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* pipe: Reduce #inclusion of pipe_fs_i.hDavid Howells2019-10-231-1/+0
| | | | | | | Remove some #inclusions of linux/pipe_fs_i.h that don't seem to be necessary any more. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* Merge tag 'smack-for-5.4-rc1' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-nextLinus Torvalds2019-09-232-23/+23
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler: "Four patches for v5.4. Nothing is major. All but one are in response to mechanically detected potential issues. The remaining patch cleans up kernel-doc notations" * tag 'smack-for-5.4-rc1' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next: smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lock security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb() smack: fix some kernel-doc notations Smack: Don't ignore other bprm->unsafe flags if LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set
| * smack: use GFP_NOFS while holding inode_smack::smk_lockEric Biggers2019-09-042-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | inode_smack::smk_lock is taken during smack_d_instantiate(), which is called during a filesystem transaction when creating a file on ext4. Therefore to avoid a deadlock, all code that takes this lock must use GFP_NOFS, to prevent memory reclaim from waiting for the filesystem transaction to complete. Reported-by: syzbot+0eefc1e06a77d327a056@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * security: smack: Fix possible null-pointer dereferences in ↵Jia-Ju Bai2019-09-041-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb() In smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(), there is an if statement on line 3920 to check whether skb is NULL: if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) This check indicates skb can be NULL in some cases. But on lines 3931 and 3932, skb is used: ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL); Thus, possible null-pointer dereferences may occur when skb is NULL. To fix these possible bugs, an if statement is added to check skb. These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by us. Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * smack: fix some kernel-doc notationsluanshi2019-09-041-18/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix/add kernel-doc notation and fix typos in security/smack/. Signed-off-by: Liguang Zhang <zhangliguang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * Smack: Don't ignore other bprm->unsafe flags if LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is setJann Horn2019-09-041-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is a logic bug in the current smack_bprm_set_creds(): If LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE is set, but the ptrace state is deemed to be acceptable (e.g. because the ptracer detached in the meantime), the other ->unsafe flags aren't checked. As far as I can tell, this means that something like the following could work (but I haven't tested it): - task A: create task B with fork() - task B: set NO_NEW_PRIVS - task B: install a seccomp filter that makes open() return 0 under some conditions - task B: replace fd 0 with a malicious library - task A: attach to task B with PTRACE_ATTACH - task B: execve() a file with an SMACK64EXEC extended attribute - task A: while task B is still in the middle of execve(), exit (which destroys the ptrace relationship) Make sure that if any flags other than LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE are set in bprm->unsafe, we reject the execve(). Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5663884caab1 ("Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack") Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | Merge branch 'work.mount0' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-07-191-12/+22
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs mount updates from Al Viro: "The first part of mount updates. Convert filesystems to use the new mount API" * 'work.mount0' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits) mnt_init(): call shmem_init() unconditionally constify ksys_mount() string arguments don't bother with registering rootfs init_rootfs(): don't bother with init_ramfs_fs() vfs: Convert smackfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert selinuxfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert securityfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert apparmorfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert openpromfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert xenfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert gadgetfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert oprofilefs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert ibmasmfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert qib_fs/ipathfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert efivarfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert configfs to use the new mount API vfs: Convert binfmt_misc to use the new mount API convenience helper: get_tree_single() convenience helper get_tree_nodev() vfs: Kill sget_userns() ...
| * | vfs: Convert smackfs to use the new mount APIDavid Howells2019-07-041-12/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Convert the smackfs filesystem to the new internal mount API as the old one will be obsoleted and removed. This allows greater flexibility in communication of mount parameters between userspace, the VFS and the filesystem. See Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt for more information. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | | Revert "Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-07-101-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs" This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus effectively commits 7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION") 2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL") that the merge brought in). It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of in-kernel X.509 certificates [2]. The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in order to not impact the rest of the merge window. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | | Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-07-081-1/+2
|\ \ \ | |_|/ |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull keyring ACL support from David Howells: "This changes the permissions model used by keys and keyrings to be based on an internal ACL by the following means: - Replace the permissions mask internally with an ACL that contains a list of ACEs, each with a specific subject with a permissions mask. Potted default ACLs are available for new keys and keyrings. ACE subjects can be macroised to indicate the UID and GID specified on the key (which remain). Future commits will be able to add additional subject types, such as specific UIDs or domain tags/namespaces. Also split a number of permissions to give finer control. Examples include splitting the revocation permit from the change-attributes permit, thereby allowing someone to be granted permission to revoke a key without allowing them to change the owner; also the ability to join a keyring is split from the ability to link to it, thereby stopping a process accessing a keyring by joining it and thus acquiring use of possessor permits. - Provide a keyctl to allow the granting or denial of one or more permits to a specific subject. Direct access to the ACL is not granted, and the ACL cannot be viewed" * tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
| * | keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACLDavid Howells2019-06-271-1/+2
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a greater range of subjects to represented. ============ WHY DO THIS? ============ The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of which should be grouped together. For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a key: (1) Changing a key's ownership. (2) Changing a key's security information. (3) Setting a keyring's restriction. And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime: (4) Setting an expiry time. (5) Revoking a key. and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache: (6) Invalidating a key. Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with controlling access to that key. Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however, be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is probably okay. As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers: (1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search. (2) Permitting keyrings to be joined. (3) Invalidation. But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really need to be controlled separately. Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks. =============== WHAT IS CHANGED =============== The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions: (1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring. (2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked. The SEARCH permission is split to create: (1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found. (2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring. (3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated. The WRITE permission is also split to create: (1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be added, removed and replaced in a keyring. (2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator. (3) REVOKE - see above. Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as: (*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key (*) Owner - permitted to the key owner (*) Group - permitted to the key group (*) Everyone - permitted to everyone Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to everyone else. Further subjects may be made available by later patches. The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now: VIEW Can view the key metadata READ Can read the key content WRITE Can update/modify the key content SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting LINK Can make a link to the key SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry INVAL Can invalidate REVOKE Can revoke JOIN Can join this keyring CLEAR Can clear this keyring The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated. The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set, or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token. The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL. The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE. The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an existing keyring. The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually created keyrings only. ====================== BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY ====================== To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be returned. It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero. SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned on if a keyring is being altered. The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs. It will make the following mappings: (1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH (2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR (3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set (4) CLEAR -> WRITE Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR. ======= TESTING ======= This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests: (1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the key. (2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 500Thomas Gleixner2019-06-192-8/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 2 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license version 2 as published by the free software foundation # extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 4122 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Enrico Weigelt <info@metux.net> Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190604081206.933168790@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | Smack: Restore the smackfsdef mount option and add missing prefixesCasey Schaufler2019-06-141-5/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The 5.1 mount system rework changed the smackfsdef mount option to smackfsdefault. This fixes the regression by making smackfsdef treated the same way as smackfsdefault. Also fix the smack_param_specs[] to have "smack" prefixes on all the names. This isn't visible to a user unless they either: (a) Try to mount a filesystem that's converted to the internal mount API and that implements the ->parse_monolithic() context operation - and only then if they call security_fs_context_parse_param() rather than security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(). There are no examples of this upstream yet, but nfs will probably want to do this for nfs2 or nfs3. (b) Use fsconfig() to configure the filesystem - in which case security_fs_context_parse_param() will be called. This issue is that smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts() checks for the "smack" prefix on the options, but smack_fs_context_parse_param() does not. Fixes: c3300aaf95fb ("smack: get rid of match_token()") Fixes: 2febd254adc4 ("smack: Implement filesystem context security hooks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Jose Bollo <jose.bollo@iot.bzh> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* | treewide: Replace GPLv2 boilerplate/reference with SPDX - rule 372Thomas Gleixner2019-06-053-15/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Based on 1 normalized pattern(s): this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify it under the terms of the gnu general public license as published by the free software foundation version 2 extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier GPL-2.0-only has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 135 file(s). Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net> Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190531081036.435762997@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | treewide: Add SPDX license identifier - Makefile/KconfigThomas Gleixner2019-05-212-0/+2
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add SPDX license identifiers to all Make/Kconfig files which: - Have no license information of any form These files fall under the project license, GPL v2 only. The resulting SPDX license identifier is: GPL-2.0-only Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* Smack: Fix kbuild reported build errorCasey Schaufler2019-04-301-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | The variable sap is defined under ifdef, but a recently added use of the variable was not. Put that use under ifdef as well. Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* smack: Check address length before reading address familyTetsuo Handa2019-04-291-4/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | KMSAN will complain if valid address length passed to bind()/connect()/ sendmsg() is shorter than sizeof("struct sockaddr"->sa_family) bytes. Also, since smk_ipv6_port_label()/smack_netlabel_send()/ smack_ipv6host_label()/smk_ipv6_check()/smk_ipv6_port_check() are not checking valid address length and/or address family, make sure we check both. The minimal valid length in smack_socket_connect() is changed from sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6) bytes to SIN6_LEN_RFC2133 bytes, for it seems that Smack is not using "struct sockaddr_in6"->sin6_scope_id field. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Smack: Fix IPv6 handling of 0 secmarkCasey Schaufler2019-04-031-0/+2
| | | | | | | | Handle the case where the skb for an IPv6 packet contains a 0 in the secmark for a packet generated locally. This can only happen for system packets, so allow the access. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* Smack: Create smack_rule cache to optimize memory usageCasey Schaufler2019-04-023-3/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch allows for small memory optimization by creating the kmem cache for "struct smack_rule" instead of using kzalloc. For adding new smack rule, kzalloc is used to allocate the memory for "struct smack_rule". kzalloc will always allocate 32 or 64 bytes for 1 structure depending upon the kzalloc cache sizes available in system. Although the size of structure is 20 bytes only, resulting in memory wastage per object in the default pool. For e.g., if there are 20000 rules, then it will save 240KB(20000*12) which is crucial for small memory targets. Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* smack: removal of global rule listVishal Goel2019-04-021-38/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In this patch, global rule list has been removed. Now all smack rules will be read using "smack_known_list". This list contains all the smack labels and internally each smack label structure maintains the list of smack rules corresponding to that smack label. So there is no need to maintain extra list. 1) Small Memory Optimization For eg. if there are 20000 rules, then it will save 625KB(20000*32), which is critical for small embedded systems. 2) Reducing the time taken in writing rules on load/load2 interface 3) Since global rule list is just used to read the rules, so there will be no performance impact on system Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Amit Sahrawat <a.sahrawat@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <cschaufler@localhost.localdomain>
* Merge branch 'work.mount' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-03-122-15/+96
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs mount infrastructure updates from Al Viro: "The rest of core infrastructure; no new syscalls in that pile, but the old parts are switched to new infrastructure. At that point conversions of individual filesystems can happen independently; some are done here (afs, cgroup, procfs, etc.), there's also a large series outside of that pile dealing with NFS (quite a bit of option-parsing stuff is getting used there - it's one of the most convoluted filesystems in terms of mount-related logics), but NFS bits are the next cycle fodder. It got seriously simplified since the last cycle; documentation is probably the weakest bit at the moment - I considered dropping the commit introducing Documentation/filesystems/mount_api.txt (cutting the size increase by quarter ;-), but decided that it would be better to fix it up after -rc1 instead. That pile allows to do followup work in independent branches, which should make life much easier for the next cycle. fs/super.c size increase is unpleasant; there's a followup series that allows to shrink it considerably, but I decided to leave that until the next cycle" * 'work.mount' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (41 commits) afs: Use fs_context to pass parameters over automount afs: Add fs_context support vfs: Add some logging to the core users of the fs_context log vfs: Implement logging through fs_context vfs: Provide documentation for new mount API vfs: Remove kern_mount_data() hugetlbfs: Convert to fs_context cpuset: Use fs_context kernfs, sysfs, cgroup, intel_rdt: Support fs_context cgroup: store a reference to cgroup_ns into cgroup_fs_context cgroup1_get_tree(): separate "get cgroup_root to use" into a separate helper cgroup_do_mount(): massage calling conventions cgroup: stash cgroup_root reference into cgroup_fs_context cgroup2: switch to option-by-option parsing cgroup1: switch to option-by-option parsing cgroup: take options parsing into ->parse_monolithic() cgroup: fold cgroup1_mount() into cgroup1_get_tree() cgroup: start switching to fs_context ipc: Convert mqueue fs to fs_context proc: Add fs_context support to procfs ...
| * introduce cloning of fs_contextAl Viro2019-02-281-0/+49
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | new primitive: vfs_dup_fs_context(). Comes with fs_context method (->dup()) for copying the filesystem-specific parts of fs_context, along with LSM one (->fs_context_dup()) for doing the same to LSM parts. [needs better commit message, and change of Author:, anyway] Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * smack: Implement filesystem context security hooksDavid Howells2019-02-282-15/+47
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Implement filesystem context security hooks for the smack LSM. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
* | Merge tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-03-071-3/+1
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit Pull audit updates from Paul Moore: "A lucky 13 audit patches for v5.1. Despite the rather large diffstat, most of the changes are from two bug fix patches that move code from one Kconfig option to another. Beyond that bit of churn, the remaining changes are largely cleanups and bug-fixes as we slowly march towards container auditing. It isn't all boring though, we do have a couple of new things: file capabilities v3 support, and expanded support for filtering on filesystems to solve problems with remote filesystems. All changes pass the audit-testsuite. Please merge for v5.1" * tag 'audit-pr-20190305' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit: audit: mark expected switch fall-through audit: hide auditsc_get_stamp and audit_serial prototypes audit: join tty records to their syscall audit: remove audit_context when CONFIG_ AUDIT and not AUDITSYSCALL audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_match audit: ignore fcaps on umount audit: clean up AUDITSYSCALL prototypes and stubs audit: more filter PATH records keyed on filesystem magic audit: add support for fcaps v3 audit: move loginuid and sessionid from CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL to CONFIG_AUDIT audit: add syscall information to CONFIG_CHANGE records audit: hand taken context to audit_kill_trees for syscall logging audit: give a clue what CONFIG_CHANGE op was involved
| * | audit: remove unused actx param from audit_rule_matchRichard Guy Briggs2019-01-311-3/+1
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The audit_rule_match() struct audit_context *actx parameter is not used by any in-tree consumers (selinux, apparmour, integrity, smack). The audit context is an internal audit structure that should only be accessed by audit accessor functions. It was part of commit 03d37d25e0f9 ("LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks") but appears to have never been used. Remove it. Please see the github issue https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/107 Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> [PM: fixed the referenced commit title] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
* | security: mark expected switch fall-throughs and add a missing breakGustavo A. R. Silva2019-02-221-2/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In preparation to enabling -Wimplicit-fallthrough, mark switch cases where we are expecting to fall through. This patch fixes the following warnings: security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c:85:10: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:940:18: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:943:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:972:21: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c:974:7: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] security/smack/smack_lsm.c:3391:9: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] security/apparmor/domain.c:569:6: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] Warning level 3 was used: -Wimplicit-fallthrough=3 Also, add a missing break statement to fix the following warning: security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c:116:26: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* | LSM: Make lsm_early_cred() and lsm_early_task() local functions.Tetsuo Handa2019-01-181-2/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since current->cred == current->real_cred when ordered_lsm_init() is called, and lsm_early_cred()/lsm_early_task() need to be called between the amount of required bytes is determined and module specific initialization function is called, we can move these calls from individual modules to ordered_lsm_init(). Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* | LSM: generalize flag passing to security_capableMicah Morton2019-01-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch provides a general mechanism for passing flags to the security_capable LSM hook. It replaces the specific 'audit' flag that is used to tell security_capable whether it should log an audit message for the given capability check. The reason for generalizing this flag passing is so we can add an additional flag that signifies whether security_capable is being called by a setid syscall (which is needed by the proposed SafeSetID LSM). Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* | LSM: Infrastructure management of the ipc security blobCasey Schaufler2019-01-082-30/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move management of the kern_ipc_perm->security and msg_msg->security blobs out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | Smack: Abstract use of ipc security blobsCasey Schaufler2019-01-082-5/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't use the ipc->security pointer directly. Don't use the msg_msg->security pointer directly. Provide helper functions that provides the security blob pointers. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | LSM: Infrastructure management of the inode securityCasey Schaufler2019-01-082-60/+18
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move management of the inode->i_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | Smack: Abstract use of inode security blobCasey Schaufler2019-01-082-18/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't use the inode->i_security pointer directly. Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | LSM: Infrastructure management of the file securityCasey Schaufler2019-01-082-14/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move management of the file->f_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the infrastructure. The modules no longer allocate or free the data, instead they tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | Smack: Abstract use of file security blobCasey Schaufler2019-01-082-4/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't use the file->f_security pointer directly. Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | Infrastructure management of the cred security blobCasey Schaufler2019-01-082-55/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move management of the cred security blob out of the security modules and into the security infrastructre. Instead of allocating and freeing space the security modules tell the infrastructure how much space they require. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | Smack: Abstract use of cred security blobCasey Schaufler2019-01-084-43/+53
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Don't use the cred->security pointer directly. Provide a helper function that provides the security blob pointer. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> [kees: adjusted for ordered init series] Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
* | LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSMKees Cook2019-01-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In order to both support old "security=" Legacy Major LSM selection, and handling real exclusivity, this creates LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE and updates the selection logic to handle them. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
* | LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMsKees Cook2019-01-081-3/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As a prerequisite to adjusting LSM selection logic in the future, this moves the selection logic up out of the individual major LSMs, making their init functions only run when actually enabled. This considers all LSMs enabled by default unless they specified an external "enable" variable. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* | LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJORKees Cook2019-01-081-0/+1
|/ | | | | | | | | | This adds a flag for the current "major" LSMs to distinguish them when we have a universal method for ordering all LSMs. It's called "legacy" since the distinction of "major" will go away in the blob-sharing world. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
* Merge branch 'mount.part1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-01-051-222/+137
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs Pull vfs mount API prep from Al Viro: "Mount API prereqs. Mostly that's LSM mount options cleanups. There are several minor fixes in there, but nothing earth-shattering (leaks on failure exits, mostly)" * 'mount.part1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (27 commits) mount_fs: suppress MAC on MS_SUBMOUNT as well as MS_KERNMOUNT smack: rewrite smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts() smack: get rid of match_token() smack: take the guts of smack_parse_opts_str() into a new helper LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt() selinux: rewrite selinux_sb_eat_lsm_opts() selinux: regularize Opt_... names a bit selinux: switch away from match_token() selinux: new helper - selinux_add_opt() LSM: bury struct security_mnt_opts smack: switch to private smack_mnt_opts selinux: switch to private struct selinux_mnt_opts LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic code selinux: kill selinux_sb_get_mnt_opts() LSM: turn sb_eat_lsm_opts() into a method nfs_remount(): don't leak, don't ignore LSM options quietly btrfs: sanitize security_mnt_opts use selinux; don't open-code a loop in sb_finish_set_opts() LSM: split ->sb_set_mnt_opts() out of ->sb_kern_mount() new helper: security_sb_eat_lsm_opts() ...
| * smack: rewrite smack_sb_eat_lsm_opts()Al Viro2018-12-211-85/+23
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | make it use smack_add_opt() and avoid separate copies - gather non-LSM options by memmove() in place Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * smack: get rid of match_token()Al Viro2018-12-211-18/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | same issue as with selinux... [fix by Andrei Vagin folded in] Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * smack: take the guts of smack_parse_opts_str() into a new helperAl Viro2018-12-211-57/+57
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | smack_add_opt() adds an already matched option to growing smack_mnt_options Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * LSM: new method: ->sb_add_mnt_opt()Al Viro2018-12-211-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Adding options to growing mnt_opts. NFS kludge with passing context= down into non-text-options mount switched to it, and with that the last use of ->sb_parse_opts_str() is gone. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * smack: switch to private smack_mnt_optsAl Viro2018-12-211-102/+55
| | | | | | | | | | Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * LSM: hide struct security_mnt_opts from any generic codeAl Viro2018-12-211-8/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Keep void * instead, allocate on demand (in parse_str_opts, at the moment). Eventually both selinux and smack will be better off with private structures with several strings in those, rather than this "counter and two pointers to dynamically allocated arrays" ugliness. This commit allows to do that at leisure, without disrupting anything outside of given module. Changes: * instead of struct security_mnt_opt use an opaque pointer initialized to NULL. * security_sb_eat_lsm_opts(), security_sb_parse_opts_str() and security_free_mnt_opts() take it as var argument (i.e. as void **); call sites are unchanged. * security_sb_set_mnt_opts() and security_sb_remount() take it by value (i.e. as void *). * new method: ->sb_free_mnt_opts(). Takes void *, does whatever freeing that needs to be done. * ->sb_set_mnt_opts() and ->sb_remount() might get NULL as mnt_opts argument, meaning "empty". Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * LSM: turn sb_eat_lsm_opts() into a methodAl Viro2018-12-211-1/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Kill ->sb_copy_data() - it's used only in combination with immediately following ->sb_parse_opts_str(). Turn that combination into a new method. This is just a mechanical move - cleanups will be the next step. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * LSM: split ->sb_set_mnt_opts() out of ->sb_kern_mount()Al Viro2018-12-211-15/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | ... leaving the "is it kernel-internal" logics in the caller. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * LSM: lift parsing LSM options into the caller of ->sb_kern_mount()Al Viro2018-12-211-20/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This paves the way for retaining the LSM options from a common filesystem mount context during a mount parameter parsing phase to be instituted prior to actual mount/reconfiguration actions. Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
| * smack: make smack_parse_opts_str() clean up on failureAl Viro2018-12-211-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | fixes e.g. a btrfs leak... Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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