net effect is that this patch should not change the behavior of the kernel in any way, it will be up to the latter LSM specific patches in this series to change the hook implementations and return the correct credentials. Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> (IMA) Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | lsm,selinux: add new hook to compare new mount to an existing mountOlga Kornievskaia2021-03-221-0/+56
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a new hook that takes an existing super block and a new mount with new options and determines if new options confict with an existing mount or not. A filesystem can use this new hook to determine if it can share the an existing superblock with a new superblock for the new mount. Signed-off-by: Olga Kornievskaia <kolga@netapp.com> Acked-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> [PM: tweak the subject line, fix tab/space problems] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: fix misspellings using codespell toolXiong Zhenwu2021-03-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A typo is f out by codespell tool in 422th line of security.h: $ codespell ./security/selinux/include/ ./security.h:422: thie ==> the, this Fix a typo found by codespell. Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhenwu <xiong.zhenwu@zte.com.cn> [PM: subject line tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: fix misspellings using codespell toolXiong Zhenwu2021-03-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A typo is found out by codespell tool in 16th line of hashtab.c $ codespell ./security/selinux/ss/ ./hashtab.c:16: rouding ==> rounding Fix a typo found by codespell. Signed-off-by: Xiong Zhenwu <xiong.zhenwu@zte.com.cn> [PM: subject line tweak] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | selinux: measure state and policy capabilitiesLakshmi Ramasubramanian2021-03-084-5/+96
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SELinux stores the configuration state and the policy capabilities in kernel memory. Changes to this data at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring this data through IMA subsystem provides a tamper-resistant way for an attestation service to remotely validate it at runtime. Measure the configuration state and policy capabilities by calling the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data(). To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required: 1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time. For example, BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.11.0-rc3+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data 2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux Sample measurement of SELinux state and policy capabilities: 10 2122...65d8 ima-buf sha256:13c2...1292 selinux-state 696e...303b Execute the following command to extract the measured data from the IMA's runtime measurements list: grep "selinux-state" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p The output should be a list of key-value pairs. For example, initialized=1;enforcing=0;checkreqprot=1;network_peer_controls=1;open_perms=1;extended_socket_class=1;always_check_network=0;cgroup_seclabel=1;nnp_nosuid_transition=1;genfs_seclabel_symlinks=0; To verify the measurement is consistent with the current SELinux state reported on the system, compare the integer values in the following files with those set in the IMA measurement (using the following commands): - cat /sys/fs/selinux/enforce - cat /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot - cat /sys/fs/selinux/policy_capabilities/[capability_file] Note that the actual verification would be against an expected state and done on a separate system (likely an attestation server) requiring "initialized=1;enforcing=1;checkreqprot=0;" for a secure state and then whatever policy capabilities are actually set in the expected policy (which can be extracted from the policy itself via seinfo, for example). Signed-off-by: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> Suggested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Suggested-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-11-17 11:26:27 +0000