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* Merge tag 'driver-core-4.11-rc1' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-02-222-3/+39
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core Pull driver core updates from Greg KH: "Here is the "small" driver core patches for 4.11-rc1. Not much here, some firmware documentation and self-test updates, a debugfs code formatting issue, and a new feature for call_usermodehelper to make it more robust on systems that want to lock it down in a more secure way. All of these have been linux-next for a while now with no reported issues" * tag 'driver-core-4.11-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/gregkh/driver-core: kernfs: handle null pointers while printing node name and path Introduce STATIC_USERMODEHELPER to mediate call_usermodehelper() Make static usermode helper binaries constant kmod: make usermodehelper path a const string firmware: revamp firmware documentation selftests: firmware: send expected errors to /dev/null selftests: firmware: only modprobe if driver is missing platform: Print the resource range if device failed to claim kref: prefer atomic_inc_not_zero to atomic_add_unless debugfs: improve formatting of debugfs_real_fops()
| * Introduce STATIC_USERMODEHELPER to mediate call_usermodehelper()Greg Kroah-Hartman2017-01-191-0/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Some usermode helper applications are defined at kernel build time, while others can be changed at runtime. To provide a sane way to filter these, add a new kernel option "STATIC_USERMODEHELPER". This option routes all call_usermodehelper() calls through this binary, no matter what the caller wishes to have called. The new binary (by default set to /sbin/usermode-helper, but can be changed through the STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH option) can properly filter the requested programs to be run by the kernel by looking at the first argument that is passed to it. All other options should then be passed onto the proper program if so desired. To disable all call_usermodehelper() calls by the kernel, set STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string. Thanks to Neil Brown for the idea of this feature. Cc: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
| * Make static usermode helper binaries constantGreg Kroah-Hartman2017-01-191-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There are a number of usermode helper binaries that are "hard coded" in the kernel today, so mark them as "const" to make it harder for someone to change where the variables point to. Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Thomas Sailer <t.sailer@alumni.ethz.ch> Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com> Cc: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org> Cc: Alex Elder <elder@kernel.org> Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org> Cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@poochiereds.net> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
* | Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-nextLinus Torvalds2017-02-222-3/+8
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull networking updates from David Miller: "Highlights: 1) Support TX_RING in AF_PACKET TPACKET_V3 mode, from Sowmini Varadhan. 2) Simplify classifier state on sk_buff in order to shrink it a bit. From Willem de Bruijn. 3) Introduce SIPHASH and it's usage for secure sequence numbers and syncookies. From Jason A. Donenfeld. 4) Reduce CPU usage for ICMP replies we are going to limit or suppress, from Jesper Dangaard Brouer. 5) Introduce Shared Memory Communications socket layer, from Ursula Braun. 6) Add RACK loss detection and allow it to actually trigger fast recovery instead of just assisting after other algorithms have triggered it. From Yuchung Cheng. 7) Add xmit_more and BQL support to mvneta driver, from Simon Guinot. 8) skb_cow_data avoidance in esp4 and esp6, from Steffen Klassert. 9) Export MPLS packet stats via netlink, from Robert Shearman. 10) Significantly improve inet port bind conflict handling, especially when an application is restarted and changes it's setting of reuseport. From Josef Bacik. 11) Implement TX batching in vhost_net, from Jason Wang. 12) Extend the dummy device so that VF (virtual function) features, such as configuration, can be more easily tested. From Phil Sutter. 13) Avoid two atomic ops per page on x86 in bnx2x driver, from Eric Dumazet. 14) Add new bpf MAP, implementing a longest prefix match trie. From Daniel Mack. 15) Packet sample offloading support in mlxsw driver, from Yotam Gigi. 16) Add new aquantia driver, from David VomLehn. 17) Add bpf tracepoints, from Daniel Borkmann. 18) Add support for port mirroring to b53 and bcm_sf2 drivers, from Florian Fainelli. 19) Remove custom busy polling in many drivers, it is done in the core networking since 4.5 times. From Eric Dumazet. 20) Support XDP adjust_head in virtio_net, from John Fastabend. 21) Fix several major holes in neighbour entry confirmation, from Julian Anastasov. 22) Add XDP support to bnxt_en driver, from Michael Chan. 23) VXLAN offloads for enic driver, from Govindarajulu Varadarajan. 24) Add IPVTAP driver (IP-VLAN based tap driver) from Sainath Grandhi. 25) Support GRO in IPSEC protocols, from Steffen Klassert" * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1764 commits) Revert "ath10k: Search SMBIOS for OEM board file extension" net: socket: fix recvmmsg not returning error from sock_error bnxt_en: use eth_hw_addr_random() bpf: fix unlocking of jited image when module ronx not set arch: add ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY config net: napi_watchdog() can use napi_schedule_irqoff() tcp: Revert "tcp: tcp_probe: use spin_lock_bh()" net/hsr: use eth_hw_addr_random() net: mvpp2: enable building on 64-bit platforms net: mvpp2: switch to build_skb() in the RX path net: mvpp2: simplify MVPP2_PRS_RI_* definitions net: mvpp2: fix indentation of MVPP2_EXT_GLOBAL_CTRL_DEFAULT net: mvpp2: remove unused register definitions net: mvpp2: simplify mvpp2_bm_bufs_add() net: mvpp2: drop useless fields in mvpp2_bm_pool and related code net: mvpp2: remove unused 'tx_skb' field of 'struct mvpp2_tx_queue' net: mvpp2: release reference to txq_cpu[] entry after unmapping net: mvpp2: handle too large value in mvpp2_rx_time_coal_set() net: mvpp2: handle too large value handling in mvpp2_rx_pkts_coal_set() net: mvpp2: remove useless arguments in mvpp2_rx_{pkts, time}_coal_set ...
| * \ Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/netDavid S. Miller2017-02-111-1/+1
| |\ \
| * | | Introduce a sysctl that modifies the value of PROT_SOCK.Krister Johansen2017-01-241-1/+2
| | |/ | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add net.ipv4.ip_unprivileged_port_start, which is a per namespace sysctl that denotes the first unprivileged inet port in the namespace. To disable all privileged ports set this to zero. It also checks for overlap with the local port range. The privileged and local range may not overlap. The use case for this change is to allow containerized processes to bind to priviliged ports, but prevent them from ever being allowed to modify their container's network configuration. The latter is accomplished by ensuring that the network namespace is not a child of the user namespace. This modification was needed to allow the container manager to disable a namespace's priviliged port restrictions without exposing control of the network namespace to processes in the user namespace. Signed-off-by: Krister Johansen <kjlx@templeofstupid.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* | | Merge branch 'next' of ↵Linus Torvalds2017-02-2154-1839/+3314
|\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull security layer updates from James Morris: "Highlights: - major AppArmor update: policy namespaces & lots of fixes - add /sys/kernel/security/lsm node for easy detection of loaded LSMs - SELinux cgroupfs labeling support - SELinux context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts within user namespaces - improved TPM 2.0 support" * 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (117 commits) tpm: declare tpm2_get_pcr_allocation() as static tpm: Fix expected number of response bytes of TPM1.2 PCR Extend tpm xen: drop unneeded chip variable tpm: fix misspelled "facilitate" in module parameter description tpm_tis: fix the error handling of init_tis() KEYS: Use memzero_explicit() for secret data KEYS: Fix an error code in request_master_key() sign-file: fix build error in sign-file.c with libressl selinux: allow changing labels for cgroupfs selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattr tpm: silence an array overflow warning tpm: fix the type of owned field in cap_t tpm: add securityfs support for TPM 2.0 firmware event log tpm: enhance read_log_of() to support Physical TPM event log tpm: enhance TPM 2.0 PCR extend to support multiple banks tpm: implement TPM 2.0 capability to get active PCR banks tpm: fix RC value check in tpm2_seal_trusted tpm_tis: fix iTPM probe via probe_itpm() function tpm: Begin the process to deprecate user_read_timer tpm: remove tpm_read_index and tpm_write_index from tpm.h ...
| * | | KEYS: Use memzero_explicit() for secret dataDan Carpenter2017-02-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I don't think GCC has figured out how to optimize the memset() away, but they might eventually so let's future proof this code a bit. Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * | | KEYS: Fix an error code in request_master_key()Dan Carpenter2017-02-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This function has two callers and neither are able to handle a NULL return. Really, -EINVAL is the correct thing return here anyway. This fixes some static checker warnings like: security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c:709 encrypted_key_decrypt() error: uninitialized symbol 'master_key'. Fixes: 7e70cb497850 ("keys: add new key-type encrypted") Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * | | Merge branch 'stable-4.11' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris2017-02-109-276/+327
| |\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | into next
| | * | | selinux: allow changing labels for cgroupfsAntonio Murdaca2017-02-071-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This patch allows changing labels for cgroup mounts. Previously, running chcon on cgroupfs would throw an "Operation not supported". This patch specifically whitelist cgroupfs. The patch could also allow containers to write only to the systemd cgroup for instance, while the other cgroups are kept with cgroup_t label. Signed-off-by: Antonio Murdaca <runcom@redhat.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | security,selinux,smack: kill security_task_wait hookStephen Smalley2017-01-123-33/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | As reported by yangshukui, a permission denial from security_task_wait() can lead to a soft lockup in zap_pid_ns_processes() since it only expects sys_wait4() to return 0 or -ECHILD. Further, security_task_wait() can in general lead to zombies; in the absence of some way to automatically reparent a child process upon a denial, the hook is not useful. Remove the security hook and its implementations in SELinux and Smack. Smack already removed its check from its hook. Reported-by: yangshukui <yangshukui@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | selinux: drop unused socket security classesStephen Smalley2017-01-122-12/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Several of the extended socket classes introduced by commit da69a5306ab92e07 ("selinux: support distinctions among all network address families") are never used because sockets can never be created with the associated address family. Remove these unused socket security classes. The removed classes are bridge_socket for PF_BRIDGE, ib_socket for PF_IB, and mpls_socket for PF_MPLS. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | selinux: default to security isid in sel_make_bools() if no sid is foundGary Tierney2017-01-091-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Use SECINITSID_SECURITY as the default SID for booleans which don't have a matching SID returned from security_genfs_sid(), also update the error message to a warning which matches this. This prevents the policy failing to load (and consequently the system failing to boot) when there is no default genfscon statement matched for the selinuxfs in the new policy. Signed-off-by: Gary Tierney <gary.tierney@gmx.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | selinux: log errors when loading new policyGary Tierney2017-01-091-5/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Adds error logging to the code paths which can fail when loading a new policy in sel_write_load(). If the policy fails to be loaded from userspace then a warning message is printed, whereas if a failure occurs after loading policy from userspace an error message will be printed with details on where policy loading failed (recreating one of /classes/, /policy_capabilities/, /booleans/ in the SELinux fs). Also, if sel_make_bools() fails to obtain an SID for an entry in /booleans/* an error will be printed indicating the path of the boolean. Signed-off-by: Gary Tierney <gary.tierney@gmx.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | proc,security: move restriction on writing /proc/pid/attr nodes to procStephen Smalley2017-01-094-29/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Processes can only alter their own security attributes via /proc/pid/attr nodes. This is presently enforced by each individual security module and is also imposed by the Linux credentials implementation, which only allows a task to alter its own credentials. Move the check enforcing this restriction from the individual security modules to proc_pid_attr_write() before calling the security hook, and drop the unnecessary task argument to the security hook since it can only ever be the current task. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | selinux: clean up cred usage and simplifyStephen Smalley2017-01-093-211/+166
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SELinux was sometimes using the task "objective" credentials when it could/should use the "subjective" credentials. This was sometimes hidden by the fact that we were unnecessarily passing around pointers to the current task, making it appear as if the task could be something other than current, so eliminate all such passing of current. Inline various permission checking helper functions that can be reduced to a single avc_has_perm() call. Since the credentials infrastructure only allows a task to alter its own credentials, we can always assume that current must be the same as the target task in selinux_setprocattr after the check. We likely should move this check from selinux_setprocattr() to proc_pid_attr_write() and drop the task argument to the security hook altogether; it can only serve to confuse things. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | selinux: allow context mounts on tmpfs, ramfs, devpts within user namespacesStephen Smalley2017-01-091-3/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit aad82892af261b9903cc11c55be3ecf5f0b0b4f8 ("selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces") prohibited any use of context mount options within non-init user namespaces. However, this breaks use of context mount options for tmpfs mounts within user namespaces, which are being used by Docker/runc. There is no reason to block such usage for tmpfs, ramfs or devpts. Exempt these filesystem types from this restriction. Before: sh$ userns_child_exec -p -m -U -M '0 1000 1' -G '0 1000 1' bash sh# mount -t tmpfs -o context=system_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0:c13 none /tmp mount: tmpfs is write-protected, mounting read-only mount: cannot mount tmpfs read-only After: sh$ userns_child_exec -p -m -U -M '0 1000 1' -G '0 1000 1' bash sh# mount -t tmpfs -o context=system_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0:c13 none /tmp sh# ls -Zd /tmp unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0:c13 /tmp Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | selinux: handle ICMPv6 consistently with ICMPStephen Smalley2017-01-091-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | commit 79c8b348f215 ("selinux: support distinctions among all network address families") mapped datagram ICMP sockets to the new icmp_socket security class, but left ICMPv6 sockets unchanged. This change fixes that oversight to handle both kinds of sockets consistently. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | selinux: add security in-core xattr support for tracefsYongqin Liu2017-01-091-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since kernel 4.1 ftrace is supported as a new separate filesystem. It gets automatically mounted by the kernel under the old path /sys/kernel/debug/tracing. Because it lives now on a separate filesystem SELinux needs to be updated to also support setting SELinux labels on tracefs inodes. This is required for compatibility in Android when moving to Linux 4.1 or newer. Signed-off-by: Yongqin Liu <yongqin.liu@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| | * | | selinux: support distinctions among all network address familiesStephen Smalley2017-01-095-2/+147
| | |/ / | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Extend SELinux to support distinctions among all network address families implemented by the kernel by defining new socket security classes and mapping to them. Otherwise, many sockets are mapped to the generic socket class and are indistinguishable in policy. This has come up previously with regard to selectively allowing access to bluetooth sockets, and more recently with regard to selectively allowing access to AF_ALG sockets. Guido Trentalancia submitted a patch that took a similar approach to add only support for distinguishing AF_ALG sockets, but this generalizes his approach to handle all address families implemented by the kernel. Socket security classes are also added for ICMP and SCTP sockets. Socket security classes were not defined for AF_* values that are reserved but unimplemented in the kernel, e.g. AF_NETBEUI, AF_SECURITY, AF_ASH, AF_ECONET, AF_SNA, AF_WANPIPE. Backward compatibility is provided by only enabling the finer-grained socket classes if a new policy capability is set in the policy; older policies will behave as before. The legacy redhat1 policy capability that was only ever used in testing within Fedora for ptrace_child is reclaimed for this purpose; as far as I can tell, this policy capability is not enabled in any supported distro policy. Add a pair of conditional compilation guards to detect when new AF_* values are added so that we can update SELinux accordingly rather than having to belatedly update it long after new address families are introduced. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | Merge branch 'stable-4.10' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux ↵James Morris2017-02-081-1/+1
| |\ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | into next
| | * | | selinux: fix off-by-one in setprocattrStephen Smalley2017-02-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | SELinux tries to support setting/clearing of /proc/pid/attr attributes from the shell by ignoring terminating newlines and treating an attribute value that begins with a NUL or newline as an attempt to clear the attribute. However, the test for clearing attributes has always been wrong; it has an off-by-one error, and this could further lead to reading past the end of the allocated buffer since commit bb646cdb12e75d82258c2f2e7746d5952d3e321a ("proc_pid_attr_write(): switch to memdup_user()"). Fix the off-by-one error. Even with this fix, setting and clearing /proc/pid/attr attributes from the shell is not straightforward since the interface does not support multiple write() calls (so shells that write the value and newline separately will set and then immediately clear the attribute, requiring use of echo -n to set the attribute), whereas trying to use echo -n "" to clear the attribute causes the shell to skip the write() call altogether since POSIX says that a zero-length write causes no side effects. Thus, one must use echo -n to set and echo without -n to clear, as in the following example: $ echo -n unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate $ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 $ echo "" > /proc/$$/attr/fscreate $ cat /proc/$$/attr/fscreate Note the use of /proc/$$ rather than /proc/self, as otherwise the cat command will read its own attribute value, not that of the shell. There are no users of this facility to my knowledge; possibly we should just get rid of it. UPDATE: Upon further investigation it appears that a local process with the process:setfscreate permission can cause a kernel panic as a result of this bug. This patch fixes CVE-2017-2618. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> [PM: added the update about CVE-2017-2618 to the commit description] Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.5: d6ea83ec6864e Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
| * | | | ima: allow to check MAY_APPENDLans Zhang2017-01-272-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Otherwise some mask and inmask tokens with MAY_APPEND flag may not work as expected. Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
| * | | | ima: fix ima_d_path() possible race with renameMimi Zohar2017-01-273-6/+24
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | On failure to return a pathname from ima_d_path(), a pointer to dname is returned, which is subsequently used in the IMA measurement list, the IMA audit records, and other audit logging. Saving the pointer to dname for later use has the potential to race with rename. Intead of returning a pointer to dname on failure, this patch returns a pointer to a copy of the filename. Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
| * | | | Merge branch 'smack-for-4.11' of git://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next into ↵James Morris2017-01-273-27/+95
| |\ \ \ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | next
| | * | | | Smack: ignore private inode for file functionsSeung-Woo Kim2017-01-101-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The access to fd from anon_inode is always failed because there is no set xattr operations. So this patch fixes to ignore private inode including anon_inode for file functions. It was only ignored for smack_file_receive() to share dma-buf fd, but dma-buf has other functions like ioctl and mmap. Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/4/17/16 Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | | | Smack: fix d_instantiate logic for sockfs and pipefsRafal Krypa2017-01-101-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Since 4b936885a (v2.6.32) all inodes on sockfs and pipefs are disconnected. It caused filesystem specific code in smack_d_instantiate to be skipped, because all inodes on those pseudo filesystems were treated as root inodes. As a result all sockfs inodes had the Smack label set to floor. In most cases access checks for sockets use socket_smack data so the inode label is not important. But there are special cases that were broken. One example would be calling fcntl with F_SETOWN command on a socket fd. Now smack_d_instantiate expects all pipefs and sockfs inodes to be disconnected and has the logic in appropriate place. Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | | | SMACK: Use smk_tskacc() instead of smk_access() for proper loggingHimanshu Shukla2017-01-101-4/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | smack_file_open() is first checking the capability of calling subject, this check will skip the SMACK logging for success case. Use smk_tskacc() for proper logging and SMACK access check. Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | | | Smack: Traverse the smack_known_list using list_for_each_entry_rcu macroVishal Goel2017-01-101-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In smack_from_secattr function,"smack_known_list" is being traversed using list_for_each_entry macro, although it is a rcu protected structure. So it should be traversed using "list_for_each_entry_rcu" macro to fetch the rcu protected entry. Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | | | SMACK: Free the i_security blob in inode using RCUHimanshu Shukla2017-01-102-4/+29
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | There is race condition issue while freeing the i_security blob in SMACK module. There is existing condition where i_security can be freed while inode_permission is called from path lookup on second CPU. There has been observed the page fault with such condition. VFS code and Selinux module takes care of this condition by freeing the inode and i_security field using RCU via call_rcu(). But in SMACK directly the i_secuirty blob is being freed. Use call_rcu() to fix this race condition issue. Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | | | SMACK: Delete list_head repeated initializationHimanshu Shukla2017-01-101-4/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | smk_copy_rules() and smk_copy_relabel() are initializing list_head though they have been initialized already in new_task_smack() function. Delete repeated initialization. Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | | | SMACK: Add new lock for adding entry in smack master listVishal Goel2017-01-101-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | "smk_set_access()" function adds a new rule entry in subject label specific list(rule_list) and in global rule list(smack_rule_list) both. Mutex lock (rule_lock) is used to avoid simultaneous updates. But this lock is subject label specific lock. If 2 processes tries to add different rules(i.e with different subject labels) simultaneously, then both the processes can take the "rule_lock" respectively. So it will cause a problem while adding entries in master rule list. Now a new mutex lock(smack_master_list_lock) has been taken to add entry in smack_rule_list to avoid simultaneous updates of different rules. Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | | | Smack: Fix the issue of wrong SMACK label update in socket bind fail caseVishal Goel2017-01-102-0/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Fix the issue of wrong SMACK label (SMACK64IPIN) update when a second bind call is made to same IP address & port, but with different SMACK label (SMACK64IPIN) by second instance of server. In this case server returns with "Bind:Address already in use" error but before returning, SMACK label is updated in SMACK port-label mapping list inside smack_socket_bind() hook To fix this issue a new check has been added in smk_ipv6_port_label() function before updating the existing port entry. It checks whether the socket for matching port entry is closed or not. If it is closed then it means port is not bound and it is safe to update the existing port entry else return if port is still getting used. For checking whether socket is closed or not, one more field "smk_can_reuse" has been added in the "smk_port_label" structure. This field will be set to '1' in "smack_sk_free_security()" function which is called to free the socket security blob when the socket is being closed. In this function, port entry is searched in the SMACK port-label mapping list for the closing socket. If entry is found then "smk_can_reuse" field is set to '1'.Initially "smk_can_reuse" field is set to '0' in smk_ipv6_port_label() function after creating a new entry in the list which indicates that socket is in use. Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | | | Smack: Fix the issue of permission denied error in ipv6 hookVishal Goel2017-01-102-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Permission denied error comes when 2 IPv6 servers are running and client tries to connect one of them. Scenario is that both servers are using same IP and port but different protocols(Udp and tcp). They are using different SMACK64IPIN labels.Tcp server is using "test" and udp server is using "test-in". When we try to run tcp client with SMACK64IPOUT label as "test", then connection denied error comes. It should not happen since both tcp server and client labels are same.This happens because there is no check for protocol in smk_ipv6_port_label() function while searching for the earlier port entry. It checks whether there is an existing port entry on the basis of port only. So it updates the earlier port entry in the list. Due to which smack label gets changed for earlier entry in the "smk_ipv6_port_list" list and permission denied error comes. Now a check is added for socket type also.Now if 2 processes use same port but different protocols (tcp or udp), then 2 different port entries will be added in the list. Similarly while checking smack access in smk_ipv6_port_check() function, port entry is searched on the basis of both port and protocol. Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <Himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| | * | | | SMACK: Add the rcu synchronization mechanism in ipv6 hooksVishal Goel2017-01-101-5/+15
| | | |/ / | | |/| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add the rcu synchronization mechanism for accessing smk_ipv6_port_list in smack IPv6 hooks. Access to the port list is vulnerable to a race condition issue,it does not apply proper synchronization methods while working on critical section. It is possible that when one thread is reading the list, at the same time another thread is modifying the same port list, which can cause the major problems. To ensure proper synchronization between two threads, rcu mechanism has been applied while accessing and modifying the port list. RCU will also not affect the performance, as there are more accesses than modification where RCU is most effective synchronization mechanism. Signed-off-by: Vishal Goel <vishal.goel@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
| * | | | LSM: Add /sys/kernel/security/lsmCasey Schaufler2017-01-199-9/+71
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I am still tired of having to find indirect ways to determine what security modules are active on a system. I have added /sys/kernel/security/lsm, which contains a comma separated list of the active security modules. No more groping around in /proc/filesystems or other clever hacks. Unchanged from previous versions except for being updated to the latest security next branch. Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
| * | | | apparmor: fix undefined reference to `aa_g_hash_policy'John Johansen2017-01-161-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The kernel build bot turned up a bad config combination when CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR is y and CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH is n, resulting in the build error security/built-in.o: In function `aa_unpack': (.text+0x841e2): undefined reference to `aa_g_hash_policy' Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | | | apparmor: replace remaining BUG_ON() asserts with AA_BUG()John Johansen2017-01-164-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | AA_BUG() uses WARN and won't break the kernel like BUG_ON(). Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | | | apparmor: fix restricted endian type warnings for policy unpackJohn Johansen2017-01-161-6/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | | | apparmor: fix restricted endian type warnings for dfa unpackJohn Johansen2017-01-162-12/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | | | apparmor: add check for apparmor enabled in module parameters missing itJohn Johansen2017-01-161-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | | | apparmor: add per cpu work buffers to avoid allocating buffers at every hookJohn Johansen2017-01-162-1/+103
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | | | apparmor: sysctl to enable unprivileged user ns AppArmor policy loadingTyler Hicks2017-01-162-1/+47
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If this sysctl is set to non-zero and a process with CAP_MAC_ADMIN in the root namespace has created an AppArmor policy namespace, unprivileged processes will be able to change to a profile in the newly created AppArmor policy namespace and, if the profile allows CAP_MAC_ADMIN and appropriate file permissions, will be able to load policy in the respective policy namespace. Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | | | apparmor: support querying extended trusted helper extra dataWilliam Hua2017-01-165-0/+245
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow a profile to carry extra data that can be queried via userspace. This provides a means to store extra data in a profile that a trusted helper can extract and use from live policy. Signed-off-by: William Hua <william.hua@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | | | apparmor: update cap audit to check SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDITJohn Johansen2017-01-161-6/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | apparmor should be checking the SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT constant. Also in complain mode make it so apparmor can elect to log a message, informing of the check. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | | | apparmor: make computing policy hashes conditional on kernel parameterJohn Johansen2017-01-162-29/+32
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Allow turning off the computation of the policy hashes via the apparmor.hash_policy kernel parameter. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | | | apparmor: convert change_profile to use fqname later to give better controlJohn Johansen2017-01-165-66/+28
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Moving the use of fqname to later allows learning profiles to be based on the fqname request instead of just the hname. It also allows cleaning up some of the name parsing and lookup by allowing the use of the fqlookupn_profile() lib fn. Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | | | apparmor: fix change_hat debug outputJohn Johansen2017-01-161-4/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
| * | | | apparmor: remove unused op parameter from simple_write_to_buffer()John Johansen2017-01-161-6/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>