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* Merge tag 'Smack-for-6.6' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-nextLinus Torvalds2023-08-301-2/+2
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler: "Two minor fixes: is a simple spelling fix. The other is a bounds check for a very likely underflow" * tag 'Smack-for-6.6' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next: smackfs: Prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso() security: smack: smackfs: fix typo (lables->labels)
| * smackfs: Prevent underflow in smk_set_cipso()Dan Carpenter2023-08-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is a upper bound to "catlen" but no lower bound to prevent negatives. I don't see that this necessarily causes a problem but we may as well be safe. Fixes: e114e473771c ("Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * security: smack: smackfs: fix typo (lables->labels)Tóth János2023-08-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix a spelling error in smakcfs. Signed-off-by: Tóth János <gomba007@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20230829' of ↵Linus Torvalds2023-08-302-29/+41
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore: - Add proper multi-LSM support for xattrs in the security_inode_init_security() hook Historically the LSM layer has only allowed a single LSM to add an xattr to an inode, with IMA/EVM measuring that and adding its own as well. As we work towards promoting IMA/EVM to a "proper LSM" instead of the special case that it is now, we need to better support the case of multiple LSMs each adding xattrs to an inode and after several attempts we now appear to have something that is working well. It is worth noting that in the process of making this change we uncovered a problem with Smack's SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr which is also fixed in this pull request. - Additional LSM hook constification Two patches to constify parameters to security_capget() and security_binder_transfer_file(). While I generally don't make a special note of who submitted these patches, these were the work of an Outreachy intern, Khadija Kamran, and that makes me happy; hopefully it does the same for all of you reading this. - LSM hook comment header fixes One patch to add a missing hook comment header, one to fix a minor typo. - Remove an old, unused credential function declaration It wasn't clear to me who should pick this up, but it was trivial, obviously correct, and arguably the LSM layer has a vested interest in credentials so I merged it. Sadly I'm now noticing that despite my subject line cleanup I didn't cleanup the "unsued" misspelling, sigh * tag 'lsm-pr-20230829' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: lsm: constify the 'file' parameter in security_binder_transfer_file() lsm: constify the 'target' parameter in security_capget() lsm: add comment block for security_sk_classify_flow LSM hook security: Fix ret values doc for security_inode_init_security() cred: remove unsued extern declaration change_create_files_as() evm: Support multiple LSMs providing an xattr evm: Align evm_inode_init_security() definition with LSM infrastructure smack: Set the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr in smack_inode_init_security() security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook lsm: fix typo in security_file_lock() comment header
| * | smack: Set the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr in smack_inode_init_security()Roberto Sassu2023-07-102-18/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | With the newly added ability of LSMs to supply multiple xattrs, set SMACK64TRASMUTE in smack_inode_init_security(), instead of d_instantiate(). Do it by incrementing SMACK_INODE_INIT_XATTRS to 2 and by calling lsm_get_xattr_slot() a second time, if the transmuting conditions are met. The LSM infrastructure passes all xattrs provided by LSMs to the filesystems through the initxattrs() callback, so that filesystems can store xattrs in the disk. After the change, the SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE inode flag is always set by d_instantiate() after fetching SMACK64TRANSMUTE from the disk. Before it was done by smack_inode_post_setxattr() as result of the __vfs_setxattr() call. Removing __vfs_setxattr() also prevents invalidating the EVM HMAC, by adding a new xattr without checking and updating the existing HMAC. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | security: Allow all LSMs to provide xattrs for inode_init_security hookRoberto Sassu2023-07-101-12/+13
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, the LSM infrastructure supports only one LSM providing an xattr and EVM calculating the HMAC on that xattr, plus other inode metadata. Allow all LSMs to provide one or multiple xattrs, by extending the security blob reservation mechanism. Introduce the new lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure, so that each LSM can specify how many xattrs it needs, and the LSM infrastructure knows how many xattr slots it should allocate. Modify the inode_init_security hook definition, by passing the full xattr array allocated in security_inode_init_security(), and the current number of xattr slots in that array filled by LSMs. The first parameter would allow EVM to access and calculate the HMAC on xattrs supplied by other LSMs, the second to not leave gaps in the xattr array, when an LSM requested but did not provide xattrs (e.g. if it is not initialized). Introduce lsm_get_xattr_slot(), which LSMs can call as many times as the number specified in the lbs_xattr_count field of the lsm_blob_sizes structure. During each call, lsm_get_xattr_slot() increments the number of filled xattrs, so that at the next invocation it returns the next xattr slot to fill. Cleanup security_inode_init_security(). Unify the !initxattrs and initxattrs case by simply not allocating the new_xattrs array in the former. Update the documentation to reflect the changes, and fix the description of the xattr name, as it is not allocated anymore. Adapt both SELinux and Smack to use the new definition of the inode_init_security hook, and to call lsm_get_xattr_slot() to obtain and fill the reserved slots in the xattr array. Move the xattr->name assignment after the xattr->value one, so that it is done only in case of successful memory allocation. Finally, change the default return value of the inode_init_security hook from zero to -EOPNOTSUPP, so that BPF LSM correctly follows the hook conventions. Reported-by: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@clip-os.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/ Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: minor comment and variable tweaks, approved by RS] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* / vfs, security: Fix automount superblock LSM init problem, preventing NFS sb ↵David Howells2023-08-151-0/+51
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | sharing When NFS superblocks are created by automounting, their LSM parameters aren't set in the fs_context struct prior to sget_fc() being called, leading to failure to match existing superblocks. This bug leads to messages like the following appearing in dmesg when fscache is enabled: NFS: Cache volume key already in use (nfs,4.2,2,108,106a8c0,1,,,,100000,100000,2ee,3a98,1d4c,3a98,1) Fix this by adding a new LSM hook to load fc->security for submount creation. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962680944.3334508.6610023900349142034.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v1 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165962729225.3357250.14350728846471527137.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v2 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/165970659095.2812394.6868894171102318796.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v3 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166133579016.3678898.6283195019480567275.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v4 Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/217595.1662033775@warthog.procyon.org.uk/ # v5 Fixes: 9bc61ab18b1d ("vfs: Introduce fs_context, switch vfs_kern_mount() to it.") Fixes: 779df6a5480f ("NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode") Tested-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: "Christian Brauner (Microsoft)" <brauner@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> Message-Id: <20230808-master-v9-1-e0ecde888221@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
* smack: Record transmuting in smk_transmutedRoberto Sassu2023-05-112-12/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | smack_dentry_create_files_as() determines whether transmuting should occur based on the label of the parent directory the new inode will be added to, and not the label of the directory where it is created. This helps for example to do transmuting on overlayfs, since the latter first creates the inode in the working directory, and then moves it to the correct destination. However, despite smack_dentry_create_files_as() provides the correct label, smack_inode_init_security() does not know from passed information whether or not transmuting occurred. Without this information, smack_inode_init_security() cannot set SMK_INODE_CHANGED in smk_flags, which will result in the SMACK64TRANSMUTE xattr not being set in smack_d_instantiate(). Thus, add the smk_transmuted field to the task_smack structure, and set it in smack_dentry_create_files_as() to smk_task if transmuting occurred. If smk_task is equal to smk_transmuted in smack_inode_init_security(), act as if transmuting was successful but without taking the label from the parent directory (the inode label was already set correctly from the current credentials in smack_inode_alloc_security()). Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* smack: Retrieve transmuting information in smack_inode_getsecurity()Roberto Sassu2023-05-111-4/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | Enhance smack_inode_getsecurity() to retrieve the value for SMACK64TRANSMUTE from the inode security blob, similarly to SMACK64. This helps to display accurate values in the situation where the security labels come from mount options and not from xattrs. Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Merge tag 'Smack-for-6.4' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-nextLinus Torvalds2023-04-241-40/+24
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler: "There are two changes, one small and one more substantial: - Remove of an unnecessary cast - The mount option processing introduced with the mount rework makes copies of mount option values. There is no good reason to make copies of Smack labels, as they are maintained on a list and never removed. The code now uses pointers to entries on the list, reducing processing time and memory use" * tag 'Smack-for-6.4' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next: Smack: Improve mount process memory use smack_lsm: remove unnecessary type casting
| * Smack: Improve mount process memory useCasey Schaufler2023-04-051-39/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The existing mount processing code in Smack makes many unnecessary copies of Smack labels. Because Smack labels never go away once imported it is safe to use pointers to them rather than copies. Replace the use of copies of label names to pointers to the global label list entries. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * smack_lsm: remove unnecessary type castingXU pengfei2023-03-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Remove unnecessary type casting. The type of inode variable is struct inode *, so no type casting required. Signed-off-by: XU pengfei <xupengfei@nfschina.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | selinux: remove the runtime disable functionalityPaul Moore2023-03-201-2/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After working with the larger SELinux-based distros for several years, we're finally at a place where we can disable the SELinux runtime disable functionality. The existing kernel deprecation notice explains the functionality and why we want to remove it: The selinuxfs "disable" node allows SELinux to be disabled at runtime prior to a policy being loaded into the kernel. If disabled via this mechanism, SELinux will remain disabled until the system is rebooted. The preferred method of disabling SELinux is via the "selinux=0" boot parameter, but the selinuxfs "disable" node was created to make it easier for systems with primitive bootloaders that did not allow for easy modification of the kernel command line. Unfortunately, allowing for SELinux to be disabled at runtime makes it difficult to secure the kernel's LSM hooks using the "__ro_after_init" feature. It is that last sentence, mentioning the '__ro_after_init' hardening, which is the real motivation for this change, and if you look at the diffstat you'll see that the impact of this patch reaches across all the different LSMs, helping prevent tampering at the LSM hook level. From a SELinux perspective, it is important to note that if you continue to disable SELinux via "/etc/selinux/config" it may appear that SELinux is disabled, but it is simply in an uninitialized state. If you load a policy with `load_policy -i`, you will see SELinux come alive just as if you had loaded the policy during early-boot. It is also worth noting that the "/sys/fs/selinux/disable" file is always writable now, regardless of the Kconfig settings, but writing to the file has no effect on the system, other than to display an error on the console if a non-zero/true value is written. Finally, in the several years where we have been working on deprecating this functionality, there has only been one instance of someone mentioning any user visible breakage. In this particular case it was an individual's kernel test system, and the workaround documented in the deprecation notice ("selinux=0" on the kernel command line) resolved the issue without problem. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Merge tag 'Smack-for-6.3' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-nextLinus Torvalds2023-02-221-3/+14
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull smack update from Casey Schaufler: "One fix for resetting CIPSO labeling" * tag 'Smack-for-6.3' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next: smackfs: Added check catlen
| * smackfs: Added check catlenDenis Arefev2023-02-211-3/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If the catlen is 0, the memory for the netlbl_lsm_catmap structure must be allocated anyway, otherwise the check of such rules is not completed correctly. Signed-off-by: Denis Arefev <arefev@swemel.ru> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | fs: port acl to mnt_idmapChristian Brauner2023-01-191-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
* | fs: port xattr to mnt_idmapChristian Brauner2023-01-191-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
* | fs: port ->permission() to pass mnt_idmapChristian Brauner2023-01-191-2/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert to struct mnt_idmap. Last cycle we merged the necessary infrastructure in 256c8aed2b42 ("fs: introduce dedicated idmap type for mounts"). This is just the conversion to struct mnt_idmap. Currently we still pass around the plain namespace that was attached to a mount. This is in general pretty convenient but it makes it easy to conflate namespaces that are relevant on the filesystem with namespaces that are relevent on the mount level. Especially for non-vfs developers without detailed knowledge in this area this can be a potential source for bugs. Once the conversion to struct mnt_idmap is done all helpers down to the really low-level helpers will take a struct mnt_idmap argument instead of two namespace arguments. This way it becomes impossible to conflate the two eliminating the possibility of any bugs. All of the vfs and all filesystems only operate on struct mnt_idmap. Acked-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
* Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20221212' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-12-131-9/+10
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore: - Improve the error handling in the device cgroup such that memory allocation failures when updating the access policy do not potentially alter the policy. - Some minor fixes to reiserfs to ensure that it properly releases LSM-related xattr values. - Update the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook to take sockptr_t values. Previously the net/BPF folks updated the getsockopt code in the network stack to leverage the sockptr_t type to make it easier to pass both kernel and __user pointers, but unfortunately when they did so they didn't convert the LSM hook. While there was/is no immediate risk by not converting the LSM hook, it seems like this is a mistake waiting to happen so this patch proactively does the LSM hook conversion. - Convert vfs_getxattr_alloc() to return an int instead of a ssize_t and cleanup the callers. Internally the function was never going to return anything larger than an int and the callers were doing some very odd things casting the return value; this patch fixes all that and helps bring a bit of sanity to vfs_getxattr_alloc() and its callers. - More verbose, and helpful, LSM debug output when the system is booted with "lsm.debug" on the command line. There are examples in the commit description, but the quick summary is that this patch provides better information about which LSMs are enabled and the ordering in which they are processed. - General comment and kernel-doc fixes and cleanups. * tag 'lsm-pr-20221212' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: lsm: Fix description of fs_context_parse_param lsm: Add/fix return values in lsm_hooks.h and fix formatting lsm: Clarify documentation of vm_enough_memory hook reiserfs: Add missing calls to reiserfs_security_free() lsm,fs: fix vfs_getxattr_alloc() return type and caller error paths device_cgroup: Roll back to original exceptions after copy failure LSM: Better reporting of actual LSMs at boot lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safe audit: Fix some kernel-doc warnings lsm: remove obsoleted comments for security hooks fs: edit a comment made in bad taste
| * lsm: make security_socket_getpeersec_stream() sockptr_t safePaul Moore2022-11-041-9/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 4ff09db1b79b ("bpf: net: Change sk_getsockopt() to take the sockptr_t argument") made it possible to call sk_getsockopt() with both user and kernel address space buffers through the use of the sockptr_t type. Unfortunately at the time of conversion the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() LSM hook was written to only accept userspace buffers, and in a desire to avoid having to change the LSM hook the commit author simply passed the sockptr_t's userspace buffer pointer. Since the only sk_getsockopt() callers at the time of conversion which used kernel sockptr_t buffers did not allow SO_PEERSEC, and hence the security_socket_getpeersec_stream() hook, this was acceptable but also very fragile as future changes presented the possibility of silently passing kernel space pointers to the LSM hook. There are several ways to protect against this, including careful code review of future commits, but since relying on code review to catch bugs is a recipe for disaster and the upstream eBPF maintainer is "strongly against defensive programming", this patch updates the LSM hook, and all of the implementations to support sockptr_t and safely handle both user and kernel space buffers. Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | smack: implement get, set and remove acl hookChristian Brauner2022-10-201-0/+71
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The current way of setting and getting posix acls through the generic xattr interface is error prone and type unsafe. The vfs needs to interpret and fixup posix acls before storing or reporting it to userspace. Various hacks exist to make this work. The code is hard to understand and difficult to maintain in it's current form. Instead of making this work by hacking posix acls through xattr handlers we are building a dedicated posix acl api around the get and set inode operations. This removes a lot of hackiness and makes the codepaths easier to maintain. A lot of background can be found in [1]. So far posix acls were passed as a void blob to the security and integrity modules. Some of them like evm then proceed to interpret the void pointer and convert it into the kernel internal struct posix acl representation to perform their integrity checking magic. This is obviously pretty problematic as that requires knowledge that only the vfs is guaranteed to have and has lead to various bugs. Add a proper security hook for setting posix acls and pass down the posix acls in their appropriate vfs format instead of hacking it through a void pointer stored in the uapi format. I spent considerate time in the security module infrastructure and audited all codepaths. Smack has no restrictions based on the posix acl values passed through it. The capability hook doesn't need to be called either because it only has restrictions on security.* xattrs. So these all becomes very simple hooks for smack. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220801145520.1532837-1-brauner@kernel.org [1] Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
* Merge tag 'pull-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfsLinus Torvalds2022-10-061-1/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull vfs constification updates from Al Viro: "whack-a-mole: constifying struct path *" * tag 'pull-path' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: ecryptfs: constify path spufs: constify path nd_jump_link(): constify path audit_init_parent(): constify path __io_setxattr(): constify path do_proc_readlink(): constify path overlayfs: constify path fs/notify: constify path may_linkat(): constify path do_sys_name_to_handle(): constify path ->getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM...
| * ->getprocattr(): attribute name is const char *, TYVM...Al Viro2022-09-011-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | cast of ->d_name.name to char * is completely wrong - nothing is allowed to modify its contents. Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge tag 'Smack-for-6.1' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-nextLinus Torvalds2022-10-032-12/+17
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler: "Two minor code clean-ups: one removes constants left over from the old mount API, while the other gets rid of an unneeded variable. The other change fixes a flaw in handling IPv6 labeling" * tag 'Smack-for-6.1' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next: smack: cleanup obsolete mount option flags smack: lsm: remove the unneeded result variable SMACK: Add sk_clone_security LSM hook
| * | smack: cleanup obsolete mount option flagsXiu Jianfeng2022-09-271-9/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These mount option flags are obsolete since commit 12085b14a444 ("smack: switch to private smack_mnt_opts"), remove them. Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | smack: lsm: remove the unneeded result variableXu Panda2022-09-271-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Return the value smk_ptrace_rule_check() directly instead of storing it in another redundant variable. Reported-by: Zeal Robot <zealci@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Xu Panda <xu.panda@zte.com.cn> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | SMACK: Add sk_clone_security LSM hookLontke Michael2022-09-271-0/+16
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Using smk_of_current() during sk_alloc_security hook leads in rare cases to a faulty initialization of the security context of the created socket. By adding the LSM hook sk_clone_security to SMACK this initialization fault is corrected by copying the security context of the old socket pointer to the newly cloned one. Co-authored-by: Martin Ostertag: <martin.ostertag@elektrobit.com> Signed-off-by: Lontke Michael <michael.lontke@elektrobit.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* / Smack: Provide read control for io_uring_cmdCasey Schaufler2022-08-261-0/+32
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | Limit io_uring "cmd" options to files for which the caller has Smack read access. There may be cases where the cmd option may be closer to a write access than a read, but there is no way to make that determination. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: ee692a21e9bf ("fs,io_uring: add infrastructure for uring-cmd") Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* smack: Remove the redundant lsm_inode_allocXiu Jianfeng2022-08-011-7/+0
| | | | | | | | | | It's not possible for inode->i_security to be NULL here because every inode will call inode_init_always and then lsm_inode_alloc to alloc memory for inode->security, this is what LSM infrastructure management do, so remove this redundant code. Signed-off-by: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* smack: Replace kzalloc + strncpy with kstrndupGONG, Ruiqi2022-08-011-5/+2
| | | | | | | | | | Simplify the code by using kstrndup instead of kzalloc and strncpy in smk_parse_smack(), which meanwhile remove strncpy as [1] suggests. [1]: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/90 Signed-off-by: GONG, Ruiqi <gongruiqi1@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Merge tag 'pull-18-rc1-work.mount' of ↵Linus Torvalds2022-06-041-0/+1
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull mount handling updates from Al Viro: "Cleanups (and one fix) around struct mount handling. The fix is usermode_driver.c one - once you've done kern_mount(), you must kern_unmount(); simple mntput() will end up with a leak. Several failure exits in there messed up that way... In practice you won't hit those particular failure exits without fault injection, though" * tag 'pull-18-rc1-work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: move mount-related externs from fs.h to mount.h blob_to_mnt(): kern_unmount() is needed to undo kern_mount() m->mnt_root->d_inode->i_sb is a weird way to spell m->mnt_sb... linux/mount.h: trim includes uninline may_mount() and don't opencode it in fspick(2)/fsopen(2)
| * move mount-related externs from fs.h to mount.hAl Viro2022-05-191-0/+1
| | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | smack: Remove redundant assignmentsMichal Orzel2022-05-231-1/+0
|/ | | | | | | | | | Get rid of redundant assignments which end up in values not being read either because they are overwritten or the function ends. Reported by clang-tidy [deadcode.DeadStores] Signed-off-by: Michal Orzel <michalorzel.eng@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Fix incorrect type in assignment of ipv6 port for auditCasey Schaufler2022-02-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Remove inappropriate use of ntohs() and assign the port value directly. Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* lsm: security_task_getsecid_subj() -> security_current_getsecid_subj()Paul Moore2021-11-222-21/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The security_task_getsecid_subj() LSM hook invites misuse by allowing callers to specify a task even though the hook is only safe when the current task is referenced. Fix this by removing the task_struct argument to the hook, requiring LSM implementations to use the current task. While we are changing the hook declaration we also rename the function to security_current_getsecid_subj() in an effort to reinforce that the hook captures the subjective credentials of the current task and not an arbitrary task on the system. Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of ↵Linus Torvalds2021-11-011-0/+46
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Add LSM/SELinux/Smack controls and auditing for io-uring. As usual, the individual commit descriptions have more detail, but we were basically missing two things which we're adding here: + establishment of a proper audit context so that auditing of io-uring ops works similarly to how it does for syscalls (with some io-uring additions because io-uring ops are *not* syscalls) + additional LSM hooks to enable access control points for some of the more unusual io-uring features, e.g. credential overrides. The additional audit callouts and LSM hooks were done in conjunction with the io-uring folks, based on conversations and RFC patches earlier in the year. - Fixup the binder credential handling so that the proper credentials are used in the LSM hooks; the commit description and the code comment which is removed in these patches are helpful to understand the background and why this is the proper fix. - Enable SELinux genfscon policy support for securityfs, allowing improved SELinux filesystem labeling for other subsystems which make use of securityfs, e.g. IMA. * tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: security: Return xattr name from security_dentry_init_security() selinux: fix a sock regression in selinux_ip_postroute_compat() binder: use cred instead of task for getsecid binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks binder: use euid from cred instead of using task LSM: Avoid warnings about potentially unused hook variables selinux: fix all of the W=1 build warnings selinux: make better use of the nf_hook_state passed to the NF hooks selinux: fix race condition when computing ocontext SIDs selinux: remove unneeded ipv6 hook wrappers selinux: remove the SELinux lockdown implementation selinux: enable genfscon labeling for securityfs Smack: Brutalist io_uring support selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to anon_inode_getfd_secure() audit: add filtering for io_uring records audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls
| * Smack: Brutalist io_uring supportCasey Schaufler2021-09-191-0/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add Smack privilege checks for io_uring. Use CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE for the override_creds case and CAP_MAC_ADMIN for creating a polling thread. These choices are based on conjecture regarding the intent of the surrounding code. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> [PM: make the smack_uring_* funcs static, remove debug code] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | Merge tag 'Smack-for-5.16' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-nextLinus Torvalds2021-11-013-44/+34
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler: "Multiple corrections to smackfs: - a change for overlayfs support that corrects the initial attributes on created files - code clean-up for netlabel processing - several fixes in smackfs for a variety of reasons - Errors reported by W=1 have been addressed All told, nothing challenging" * tag 'Smack-for-5.16' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next: smackfs: use netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del() for deleting cipso_v4_doi smackfs: use __GFP_NOFAIL for smk_cipso_doi() Smack: fix W=1 build warnings smack: remove duplicated hook function Smack:- Use overlay inode label in smack_inode_copy_up() smack: Guard smack_ipv6_lock definition within a SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING block smackfs: Fix use-after-free in netlbl_catmap_walk()
| * | smackfs: use netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del() for deleting cipso_v4_doiTetsuo Handa2021-10-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | syzbot is reporting UAF at cipso_v4_doi_search() [1], for smk_cipso_doi() is calling kfree() without removing from the cipso_v4_doi_list list after netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add() returned an error. We need to use netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_del() in order to remove from the list and wait for RCU grace period before kfree(). Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=93dba5b91f0fed312cbd [1] Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+93dba5b91f0fed312cbd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Fixes: 6c2e8ac0953fccdd ("netlabel: Update kernel configuration API") Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | smackfs: use __GFP_NOFAIL for smk_cipso_doi()Tetsuo Handa2021-10-221-3/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | syzbot is reporting kernel panic at smk_cipso_doi() due to memory allocation fault injection [1]. The reason for need to use panic() was not explained. But since no fix was proposed for 18 months, for now let's use __GFP_NOFAIL for utilizing syzbot resource on other bugs. Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=89731ccb6fec15ce1c22 [1] Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+89731ccb6fec15ce1c22@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | Smack: fix W=1 build warningsCasey Schaufler2021-10-131-12/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | A couple of functions had malformed comment blocks. Namespace parameters were added without updating the comment blocks. These are all repaired in the Smack code, so "% make W=1 security/smack" is warning free. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | smack: remove duplicated hook functionFlorian Westphal2021-10-121-23/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ipv4 and ipv6 hook functions are identical, remove one. Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | Smack:- Use overlay inode label in smack_inode_copy_up()Vishal Goel2021-09-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently in "smack_inode_copy_up()" function, process label is changed with the label on parent inode. Due to which, process is assigned directory label and whatever file or directory created by the process are also getting directory label which is wrong label. Changes has been done to use label of overlay inode instead of parent inode. Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | smack: Guard smack_ipv6_lock definition within a SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING blockSebastian Andrzej Siewior2021-09-241-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The mutex smack_ipv6_lock is only used with the SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING block but its definition is outside of the block. This leads to a defined-but-not-used warning on PREEMPT_RT. Moving smack_ipv6_lock down to the block where it is used where it used raises the question why is smk_ipv6_port_list read if nothing is added to it. Turns out, only smk_ipv6_port_check() is using it outside of an ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING block. However two of three caller invoke smk_ipv6_port_check() from a ifdef block and only one is using __is_defined() macro which requires the function and smk_ipv6_port_list to be around. Put the lock and list inside an ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING block to avoid the warning regarding unused mutex. Extend the ifdef-block to also cover smk_ipv6_port_check(). Make smack_socket_connect() use ifdef instead of __is_defined() to avoid complains about missing function. Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | smackfs: Fix use-after-free in netlbl_catmap_walk()Pawan Gupta2021-09-151-1/+4
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Syzkaller reported use-after-free bug as described in [1]. The bug is triggered when smk_set_cipso() tries to free stale category bitmaps while there are concurrent reader(s) using the same bitmaps. Wait for RCU grace period to finish before freeing the category bitmaps in smk_set_cipso(). This makes sure that there are no more readers using the stale bitmaps and freeing them should be safe. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/000000000000a814c505ca657a4e@google.com/ Reported-by: syzbot+3f91de0b813cc3d19a80@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* / selinux,smack: fix subjective/objective credential use mixupsPaul Moore2021-09-231-2/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Jann Horn reported a problem with commit eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials") where some LSM hooks were attempting to access the subjective credentials of a task other than the current task. Generally speaking, it is not safe to access another task's subjective credentials and doing so can cause a number of problems. Further, while looking into the problem, I realized that Smack was suffering from a similar problem brought about by a similar commit 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials"). This patch addresses this problem by restoring the use of the task's objective credentials in those cases where the task is other than the current executing task. Not only does this resolve the problem reported by Jann, it is arguably the correct thing to do in these cases. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: eb1231f73c4d ("selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials") Fixes: 1fb057dcde11 ("smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials") Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* smack: mark 'smack_enabled' global variable as __initdataAustin Kim2021-07-202-2/+2
| | | | | | | | Mark 'smack_enabled' as __initdata since it is only used during initialization code. Signed-off-by: Austin Kim <austin.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Smack: Fix wrong semantics in smk_access_entry()Tianjia Zhang2021-07-201-9/+8
| | | | | | | | | | In the smk_access_entry() function, if no matching rule is found in the rust_list, a negative error code will be used to perform bit operations with the MAY_ enumeration value. This is semantically wrong. This patch fixes this issue. Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Smack: fix doc warningChenXiaoSong2021-06-081-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | Fix gcc W=1 warning: security/smack/smack_access.c:342: warning: Function parameter or member 'ad' not described in 'smack_log' security/smack/smack_access.c:403: warning: Function parameter or member 'skp' not described in 'smk_insert_entry' security/smack/smack_access.c:487: warning: Function parameter or member 'level' not described in 'smk_netlbl_mls' security/smack/smack_access.c:487: warning: Function parameter or member 'len' not described in 'smk_netlbl_mls' Signed-off-by: ChenXiaoSong <chenxiaosong2@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Revert "Smack: Handle io_uring kernel thread privileges"Jens Axboe2021-05-181-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | This reverts commit 942cb357ae7d9249088e3687ee6a00ed2745a0c7. The io_uring PF_IO_WORKER threads no longer have PF_KTHREAD set, so no need to special case them for credential checks. Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
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