| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Introduce a bpf object related check when sending and receiving files
through unix domain socket as well as binder. It checks if the receiving
process have privilege to read/write the bpf map or use the bpf program.
This check is necessary because the bpf maps and programs are using a
anonymous inode as their shared inode so the normal way of checking the
files and sockets when passing between processes cannot work properly on
eBPF object. This check only works when the BPF_SYSCALL is configured.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Implement the actual checks introduced to eBPF related syscalls. This
implementation use the security field inside bpf object to store a sid that
identify the bpf object. And when processes try to access the object,
selinux will check if processes have the right privileges. The creation
of eBPF object are also checked at the general bpf check hook and new
cmd introduced to eBPF domain can also be checked there.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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Introduce several LSM hooks for the syscalls that will allow the
userspace to access to eBPF object such as eBPF programs and eBPF maps.
The security check is aimed to enforce a per object security protection
for eBPF object so only processes with the right priviliges can
read/write to a specific map or use a specific eBPF program. Besides
that, a general security hook is added before the multiplexer of bpf
syscall to check the cmd and the attribute used for the command. The
actual security module can decide which command need to be checked and
how the cmd should be checked.
Signed-off-by: Chenbo Feng <fengc@google.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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security_inode_getsecurity() provides the text string value
of a security attribute. It does not provide a "secctx".
The code in xattr_getsecurity() that calls security_inode_getsecurity()
and then calls security_release_secctx() happened to work because
SElinux and Smack treat the attribute and the secctx the same way.
It fails for cap_inode_getsecurity(), because that module has no
secctx that ever needs releasing. It turns out that Smack is the
one that's doing things wrong by not allocating memory when instructed
to do so by the "alloc" parameter.
The fix is simple enough. Change the security_release_secctx() to
kfree() because it isn't a secctx being returned by
security_inode_getsecurity(). Change Smack to allocate the string when
told to do so.
Note: this also fixes memory leaks for LSMs which implement
inode_getsecurity but not release_secctx, such as capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reported-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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From David Howells:
"There are two sets of patches here:
(1) A bunch of core keyrings bug fixes from Eric Biggers.
(2) Fixing big_key to use safe crypto from Jason A. Donenfeld."
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This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with
get_random_bytes_wait, so that we wouldn't use bad randomness at boot
time. But, upon looking further, it appears that there were even deeper
underlying cryptographic problems, and that this seems to have been
committed with very little crypto review. So, I rewrote the whole thing,
trying to keep to the conventions introduced by the previous author, to
fix these cryptographic flaws.
It makes no sense to seed crypto/rng at boot time and then keep
using it like this, when in fact there's already get_random_bytes_wait,
which can ensure there's enough entropy and be a much more standard way
of generating keys. Since this sensitive material is being stored
untrusted, using ECB and no authentication is simply not okay at all. I
find it surprising and a bit horrifying that this code even made it past
basic crypto review, which perhaps points to some larger issues. This
patch moves from using AES-ECB to using AES-GCM. Since keys are uniquely
generated each time, we can set the nonce to zero. There was also a race
condition in which the same key would be reused at the same time in
different threads. A mutex fixes this issue now.
So, to summarize, this commit fixes the following vulnerabilities:
* Low entropy key generation, allowing an attacker to potentially
guess or predict keys.
* Unauthenticated encryption, allowing an attacker to modify the
cipher text in particular ways in order to manipulate the plaintext,
which is is even more frightening considering the next point.
* Use of ECB mode, allowing an attacker to trivially swap blocks or
compare identical plaintext blocks.
* Key re-use.
* Faulty memory zeroing.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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Error paths forgot to zero out sensitive material, so this patch changes
some kfrees into a kzfrees.
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com>
Cc: security@kernel.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
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kmemdup() is preferred to kmalloc() followed by memcpy().
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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When checking for permission to view keys whilst reading from
/proc/keys, we should use the credentials with which the /proc/keys file
was opened. This is because, in a classic type of exploit, it can be
possible to bypass checks for the *current* credentials by passing the
file descriptor to a suid program.
Following commit 34dbbcdbf633 ("Make file credentials available to the
seqfile interfaces") we can finally fix it. So let's do it.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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In key_user_lookup(), if there is no key_user for the given uid, we drop
key_user_lock, allocate a new key_user, and search the tree again. But
we failed to set 'parent' to NULL at the beginning of the second search.
If the tree were to be empty for the second search, the insertion would
be done with an invalid 'parent', scribbling over freed memory.
Fortunately this can't actually happen currently because the tree always
contains at least the root_key_user. But it still should be fixed to
make the code more robust.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Because keyctl_read_key() looks up the key with no permissions
requested, it may find a negatively instantiated key. If the key is
also possessed, we went ahead and called ->read() on the key. But the
key payload will actually contain the ->reject_error rather than the
normal payload. Thus, the kernel oopses trying to read the
user_key_payload from memory address (int)-ENOKEY = 0x00000000ffffff82.
Fortunately the payload data is stored inline, so it shouldn't be
possible to abuse this as an arbitrary memory read primitive...
Reproducer:
keyctl new_session
keyctl request2 user desc '' @s
keyctl read $(keyctl show | awk '/user: desc/ {print $1}')
It causes a crash like the following:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffff92
IP: user_read+0x33/0xa0
PGD 36a54067 P4D 36a54067 PUD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
CPU: 0 PID: 211 Comm: keyctl Not tainted 4.14.0-rc1 #337
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-20170228_101828-anatol 04/01/2014
task: ffff90aa3b74c3c0 task.stack: ffff9878c0478000
RIP: 0010:user_read+0x33/0xa0
RSP: 0018:ffff9878c047bee8 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff90aa3d7da340 RCX: 0000000000000017
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffff82 RDI: ffff90aa3d7da340
RBP: ffff9878c047bf00 R08: 00000024f95da94f R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f58ece69740(0000) GS:ffff90aa3e200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000ffffff92 CR3: 0000000036adc001 CR4: 00000000003606f0
Call Trace:
keyctl_read_key+0xac/0xe0
SyS_keyctl+0x99/0x120
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x7f58ec787bb9
RSP: 002b:00007ffc8d401678 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000fa
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc8d402800 RCX: 00007f58ec787bb9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000174a63ac RDI: 000000000000000b
RBP: 0000000000000004 R08: 00007ffc8d402809 R09: 0000000000000020
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffc8d402800
R13: 00007ffc8d4016e0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: e5 41 55 49 89 f5 41 54 49 89 d4 53 48 89 fb e8 a4 b4 ad ff 85 c0 74 09 80 3d b9 4c 96 00 00 74 43 48 8b b3 20 01 00 00 4d 85 ed <0f> b7 5e 10 74 29 4d 85 e4 74 24 4c 39 e3 4c 89 e2 4c 89 ef 48
RIP: user_read+0x33/0xa0 RSP: ffff9878c047bee8
CR2: 00000000ffffff92
Fixes: 61ea0c0ba904 ("KEYS: Skip key state checks when checking for possession")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.13+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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It was possible for an unprivileged user to create the user and user
session keyrings for another user. For example:
sudo -u '#3000' sh -c 'keyctl add keyring _uid.4000 "" @u
keyctl add keyring _uid_ses.4000 "" @u
sleep 15' &
sleep 1
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @u
sudo -u '#4000' keyctl describe @us
This is problematic because these "fake" keyrings won't have the right
permissions. In particular, the user who created them first will own
them and will have full access to them via the possessor permissions,
which can be used to compromise the security of a user's keys:
-4: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid.4000
-5: alswrv-----v------------ 3000 0 keyring: _uid_ses.4000
Fix it by marking user and user session keyrings with a flag
KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING. Then, when searching for a user or user session
keyring by name, skip all keyrings that don't have the flag set.
Fixes: 69664cf16af4 ("keys: don't generate user and user session keyrings unless they're accessed")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v2.6.26+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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Userspace can call keyctl_read() on a keyring to get the list of IDs of
keys in the keyring. But if the user-supplied buffer is too small, the
kernel would write the full list anyway --- which will corrupt whatever
userspace memory happened to be past the end of the buffer. Fix it by
only filling the space that is available.
Fixes: b2a4df200d57 ("KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> [v3.13+]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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In keyctl_read_key(), if key_permission() were to return an error code
other than EACCES, we would leak a the reference to the key. This can't
actually happen currently because key_permission() can only return an
error code other than EACCES if security_key_permission() does, only
SELinux and Smack implement that hook, and neither can return an error
code other than EACCES. But it should still be fixed, as it is a bug
waiting to happen.
Fixes: 29db91906340 ("[PATCH] Keys: Add LSM hooks for key management [try #3]")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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In keyctl_assume_authority(), if keyctl_change_reqkey_auth() were to
fail, we would leak the reference to the 'authkey'. Currently this can
only happen if prepare_creds() fails to allocate memory. But it still
should be fixed, as it is a more severe bug waiting to happen.
This patch also moves the read of 'authkey->serial' to before the
reference to the authkey is dropped. Doing the read after dropping the
reference is very fragile because it assumes we still hold another
reference to the key. (Which we do, in current->cred->request_key_auth,
but there's no reason not to write it in the "obviously correct" way.)
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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If key_instantiate_and_link() were to fail (which fortunately isn't
possible currently), the call to key_revoke(authkey) would crash with a
NULL pointer dereference in request_key_auth_revoke() because the key
has not yet been instantiated.
Fix this by removing the call to key_revoke(). key_put() is sufficient,
as it's not possible for an uninstantiated authkey to have been used for
anything yet.
Fixes: b5f545c880a2 ("[PATCH] keys: Permit running process to instantiate keys")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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In request_key_auth_new(), if key_alloc() or key_instantiate_and_link()
were to fail, we would leak a reference to the 'struct cred'. Currently
this can only happen if key_alloc() fails to allocate memory. But it
still should be fixed, as it is a more severe bug waiting to happen.
Fix it by cleaning things up to use a helper function which frees a
'struct request_key_auth' correctly.
Fixes: d84f4f992cbd ("CRED: Inaugurate COW credentials")
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull misc security layer update from James Morris:
"This is the remaining 'general' change in the security tree for v4.14,
following the direct merging of SELinux (+ TOMOYO), AppArmor, and
seccomp.
That's everything now for the security tree except IMA, which will
follow shortly (I've been traveling for the past week with patchy
internet)"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
security: fix description of values returned by cap_inode_need_killpriv
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cap_inode_need_killpriv returns 1 if security.capability exists and
has a value and inode_killpriv() is required, 0 otherwise. Fix the
description of the return value to reflect this.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull apparmor updates from John Johansen:
"This is the apparmor pull request, similar to SELinux and seccomp.
It's the same series that I was sent to James' security tree + one
regression fix that was found after the series was sent to James and
would have been sent for v4.14-rc2.
Features:
- in preparation for secid mapping add support for absolute root view
based labels
- add base infastructure for socket mediation
- add mount mediation
- add signal mediation
minor cleanups and changes:
- be defensive, ensure unconfined profiles have dfas initialized
- add more debug asserts to apparmorfs
- enable policy unpacking to audit different reasons for failure
- cleanup conditional check for label in label_print
- Redundant condition: prev_ns. in [label.c:1498]
Bug Fixes:
- fix regression in apparmorfs DAC access permissions
- fix build failure on sparc caused by undeclared signals
- fix sparse report of incorrect type assignment when freeing label proxies
- fix race condition in null profile creation
- Fix an error code in aafs_create()
- Fix logical error in verify_header()
- Fix shadowed local variable in unpack_trans_table()"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2017-09-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor:
apparmor: fix apparmorfs DAC access permissions
apparmor: fix build failure on sparc caused by undeclared signals
apparmor: fix incorrect type assignment when freeing proxies
apparmor: ensure unconfined profiles have dfas initialized
apparmor: fix race condition in null profile creation
apparmor: move new_null_profile to after profile lookup fns()
apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation
apparmor: add more debug asserts to apparmorfs
apparmor: make policy_unpack able to audit different info messages
apparmor: add support for absolute root view based labels
apparmor: cleanup conditional check for label in label_print
apparmor: add mount mediation
apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals
apparmor: Redundant condition: prev_ns. in [label.c:1498]
apparmor: Fix an error code in aafs_create()
apparmor: Fix logical error in verify_header()
apparmor: Fix shadowed local variable in unpack_trans_table()
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The DAC access permissions for several apparmorfs files are wrong.
.access - needs to be writable by all tasks to perform queries
the others in the set only provide a read fn so should be read only.
With policy namespace virtualization all apparmor needs to control
the permission and visibility checks directly which means DAC
access has to be allowed for all user, group, and other.
BugLink: http://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1713103
Fixes: c97204baf840b ("apparmor: rename apparmor file fns and data to indicate use")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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In file included from security/apparmor/ipc.c:23:0:
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:26:3: error: 'SIGSTKFLT' undeclared here (not in a function)
[SIGSTKFLT] = 16, /* -, 16, - */
^
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:26:3: error: array index in initializer not of integer type
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:26:3: note: (near initialization for 'sig_map')
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:51:3: error: 'SIGUNUSED' undeclared here (not in a function)
[SIGUNUSED] = 34, /* -, 31, - */
^
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:51:3: error: array index in initializer not of integer type
security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h:51:3: note: (near initialization for 'sig_map')
Reported-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Fixes: c6bf1adaecaa ("apparmor: add the ability to mediate signals")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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sparse reports
poisoning the proxy->label before freeing the struct is resulting in
a sparse build warning.
../security/apparmor/label.c:52:30: warning: incorrect type in assignment (different address spaces)
../security/apparmor/label.c:52:30: expected struct aa_label [noderef] <asn:4>*label
../security/apparmor/label.c:52:30: got struct aa_label *<noident>
fix with RCU_INIT_POINTER as this is one of those cases where
rcu_assign_pointer() is not needed.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Generally unconfined has early bailout tests and does not need the
dfas initialized, however if an early bailout test is ever missed
it will result in an oops.
Be defensive and initialize the unconfined profile to have null dfas
(no permission) so if an early bailout test is missed we fail
closed (no perms granted) instead of oopsing.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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There is a race when null- profile is being created between the
initial lookup/creation of the profile and lock/addition of the
profile. This could result in multiple version of a profile being
added to the list which need to be removed/replaced.
Since these are learning profile their is no affect on mediation.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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new_null_profile will need to use some of the profile lookup fns()
so move instead of doing forward fn declarations.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Provide a basic mediation of sockets. This is not a full net mediation
but just whether a spcific family of socket can be used by an
application, along with setting up some basic infrastructure for
network mediation to follow.
the user space rule hav the basic form of
NETWORK RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'network' [ DOMAIN ]
[ TYPE | PROTOCOL ]
DOMAIN = ( 'inet' | 'ax25' | 'ipx' | 'appletalk' | 'netrom' |
'bridge' | 'atmpvc' | 'x25' | 'inet6' | 'rose' |
'netbeui' | 'security' | 'key' | 'packet' | 'ash' |
'econet' | 'atmsvc' | 'sna' | 'irda' | 'pppox' |
'wanpipe' | 'bluetooth' | 'netlink' | 'unix' | 'rds' |
'llc' | 'can' | 'tipc' | 'iucv' | 'rxrpc' | 'isdn' |
'phonet' | 'ieee802154' | 'caif' | 'alg' | 'nfc' |
'vsock' | 'mpls' | 'ib' | 'kcm' ) ','
TYPE = ( 'stream' | 'dgram' | 'seqpacket' | 'rdm' | 'raw' |
'packet' )
PROTOCOL = ( 'tcp' | 'udp' | 'icmp' )
eg.
network,
network inet,
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
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Switch unpack auditing to using the generic name field in the audit
struct and make it so we can start adding new info messages about
why an unpack failed.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
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With apparmor policy virtualization based on policy namespace View's
we don't generally want/need absolute root based views, however there
are cases like debugging and some secid based conversions where
using a root based view is important.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
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Add basic mount mediation. That allows controlling based on basic
mount parameters. It does not include special mount parameters for
apparmor, super block labeling, or any triggers for apparmor namespace
parameter modifications on pivot root.
default userspace policy rules have the form of
MOUNT RULE = ( MOUNT | REMOUNT | UMOUNT )
MOUNT = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'mount' [ MOUNT CONDITIONS ] [ SOURCE FILEGLOB ]
[ '->' MOUNTPOINT FILEGLOB ]
REMOUNT = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'remount' [ MOUNT CONDITIONS ]
MOUNTPOINT FILEGLOB
UMOUNT = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'umount' [ MOUNT CONDITIONS ] MOUNTPOINT FILEGLOB
MOUNT CONDITIONS = [ ( 'fstype' | 'vfstype' ) ( '=' | 'in' )
MOUNT FSTYPE EXPRESSION ]
[ 'options' ( '=' | 'in' ) MOUNT FLAGS EXPRESSION ]
MOUNT FSTYPE EXPRESSION = ( MOUNT FSTYPE LIST | MOUNT EXPRESSION )
MOUNT FSTYPE LIST = Comma separated list of valid filesystem and
virtual filesystem types (eg ext4, debugfs, etc)
MOUNT FLAGS EXPRESSION = ( MOUNT FLAGS LIST | MOUNT EXPRESSION )
MOUNT FLAGS LIST = Comma separated list of MOUNT FLAGS.
MOUNT FLAGS = ( 'ro' | 'rw' | 'nosuid' | 'suid' | 'nodev' | 'dev' |
'noexec' | 'exec' | 'sync' | 'async' | 'remount' |
'mand' | 'nomand' | 'dirsync' | 'noatime' | 'atime' |
'nodiratime' | 'diratime' | 'bind' | 'rbind' | 'move' |
'verbose' | 'silent' | 'loud' | 'acl' | 'noacl' |
'unbindable' | 'runbindable' | 'private' | 'rprivate' |
'slave' | 'rslave' | 'shared' | 'rshared' |
'relatime' | 'norelatime' | 'iversion' | 'noiversion' |
'strictatime' | 'nouser' | 'user' )
MOUNT EXPRESSION = ( ALPHANUMERIC | AARE ) ...
PIVOT ROOT RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] pivot_root [ oldroot=OLD PUT FILEGLOB ]
[ NEW ROOT FILEGLOB ]
SOURCE FILEGLOB = FILEGLOB
MOUNTPOINT FILEGLOB = FILEGLOB
eg.
mount,
mount /dev/foo,
mount options=ro /dev/foo -> /mnt/,
mount options in (ro,atime) /dev/foo -> /mnt/,
mount options=ro options=atime,
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
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Add signal mediation where the signal can be mediated based on the
signal, direction, or the label or the peer/target. The signal perms
are verified on a cross check to ensure policy consistency in the case
of incremental policy load/replacement.
The optimization of skipping the cross check when policy is guaranteed
to be consistent (single compile unit) remains to be done.
policy rules have the form of
SIGNAL_RULE = [ QUALIFIERS ] 'signal' [ SIGNAL ACCESS PERMISSIONS ]
[ SIGNAL SET ] [ SIGNAL PEER ]
SIGNAL ACCESS PERMISSIONS = SIGNAL ACCESS | SIGNAL ACCESS LIST
SIGNAL ACCESS LIST = '(' Comma or space separated list of SIGNAL
ACCESS ')'
SIGNAL ACCESS = ( 'r' | 'w' | 'rw' | 'read' | 'write' | 'send' |
'receive' )
SIGNAL SET = 'set' '=' '(' SIGNAL LIST ')'
SIGNAL LIST = Comma or space separated list of SIGNALS
SIGNALS = ( 'hup' | 'int' | 'quit' | 'ill' | 'trap' | 'abrt' |
'bus' | 'fpe' | 'kill' | 'usr1' | 'segv' | 'usr2' |
'pipe' | 'alrm' | 'term' | 'stkflt' | 'chld' | 'cont' |
'stop' | 'stp' | 'ttin' | 'ttou' | 'urg' | 'xcpu' |
'xfsz' | 'vtalrm' | 'prof' | 'winch' | 'io' | 'pwr' |
'sys' | 'emt' | 'exists' | 'rtmin+0' ... 'rtmin+32'
)
SIGNAL PEER = 'peer' '=' AARE
eg.
signal, # allow all signals
signal send set=(hup, kill) peer=foo,
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Seth Arnold <seth.arnold@canonical.com>
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Reported-by: David Binderman <dcb314@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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We accidentally forgot to set the error code on this path. It means we
return NULL instead of an error pointer. I looked through a bunch of
callers and I don't think it really causes a big issue, but the
documentation says we're supposed to return error pointers here.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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verify_header() is currently checking whether interface version is less
than 5 *and* greater than 7, which always evaluates to false. Instead it
should check whether it is less than 5 *or* greater than 7.
Signed-off-by: Christos Gkekas <chris.gekas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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with W=2:
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c: In function ‘unpack_trans_table’:
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:469: warning: declaration of ‘pos’ shadows a previous local
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:451: warning: shadowed declaration is here
Rename the old "pos" to "saved_pos" to fix this.
Fixes: 5379a3312024a8be ("apparmor: support v7 transition format compatible with label_parse")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull more set_fs removal from Al Viro:
"Christoph's 'use kernel_read and friends rather than open-coding
set_fs()' series"
* 'work.set_fs' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs: unexport vfs_readv and vfs_writev
fs: unexport vfs_read and vfs_write
fs: unexport __vfs_read/__vfs_write
lustre: switch to kernel_write
gadget/f_mass_storage: stop messing with the address limit
mconsole: switch to kernel_read
btrfs: switch write_buf to kernel_write
net/9p: switch p9_fd_read to kernel_write
mm/nommu: switch do_mmap_private to kernel_read
serial2002: switch serial2002_tty_write to kernel_{read/write}
fs: make the buf argument to __kernel_write a void pointer
fs: fix kernel_write prototype
fs: fix kernel_read prototype
fs: move kernel_read to fs/read_write.c
fs: move kernel_write to fs/read_write.c
autofs4: switch autofs4_write to __kernel_write
ashmem: switch to ->read_iter
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Make the position an in/out argument like all the other read/write
helpers and and make the buf argument a void pointer.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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Use proper ssize_t and size_t types for the return value and count
argument, move the offset last and make it an in/out argument like
all other read/write helpers, and make the buf argument a void pointer
to get rid of lots of casts in the callers.
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
"A relatively quiet period for SELinux, 11 patches with only two/three
having any substantive changes.
These noteworthy changes include another tweak to the NNP/nosuid
handling, per-file labeling for cgroups, and an object class fix for
AF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets; the rest of the changes are minor tweaks or
administrative updates (Stephen's email update explains the file
explosion in the diffstat).
Everything passes the selinux-testsuite"
[ Also a couple of small patches from the security tree from Tetsuo
Handa for Tomoyo and LSM cleanup. The separation of security policy
updates wasn't all that clean - Linus ]
* tag 'selinux-pr-20170831' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: constify nf_hook_ops
selinux: allow per-file labeling for cgroupfs
lsm_audit: update my email address
selinux: update my email address
MAINTAINERS: update the NetLabel and Labeled Networking information
selinux: use GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC kmem_caches
selinux: Generalize support for NNP/nosuid SELinux domain transitions
selinux: genheaders should fail if too many permissions are defined
selinux: update the selinux info in MAINTAINERS
credits: update Paul Moore's info
selinux: Assign proper class to PF_UNIX/SOCK_RAW sockets
tomoyo: Update URLs in Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/tomoyo.rst
LSM: Remove security_task_create() hook.
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nf_hook_ops are not supposed to change at runtime. nf_register_net_hooks
and nf_unregister_net_hooks are working with const nf_hook_ops.
So mark the non-const nf_hook_ops structs as const.
Signed-off-by: Arvind Yadav <arvind.yadav.cs@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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This patch allows genfscon per-file labeling for cgroupfs. For instance,
this allows to label the "release_agent" file within each
cgroup mount and limit writes to it.
Signed-off-by: Antonio Murdaca <amurdaca@redhat.com>
[PM: subject line and merge tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Update my email address since epoch.ncsc.mil no longer exists.
MAINTAINERS and CREDITS are already correct.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Update my email address since epoch.ncsc.mil no longer exists.
MAINTAINERS and CREDITS are already correct.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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There is a strange __GFP_NOMEMALLOC usage pattern in SELinux,
specifically GFP_ATOMIC | __GFP_NOMEMALLOC which doesn't make much
sense. GFP_ATOMIC on its own allows to access memory reserves while
__GFP_NOMEMALLOC dictates we cannot use memory reserves. Replace this
with the much more sane GFP_NOWAIT in the AVC code as we can tolerate
memory allocation failures in that code.
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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As systemd ramps up enabling NNP (NoNewPrivileges) for system services,
it is increasingly breaking SELinux domain transitions for those services
and their descendants. systemd enables NNP not only for services whose
unit files explicitly specify NoNewPrivileges=yes but also for services
whose unit files specify any of the following options in combination with
running without CAP_SYS_ADMIN (e.g. specifying User= or a
CapabilityBoundingSet= without CAP_SYS_ADMIN): SystemCallFilter=,
SystemCallArchitectures=, RestrictAddressFamilies=, RestrictNamespaces=,
PrivateDevices=, ProtectKernelTunables=, ProtectKernelModules=,
MemoryDenyWriteExecute=, or RestrictRealtime= as per the systemd.exec(5)
man page.
The end result is bad for the security of both SELinux-disabled and
SELinux-enabled systems. Packagers have to turn off these
options in the unit files to preserve SELinux domain transitions. For
users who choose to disable SELinux, this means that they miss out on
at least having the systemd-supported protections. For users who keep
SELinux enabled, they may still be missing out on some protections
because it isn't necessarily guaranteed that the SELinux policy for
that service provides the same protections in all cases.
commit 7b0d0b40cd78 ("selinux: Permit bounded transitions under
NO_NEW_PRIVS or NOSUID.") allowed bounded transitions under NNP in
order to support limited usage for sandboxing programs. However,
defining typebounds for all of the affected service domains
is impractical to implement in policy, since typebounds requires us
to ensure that each domain is allowed everything all of its descendant
domains are allowed, and this has to be repeated for the entire chain
of domain transitions. There is no way to clone all allow rules from
descendants to their ancestors in policy currently, and doing so would
be undesirable even if it were practical, as it requires leaking
permissions to objects and operations into ancestor domains that could
weaken their own security in order to allow them to the descendants
(e.g. if a descendant requires execmem permission, then so do all of
its ancestors; if a descendant requires execute permission to a file,
then so do all of its ancestors; if a descendant requires read to a
symbolic link or temporary file, then so do all of its ancestors...).
SELinux domains are intentionally not hierarchical / bounded in this
manner normally, and making them so would undermine their protections
and least privilege.
We have long had a similar tension with SELinux transitions and nosuid
mounts, albeit not as severe. Users often have had to choose between
retaining nosuid on a mount and allowing SELinux domain transitions on
files within those mounts. This likewise leads to unfortunate tradeoffs
in security.
Decouple NNP/nosuid from SELinux transitions, so that we don't have to
make a choice between them. Introduce a nnp_nosuid_transition policy
capability that enables transitions under NNP/nosuid to be based on
a permission (nnp_transition for NNP; nosuid_transition for nosuid)
between the old and new contexts in addition to the current support
for bounded transitions. Domain transitions can then be allowed in
policy without requiring the parent to be a strict superset of all of
its children.
With this change, systemd unit files can be left unmodified from upstream.
SELinux-disabled and SELinux-enabled users will benefit from retaining any
of the systemd-provided protections. SELinux policy will only need to
be adapted to enable the new policy capability and to allow the
new permissions between domain pairs as appropriate.
NB: Allowing nnp_transition between two contexts opens up the potential
for the old context to subvert the new context by installing seccomp
filters before the execve. Allowing nosuid_transition between two contexts
opens up the potential for a context transition to occur on a file from
an untrusted filesystem (e.g. removable media or remote filesystem). Use
with care.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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For PF_UNIX, SOCK_RAW is synonymous with SOCK_DGRAM (cf.
net/unix/af_unix.c). This is a tad obscure, but libpcap uses it.
Signed-off-by: Luis Ressel <aranea@aixah.de>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Since commit a79be238600d1a03 ("selinux: Use task_alloc hook rather than
task_create hook") changed to use task_alloc hook, task_create hook is
no longer used.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
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